Explanatory Memorandum submitted by the
Home Office on draft Agreements between the European Union and
the United States of America on Extradition and on Mutual Legal
Assistance, under Articles 24 and 38 of the Treaty of the European
Union (8295/1/03 CATS 20 USA 29 Rev 1)
SUBJECT MATTER
1. This Explanatory Memorandum (EM) is in
respect of the draft Agreements between the EU and USA on judicial
cooperation in criminal matters (8295/1/03). The Agreements were
proposed as part of the counter-terrorism package at the special
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in September 2001. They
are designed to improve judicial cooperation between the European
Union and the United States of America, including in relation
to terrorism and associated offences. The Agreements supplement
existing bi-lateral treaties between individual Member States
and the US or, where no such treaties exist, create a framework
for judicial cooperation.
SCRUTINY HISTORY
2. The text of these draft Agreements is
being submitted for Parliamentary Scrutiny for the first time.
The Scrutiny Committees have, however, been informed of the commencement
and progress of negotiations by way of letters from the Home Office
on 29 May 2002, 30 January and 27 March 2003. An Explanatory Memorandum
on the draft Council Decision authorising the Presidency to sign
the Agreements (8296/03) was submitted on 28 April.
MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3. The Home secretary has responsibility
for policy matters relating to judicial cooperation in criminal
matters (except in Scotland) and takes the lead on judicial cooperation
with other EU Member States within the framework of Title VI of
the Treaty on European Union. Scottish Executive Ministers also
have an interest.
LEGAL AND
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(i) Legal Basis
4. Articles 24 and 38 of the TEU. Article
24 provides for the conclusion of international agreements by
the Council for the purposes of Title V (common foreign and security
policy). Articles 24(4) and 38 provide that international agreements
may also cover matters falling under Title VI TEU (police and
judicial cooperation).
5. The Government's view is that agreements
under Article 24 are concluded by the Council on behalf of the
Union, and that it is the Union that is a party to such agreements
rather than the Member States. To this extent Article 24 has by
implication conferred limited legal personality on the Union.
Agreements under Article 24 are binding on Member States, subject
to a declaration under Article 24(5). The UK and other Member
States intend to make such a declaration in this case.
(ii) European Parliament Procedure
6. The Treaty does not require any consultation
with the European Parliament on the draft Agreements.
(iii) Voting Procedure
7. Unanimity in the Council.
(iv) Impact on United Kingdom Law
8. The provisions in Article 9 of the draft
Extradition Agreement on temporary surrender reflect those in
the Extradition Bill currently before Parliament. The Government
is currently considering whether legislation is needed in order
to enable UK authorities to request the temporary surrender of
fugitives in custody in the US, in the light of the requirement
to keep that fugitive in custody once transferred to the United
Kingdom. This would not prevent the UK from meeting its obligations
under the Agreement, though pending any legislation it is unlikely
that the UK would be able to make a successful request for the
temporary surrender of a fugitive from the US.
9. Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the draft Extradition
Agreement will require administrative changes, which will simplify
and speed up the procedures for transmitting extradition documentation.
Other provisions in that draft Agreement are either contained
in the recently signed bilateral Extradition Treaty with the US,
which we hope to bring into force shortly, or in the Extradition
Bill currently before Parliament. It is anticipated that these,
if concluded, would enable the implementation of the EU/US Extradition
Agreement.
10. The provisions of most Articles of the
Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Agreement are either already in
place or reflect those in the Crime (International Co-operation)
Bill. Article 4 provisions would be provided by a combination
of measures. The Crime (IC) Bill's provision for secondary legislation,
at section 52(2), would enable the US to be designated. The planned
secondary legislation under Part 11 of the Proceeds of Crime Act
2002 will generally enhance international cooperation, including
with the US, against money laundering. The provisions of Parts
1-3 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 deal with
terrorist financing.
11. Article 5 of the draft MLA Agreement
provides for Joint Investigation Teams (JIT). The Government is
currently considering, including with the US, the form of legislation
required to deliver this provision. Article 5 does not exactly
replicate the JIT provisions in the EU MLA Convention 2000. The
extent of co-operation envisaged by the US under Article 5(4)
is likely to affect whether it is necessary, or possible, to designate
the US by means of secondary legislation under Section 88(7)(c)
of the Police Act 1996 (as amended by Sec. 103 of Police Reform
Act 2002). Section 88(7) is referenced by clauses 26 (and 18)
of the current Crime (International Co-operation) Bill, which
provides for the dispensation of the need for letters of request
for MLA in certain circumstances. Secondary legislation, to designate
the US under the Police Act, is possible only if there is a bilateral
Agreement with the US. Officials have commenced discussions, with
their counterparts in the US, on the possible need for a supplementary
provision to the existing bilateral UK/US MLA Treaty for the purposes
of Article 5.
12. The Government would not wish to slow
down, any more than was absolutely necessary, the bringing into
force of these important Agreements. Following signature, and
the passage of relevant legislation, the Extradition and Crime
(International Co-operation) Bills, the Government would seek
to introduce any further necessary legislation, which would enable
it to agree either to the conclusion of the Agreements or to their
application to the UK.
(v) Application to Gibraltar
13. The proposal has a legal base in Title
VI TEU and will not therefore apply to Gibraltar unless expressly
extended. The Government of Gibraltar is being asked if it wishes
to participate in this measure. Similarly, under the provisions
of Articles 19 (Extradition) and 16 (MLA) of the agreements, the
Channel Islands and Isle of Man will be asked if they wish to
participate. This does not need to be decided before signature.
APPLICATION TO
THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC AREA
14. As a proposal directed at EU Member
States, the Agreements will not apply to the EEA.
SUBSIDIARITY
15. No issues of subsidiarity arise here.
The Agreements can be adopted only at EU level, but will supplement
existing Treaties between individual Member States and the US.
They do not preclude the conclusion of more favourable UK/US bilateral
arrangements.
CONSULTATION WITH
OUTSIDE INTERESTS
16. In view of the confidential nature of
negotiations to date, no consultations with outside parties have
been possible.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
17. The Agreements extend some elements
of judicial cooperation, which have been agreed between Member
States, to the US, in particular, the provisions of the EU Mutual
Legal Assistance Convention 2000 and its Protocol, together with
some extradition provisions deriving from the European Convention
on Extradition, Schengen Convention and the Framework Decision
on the European Arrest Warrant. However, none of the "mutual
recognition" provisions, for example the abolition of dual
criminality or the recognition of judicial decisions in the latter
Framework Decision are to be applied to the US.
18. The United Kingdom has, particularly
in comparison with some other EU Member States, extensive judicial
cooperation mechanisms with the US. These are based on the MLA
Treaty of 1994, as amended, and the Extradition Treaty of 1972,
as amended. The Government has also recently signed a revised
bilateral Extradition Treaty with the US. The Extradition Agreement
will therefore have little added value for the UK, beyond some
improved administrative arrangements to speed up procedures for
transmitting documentation.
19. The Government's policy concerns were
that the EU/US Agreements should add value to existing bi-lateral
treaties for other Member States even if not for the UK, and that
they should neither inhibit existing bi-lateral cooperation, nor
the conclusion of future bi-lateral Treaties with the US. The
Government is satisfied that the provisions of the draft EU/US
Agreements meet these objectives. Articles 3 (both agreements),
17 (Extradition) or 14 (MLA), and 18 (Extradition) or 17 (MLA)
enable full clarification of the relationship between existing
bi-lateral arrangements and the EU/US agreement. For example,
the provisions of Article 4, especially subsection (2), of the
Extradition Agreement would not apply to the UK because the new
UK/US bilateral treaty applies a sentence threshold, not a list
of offences, to extraditable offences. In addition, the exchange
of designations and notifications will allow further clarification
of the relationship between these Agreements and UK/US bilateral
arrangements.
20. Similarly, the Government wished to
ensure that the Article 38 Agreement, the first with legislative
consequences, did not give rise to excessive interference in UK/US
relations. We are satisfied that neither ECJ jurisdiction, nor
infraction proceedings, would apply. The method by which the EU
would ensure UK compliance with the agreement, following the specified
consultation procedures, would be through the principles of loyalty
and good faith to unanimous Council decisions.
21. The Agreements do not address all the
key concerns of the US side. The Extradition Agreement does not
require the extradition of own nationals, the abolition of the
political offence exception or the effective enforcement of US
determinate sentences for nationals returned to other EU Member
States. Similarly, discussions on the application of provisions
equivalent to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (1990)
have been postponed to a possible future MLA Agreement.
22. In response, the US has sought to ensure
that there remains some elements of added value. In particular
the US was anxious to retain Article 10(2) of the Extradition
Agreement and to avoid specific references to the International
Criminal Court or the Special Courts (Military Tribunals) which
could be used to try some terrorism cases. The Government was
satisfied that the text of the Extradition Agreement would not
inhibit the UK from giving ICC requests priority, or from refusing
extradition to face a Military Tribunal which did not meet the
fair trial requirements of the ECHR or Human Rights Act. The explanatory
note to Article 10 of the Extradition Agreement confirms the relationship
with requests from the ICC.
23. Whilst there are elements of the text
which are not ideally drafted from a UK perspective, the Government
agrees with the Presidency's assessment that further negotiations
with the US are unlikely to be productive. The text reflects the
differing concerns of the 15 Member States and the USA. However,
the Government is satisfied that the explanatory notes are sufficient
for it to determine the extent of its obligations under the Agreements.
In particular, they confirm that Article 8 of the MLA Agreement
does not impose an obligation to provide information to administrative
bodies which have no criminal investigation function, because
that would go beyond the competence of an Article 38 Agreement.
The provisions of Article 8 are therefore consistent with both
the UK/US bilateral (Article 7 of which refers to administrative
hearings), and Section 4 of the Criminal Justice (International
Co-operation) Act 1990.
24. Article 4 of the MLA Agreement, in effect,
extends to the US the provisions of the Protocol to the 2000 EU
Mutual Legal Assistance Convention. Subsection (4)(b) is required
for those Member States which either have no bilateral MLA Treaty,
or where those treaties do not already provide for account identification
assistance, or where the Member State has not criminalised the
laundering of the proceeds of the offender's own crime, including
terrorist financing. The UK cannot currently provide assistance
in identifying bank accounts. Although we shall be able to do
so when the relevant powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act enters
into force and the Crime (International Co-operation) Bill is
enacted and enters into force. The UK can already provide details
of identified bank accounts under existing MLA arrangements.
25. As indicated at paragraph 15 above,
the JIT provisions at Article 5 of the MLA Agreement may require
legislation; probably secondary rather than primary, which would
speed up the ability of the UK to meet the requirements of the
Agreement. The Government is considering whether to seek to negotiate
a supplementary bilateral agreement with the US, which officials
have started to discuss. Such a bilateral agreement could also
clarify certain operational procedures, including the question
of civil and criminal liabilities in sections 88 and 89 of the
Police Act 1996 (as amended). Alternatively, the discussions could
decide that such matters could appropriately be left to the competent
authorities establishing JITs to decide, on a case-by-case basis,
as envisaged, in the Article 5(2) references to "procedures"
and "terms of participation".
26. Article 9 of the draft MLA Agreement
relates to data protection. It restricts the use of evidence or
information by the requesting state to certain listed circumstances
and enables the requested state to place additional restrictions
on a case-by-case basis. Its provisions are not significantly
different from those of the UK/US bilateral MLA Treaty, except
for Article 9(1)(b) which allows the requesting state to use evidence
or information to prevent an immediate and serious threat to public
security without obtaining the prior consent of the requested
state. Such occurrences are likely to be rare, and in any event
it is unlikely that a requested country would be aware of any
such use of information under current arrangements. The explanatory
note to Article 9 reflects a similar provision in the Council
of Europe Cybercrime Convention.
27. The provisions of Article 14 of the
draft Extradition Agreement are already common practice in UK/US
extradition cases, where either side has concerns about the public
disclosure of sensitive information (for example relating to sources
of intelligence or identifying potentially vulnerable witnesses).
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
28. No direct financial costs have been
identified at this stage. But should agreement be reached, we
anticipate that the unit costs associated with the execution of
requests under Article 4 of the MLA Agreement would reflect those
estimated in relation to the Proceeds of Crime Act and the Crime
(IC) Bill. Other costs are anticipated as minimal, given the existing
extensive UK/US cooperation in these matters.
TIMETABLE
29. The Presidency intends to seek adoption
of the Council Decision authorising signature of the Agreements
at the JHA Council on 5-6 June, in order to sign the Agreements
at the EU/US summit on 25 June.
13 May 2003
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