THE HEADLINE GOALS AND THE CAPABILITIES REQUIRED

46. To make the ESDP effective it will be necessary to develop real military capabilities and robust command and control systems that can operate efficiently and effectively in time of crisis. In this chapter we will examine what progress the EU has made in the areas of capabilities and command and control.

47. At Helsinki EU governments set themselves the goal of being able to conduct the full range of Petersberg tasks by 2003, and in doing so committed themselves to being able to deploy within two months 50-60,000 troops which could be sustained for a year. It is therefore important to consider the military requirements of the Petersberg tasks and to assess whether the capabilities necessary will be delivered on time and in such a manner as to enable the EU to be able to undertake the full range of tasks in all scenarios.

48. We note that the Helsinki headline goals were ambiguous on two key issues. First, they did not define in detail the type of military operations that an EU force might undertake. The range of military operations implied by the Petersberg tasks covers the whole spectrum of conflict from policing tasks, up to the point of war fighting. Our witnesses offered widely differing views as to what the Petersberg tasks were and what an EU force might be capable of undertaking. Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform, summarised the varying views by noting that

"The Petersberg tasks were, I imagine, deliberately framed in such a vague way that they are all things to all people. What they are not is collective self-defence, clearly. What they are not is bombing Serbia, and what they are not is hunting for al Qaeda in the hills of Afghanistan. But many people say that the Petersberg tasks are peacemaking. That is the word used. That could mean separating parties in a civil war, which could be a rather high-intensity conflict. I have always assumed that they are sufficiently vague to allow them to refer to high intensity conflict if the EU wanted them to. The British line has always been to downplay that and stress how modest they are. The French like to think more longer term than the British and like to stress the higher end of the Petersberg tasks as something for which the EU should prepare." (Q426)

49. Secondly, we found no evidence of a geographical limit to the Petersberg tasks. These issues have implications for force development and the cost of meeting the headline goals. For example, the lack of geographical limits has implications for training, deployment, force protection and sustainability, implying that troops might be required to fight in all climates, and that lines of supply and communication need to be capable of servicing them far beyond Europe. The size of the EU force of 60,000 troops—a corps sized unit—implies at least some limits on what the EU can do at any one time, but our witnesses had widely differing views on this issue. Ben Bradshaw MP, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was asked by the Committee to define the recent crises which might have come within the scope of the Petersberg tasks, but replied that "crises do not lend themselves to such precise definition" and set out a number of tests for deploying troops under the tasks, thus implying that no geographical limits had been devised.[27] The Secretary of State for Defence supported this, mentioning UN-led missions in Mozambique, Sierra Leone and East Timor as possibilities (Q292, Q329) and saying that "the world is a much less predictable place and … we are likely to have to use our armed forces in a number of theatres that we would never have anticipated before." (Q277) In his speech in Bangalore, India, on 5 January 2002 the Prime Minister set out Britain's global obligations commenting:

"We are not a superpower, but we can act as a pivotal partner, acting with others to make sense of this global interdependence and make it a force for good, for our own nation and the wider world. In so doing, I believe we have found a modern foreign policy role for Britain."

—  A year ago, few would have contemplated the deployment of British forces in Afghanistan. The further the distance from the European Union, the greater the need for extremely sophisticated command, control, communication and logistical support to operate over considerable distances. But Sir John Weston, for his part, viewed "with some scepticism the notion that the ESDP one fine day is suddenly going to prove able to reach effectively and militarily to the most difficult spots in the world" (Q255). Greater clarity in establishing the military tasks that an EU force might be capable of undertaking and where and how it might be expected to operate is central to effective force development.[28]

THE CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT AND IMPROVEMENT CONFERENCES, 2000-2001

50. EU governments have been fully aware that if they are to produce an effective ESDP, they will need to acquire the relevant capabilities. Indeed, according to the Secretary of State for Defence, the whole purpose of the ESDP is to improve capabilities: he told us that "We went into this as a means of improving military capabilities in Europe as a contribution not only to Europe's ability to complement its Common Foreign and Security Policy, but also as a means of ensuring that the capabilities available to NATO were improved" (Q310). The seriousness of this is illustrated by the following earlier exchange:

Lord Powell of Bayswater: "Would the Secretary of State conclude from that that the European defence co-operation is really only worth while if it does produce these extra capabilities? If, at the end of a period, it does not do that, then perhaps one should reconsider and decide that this has not been a very good initiative and return to the NATO framework?"

Mr Hoon: "Yes." (Q306)

51. To this end, two conferences have so far been convened with the goal of ensuring that these capabilities are assembled. In November 2000, the EU defence ministers met in Brussels to convene the Capabilities Commitment Conference, at which member states and others committed some 100,000 troops[29] towards the headline goals, including 12,500 troops from the United Kingdom. There has been some confusion over the level of United Kingdom commitment. Ben Bradshaw MP talked of 20,000 troops, 15,000 of which could be deployable at any one time (Q153). However, Lord Bach, Under-Secretary of State for Defence, told the House of Lords on 9th January 2002 that: "the United Kingdom has identified a pool of relevant forces and capabilities up to a maximum of 12,500 troops, plus, if required, up to 18 warships and 72 combat aircraft." (HL Hansard, column 556).[30]

52. At first sight, these pledges look impressive, even exceeding the requirement set at Helsinki for 50-60,000 troops. We should note, however, that when examined closely it represents only a start. This is because, first, to sustain a force of 60,000, up to three times that figure are required to ensure a proper rotation of fresh and adequately trained troops, and, according to Professor Clarke, to attain the necessary number of troops will require EU governments committing something like 20 per cent of their available non-conscript forces (Q97). In addition, since some of the details remain confidential it is unclear whether this 100,000 offers an appropriate balance of personnel and capabilities. Moreover, witnesses remarked that it is important to avoid excessive concentration on numbers of armed forces at the expense of the quality of armed forces, their availability and sustainability. The Secretary of State for Defence noted that "Countries make their own arrangements for meeting the standards specified. No distinction is made between conscript and professional forces at this stage."[31]

53. We consider that the Capabilities Commitments Conference was a useful start and that significant progress was made on the need to provide core capabilities with some 94 of 144 capability targets being met. Progress continued throughout last year and, in November 2001, member states met at the follow-up Capabilities Improvement Conference, at which 10 of the remaining 50 capabilities shortfalls were declared to have been remedied, as listed below.

54. There remain, however, 40 capabilities shortfalls to be remedied and, while it is encouraging in any case to note that 104 of the original 144 shortfalls recorded in 2000 have been accounted for, the list of what remains is striking.

55. The EU has classified the list into 10 shortfalls where the situation has improved and 30 areas for which no improvement is yet discernible. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that to rectify many of the shortfalls would be costly and it will take some time for such capabilities to be delivered: in many cases the capabilities will not be ready until the medium term, or 2010-2012. This is acknowledged by the Secretary of State for Defence, who told us that "we have done the easy part of the process by identifying each country's contribution to the headline goal, and this year we are moving into the more difficult part, which is how we each address the shortfalls and take the tough decisions on doing that both financially and collectively" (Q259). If we examine the list, in areas in need of "improvement" this includes carrier-based air power, cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions. Real problems also remain in the list of "other remaining shortfalls" where witnesses drew our attention to the lack of attack helicopters, air-to-air refuelling, suppression of enemy air defence and general cargo shipping[35]. The list was supplied to the Sub-Committee a mere two weeks before Laeken Council at which the ESDP was declared operational, and therefore we can only conclude that the declaration was made on political rather than military grounds, even if the Secretary of State did tell us that "There will be no point in declaring some sort of operationality if, frankly, we cannot do it." (Q319)

56. Many of the capabilities shortfalls will require long procurement cycles and, even if decisions are taken now, the capabilities will not be available for many years. There is therefore little likelihood of many of these remaining gaps in capabilities being covered by 2003. The European Union will not be able to fulfil its headline goal of being able to rapidly deploy and sustain forces across the whole range of the Petersberg tasks. Indeed, according to many of our witnesses, it is unlikely that this goal will be attained much before the end of this decade: for example, according to General Naumann, "if you really look at the list of identified shortfalls and what they have now promised to deliver, you will detect that the critical shortfalls are not yet covered by commitments and that most of those critical shortfalls will not be covered much earlier than 2008." (Q439)[36]

CAN WE TAKE THE PLEDGES AT FACE VALUE?

57. We note that the forces and capabilities pledged to the ESDP are national rather than EU assets, and the problem is the extent to which we can take these commitments at face value. Many governments pledge troops and capabilities for national, United Nations and NATO purposes simultaneously, often double or triple-hatting the same forces to different organisations. We were unable to gauge the extent to which the pledge of 100,000 troops is affected by this sort of behaviour, although some witnesses were wary: Sir John Keegan, for example, warned of "Lots of promises, lots of double counting and even triple counting too to make the promises stand up" (Q46) and Iain Duncan Smith said that "here we have 100,000 ground troops, some 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships. Where are they coming from? They are not new assets. They are assets that are already, for most of the NATO nations, nominated for NATO operations." (Q2) He believed that "there will not be a single extra soldier, aircraft or ship created for this that is not already allocated somewhere else." (Q36).

58. We also note that the EU requirement of forces and capabilities for a particular operation and the commitments of member states under current arrangements will create planning uncertainties in the task of putting together a force package. This will especially be the case if the ESDP becomes too dependent on role specialisation, and where individual countries with specific roles opt out of any particular operation. We also note that the intergovernmental voluntary nature of undertaking operations should not allow governments permanently to opt out of putting soldiers in harms way if an EU led force is to be politically credible.[37]

DEFENCE SPENDING

59. Our witnesses made clear that irrespective of the individual pledges, fulfilling capabilities shortfalls is going to require increased and sustained defence expenditure. According to Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, "the basic problem, which has been a problem from the start, remains money." (Q339) The ESDP is an intergovernmental activity and it is member state governments that will have to fund the creation of new capabilities to which they are publicly committed.

60. Trends in defence expenditure since the launch of the ESDP are hard to detect. For many countries, however, defence spending is at historically low levels. According to the IISS, recent defence spending is as follows:

—  By comparison, the United States spent $294,695 million, or 3.0 per cent of its GDP on defence in 2000, compared with 3.2 per cent in 1998.

61. In terms of trends in defence spending, compared with figures that we noted at the time of our last report in July 2000, an increase in spending only occurred in Germany, Greece and the Netherlands, and in each case by only 0.1 percentage points. Spending remains constant in Austria and Spain, and in each of the ten remaining countries a decrease is recorded. We note that sustained increases are required in some countries against a very low level of defence expenditure for many years, although Germany's military capabilities could be built up more quickly than others.

62. What is unclear from the figures is the extent to which the member states may have adjusted their future expenditure plans to take into account the needs of the ESDP and the changing priorities consequent to September 11^th. Some witnesses suggested that in the light of these developments, member states would increase defence budgets: for example, Professor Clarke pointed out that "There is a certain amount of circumstantial evidence that it [the ESDP] has helped to stabilise declining defence budgets" (Q107) However, others were less sanguine. Sir John Keegan said that "in every European country the problem with improving defence capabilities is not so much the striking of attitudes, it is fighting the war with the exchequer over the competition for social policies … the armed forces are going to find their lives more and more difficult as social welfare becomes the overriding concern of governments." (Q58) His conclusion was that "There is no sign at all that they are willing to produce the money." (Q92)[39] Illustrative of this uncertainty is the case of the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft, which, after much negotiation, was the subject of a deal signed by eight EU defence ministers in December 2001. Under this deal, the eight EU member states would buy 196 planes, including 73 for Germany[40]. However, as we went to press, there was new uncertainty as to whether Germany could afford its order[41], and in doing so, maintain the entire viability of the project which is dependent on an order of 180 planes. This comes shortly after Italy's decision to withdraw from the same order before the December 2001 deal was signed. There is now a considerable risk that the project will collapse and a significant setback to plans to enhance Europe's capabilities could possibly arise.

63. However we note that in addition to the need to increase defence spending to fund new capabilities, it is equally important that existing funding is spent efficiently, effectively and in a way which encourages inter-operability. We have already seen that Germany is concentrating much of its efforts on converting its armed forces from cold war to Petersberg tasks, and we note that other governments have followed the lead taken by the United Kingdom in undertaking a strategic defence review. If handled properly, the ending of conscription in many countries should also enhance military capabilities.

64. Enhanced and efficient defence expenditure and force restructuring must go hand in hand with improved training at individual, formation and joint levels. This will need time and money. The gulf in training standards is not just a matter of regular and conscript forces. The EU must ensure that standards of training at all levels are laid down and monitored under the ESDP.[42] The EU must move quickly to organise exercises. We note that a single high level command and control exercise will take place in May, but this must be supplemented by a more extensive exercise programme as soon as possible.

65. There is also potential for role specialisation and perhaps for even greater savings from procurement and inter-operability. For example, some governments are combining efforts with other countries: the Netherlands has voted money to Germany to procure jointly heavy air lift, and negotiations are underway between Belgium and the Netherlands to combine their naval forces. Such developments point to the growing realisation that at least for some states it is too costly to have a complete range of national forces. The Secretary of State for Defence suggested the headline goal offers the possibility of complementarity rather than duplication and drew our attention to several encouraging developments with nations "…who do not have a strong military reputation recognising that they can play a part. A third of their contribution would not achieve much, but by acting together to satisfy the definition that they have set for themselves of being able to offer a brigade over a long period of time, satisfying the headline goal, is enormously significant." (Q314) We note too the need for improved mechanisms for procurement and interoperability, both on a national and European level where significant savings could be realised.

66. While we note the potential financial benefits of role specialisation, we must exercise a degree of caution. To maintain coherence and fighting capability, brigades (equivalent to 3,000-5,000 troops) are the most efficient formation that should be deployed at the top end of the Petersberg tasks, for example for peace enforcement operations. Role specialisation will only be effective if planners can be sure that the nominated units, formations or assets can be guaranteed to be always available for the duration of the operation. Forming multinational forces for specialist roles, for example strategic lift, may be a better way to proceed. This will require a considerable degree of political will; and it has implications for the concept of coalitions of the willing.

67. The fact remains that defence expenditure will have to rise if the ESDP objectives are to be met. As is made clear by Professor Freedman and others, there is not much evidence that it will rise, or consequently, that the Helsinki headline goals will be met (QQ371-372). Increasing expenditure will not be an easy task, but politicians must realise that they will not be able to produce enhanced military capabilities without providing new resources, and they cannot simply claim that they will be able to find the necessary resources from efficiency savings. More effective defence spending, role specialisation, inter-operability and improved procurement practices are critical measures to ensure that the ESDP is properly resourced. Nevertheless, we reach the inescapable conclusion that EU governments will need to increase defence expenditure in real terms if real capabilities are to match the objectives set out at Helsinki.[43]

COMMAND AND CONTROL

68. In our first report, we noted the importance of creating a robust and responsive command and control mechanism if an EU-led force is to be effective. Since then the EU has established an interim Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. We note two concerns with the existing command and control arrangements. First, in spite of the declaration at Laeken in December 2001 that an EU force was operational, none of our witnesses believed that in peacetime or in a crisis sufficiently robust mechanisms have been created for the EU to run tasks at an operational level in military terms. General Naumann, for example, stressed that "The European Union has at this point in time no real appropriate command and control capability. They have to go back to nations and ask one nation to be the lead nation or go to NATO and ask NATO for the headquarters to do the command and control." (Q451) This contrasts with the view of NATO command and control, where practices had been developed over 50 years. According to Sir John Keegan,

"It was an extremely efficient organisation and what is more, not only was the structure efficient but its components were efficient because they all knew each other, they trained together, they went on exercise together, all year long, year after year… And the one time that the NATO system was tried out in practice (which was when the NATO Army was effectively taken to the Gulf in 1991) it worked with quite horrifying efficiency." (Q66)

—  In particular we remain concerned about the ability to deploy Headquarters for EU-led missions, especially at the operational level of command between the strategic and tactical, and how this will be managed in practice without relying on NATO command and control structures.[44]

69. Secondly, it is important that there is proper co-ordination between EU and NATO planning staff, to ensure transparency and coherence in their respective activities. Some witnesses regretted that EU governments had not fully located the ESDP within NATO structures and feared competition between rival organisations in times of crisis: Sir John Keegan pointed to the need for "absolutely agreed inter-operable staff systems and operational procedures and communication systems" (Q81). We have been somewhat reassured that national representatives of all member states except France and Belgium are the same as those who sit on the equivalent NATO committees. Nevertheless, in the event of a crisis it is important that the organisations of NATO and EU do not compete but work in partnership with each other.

70. There are suggestions that there might be an arrangement in which the four neutral countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden) looked after contingency planning, so that NATO planners and EU planners were not making separate contingency plans that might lead to a debacle in the event of an emergency. These suggestions are controversial and touch upon the neutrality of the four non-NATO EU nations and the autonomy from NATO desired by the French.

71. There was also unease expressed that NATO had itself to undergo further reform and modernisation if it is to retain its relevance—especially in streamlining committee structures and in developing NATO headquarters capable of rapid deployment. As summed up by Professor Freedman, "Those who work in NATO have been rather surprised themselves to have the impression of a smoothly functioning, effortless bureaucratic machine, cranking out decisions expeditiously. It may only appear like that when you compare it to Brussels!" (Q349) Moreover, a number of our witnesses noted a lessening of US interest in using NATO structures. General Naumann commented:

"…the Americans are afraid that nations which do not contribute wish to have an influence in the NATO command structure. The bad experiences of Kosovo are coming back and they do not want to see another operation run by committees." (Q443)

—  Given these experiences, we heard evidence that in future the US might be loath to undertake such a mission through NATO where those who did not contribute military forces wanted to have an influence on the conduct of the operations. General Naumann commented that to ensure a strong transatlantic partnership, the Europeans will need to develop capabilities that the US currently does not possess:

"If we really want to think through the consequences of 11 September…we should try to identify European component force elements which could really supplement American capabilities so that the European contribution to such a contingency operation would really become indispensable to the Americans. With that, I think we could establish a link which would really strengthen the connections between Europe and the United States of America". (Q443)

72. A major command and control issue, which has already been mentioned, is whether the ESDP can work as required by the Helsinki headline goals on a voluntary basis, as a so-called "coalition of the willing". Under such a scenario, member states might be able to opt out of missions as they see fit, but this has very serious implications for planning. If all nations contributed equally to the ESDP in similar fashions, each by a standard package of teeth arms, logistics and material, it would be less problematic if one member state chose not to participate in a particular operation. Whilst Britain, France and Germany could probably meet the headline goal themselves, part of the purpose of the headline goal was to involve all 15 member states in improving the range of military capabilities. Nevertheless, under current arrangements we believe that meeting the headline goal is disproportionately dependent on Britain and France.[45]

73. Problems could also arise if Russia took part in an EU-led operation. Russia and the Ukraine were invited at the European Council at Feira in June 2000 to take part in Petersberg task missions, and Russia already has meetings with the EU's Political and Security Committee and the troika in each EU presidency to discuss defence issues. Russia already has much to offer (such as strategic air-lift capability) for which the EU would otherwise have to rely on NATO, and also could offer a substantial number of troops. Russian participation in a Petersberg mission, however, might also create problems of command and control and complicate the working relationship with NATO.

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

74. In our last report we noted concern about the mechanisms for parliamentary accountability of ESDP and this remains an unresolved issue. Since this EU policy is intergovernmental, we are principally concerned with arrangements for national parliaments to hold their own executive to account. In particular there needs to be a suitable accountability mechanism for decisions taken in the Council of Ministers by British ministers regarding matters which are less than war, but which cover humanitarian and crisis management decisions in which British lives are at stake. Developing such mechanisms requires further attention.

1. However we also note the European Parliament's aspiration to take over the responsibilities of the WEU Assembly and take responsibility for scrutinising collective decisions of the Council of Ministers. There have also been competing proposals to create a European defence assembly and plans to improve national parliamentary contributions to EU decision making. We believe this is unnecessary in view of the existence already of a number of informed parliamentary assemblies. However, democratic accountability is inadequate and the matter must be addressed at both national and European levels if ESDP is to have widespread support of EU citizens.[46] The Government have made clear that they do not believe that the WEU Assembly should take on this role[47]. When asked whether the Government would block attempts by the Assembly to take on the formal role of parliamentary oversight of the ESDP, Mr Bradshaw replied, simply, "Yes" (Q190). They have also suggested that in the interim period before the Inter-Governmental Council in 2004, the work of parliamentary scrutiny could be carried out by the existing international parliamentary bodies: the NATO Assembly, the WEU Assembly and the OSCE Assembly. We support this view and recommend that each of these bodies establish working groups together with a representative from the European Parliament to carry out this work.[48]

28   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back

29   But see para 57. Back

30   We asked Mr Bradshaw which figure was accurate, and he told us that:

"Lord Bach was correct in saying that the United Kingdom has provided 12,500 troops for use on any one occasion from a pool of 20,000 over a period of time. As he went on to say, the 12,500 figure does not include the personnel on board the ships and aircraft we have also made available. The figure of 15,000 troops I quoted in my evidence to your Committee was an estimate of the number of United Kingdom personnel in total which could be used for an EU led crisis management operation including support staff, naval officers, airforce personnel and civilians.

"For the purposes of your report, I suggest that you use Lord Bach's figure of 12,500 troops as representing the maximum United Kingdom infantry commitment to the Helsinki Headline Goal." (p60). Back

31   Letter from Secretary of State for Defence to Chairman of the Sub-Committee, 5^th December 2001. (p88). Back

32   Source: EU capabilities improvement chart, 13997/01. Back

33   Augmentees are those forces needed to bring units up to war time establishment. Back

34   Source: EU capabilities improvement chart, 13997/01. Back

35   See, for example, Alexander and Garden (p130), Duke (p133), Lindley-French (pp158-159) and (pp176-178), and Naumann (Q451). Back

36   See also, for example, Hopkinson (p148). Back

37   Conclusions paragraph 90. Back

38   Note that these figures, taken from The Military Balance 2001-2002, are expressed in constant 1999 dollars. Back

39   See also Iain Duncan Smith (Q19). Back

40   The United Kingdom commitment is 25 planes. Back

41   See, for example, The Daily Telegraph, 21st January 2002, p.11. Back

42   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back

43   Conclusions paragraph 87. Back

44   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back

45   Conclusions paragraph 88. Back

46   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back

47   In a letter to the Chairman dated 10th May 2001, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Baroness Scotland of Asthal, said that "It would not be appropriate for the WEU Assembly to take on a formal role in the Parliamentary oversight of ESDP."  Back

48   Conclusions paragraph 89. Back