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6 Nov 2006 : Column GC57
Grand Committee
Monday, 6 November 2006.
The Committee met at half-past three of the clock
[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (LORD ELTON) in the Chair.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Elton): I remind noble Lords that they should speak standing and that, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, the Committee will adjourn at the earliest convenient moment after the Division Bells are rung and will resume after 10 minutes. If a noble Lord is speaking, I would be obliged if he would find the earliest convenient moment to pause in his speech so that we can get on.
Risk Management: EAC Report
Lord Wakeham rose to move, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the 5th Report of the Economic Affairs Committee on Government Policy on the Management of Risk (5th Report, HL Paper 183).
The noble Lord said: I am pleased to introduce this debate, and to do so in the Moses Room. An earlier report of the Economic Affairs Committee was the first committee report to be reported here. It was a successful experiment that has led the way for other committee reports to be debated in this room. I should start with a confession rather than a declaration of interest. The Minister, my noble friend from the Front Bench and I are all members of the same professional body. In the past week, that body has written to me to say that, as I have been paying the subscription for such a long time, it now no longer wants me to pay it and has made me a life member. It means that the Minister and my noble friend will subsidise me until they reach an age when they have paid their subscriptions for long enough to qualify for free membership. That is not quite a declaration of interest, but noble Lords ought to know that.
I have one declaration of interest: as most noble Lords will know, I am the convenor of the Lords and Commons Pipe and Cigar Smokers’ Club, which means that I smoke three decent cigars a year, but not many more. Lastly, I thank all the members of the committee for their collective contribution to the report which, like all reports from the Economic Affairs Committee, is evidence-based and entirely non party-political. I thank also our specialist adviser, Professor Mike Jones-Lee, as well as our Clerk and his excellent team. They have all given us a great deal of support.
In our report we had many positive things to say about the Government’s approach to risk management. In particular, we felt that the Government had succeeded in developing a sound and potentially effective framework for the assessment of risk. However, we felt that there were some important areas in which current guidelines are either inadequate or are not applied appropriately. In addition, we were concerned to find cases where the use of evidence was less than rigorous in framing policy and in public statements by Ministers.
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I shall deal first with matters of principle. Regarding the adequacy of existing guidelines, we were concerned that the existing policy assessment procedures give insufficient weight to the impact of legislation on personal freedoms. Quite apart from the impact of any specific legislation, we were particularly concerned that no consideration whatsoever is given to the cumulative impact that successive legislation can have on personal freedoms. Each small piece of legislation may on its own seem reasonable, but when added together an environment is created in which there are substantial restrictions on personal freedom of choice. Our report quotes the views of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on this:
“I think from time to time we do not focus on the cumulative impact. I think we need to think how we could do this better and I think we need to think how we look at the cumulative impact better than we do at the moment”.
The committee felt that that was a sensible thing for the noble and learned Lord to say at the time. We were encouraged by these comments and we recommended that the Government introduce a formal procedure to consider the potential impact of legislation on personal freedoms, which would be quite distinct from the current procedure in which a Minister merely certifies that legislation complies with the Human Rights Act.
In contrast to the comments of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, the Government’s response to our recommendations is, in our view, both complacent and inadequate. While recognising that existing procedures do not give proper consideration to the cumulative impact of legislation on personal freedoms, the Government suggest that such matters should not be part of policy-making and are best dealt with by organisations such as the Law Society, which is concerned with the overall coherence of the law, and the proposed Commission on Human Rights and Equality, which apparently will be concerned with respect for human rights and equality in society. Whatever the merits of these bodies, the simple fact is that they are not designed to deal with matters of personal freedom of the kind with which the committee was concerned. The case for establishing a formal assessment procedure along the lines discussed in our report remains, in our view, unanswered by the Government. Coherence and equality are not the same as freedom, and it is quite possible to have a coherent set of laws that oppress people in equal measure.
Turning to more specific matters, we expressed concern about the Government’s use of evidence in the context of both general policy statements by Ministers and in the more detailed formulation of policy. Our report highlighted instances in which policy statements appeared to be motivated by media reports and unsubstantiated anecdotes rather than a balanced consideration of the available evidence—pronouncements about developing a compensation culture and excessive risk aversion among the public are clear examples. We examined each of those concerns and found no evidence to support the view that British society had become increasingly litigious or that people hold unreasonable views about risk.
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However, the Government’s response to our comments reads as a retrospective justification of the attitudes taken by Ministers in promoting particular policies rather than a recognition of a simple point made in our report that policy decisions should be soundly based on available evidence and not unduly influenced by transitory or exaggerated opinions. To repeat what we said in our report, it is important that the Government ensure that their own handling of information and statistics is beyond reproach.
The last point concerning the use of statistics is particularly relevant in one of the cases highlighted in our report: passive smoking. We took the view that existing policy guidelines were not properly implemented in this case and that the subsequent policy response reflected in the Health Bill was disproportionate to the problem. We were particularly concerned that the Government’s use of evidence did not conform with their own standards of good practice. The evidence that we received, and other evidence available in the public domain, clearly points to the fact that the health risks associated with passive smoking are relatively minor and not sufficient on their own to justify the legislation to restrict smoking in public places. This is not to say that active smoking is not harmful or that policies to restrict smoking are not a good thing. It simply means that a policy to eliminate smoking in public places cannot rely on the argument that the Government tried to make: that passive smoking poses a major risk to public health.
In their response, the Government reject our analysis of passive smoking and attempt to undermine our conclusions by challenging the evidence in different ways. They argue that the scientific and medical evidence of the health risks presented by second-hand smoke is now well established and clear.
[The Sitting was suspended for a Division in the House from 3.40 to 3.50 pm.]
Lord Wakeham: Nothing in our report can be interpreted to mean that we do not think that smoking is harmful or that policies to restrict it are not a good thing. It simply means that a policy to eliminate smoking in public places cannot rely, as the Government tried to, on the argument that passive smoking poses a major health risk to the public.
In their response, the Government reject our analysis of passive smoking and attempt to undermine our conclusions by challenging the evidence in different ways. They argue:
“The scientific and medical evidence of the health risk presented by second hand smoke is now well established and clear”.
It highlights comments in our report that,
- “the main harm, if there is one, concerns children who are exposed to passive smoking in the home, which is something the bill is not designed to address”.
It highlights, too, the fact that we received evidence from Imperial Tobacco and the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association, presumably with the intention of suggesting that we may have received biased evidence.
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What the Government response conveniently ignores, however, is the main part of the paragraph that I question. It quotes evidence given by the Under-Secretary of State for Public Health, who told the committee that,
- “it is clearly the case that, in relation to deaths from smoking and second-hand smoke, the most serious aspect of that is smoking in the home. Ninety-five percent of the deaths come from smoking in the home”.
The Government’s response also quotes Sir Richard Peto’s evidence to us that:
They fail to mention, however, that he also told us that,
I stress that our objective in raising the issue of passive smoking was not to defend any kind of smoking, whether active or passive, or to say that legislation is not needed to limit smoking in public places. Our primary purpose was to emphasise a more general point: risk assessment procedures and policy formulation should always be based on a clear statement of objectives, an unbiased assessment of available evidence, and a proper regard for the impact of legislation on personal freedom and choice. Our view was that the legislation relating to passive smoking failed to consider these matters properly and that the Government should learn the appropriate lessons from their mistakes to ensure that future policy responses are transparent, evidence-based and proportionate. Judging from the tone of the Government’s response to our comments on passive smoking, this lesson has still to be learnt.
Our report condemns the use of ambiguous policy guidelines such as the precautionary principle and ALARP—that is, as low as reasonably practicable. The Government response seeks to defend these as a useful part of policy assessment procedures, used alongside other information and research. However, the response does not really provide a defence for their use, other than to say that they are widely used and useful in focusing attention on factors that may be difficult to quantify. In our view, this was a disappointingly lame and circular argument.
By and large, we thought that the Government had some very good policies on risk management in general, but we felt that they did not always live up to their own policies in practice.
Moved, That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the 5th Report of the Economic Affairs Committee on Government Policy on the Management of Risk (5th Report, HL Paper 183).—(Lord Wakeham.)
3.54 pm
Lord Sheldon: My Lords, I am happy to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, who has managed the committee extremely well during a number of reports and examinations. The committee has been unanimous on all those occasions, which is a tribute to the way in which he has handled affairs. That unanimity continues and, I am sure, will continue.
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I want to deal just with road and railway accidents; the comparison between them and how money is spent on them is important to me.
First, in 2005 there were 3,201 road deaths. Against that, there were seven deaths on the railways. There were 402,000 road accidents where claims were made. Twelve per cent of all deaths—about 250 on the motorway—occurred on the hard shoulder, awaiting assistance for a breakdown. I find that astonishing.
In accidents, the role of the media impacts on Government. Frequently, they are anxious to respond to exaggerated claims of government inadequacy. Paragraphs 98 and 99 of our report state:
“Although we share concerns about the potential impact of inaccurate media reports, in practice there is little government can or should do to change the way that the media report risk-related stories, other than to encourage balance and proportionality in the reporting of statistics and scientific research. Beyond that, the most important thing government can do is to ensure that its own policy decisions are soundly based on available evidence ... The evidence we took suggests that the Government has at times given insufficient weight to available evidence and placed too great a reliance on unsubstantiated reports that often have their origin in the media”.
That is very serious because it seems to control so many matters. The report continues:
“In view of this, it is important that the Government ensures that its own handling of information and statistics is beyond reproach. We would also like to see greater use of the Press Complaints Commission by interested parties, including the Government, who feel that cases involving risks to the public had been mis-reported or mis-represented”.
The rate of deaths in the car was 2.7 per billion passenger kilometres, while on the rail the figure was 0.4, so the incidence is between six and seven times for car accidents. Professor John Broome, who is very knowledgeable on these matters, said in evidence to the committee on 6 December last year:
“So I think we can achieve a lot by looking at the railways and saying that what the railways are spending is 20 times as much per life year as what the health service is spending, say. That means we can save more life years by taking money out of the railways and putting it into the health service. You can get more life years just by doing that”.
How does that compare with the statement that the Government will act proportionately and consistently in dealing with risks to the public? They are not acting proportionately. Road and rail are not treated proportionately at all. On risk aversion, in paragraph 6 of our report, we state
“Perceptions of risk by the public clearly have a potentially important impact in a policy environment that rightly aims to be responsive to public concerns over safety. There is a danger, however, that excessive risk-aversion on the part of the public may drive policy in an unreasonably cautious direction, with disproportionate expenditure on risk mitigation measures as well as non-financial costs. Part of the job of government is of course to take account of public concerns”—
That is where the press and the media are involved in those matters.
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The committee found very little evidence of a compensation culture—an important aspect. However, the Government, in their response, stated that,
- “found that there was a perception that one did, and that this was having a damaging influence on behaviour. In the work on tackling this perception, Government does not consider that the policy is being pushed in a risk-averse direction”.
The Government’s response is important because they go on to say:
“Rather we are driving policy in the opposite direction, so that people have a better understanding of their rights and responsibilities and are encouraged to adopt sensible and proportionate risk management procedures without being excessively risk-averse”.
However, the report requires a more thorough examination. My own feeling, which largely comes from my period as a Member of Parliament, is that people are now more willing to make claims than they used to be. This is a continuing and serious aspect because there will be rather more claims than there were before. The report is not quite so clear on this matter; it states that there is some uncertainty about it.
Paragraph 47 of the report states:
“In some cases, costs and benefits may be difficult or even impossible to measure, particularly when the relative outcomes are ill defined or subject to extreme uncertainty”.
One of our major problems is that these things are difficult to define. The report continues:
“Problems can also arise if attempts are made to incorporate certain kinds of costs which are not readily amenable to monetary evaluation, such as those associated with the loss of liberties arising from restrictive or proscriptive measures”.
That is one of the difficulties of assessing the costs and benefits of accidents.
There is also a major problem of valuing human life and the willingness to pay to reduce the risk in certain circumstances. Paragraph 32 of the report points out that it is difficult to find evidence that we are becoming a more risk-averse society. I agree that proof is difficult to find but, again, my period as a Member of Parliament, when I discussed many such issues with constituents, led me to believe that the fear of risk has increased. The question we have to ask ourselves is: what have we done to reduce the level of risk? As we see in the report, there is a need for the greater use of the Press Complaints Commission because the press exaggerates so many of these matters.
We end the report by highlighting the very important point that:
That is much needed. It is one of the most important parts of the report as it concerns the relationship between road and rail safety. It continues that,
- “we would encourage agencies working in other relevant areas, such as the Department of Health, the NHS and NICE, to follow in the same direction. However, the evidence suggests that road safety expenditure is below the level that would be justified by current safety project appraisal procedures and government action is needed to ensure that transport safety expenditures are consistent between road and rail”.
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This is what is really required now—there is no question about it. Rail accidents go on the front page; road accidents you find in a tiny corner at the bottom of a local paper. The one is so much more important than the other in terms of numbers, and we need to adjust our procedures accordingly.
4.04 pm
Lord Giddens: I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, and the committee on their report. I confess to having had a little frisson of pleasure when I saw the report listed because I spent a large chunk of my career studying risk and, for me, it is an endlessly instructive subject. Traditional cultures did not have a notion of risk—they did not need it because they did not face the future. If something happened, it could be blamed on the gods, the spirits or simply fate. So the rise of the idea of risk was crucial to the rise of our civilisation.
That is not as esoteric and anthropological a point as it might sound. It means that risk, and especially risk assessment, are crucial to security and safety. Many people think of risk and security as opposites but they are not, because the calculation of risk is crucial to nearly all the forms of security and safety that we enjoy today. It has made the world a much safer place, although, as I shall go on to say, there are many problems in the world, from those involving health to those relating to the buildings that we live in, and risk analysis is crucial to security.
I agree with about 70 per cent of the report. I certainly agree that it does not make sense to make sweeping generalisations about risk-averse society. I do not see how one could possibly either measure or justify such statements. It is always important to recognise that, like most areas of risk, risk aversion is a very complex notion. For example, it is sometimes asked why older people are afraid to go out on the streets at night, as it is nearly always younger people who are beaten up or mugged. But that neglects the fact that older people know that the streets are dangerous and stay inside, and, to some extent, that is why they do not appear in the statistics.
Risk aversion is a complicated issue. Paradoxically, some of the most dangerous roads are those with the lowest levels of traffic accidents because people know that they are dangerous. Therefore, you certainly cannot generalise about risk aversion in the way that the Prime Minister seemed to do in his speech referred to in the opening part of the report.
I am much less happy with the conclusions drawn about passive smoking. I suppose that it depends how you assess significant risk, but I think that here one is talking about future risk. Passive smoking is likely to affect a large number of young people. We do not really know what the true level of risk will be, but the findings suggest that comparatively it is significant and that therefore it is not accidental that in places ranging from many states in the United States to the most improbable countries, such as Italy and France, with well established smoking cultures, smoking has been banned in public places. Many countries have done so, and I do not think that is because they did
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[The Sitting was suspended for a Division in the House from 4.08 to 4.18 pm.]
Lord Giddens: Perhaps the committee made a conscious judgment not to say more on large-scale risks, but I would have liked it to do so. The management of such risks is different from those on which the report concentrates. The report talks about drivers and car accidents on page 6, and rightly says that every time someone gets into a car you cannot tell what will happen to that individual, but you can assess the risk that they will be involved in an accident or suffer injury or death. You cannot do that with most large-scale risks, which is why they are different. The Government face fundamental problems with them, for reasons I will come to.
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