Mr Fred Barker, Mr Clive Bates, Dr Joe McHugh and Dr Clive Williams

19 FEBRUARY 2007

  Q240  Lord Howie of Troon: I presume from that that you would not expect the matter to be cleared up at the beginning but that you would expect to see a step-by-step process, and negotiation and discussion from then on, hoping to reach some kind of agreement in the end?

  Mr Barker: Yes.

  Q241  Lord Jenkin of Roding: Has the Scottish NuLeAF a name yet?

  Mr Barker: Certainly not one as snappy as our own. I do not think it has cracked the acronym problem at this stage.

  Q242  Lord Flowers: On the basis of a unanimous statement by security experts, which included the Assistant Director of the OCNS, the CoRWM report raised specific concerns regarding the security of interim storage sites and the vulnerability of such sites to potential terrorist attacks. Are you aware of any significant initiatives that address these concerns? It is, of course, a global problem rather than a purely local one.

  Mr McHugh: That is a question which would probably be best asked of OCNS directly. Our understanding of the civil nuclear security regulator's position is that they feel that deep geological disposal is the most secure solution for the long term for radioactive wastes and in the meantime the wastes need to be properly treated and conditioned so that they are absolutely safe.

  Q243  Lord Flowers: But this stuff is going to be around for 50 years.

  Mr McHugh: Absolutely, and in the meantime the civil nuclear security regulator is ensuring that it is secure on nuclear sites. If you want to know the details of that I think you would be best asking OCNS directly. I know they have given evidence to select committees. It is a sensitive area in view of the measures which would need to be in place but I know they have provided evidence previously to select committees.

  Q244  Chairman: Mr Barker, you were on the CoRWM working group, were you not, which looked at this issue? Would you like to comment also?

  Mr Barker: The direct answer to the question is that I am not aware of any major developments since we had that session within CoRWM, but from NuLeAF's point of view we know that the NDA is committed to undertaking a review of interim storage arrangements and that security is one of the criteria it will use to evaluate options for future interim storage. We would expect the NDA to be able to explain how it has applied that security criterion and what impact it has had on its evaluation, obviously within the constraints of being able to provide information about security matters.

  Q245  Lord Flowers: One wants to generate public confidence in the whole nuclear business, but especially at the moment in the handling of wastes. In order to do that one has to have as much transparency as possible about the whole process, including security arrangements. Of course, you do not give the details of operational arrangements but we asked the same question of Sir Anthony Cleaver when he was here and he more or less shuffled it off and said, "that is not my concern. It is somebody else's", but he has now supplied us with a couple of pages of information which, without going into operational details, very properly, give a pretty clear, open, to be published by us, discussion of what the security arrangements are, and that, I think, will be very informative to a lot of people who are very concerned about the risk. Do you not think this should be the general approach on security arrangements?

  Mr Barker: Yes, NuLeAF would very much support that perspective and although, as you say, it is not possible to give operational details, it certainly is possible to talk about the process by which confidence in security arrangements might be gained. I made reference to the NDA review of interim storage. Security will be a consideration in that and I think it should be possible to explain how it has been a consideration in that review on interim storage options.

  Chairman: Lord Flowers referred to that helpful supplementary evidence we had from Sir Anthony Cleaver. One of the questions we asked him originally was whether the NDA had relationships on security matters with its counterparts overseas, and his answer, perhaps rather surprisingly, was, "No, and that is because the NDA is, as far as I know, the only organisation of its kind worldwide". Does that answer surprise you, as it did me?

  Q246  Lord Flowers: Yes, me too.

  Mr McHugh: There are other bodies. For example, in the US the Department of Energy is charged with clearing up its defence nuclear legacy and although I am not saying the NDA has modelled itself on the US Department of Energy it has certainly taken note of the US arrangements.

  Q247  Lord Flowers: The chief security consideration is, what is the threat?

  Mr McHugh: Indeed.

  Lord Flowers: You do not have to go to a similar organisation abroad to ask that question. You can go to a whole variety of institutions, the CIA and heaven knows what.

  Chairman: We have come to the end of our questions. I realise that we have impinged on your time to a great extent but it has been a very interesting morning for us and thank you very much for all the help you have given us. If there are any follow-up points you felt you did not have enough time to cover and would like to elaborate on, and I know I was trying to push things on near the end, do please send a note in to the Clerk. Thank you again for your help this morning.