Select Committee on European Union Second Report


CHAPTER 6: Global Pressures: The WTO

107.  The reforms of 2003 significantly altered the CAP but further change is on the horizon. Despite reforms of recent years, the CAP still maintains a high level of domestic support for its agricultural markets through Pillar 1's market price support mechanisms[43] and pressure is mounting to change this situation and to change it soon. The Financial Secretary told us this was the "most damaging part of the CAP", more so even than the direct subsidies (Q 102).

108.  The CAP has acted as a barrier to the free flow of trade. According to a recent World Trade Organization (WTO) report, the EU "continues to limit foreign competition and to generate surpluses of some products"[44]. While maintaining high prices through market intervention and import barriers, the payment of production and export subsidies allows EU farmers to export surpluses created at lower cost, thus undermining the market for produce from third countries. If such subsidies and protection of agricultural markets were cut, agricultural exports from developing nations could help those economies to grow.

109.  The current WTO Doha Development Round of talks is aimed at eliminating just such support. The EU has committed itself to the Round by being among the WTO signatories who signed up to an outline of the eventual new trade agreement in August 2004[45]. Of most immediate importance to the EU is likely to be the agreement eventually to phase out all export subsidies.

110.  We commend the EU for its decision to "move" on export subsidies. The EU must do all it can to build an environment where farm production is based on market demand and not subsidy entitlement. The EU should negotiate on the basis that it will firmly commit itself to phasing out its agricultural export subsidies within a specified time frame. It will be extremely difficult to secure the agreement of other developed countries to this objective, however, that should not stop the EU from making every effort to achieve it.

111.  The impact of a Doha agreement on the EU 2007-2013 agriculture budget will depend greatly on timing. It is expected that December's WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong will further endorse the outline agreement of August 2004. Negotiation on the detail could be expected to take up most of 2006 with an agreement possible in 2007. It therefore would be probable that a new agreement on agricultural trade could begin to be applied from 2008-2009. Any effects for the CAP could significantly begin to impact the budget from approximately 2011-2012.

The end of subsidy in sight—the impact on the CAP

112.  If agreed in its current form, the Doha agreement could have a beneficial effect on the EU budget. Savings of €1.5-3 billion could be made annually if the EU was no longer allowed to fund its current export subsidies. However this saving could be wiped out by possible payments of compensation that would have to be paid to those sectors hit hardest by the reduction and removal of export subsidies and the scaling down of import tariffs—most notably, the dairy and sugar sectors (Q 150 and QQ 211-2).

113.  Our witnesses were confident that a Doha agreement would not require a significant change to the level of EU domestic support for farmers. This was mainly due to the 2003 reform agreement having moved most of the Union's agricultural support from the proscribed blue and amber box classifications of support into the permitted green box (Q 60, Q 247 and Q 433).

BOX 9

What are the WTO trade boxes?

In WTO terminology, agricultural subsidies are identified by "boxes" which are given different colours depending upon their acceptability or otherwise. There are exemptions for developing countries.


Amber box


All domestic support measures considered to distort production and trade (with some exceptions) fall into the amber box. These include measures to support prices, or subsidies directly related to production quantities. The reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a "Total Aggregate Measurement of Support" which includes all supports for specified products together with supports that are not for specific products, in one single figure.


Blue box


This is the "amber box with conditions" — conditions designed to reduce distortion. Any support that would normally be in the amber box, is placed in the blue box if the support also requires farmers to limit production. At present there are no limits on spending on blue box subsidies. In the current negotiations, some countries want to keep the blue box as it is because they see it as a crucial means of moving away from distorting amber box subsidies without causing too much hardship.


Green box


In order to qualify, green box subsidies must not distort trade, or at most cause minimal distortion. They have to be government-funded (not by charging consumers higher prices) and must not involve price support.


They tend to be programmes that are not targeted at particular products, and include direct income supports for farmers that are not related to (are "decoupled" from) current production levels or prices. They also include environmental protection and regional development programmes. "Green box" subsidies are therefore allowed without limits, provided they comply with policy-specific criteria.


Source: Based on WTO Fact Sheet: Domestic Support in Agriculture - The Boxes

114.  The National Farmers' Union pointed out that "CAP reform has anticipated some of the changes that the Doha Development Round is expected to bring about, most notably the reduction (or even eventual elimination, subject to the adoption of total decoupling by all countries) in support currently classified within the Blue Box"(p 14). Decoupled payments have allowed for the reclassification of most direct agricultural supports into the Green Box. The decoupling objective of the 2003 reforms is commendable. The EU must build on this to reform the CAP fully and eliminate all market support measures.

115.  The National Farmers' Union and other farm linked organisations however were concerned that, in the absence of export subsidies and with tariffs being reduced, "only the introduction of a quota system and/or a reduction in the support provided by the intervention price could prevent a potential dramatic increase in intervention support expenditure" (p 14).

116.  We acknowledge these views but do not consider that they justify the continuation of measures which cause trade distortion. We recommend that the EU should push ahead to attain a successful Doha agreement. Political will to cut subsidies and create freer trade must be met with strong action to move all EU subsidies into the Green Box by a specified date. Such action must be accomplished if the CAP is to be fully reformed.


43  
The level of subsidising of production remains substantial: "The total value of aid that potentially has the most production-distorting effects (market price support, output payments, and input subsidies) accounted for 68.7% of support to producers in 2002, down from 69.9% in 2000." (TRADE POLICY REVIEW European Communities: Report by the Secretariat, World Trade Organization, Restricted WT/TPR/S/136 23 June 2004 (04-2591), pp2-13). Back

44   ibid. Back

45   The so-called "July package": WTO General Council Decision WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.  Back


 
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