99.  We put on record our regret that the German Presidency should have been unwilling to discuss with the Committee of a national Parliament an initiative to which we, like them, attach great importance. (paragraph 4)

100.  We believe that for seven Member States to enter into an agreement including first pillar matters falling squarely within EC competence may have breached the letter, and certainly breached the spirit, of Article 10 of the EC Treaty. (paragraph 22)

101.  In the space of a year four ministers told us that the question of accession to Prüm was under "close", "active" and "serious" consideration. We do not understand why it should have taken so long for the Government to conclude that there was at least one provision of the Treaty to which the United Kingdom could not agree. (paragraph 28)

102.  The threshold for holding DNA profiles on the United Kingdom DNA database is far lower than in any other Member State, and the proportion of the population on the database correspondingly far higher. The Government should as a matter of urgency examine the implications of DNA exchanges for those on the United Kingdom database. (paragraph 42)

103.  Law enforcement authorities in all the Member States must be provided with the same clear guidance and training which will enable them to operate the new laws responsibly in the fight against crime. (paragraph 53)

104.  It is understandable that a State which holds the Presidency should wish to make use of that opportunity to further legislative proposals which it is particularly anxious to see implemented. This should not however be seen as a reason for cutting short full consideration by all the Member States. The timetable for initiatives by Member States should be the same as for Commission proposals. (paragraph 57)

105.  We congratulate the Government on having successfully insisted on the removal from the Prüm Decision of a general provision which would allow designated officers and officials of one Member State to enter the territory of another Member State without prior permission. (paragraph 65)

106.  Since unanimity is needed for the adoption of the Prüm Decision this shows that, given the will, the Government should be able to secure agreement on other matters which need to be settled before the Decision can be adopted. (paragraph 66)

107.  If and when the Prüm Decision is agreed, any matters in the Framework Decision on the principle of availability which have not been adequately dealt with must continue to be the subject of negotiation. (paragraph 71)

108.  There should be a convention that any legislative proposals by Member States should, like Commission proposals, be accompanied by full explanatory memoranda and regulatory impact assessments. (paragraph 73)

109.  Member States which are asked to consider an initiative by some of their number should normally decline to do so unless and until they have been supplied with a full explanatory memorandum covering in particular the estimated cost of the initiative. (paragraph 74)

110.  The Government should not allow the Prüm Decision to be incorporated into EU law unless and until there is available a reliable estimate of the start-up cost and the running costs of doing so, and then only if they believe that the benefits to the United Kingdom of implementing the Decision justify these costs. (paragraph 78)

111.  The Government should insist on the inclusion in the Prüm Decision of provisions to ensure that its operation is properly monitored. What is required is at the very least:

• an obligation on national agencies to produce annual reports, including statistics, on the use of their powers under the Decision; and

• an obligation on the Commission to produce an overall evaluation of the operation of the Decision, for submission to the Council, the European Parliament and national parliaments, to see whether it needs amendment. (paragraph 80)

112.  There should be a requirement that Member States putting forward initiatives with data protection implications should consult the European Data Protection Supervisor. (paragraph 81)

113.  We share the view of the Commission that negotiations on the Data Protection Framework Decision, instead of being sidelined, should proceed in parallel with those on the Prüm Decision. (paragraph 90)

114.  The Government should seize the opportunity to stipulate that they will agree to the Prüm Decision only if other Member States, led by the German Presidency, simultaneously agree to a Framework Decision setting high standards for the protection of data across the third pillar. (paragraph 91)

115.  If the Presidency wishes other Member States to accept its own views on the exchange of information, it must be prepared to listen to views on how that information is to be safeguarded, and to act on those views. (paragraph 92)

116.  The Government should strongly resist any suggestion that agreement on a statement of general principles on data protection would be an adequate quid pro quo for the adoption of the Prüm Decision. (paragraph 95)

117.  The Government should try to ensure that United Kingdom data protection standards are replicated across the EU. The only way to achieve this is to adopt for all third pillar measures a Framework Decision which will guarantee those standards for the protection of personal data in all Member States. (paragraph 97)

118.  We believe that, given the need for unanimity, the negotiations on the Prüm Decision provide an unrivalled opportunity for adopting a data protection regime at the same time as the legislation facilitating data exchange is adopted. (paragraph 98)

119.  We recommend this report to the House for debate. (paragraph 5)