Immediately after Chinook ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994, a RAF Board of Inquiry was convened in accordance with standard procedures, to examine the evidence and determine the cause of the accident. A thorough investigation followed, carried out by an expert RAF team, assisted by civilian specialists from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch and manufacturers of the aircraft and its systems.

  No evidence of any technical malfunction was found. After due consideration of all the circumstances, the investigating board determined that the pilots had continued to fly their aircraft towards the Mull, below a safe altitude, in unsuitable weather conditions which they had been warned to expect. This was contrary to the basic rules of airmanship and the reviewing officers, an integral part of the Board of Inquiry process, concluded that in allowing the aircraft to do this, the pilots had not exercised the skill, care or judgement they were known to possess. They were therefore held to be grossly negligent.

  The Board of Inquiry process in this case took a year to complete. Ministers were then fully briefed, and approval was given to the release of the RAF Board of Inquiry report by the then Secretary of State for Defence.

  Some six months later the Fatal Accident Inquiry began before Sheriff Sir Stephen Young. Detailed evidence was taken from a number of witnesses including military personnel during which the overall integrity of the aircraft came under scrutiny. When the Sheriff's determination was published in March 1996, he was not able to determine positively the cause of the accident. As I understand it, the issue of negligence or otherwise of the pilots was not (as the Sheriff himself noted) a matter for that Inquiry.

  Lord Chalfont, leader of the Mull of Kintyre Group, first raised the issue of the findings of the Board of Inquiry in debate in the House of Lords on 22 May 1997. The current administration had only recently taken up office, but after detailed briefing, Ministers were entirely satisfied that the Board of Inquiry had been properly conducted. They accepted the reviewing officers' findings. Successive Ministers have been similarly briefed and all have reached the same conclusions. I refer to the "current administration", simply to register the point that I am unable to comment on the basis on which previous Ministers reached their conclusions since I do not, by convention, have access to their papers.

  This was the first of several such debates. Members of both Houses have also tabled more than 200 questions concerning the accident. There has been intense interest in the media, particularly Channel 4 News and Computer Weekly. Many different issues have been raised, covering a wide range of topics, from technical detail about the aircraft's various components to theories about extreme weather conditions. The Department has examined in detail every issue raised, but nothing has been found which undermines the Board of Inquiry finding. Officials have also examined the papers submitted by Robert Key MP (which were drawn up by Mr Malcolm Perks and Squadron Leader Burke), Computer Weekly's report "RAF Justice", the "Macdonald Report" which was written by three Fellows of the Royal Aeronautical Society (although the Society did not initiate this work nor adopt it), and the paper submitted by Lord Chalfont. Again nothing has been found which has any bearing on the outcome of the RAF Board of Inquiry.

  The Mull of Kintyre accident has been the subject of two previous Parliamentary Committee inquiries. In 1998 the House of Commons Defence Committee considered the lessons of the Chinook crash, taking detailed evidence from the then Armed Forces Minister, Dr John Reid, and officials about many issues, including the overall reliability of the aircraft, the Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC), the aircraft's engine fuel control system. The Committee found no compelling evidence to support claims that the crash of ZD576 pointed to flaws in the design of the Chinook Mk2 or its components (Defence Committee Fourth Report Session 1997-98 refers). The Defence Committee also took evidence about the attribution of blame by Boards of Inquiry. At the time this had been the subject of a Departmental review, and the policy recently changed (although not retrospectively) so Boards of Inquiry no longer attribute blame. This change of policy was welcomed by the Defence Committee.

  The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also considered the accident as part of a wider review of the acceptance of military equipment off contract and into service. It criticised the acceptance procedures for the Chinook Mk2 helicopter, and it suggested that the RAF's Board of Inquiry procedures were flawed and failed, in this case, to meet the necessary standard of proof. But when examined in detail, the PAC report offered no new evidence that would undermine the judgement of the Board of Inquiry. The Government's formal response to the PAC report was set out in the Treasury minute published on 16 March 2001.

  The Government has always made it clear that if new evidence relating to the accident were to come to light, it would be examined with care, thoroughness and compassion. In the absence of any such evidence, there is no basis for further investigation into the accident.