76. We have already noted in our previous chapters the significant gaps in capabilities that have been identified by the European Union and the uncertain status of the ESDP's command and control structure. It is clear that the EU will be unable to reach the headline goal in respect of the full range of Petersberg tasks within the next few years, and thus we will state where the EU needs to focus its efforts.

CAPABILITIES

77. The list of capability gaps provided to us by the Secretary of State for Defence does not make a qualitative differentiation between those capabilities, and does not stress which deficiencies require most urgent attention: for example, the "Press Info Group" is listed in the same category of "shortfalls for which the situation has improved" as Combat Search and Rescue. Nor does it state the cost of providing such capabilities. We believe it is important to give priority to the deficiencies that must be remedied immediately, especially since EU governments have declared the EU force operational.[49]

78. The capabilities deficiencies that were noted most frequently by our witnesses were air-to-air refuelling, sea and air heavy lift, secure communications, suppression of enemy air defences and intelligence. Without these capabilities an EU-led force will only be capable of effectively carrying out less demanding Petersberg tasks. If EU governments eliminate these deficiencies not only will it allow the EU to respond to the full range of Petersberg tasks, but it will also offer a complement to US capabilities and, according to General Naumann, will make Europe an indispensable partner to the indispensable nation, the United States of America. (Q443)

WHAT MISSIONS SHOULD THE EU BE CONTEMPLATING?

79. At the Laeken European Council in December 2001, the ESDP was declared operational. There is not as yet any statement of what EU governments believe such a force is capable of undertaking, but it might reasonably be expected that the EU considers itself capable of a small operation at the lower level of the Petersberg tasks, such as peacekeeping. Even so, witnesses expressed considerable doubt as to whether the EU should consider the deployment of forces unless it is capable of managing any potential escalation in conflict.

80. As noted earlier it also remains unclear to what extent the European Union will be able to draw upon all the national resources that have so far been pledged. Of the 100,000 or so troops so far committed, some are conscripts, and it is difficult to judge whether they are deployable at all. The German government has suggested that there should be two tiers of forces, but there is much division on this issue for reasons discussed earlier in this report. In addition concern remains over the coherence of the national capabilities committed to the ESDP. There is no doubt the EU will have to concentrate significantly on developing inter-operability and we note the need to carry out field training and command post exercises in readiness for any future EU-led military operation.

81. At the European Council at Feira in Portugal in June 2000 member states agreed to establish by 2003 a separate facility, consisting of 5,000 police officers, which could operate in a post-conflict situation, perhaps in the aftermath of a rapid-reaction force operation. As we note in our introduction, the civilian aspect of the ESDP has been much overlooked, but it is of vital importance in the aftermath of a conflict when stability has been attained and when the priority is to re-establish law and order and a working judicial system[50]. There are currently 18,000 troops in Bosnia, some of whom could be replaced if such a pool were operational.

CONSTRUCTING AND TESTING COMMAND AND CONTROL

82. Finally, we have noted earlier the importance of creating proper command and control mechanisms. To date, there has been insufficient progress in establishing and testing command and control mechanisms. This matter should be a priority of the EU.[51]

83. The political problems of establishing command and control are, as noted in previous chapters, far from solved, and the EU will need to make progress on the mechanisms to include non-EU members of NATO in ESDP. Specifically, the remaining obstacles in securing Turkish approval must be removed. One of the most pressing tasks is for EU governments to resolve this problem.

1. Some progress has been made, in that mechanisms are in place to allow "constructive abstention", but there is still disagreement between member states over the need for a UN mandate at the higher end of the Petersberg spectrum. Charles Grant talked of a "deliberate fudge" (Q417), with the Swedes and the Finns insisting on it and the British taking a contrary view. His opinion was that "there are different views on this, and therefore it is being left ambiguous, quite deliberately." (Q417) He continued by saying that "the way the ESDP is being planned, nobody is forcing any country to send its troops if it does not want to. So there are provisions for coalitions of the willing. That is how it would work anyway. Therefore, I think the Finns or whoever, if they did not want to take part, would just say, "Sorry, we're opting out of this." I am not too worried by this particular fudge." (Q418) Despite the declaration at Laeken that an EU military capability is now operational we agree with the Secretary of State for Defence who remarked that the Government would "Keep our eye on 2003...what we will be looking for is a steady build-up of operationality between now and then. I want to emphasise the British approach to this will be to test against capabilities." (Q319)

50   According to the draft Presidency Report on the ESDP, submitted to the Laeken European Council (15193/01), the targets set at Feira haven been met. 1,400 of these officers are meant to be deployable within 30 days. Back

51   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back