Select Committee on European Union Thirty-First Report


CHAPTER 3: Strategic Objectives[11]

11.  The 3 Strategic objectives identified within the Strategy are:

  • Addressing the Threats;
  • Building Security in our Neighbourhood;
  • An international order based on effective multilateralism.

Addressing the threats

12.  Distant and local threats are identified as of equal concern to the security of the Union. Self-defence is no longer based principally on the threat of military invasion but rather on problems caused by global instability in other, sometimes distant, parts of the world. Conflict and threat prevention are now aspects of self-defence policy. The Strategy explains that issues such as terrorism cannot be dealt with purely by military means and states that "the European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations".[12]

13.  We welcome the EU's current work to address security threats (for example strengthening the IAEA and dealing with regional conflicts).

Building Security in our Neighbourhood

14.  The Strategy emphasises the importance of building up a ring of well governed countries to the South and East of the EU borders. The Strategy also highlights the benefits of multi-lateral intervention in the Balkans; "the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict".[13] The resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is acknowledged as a strategic priority for Europe without which "there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East".[14] It refers to a 'two state solution' in general rather than to the 'Road Map' in particular.

15.  Mr Solana provided a further, welcome explanation of the European Neighbourhood policy: "the new neighbourhood policy was born out of the fact of enlargement and we could not leave the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus hanging out of their own holes ..we could not abandon the Ukraine. They are not going to be in the institution but you cannot abandon them; we have had to protect them… Then there came the question of the southern part of the Mediterranean where we had already a neighbourhood policy that dated from 1995, so we incorporated that into the first. That policy is not new; it is the same with a new name… I do not think it is a mistake to have a common envelope but at the same time country to country a specific plan for the different countries. It is not the same to deal with Moldova than to deal with the Ukraine."[15] We recognise that a single Neighbourhood Policy may not be appropriate for countries with very different stages of economic and political development, and with very different cultural and geographical perspectives.

An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism

16.  The Strategy asserts the commitment of the EU to "uphold and develop International Law"[16] and that the United Nations Charter is the "fundamental framework for international relations".[17] "Early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention"[18] (which may include the use of force) to threats would be welcome, within the UN Charter. Clarification is nevertheless required on whether this would include pre-emptive action.

17.  Strengthening the UN and other international organisations are seen as priorities as are supporting the development of existing institutions (such as the World Trade Organisation) and supporting new institutions for example the International Criminal Court. The Security Strategy here places an emphasis on the role of trade and development policies as 'powerful tools for promoting reform'.[19] The European Council is well placed to coordinate these policies alongside foreign and security policy.

18.  This multilateral attitude was reflected by Mr Solana's opinions on the EU's role in North Korea and Iran. Mr Solana asked us "What is our role in the North Korea six party talks? It is not to destroy. We would be stupid if we say that we want to be the seventh [party].. It is much better if we say that we support the six and we have said publicly….we applaud the success of this but we do not want to be part of the problem or part of the solution. Some Member States say 'Why are you not at the same table?' But it is because we do not need to be. We are well represented at the table.. Iran is a much more difficult topic but we are determined to prevent Iran from being a terrorist state".[20]

19.  This is also reflected in the EU's attitude towards the African Union (AU): Mr Solana told us "There is no doubt that they [the AU] know how to handle their own problems better than coming from outside. This is what they want. They want to assume their own responsibilities, they need a bit of help and I think that we should give them this help because otherwise we have to assume that responsibility at a more expensive level and, politically in a less attractive atmosphere."[21] We also note that Mr Solana said that "for the moment, no forces have been deployed but, in other places, there will be an eventual need for the Sudan to deploy forces or not and we would like to see the African Union leading."[22]

20.  We were pleased to hear Mr Solana's acknowledgment of the importance of NATO despite few references to the Organisation within the Strategy: "I think that cooperation between the European Union and NATO is fundamental. The arrangement that the European Union has with NATO is very important. Remember that we are in crisis management and NATO is not in crisis management but fundamental on collective defence."[23] This confirmed what we were told by Mr Sawers from FCO "it remains the position of the European Union as a whole, that whenever the Americans want to be involved in a security operation of this sort then NATO will be the organisation of choice for pursuing defence operations. Where the Americans decide, for whatever reason, not to be involved, or that the level of the task is less that what is required, then NATO will not be an option, but the NATO resources are available. The whole EU defence capability has a relationship of close linkage into NATO and…will be dependent upon the NATO structures."[24]

21.  The EU's Security Strategy will be more effective if it is anchored firmly in cooperation between Europe and North America. To avoid any doubt, the importance of NATO (despite the desirability of enhanced EU capability) should be emphasised and the Council of Ministers (and the US too) needs to work hard to restore the transatlantic partnership.[25]


11   Security Strategy Part II, see Appendix 4, page 15. Back

12   Page 16. Back

13   Ibid. Back

14   Page 17. Back

15   Q72. Back

16   Page 17. Back

17   Ibid. Back

18   Page 18. Back

19   Ibid. Back

20   Q64. Back

21   Mr Solana Q53. Back

22   Q53. Back

23   Q63. Back

24   Q19. Back

25   See our previous report: A Fractured Partnership? Relations Between the European Union and the United States of America (30th Report session 2002-03, HL Paper 134). Back


 
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