Nuclear Security
3.30. Nuclear security in the United Kingdom
is regulated by the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS),
which is now part of the HSE Nuclear Directorate.
3.31. The CoRWM report raised concerns about
the interim storage of radioactive waste and its vulnerability
to potential terrorist attacks. During one of its specialist workshops
on nuclear security, security expertsa group which included
the Assistant Director of the OCNS, John Reynoldsrecorded
their "unanimous opinion that greater attention should be
given to the current management of radioactive waste held in the
UK, in the context of its vulnerability to potential terrorist
attacks". Furthermore, the experts were "not aware of
any UK Government programme that is addressing this issue with
adequate detail or priority".[33]
3.32. We pursued this issue with both the NDA
and the Government. We were surprised at first to hear that the
NDA considers security to be a matter solely for the OCNS (QQ
83, 85). However, in a supplementary memorandum, Sir Anthony Cleaver
informed us that "all nuclear licensed sites, including those
owned by the NDA, are required by the Nuclear Industries Security
Regulations 2003 (NISR 03) to produce a site security plan, to
submit this for approval to the Office of Civil Nuclear Security
(OCNS) (the independent civil regulator) and to take all measures
necessary to comply with that plan" (p 22).
3.33. We were also reassured by the Minister
that "current security measures are robust" but that
"it is best not to go into great detail in publishing security
plans" (QQ 163, 166).
3.34. We agree that it would not be desirable
to publish operational detail regarding the specific security
arrangements at nuclear sites but we would endorse Fred Barker's
comments that it would be "possible to talk about the process
by which competent security arrangements might be gained"
(Q 245). Furthermore, the supplementary memoranda from both
the NDA and the Government reveal that some of the information
relating to nuclear security is very much in the public domain
(pp 22, 41).
3.35. The Government must engage in a much
more open dialogue with local communities and other stakeholders
regarding the risks presented by current temporary storage and
the steps taken to address them. We therefore recommend that the
Government review the amount and level of detail of information
on nuclear security that is made available to stakeholders or
published. Security arrangements form an integral part of the
implementation programme and information on their nature should
be readily available.
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