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The really bald point is whether this country can afford nuclear deterrence considering what we are likely to get out of it. A successor to Trident, tied to the existing submarine-launched missile system, would cost at least £25 billion, judging from some of the estimate over-runs on various projects, and probably even more. That is a vast amount over 30 years, which our defence budget—now under immense pressure, already revealing massive funding gaps, particularly in the crunch period 2011-20—could not possibly cope with, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, with all his experience, has said. It would simultaneously have to provide the many things likely to be required and used in the defence field, as the Prime Minister has said.
After the most careful thought, if the British deterrent comes to be seen more as a status symbol like an American Express gold or platinum card, rather than a serious military weapon of war adding to our Armed Forces’ effectiveness, even for hard battle—the Prime Minister’s phrase, not mine, but one to which I thoroughly subscribe—and enhancing the security of our nation, £25 billion would be a great deal to pay for something so nebulous and doubtful. I can imagine the Treasury’s reaction if the argument “You never know what lies around the corner” was used to justify the proper size and shape for our conventional forces, which history has shown are always on call in the national interest.
Therefore there must be a strong, perhaps over-riding case for the Government to continue to review such an important decision carefully, unemotionally, and taking into account changes in the international scene and in technological developments, even if this means delaying the decision. Before putting firm recommendations to Parliament, they should look first at other non-nuclear and sub-strategic options for our armoury with a far greater utility factor—cruise missiles in some form might be one option—which would still enhance both the deterrent power and the effectiveness of our Armed Forces. The aim at all times would be to achieve a greater flexibility in utility and selectivity of targeting than an exclusively megatonne nuclear solution can possibly provide, and at far less cost.
Before Parliament is asked to endorse any Trident replacement, it should be made aware not only of the realistic costs—I stress realistic—but of how these costs are to be met and, if it is to be out of our defence vote, which is almost certainly going to be the case, of what compensating savings would have to be made to accommodate that replacement. If not, an assessment of the value and impact of such a decision would be incomplete.
My final devil’s advocate question, although one which I hope noble Lords will feel is worthy of serious consideration, is: would this country not be better off morally and militarily without a new nuclear weapons system?
5.51 pm
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. I do so with some trepidation. His extensive
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My noble friend Lord O’Neill pointed out that our Labour Government were elected on a manifesto to renew and retain our independent deterrent. We would certainly be criticised extensively if we did not fulfil our manifesto commitments. The Labour Party, of which some Liberal Democrats used to be members, has been committed for almost all its existence to an independent deterrent. I say to my noble friend Lord Judd and to my noble and learned friend Lord Archer of Sandwell, for both of whom I have great respect, that we need to bear that point in mind.
Notwithstanding that commitment in the manifesto, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester so generously said, this Government are involved in the widest possible consultation. Indeed, it is unprecedented consultation. First, the Government reviewed all of the options that have been discussed today. Then, having reviewed them, they put forward this White Paper as a basis for consultation, for public debate as well as parliamentary debate. We are having this debate here, there will be one in the Commons, and the Commons will be voting on this issue. I say to those who criticise the Prime Minister—I say this particularly to the Liberal Democrat Front Bench who cannot resist a pop at the Prime Minister; there seems to be some obsession—that he needs to be given some credit for the consultation process. We had a Commons vote on Iraq as well.
I feel very strongly that in this decision, as with global warming, we need to think in the very long term rather than the short term, in decades rather than years. Our generation—and we are mostly of the same generation—has enjoyed the advantages of the protection of the independent deterrent. We have seen peace in Europe in almost all of my lifetime. As for the timescale of the decision, I think everyone has accepted that, with perhaps the question of a year or two here or there, it will take a long time for these decisions to be implemented and most of us agree they have to be taken now. If we do not take the decision on submarines, we are in danger of depriving our children and our grandchildren of the kind of protection that we have enjoyed. They may face circumstances that we cannot foresee in which other powers threaten this country. I ask noble Lords to bear that in mind. We have had the protection and we should not deprive our children and our grandchildren of it.
The Liberal Democrats argue that we should delay the decision. I shall not describe this as the usual fence sitting by the Liberal Democrats. The White Paper makes a powerful case that a clear decision has to be made. In all conscience, it is a difficult decision—my noble friend Lord O'Neill argues that it is a popular one—and it may even be unpopular. Do Governments voluntarily bring forward difficult decisions—decisions that may not be the most popular—and suggest that it is merely part of the Prime Minister's legacy? Again, that is the Liberal Democrats indulging in their obsession.
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Some argue, as has been argued today, that nuclear weapons are immoral. No weapon is moral or immoral in itself. It depends on the motivation for possessing such a weapon and the uses to which it is or may be put. That applies to every weapon. If peace can best be maintained by the possession of and the threat to use a weapon, surely that is a positive argument in its favour. The choice in this case, as in many cases, is between the lesser of two evils. Some argue that as the Cold War is over, this deterrent is not needed because the threats now come from rogue states or from terrorists. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, argued that. To deal with that, the Government are improving and extending our counterinsurgency forces and we are strengthening our security and intelligence services. So we are dealing separately with that threat, but the nuclear capability is designed to meet other potential threats, just as tanks, aircraft carriers and our other capabilities have other purposes as well.
We face a threat from nuclear or near-nuclear states at the moment and from others that may acquire nuclear weapons in the next few decades. We need to be prepared for that. Perhaps we need an insurance policy—sometimes insurance policies are wise things to have. Some argue, notably the Scottish National Party, that we should be non-nuclear, like Sweden or Norway. Those illustrations are used again and again. That is a naive comparison because we have a totally different history and background from the Scandinavian countries and from other countries. Whether we like it or not, there is a current enmity towards the United Kingdom from some of the nearby nuclear regimes because Britain has stood side-by-side with the United States on the international stage. We must accept, therefore, that we are more vulnerable to attack.
It is said by some—the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said it today—that the plan goes against the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The Minister dealt with that in relation to the reduction in warheads by 20 per cent, having reduced them already by 30 per cent—a total of 50 per cent—and the reduction of the number of submarines. That commitment to nuclear non-proliferation should be acknowledged.
Unilateralists also argue—this point was made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, acting as the devil's advocate although, at times, he almost sounded like the devil himself—that if we make this bold move of nuclear disarmament, others will follow. Where is the evidence to support that? Who will follow? I ask those who argue that to name any country that will follow our bold example. I doubt that any will be forthcoming.
It is also suggested that possession is illegal, but there are no rulings of the International Court of Justice. The South Americans took the question to the ICJ, but there was no ruling about the illegality of possession of these weapons. Strangely enough, the only legal ruling was in the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland where the Faslane protestors took the issue. There was a clear ruling that the possession of such weapons was not illegal.
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Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, my noble friend said that there is no legal ruling on the matter. Has he read the opinion of the International Court of Justice, which is quite substantial?
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, I have read it, and I have also read the submissions to the International Court of Justice. My understanding is that the court accepted arguments for and against. My noble and learned friend will be speaking later and he will, no doubt, quote directly from the ruling if he is able to contradict me. I believe that what I said is correct.
Lord Bramall: My Lords, I did not suggest that it is illegal to have nuclear weapons. We have them quite legitimately. I plead guilty to the first thing the noble Lord accused me of, but not the second.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, I accept the first plea and agree with the noble and gallant Lord on the second point. I was referring only to his comment that people will follow our example, not to the question of illegality. I had moved on from that.
Some people, including a number of noble Lords today—including, astonishingly, the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton—argue that the money is better spent elsewhere; schools and hospitals are always cited. I shall make two points in relation to that suggestion. First, a Government’s first duty is to protect its citizens so children can go to school safely and people can go to hospital safely. Secondly, we are still spending more money on schools, hospitals and international development. Incidentally, international development makes it less likely that we will need to spend so much money on defence in future.
No one who has argued the case on this side has mentioned jobs. The jobs provided in the United Kingdom to support the nuclear deterrent are incidental to the argument, but they are not incidental to the people who work in the industry and support it with great commitment.
Some people argue that we should shelter under the US nuclear umbrella. We have heard that today, astonishingly from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench. It is astonishing that the same people who argue that we should hide under the protection of the American umbrella are those who have criticised our relationship with the United States, the special relationship and the way we work so closely with the US.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire: My Lords, I think the noble Lord misunderstood me. I was merely pointing out that if one does take the position, which I think the noble Lord does, that we should be as close as possible to the United States, that weakens the argument for an independent deterrent.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock: My Lords, I accept that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, makes that argument. Perhaps I have heard the other argument from some
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I notice that time is moving on. We have a responsibility to future generations. We have been protected throughout our lives by the independent deterrent. All the arguments support renewal, and I hope that the Government will listen to the debate and to the arguments that I and others have put forward today.
6.05 pm
Lord Powell of Bayswater: My Lords, I draw attention to my declaration of interests in the register. I support the case made in the White Paper for modernising our nuclear deterrent. Indeed, I regard it as self-evident. My reservations, which I shall come on to, relate to the number of warheads and submarines. In essence, I do not believe we can have fewer than four submarines to enable one to be on patrol at all times, and I have some concern that the Government may be preparing an escape route on that.
Before coming to those issues, I shall make a few general observations. First, on the non-proliferation treaty, about which the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, spoke eloquently, it is a major objective to make it more effective. However, as we heard, Britain has set a good example by greatly reducing the size of its nuclear deterrent force. Other countries have greatly reduced their stocks of nuclear warheads, although more could certainly be done. I do not think it would be right to say that modernising an existing nuclear deterrent by one of the countries that was recognised to be in a special position by the NPT sets a bad example, especially not if one effect of that modernisation is to make the nuclear weapons safer and, possibly, less indiscriminate.
I note that there are people—indeed, one is sitting very close to me, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall—who argue that we would never be prepared to use our nuclear deterrent, even in extremis. That fails to understand the resolve of our prime ministers to make choices with huge consequences, and I make that comment based on very close-quarters observation of some of them.
Some noble Lords have argued that we face a new breed of enemy who is impervious to the threat of nuclear retaliation. That ignores the experience of the first Gulf War when the late Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction but did not use them because he was told very explicitly indeed what the consequences of using them would be. In that case, deterrence certainly worked. Even the baddest of enemies—and we are likely to face some very bad and nuclear-armed enemies in future—have a well developed sense of self-preservation. They are much less likely to use nuclear weapons or pass them on as proxies to terrorists if the price of that is retaliation. Only nuclear weapons deter the use of nuclear weapons; nothing else does.
The nuclear threat is not as clear and present a danger just now as it was at the height of the Cold War, but we are not talking about “just now”; we are
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I do not entirely shy away from arguing that we should also preserve the deterrent for reasons of status, although, of course, the primary arguments are all military. Our status is earned by our contribution to preserving peace and stability, which gives us the influence to pursue wider British objectives and interests. We are more influential, in particular, on national security issues, than several comparable G8 countries, such as Germany, because we are more willing and able to make an effective military contribution in times of crisis and our nuclear deterrent guarantees that we shall continue to be able to do that whatever threats face us.
Turning to the choice of system, I am sure that the Government have made the right choice in sticking to Trident for the same reasons that guided the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, to choose it in the first place. A submarine-based system provides the most effective form of deterrence with the smallest footprint. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said about cruise missiles. First, I hope that he is wrong that the Ministry of Defence failed to examine carefully and in detail the case for cruise missiles. Not to have done so would be extremely unprofessional, and I would be most reluctant to believe that of the Ministry of Defence, as I know it.
Secondly, I think that there are genuine question marks over the range and capability of cruise missiles. Perhaps I am old fashioned, but I still believe that there is something in the old maxim of preferring to stick with nurse for fear of something worse. Sticking to the Trident system may turn out to be the best course.
It has also been suggested that the lifetime of the existing force could be considerably extended. In recalling past alarms about cracks appearing in our nuclear submarines and the need to withdraw them from service for extended periods, I rather doubt that some of the wilder claims made for extending the life of our submarine force could ever be justified.
I disagree with those who argue that the money spent on our nuclear deterrent could more cost-effectively be invested in conventional forces. We do
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My final point is to urge the Government to remain firm in their resolve to maintain adequate numbers of warheads and submarines. I find the White Paper less than wholly reassuring on that point. We already maintain only a minimum deterrent, in line with our goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons overall. But you cannot have your disarmament cake and eat it. Given the range of threats, which the White Paper rightly identifies, the head room for further reductions in the number of warheads simply does not exist. I am also deeply sceptical whether it is possible to build the sort of submarines needed to ensure that one is on patrol at all times if we have only three in total. We must be able to meet the operational and targeting requirements of keeping our deterrent credible. It would be a false economy to save millions if that makes the expenditure of billions on a deterrent system ineffective.
I hope very much that the Government will not weaken in their commitment to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence by building the number of boats required to achieve that and that there will not be pressure to abandon that position either by Treasury cheese-paring or by a need to appease those who oppose our nuclear deterrent altogether.
6.12 pm
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer: My Lords, last year there was a tremendous consensus among the political parties, the Government and scientists that the greatest threat to the security of our country was climate change. I want to look at some of the arguments about the renewal of an independent nuclear deterrent in the context of climate change.
I am an unashamed unilateralist. I do not want to go into the ethics of the argument this afternoon, as that debate has not changed over the past 30 years, although the context has. Climate change will bring unknown consequences. Scientists are unable to model exactly where we are going with climate change, and social scientists cannot model what the consequences will be. Among the possible effects that they have outlined are mass migration, resource shortages, especially of food and water, and an atmosphere of great instability and vulnerability. In such an atmosphere, it could be argued, it would be important to have an independent nuclear deterrent to deter people from encroaching on our resources. But, can we really envisage a situation where we would launch an attack on people, for example refugees, threatening to overwhelm us?
I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester that there has not been a debate about the morals of when we would use such a weapon in this context. Nor is it likely that a country which wanted to acquire our land and water resources
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A number of noble Lords have pointed to the need for resources to go into conventional military weapons and other areas of demand such as schools and hospitals. As long ago as 1995, the opinion of quite a body of leading economists was brought together in a book called Economists and the Environment. Their opinion, even then, was that it made far more sense to spend less on weapons and more on the environment.
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