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Kosovo
6.39 pm
rose to ask Her Majesty’s Government what proposals they have for the future status of Kosovo.
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The noble Lord said: My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to open this short debate on Kosovo. It is timely because the status problem is likely to be resolved shortly, and it is important that your Lordships should be able to express views before that decision is published. Perhaps the Minister will confirm the expected timetable. We know that Martti Ahtisaari, the UN special envoy, has delayed his report until after the elections in Serbia on 21 January. His proposals are then likely to be passed to Pristina and to Belgrade in February, and to be published in March. The EU Commission has already given its views on the importance of the decision in its annual report, which was published on 8 November. In addition, the text of the Council’s joint action on the establishment of the EU preparatory team has declared that the EU has a vital interest in a positive result of this process and stands ready to enhance its role in Kosovo following the status settlement.
Technically, of course, Kosovo is now part of Serbia and therefore regularised by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, but it is in legal limbo and, in practice, a UN protectorate, which leads to intense frustration among the Albanian majority. The EU report states that the status issue has dominated Kosovo politics and has deflected Kosovo from necessary internal reforms. It points out some areas of improvement, such as strengthening the Assembly’s role and establishing new institutions, but its overall tone is very negative. In particular, it highlights a lack of, or inadequate, progress in key political and economic fields, and points out that unemployment remains high and that more needs to be done in fields such as organised crime, the trafficking of human beings, and drugs. Otherwise, as optimists might say, it is a highly favourable report. It is sad to reflect that the imminence of the decision on status has been known for some time but that it did not stimulate greater effort to make progress in Kosovo.
It might be helpful to look at Kosovo in its regional and historical context. The prospect of EU membership is a major positive factor for the west Balkans as a whole. The EU correctly recognises that much of the solution lies in boosting regional co-operation and integration and in reducing the existing barriers to intra-regional trade. Yet we know that we face enlargement fatigue and that the question of absorption capacity lies like a cloud over the whole region, even over Croatia.
There is also some evidence of recent backsliding in the region. There is strain in Macedonia, for example, following the July elections, which some see as a threat to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. And a year after candidate status was accorded to Macedonia last December under the UK presidency, the EU has still not decided to begin accession negotiations. Then there was the October election of Silajdzic for the Bosniak presidential seat in Sarajevo, mounting extremism in Bosnia, and the Serbian referendum on 30 October, which included a clause declaring Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia.
What of Kosovo itself? Obviously we need to place Kosovo in the context of the negative legacy of the former Yugoslavia. It was the poorest province of
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On my several visits to Kosovo I have noted a lack of community spirit which includes lack of indigenous NGOs, crime, violence, and alas a dependency culture. Of the population of 2.473 million, 60 per cent are unemployed and 55 per cent are under the age of 30. The average age of the Albanians is 28 and of the Serbs 54. A recent study by two former members of UNMIK argued that the UN had been insufficiently robust in tackling what they call the “thugocracy”. They state that,
- “most Albanians who took up arms to challenge Serbian oppression did not object to one ethnic group bullying all the others; they simply wanted their ethnic group to be the one on top”.
However, the inventiveness and enterprise of the Kosovars from 1989 to 1999—the university is an example—shows that they are capable of enterprise even if they have shown little capacity for it since the war.
It is small wonder that Martti Ahtisaari appears to have concluded on the basis of his experiences since February that an internal consensus is not available and that an imposed solution is inevitable. Commentators fear riots by one side or the other when the proposals are published. There is of course much combustible material from the past, but we cannot ignore the reality that 90 per cent-plus of the population have a fixed determination for independence. Equally, they cannot be given a blank cheque. The result is likely to be a unique formula—independence, but with strong conditionalities, including protection of minority rights and substantial decentralisation to Serbian municipalities.
It has been a bad year for Serbia, which has lost Montenegro and is about to lose Kosovo. It has a victim complex, conveniently forgetting the responsibility of Milosevic for its troubles and simply refusing to recognise current realities, as the referendum showed. But the international community should be sensitive to the legitimate concerns of a proud country and should do nothing to humiliate it. There is recent evidence that the international community has recognised this, including the decision on 20 November at the Riga summit of NATO. I also think of the European Union opening visa facilitation negotiations on 30 November, which it hopes to conclude by the end of next year. It is all part of what has been called an EU charm offensive. There must have been strong international guarantees of minority rights with sanctions for any infringement. Again, Javier Solana has undertaken to review, after the Serb elections in January, the reopening of SAA negotiations, which were suspended in May. Clearly, the European Union hopes that this will encourage a moderate outcome of those elections.
There is also a major challenge to Kosovo to act responsibly. It is fair to say that Prime Minister Ceku has taken a limited number of initiatives on national reconciliation, but the immediate prospect is difficult.
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Russia is now in a more assertive mood and may well see independence as a negative precedent for Chechnya and could well seek to make trouble in the frozen conflicts in Georgia—in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—and in Moldova in relation to Transnistria. China’s response may be influenced by Taiwan and Tibet. Even though the West argues that Kosovo is unique, Russia and China may demand a price if they do not veto. Even if the Security Council, as expected, issues a mandate for the European Union, over time more countries will recognise Kosovo’s independence, whatever the Russian and Chinese position.
I end with a series of questions to my noble friend. What are the current assumptions of his department about the response of Russia and China at the Security Council? What safeguards does he expect, apart from minority rights? Does he anticipate a continuing role from NATO even if there is an ESDP mission? I am of course aware that the GAERC at its meeting today and tomorrow will consider a proposed council joint action to extend the mandate of the EU planning team. Is my noble friend confident, however, that the European Union has fully recognised the scale of the task that awaits it in Kosovo and is making the necessary budget amendments?
The International Organisation for Migration, IOM, has stated that trafficking in women and girls is now the third source of income, after arms and drugs, for the Albanian mafia network. Will he undertake to ensure that the problem of human trafficking is given high priority in any negotiations? What steps are proposed to tackle the problem of the 300,000 illegally held small arms in Kosovo that Saferworld reports are held there? Finally, and perhaps most importantly of these questions, what specific contribution will the UK make in finance and technical assistance?
I have one final reflection. I posed the question of what is our interest and that of our European Union partners. The answer is surely a Kosovo that is as stable as can be managed during and after the transition period, with a clear perspective of eventual membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Bluntly, if we do not go to them and help them manage the transition, they will come to us in the shape of refugees, illegal immigrants, organised crime, drug barons and human traffickers. Kosovo will ultimately be independent politically, with no conditions, if—and, given all its problems, perhaps this is a big “if”—it meets the relevant EU criteria. Then, and only then, it should be welcomed as a full member of our European family.
6.52 pm
Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon: My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea. He and I have stood together on many occasions and on all of them, I think, we have stood on the same side on crucial foreign policy issues. I followed his perceptive speech with a good deal of interest and agreement, and I shall touch on some of the matters that he did.
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I cannot quite agree with the noble Lord that the October elections in Bosnia produced a more nationalist outcome. In fact, all the nationalist parties were weaker at the end of those elections than at the beginning. I do not think that Haris Silajdzic is any more nationalist than the Bosniak whom he removed in the elections.
I have kept quiet on the Balkans since I left there at the end of January because I believe that, when you leave the stage, you leave the stage, and I wanted to let some time go by. However, time and events now persuade me to say one or two words about an increasingly troublesome situation in the western Balkans. I fear that I shall be critical of the international community, but that criticism does not extend to the policies of Her Majesty’s Government, which are correct, robust and well targeted; I suspect that what has happened recently in the Balkans is despite them, rather than because of them. I pay particular tribute to the Government’s ambassadors on the ground in the western Balkans, especially the remarkable and extremely able Matthew Rycroft in Sarajevo.
I fear that I cannot be so complimentary or encouraging about the recent policies of the international community in the Balkans. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is correct: things have gone backwards in the past year or so. I find the situation at present extremely troublesome. There are brighter signs: Macedonia, despite the election, seems to be moving forward gently, and Albania continues to surprise us by its progress. However, I deeply regret that the international community has allowed the remarkable progress made over the past years in Bosnia and Herzegovina—not during my time alone, but before that—to be checked. In my view, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has now moved into reverse.
Maybe all this is because it is election year or because Governments still have to be formed. Elections were held in October and I do not suppose that the Governments will be formed until February, if the past is anything to go by. But I fear that it is more than that. I am especially disturbed that Republika Srpska has been allowed again to behave in a fashion by which it seems to indicate that it thinks of itself not as part of a state but as a state itself. It has gone backwards on the agreements made to transfer powers to the state level in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It has reneged on the agreements that it made about police reform. It has been allowed to threaten referenda, which is deeply irresponsible in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially as they have been proposed contrary to Dayton. It has been allowed to begin to open representation in capital cities abroad, and allowed—even encouraged—by Belgrade to entertain the idea that a resolution in Kosovo would need some change in the status of Republika Srpska and the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Meanwhile, it seems that the Serbs in Belgrade have decided once again that the way to the future is back to the past. The Serbs are a great and remarkable people, for whom I have admiration and respect; nevertheless, from time to time, they love to believe that it is Serbs against the world. I fear that that is happening. I fear that the elections on 21 January will see a shift to the right and a rise in the power of Seselj’s party.
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Against this, we must view the situation in Kosovo. Here I fear that we made a mistake right at the start. There is a rule about peacemaking—if the international community, together with the local community, can form a common project that they can seek to achieve together, they can move things forward. But I regret that in 1999 we left a vacuum where the answer to the only question that anybody wanted to ask—what is the status of Kosovo?—should have lain. One thing was plain and obvious—whatever else happened, Kosovo could not again be governed by Belgrade. But we would not admit that. I cannot imagine why.
By their actions in Kosovo, the Serbs lost the moral right to govern a province in which they had only 5 per cent of the population. But our incapacity to tell Kosovo at least that it would not be governed by Belgrade did two things: it enabled the nationalists in Belgrade to play the issue for votes and it enabled the destructive forces in Kosovo to fill the vacuum that we would not fill with an answer by seeking to provide the answer themselves, usually by force or the threat of force.
We must address the issue that we should have addressed in 1999. This is not the benefit of hindsight. With Senator Joe Biden, I wrote a paper in 1999 for both our Governments, recommending that we should at least recognise that Kosovo would never again be governed by Belgrade; we argued that to allow Belgrade the illusion that that might be so and to allow Kosovo the opportunity to doubt our intentions on this matter would only damage the prospects of making peace there. That is what has happened.
We proposed at the time that some tests should be set for Kosovo. When it had reached those attributes that a state can fulfil—good relations with its neighbours, proper protection of human rights, protection of property—we might entertain its claim for statehood. In 1999, we proposed what later became known as “standards before status”, but by then it was too late because the malevolent forces had already gathered and both sides, in Kosovo and Belgrade, had begun to grip the situation that we had failed to grip. So now we must return to this question.
I heartily congratulate Martti Ahtisaari, whose patient, sagacious and determined diplomacy has produced a set of proposals, the outline of which is visible to all. What is proposed is strong decentralisation, strong protection for minority rights—in this case, the Serbs—and a form of independence under international tutelage. I think that that is the right solution. However, it was not right that the international community, faced with the Ahtisaari proposals—he has now finished his work and there is nothing further that he can do—decided yet again to delay. I cannot imagine why. I suppose that it was in the mistaken belief that, somehow or other, delaying until 21 January might save us from a backlash from the right in Serbia. It will not. It is almost never right in the Balkans to delay or to appease. We have simply allowed the nationalist forces to gather around behind the delusion that Kosovo might have some status in the future other than ultimate independence. That has been extremely damaging.
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I hope that delay will not continue. It does nobody any good. The Ahtisaari proposals are there. We all know that the Russians are opposed to them and that some new members of the European Union will follow the old, historic pro-Belgrade policy in whatever circumstances, but this is a nettle that must be grasped. I hope that we will have the Serb elections on 21 January, and on 22 January we will announce what the Ahtisaari proposals will be. Belgrade will want to delay again. It will say, “Hang on, let’s wait until we have formed a Government, months down the track”. The Belgrade policy is very clear. It wants to provoke the Kosovo Albanians into a strong reaction—one of force, disturbance and instability. That is Belgrade’s game and we should not be playing it.
I suspect that the Government share that view, although they have probably not been able to say so. I suspect that the Government did not want NATO to abandon conditionality on Karadzic and Mladic, but we were forced to do so because of a sudden and unexpected volte-face by the United States, which I deeply regret—it was wrong. I suspect that the Government have been taking a robust line on this question of delay and I recommend that they continue doing so.
I have one final point. The one thing that keeps the western Balkans on the track of reform is the magnetic pull of Brussels—nothing else. The sadness is that that magnetic pull has weakened because there is doubt in the capitals of Europe about whether we want the western Balkans in the EU. The question of enlargement has become muddled up with Turkey. But this is not about expanding Europe beyond its present borders. It is about unfinished business within our present borders. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Swansea, is right. If we do not bring them in, we will find them in our cities, with criminality and trafficked women, because that is the corridor through which they come. It is in Europe’s interest to keep that magnetic pull strong and to keep the western Balkans on the track of reform. The international community has allowed that to slacken; it has allowed the conditionality and the magnetic pull of Brussels to be weakened in the past year, and the Balkans are now moving backwards. They will not return to conflict, but they will stay in a black hole of dysfunctionality and criminality for as long as we allow this to continue.
I deeply regret the way in which things are going. I hope that the Government and the international community will insist that the Ahtisaari proposals for Kosovo are published on 21 January, that there is no further delay and that this nettle is grasped—and that we do at last in the early part of next year what we should have done in 1999.
7.03 pm
My Lords, the international community is facing a critical moment in what could—and, one hopes, will—be the final chapter in the cascade of events, many of them tragic and many of them not too brilliantly handled, that followed the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. The
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The challenge remains how to ensure that this final chapter in the break-up of Yugoslavia is completed in a way that ensures a peaceful transition to a future that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovars while guaranteeing the human rights of all the inhabitants of Kosovo and ensuring peace and stability throughout the Balkan region. That is easy to say but difficult to do. The Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, could not, therefore, be more timely.
Perhaps the easiest part of the question to answer is what the legitimate aspirations of the Kosovars are. With roughly 90 per cent of the population of ethnic Albanian origin and their absolute determination to have an independent state of their own, it is hard to see how any outcome could be accepted and respected that does not in one way or another and in some predictable timescale secure their independence. But answering that question is only the beginning of any solution. It raises the need to protect, not only on paper but in everyday life, the human rights of the minority populations in Kosovo, most obviously but by no means exclusively the Serbs. It raises also the spectre of a greater Albania, which has the potential to be intensely destabilising right across a region which contains several states with substantial ethnic Albanian minorities. It raises also the question of the prospects for EU membership of Kosovo and its neighbour, Serbia. Finding answers to all those questions, not just the simple one about Kosovo’s independence, is likely to determine whether any outcome can be sustainable and achieved peacefully.
From time to time, it has been suggested that a possible solution to the problem of minorities would be to detach from Kosovo as it is presently defined those geographical areas which are principally inhabited by ethnic Serbs and to incorporate them in Serbia. However, such a solution would surely cause more problems than it would resolve and create destabilising pressure for further territorial adjustments in the region, including in Serbia. It would be to enter the logic of ethnic cleansing, which we should now aim to put behind us, not to legitimate. But if that solution is to be rejected, it is all the more essential that the personal and political rights of minorities should be permanently entrenched in whatever constitution an independent Kosovo adopts, and that the practical implementation of such rights should be ensured for at least an initial period by some degree of international supervision. As to the spectre of a greater Albania, it would probably be best if that were to be quite explicitly ruled out in any settlement which is reached over Kosovo.
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