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Lord Roper: My Lords, the noble Lord is very well informed on this subject, but he is now trespassing into the time of other noble Lords who wish to speak in this debate.
Lord Morris of Manchester: My Lords, I was approached earlier by one of our colleagues, who is here now, to say that it was understood that, since I was opening the debate, there could be some flexibility. Nevertheless, I am near to concluding.
Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, my speech takes only seven or eight minutes, so perhaps noble Lords will allow the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Manchester, the two minutes that I might have taken. I do not know whether that is possible.
Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord is now drawing his speech swiftly to a close.
Lord Morris of Manchester: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Park and my noble friend Lady Andrews. Almost all of the MoD's written evidence was publicly available on the department's website, from which it was simply downloaded and dressed up as new and substantive evidence on scientific and other issues. It was, of course, already woefully outdated by extremely important and new
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evidence from the United States, in particular the findings on 1 June of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, on fallout from the demolitions of Iraqi chemical weapons at Khamisiyah. There followed the findings of the research advisory committee of the US Secretary of Veterans Affairs, on brain damage from using pyridostigmine bromide and organophosphates, and low-level chemical exposure.
The MoD has yet to respond in any way either to the GAO's report or to that of the research advisory committee, notwithstanding their profound importance to thousands of British servicemen and servicewomen. Notwithstanding ministerial undertakings to inform Parliament of the outcome of Porton Down's work on the safety or otherwise of the multiple immunisation programme, and to update us by this month on the effects for British troops of the fallout from the explosions at Khamisiyah, no more has yet been said. So much for the inquiry having ignored new and substantive evidence and the MoD's claim to "political transparency".
General Sir Peter de la Billiere, who commanded our forces in the first Gulf conflict, joined noble Lords recently in recalling that, speaking in this House after Blenheim, the Duke of Marlborough said—
Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I ask the noble Lord to draw his remarks to a close now.
Lord Morris of Manchester: My Lords, the Duke of Marlborough said that the best way to mark that great victory was to do right by the soldiers who fought so bravely with him. The Lloyd report, as has been said, is in that proud tradition, and I honour the noble and learned Lord and all who worked with him to make it happen.
Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, I have had the honour to support the noble Lord, Lord Morris of Manchester, in the British Legion's fight for the needs of the Gulf War veterans since 1996—eight years, in which a dwindling number of men and women have grown more ill while they waited for recognition that their seriously impaired health has been due to the effects of their service in the first Gulf War, in 1991. They were then given multiple injections and vaccines, despite the fact that the Department of Health, it later proved, had warned against possible adverse reactions from such a cocktail but had been ignored.
The then government admitted that. They also admitted, in 1997, that thanks to administrative errors in the Ministry of Defence, medical records had been lost when data were transferred from one computer to another. Of those, a number were known to be related to Gulf War veterans. When the veterans tried to gain access to those records, at least one was told, "Certain injections and medication administered during the Gulf War campaign were classified secret". So the Army medical directorate itself had to tell veterans
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that, in view of the classification, it had no access to those records and was not authorised to possess the information.
The Defence Committee noted also that, despite a series of denials to the noble Countess, Lady Mar, in this House, organophosphates and pesticides had been used in the Gulf and could be a factor to be considered. A briefing note (No. 3) in June 1993 stated categorically:
"A wide range of OP compounds had been extensively used by British personnel during Operation Granby".
I am going over that familiar ground because this is only one—only too typical—instance of what the Defence Select Committee called "the culture of resistance" in the MoD.
That has led the ministry, sadly, throughout the past 12 years—of course, the virtual destruction of the Defence Medical Services by the previous government did not help—to insist that no executive decision can be taken until an ever-lengthening series of research projects has been carried out. That has been demonstrated in the list of MoD-generated papers in the appendix to this admirable and extensive report. Nothing, it seems, can be done until the research has been completed. In the mean time, men sicken and die or become more ill, while, as the Defence Select Committee said, the MoD has alas been quick to deny, slow to investigate and reactive rather than proactive.
The only thing that can break this logjam—I beg the Minister to hear this—is for Ministers to take an executive decision to act on what is known before it is too late. There have been promises—many promises. In 1997, the Prime Minister said in the run-up to the election that there would be a public inquiry. The new Minister promised action and a new beginning. What happened? There followed the creation of the Veterans Agency, subsuming the War Pensions Agency into the MoD, the creation of the Gulf Veterans Illness Unit and a newsletter.
As is not unusual, the Government's idea of action was to create organs of government. They appear not to know how to respond, at least in this instance, in practical human terms, nor have they shown any understanding of the personal factor; that is, the need of the veterans that the justice of their case should be acknowledged. The presence of the Minister or at least a senior MoD official at the inquiry, even as an observer, would have sent a significant message. But, of course, the Government did not want to send one.
It is amazing that the MoD still says that it does not rule out an official inquiry, but remains of the view that the only way to establish the cause of ill health in some Gulf veterans is through scientific and medical research. Annex D of the report before us lists 10 pages of the many reports and research projects undertaken from 1994 to 2004. Some are presumably still continuing. There is no doubt that Ministers take a continuing interest in this issue and have had benevolent intentions. Alas, however, there has been no will to act in the one practical way that would matter.
However, the present admirable, independent and exhaustive report must surely be accepted and should make it unnecessary for an official inquiry that is at
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present contemplated only in the far distant future, if ever, to be carried out. The latest US report must equally provide a conclusive assessment of the justice and well founded nature of the Gulf veterans' claims, based on extensive research. The US, after all, funded at least one of the MoD inquiries in the UK. In the US, as here, there was initial scepticism and a view that "it was all in their minds". That attitude, it seems, has changed.
I have taken part in no less than eight full debates on this issue, starting in 1996, and there were at least two major Defence Select Committee reports in the other place. Throughout that time, I am sad to say that the ministry has taken refuge in setting up yet more research projects while denying veterans access to their records—where they still existed—which they needed to fight their case. Perhaps I may urge the Minister to fulfil the promise of action given in 1997—a promise which I believe was given in good faith—and to take heed of the wise words of the two US Congressmen quoted in the report.
In the US, too, there has been indifference, bureaucratic inertia and whitewash. But, as one Congressman said,
"We understand the loss of an arm, but not the total debilitation of Gulf War illness. Because we did not understand, that does not mean we should not compensate them".
After 14 years, it was time, he thought, to reach finality. The Americans have looked at 100,000 veterans with symptoms of Gulf War illness. They have carried out extensive research, some of it in conjunction with the UK. The MoD has always claimed to be closely associated with and informed about the US research. I hope therefore that it will now accept the US assessment and act without further delay to meet the needs of the veterans. As long ago as 1994, under the previous government, the Defence Select Committee at that time could not help contrasting the attitude of the MoD with that of the US Government.
The services are under great pressure today with too many demands chasing too few soldiers. How the Government behave in the light of this inquiry will send a critically important signal to those now serving and to those who might think of doing so. No government can afford to be seen to be unable or unwilling to act in the face of the evidence provided both by the present inquiry and the forthcoming US report, nor can they afford to be seen to be careless of the well-being of soldiers.
Incidentally, I should like to be assured that the change in the burden of truth criteria which was pushed through in the Armed Forces (Pensions and Compensation) Bill will not be applied retrospectively or in any way against the interests of the Gulf War veterans.
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