THE MERGER CONTROL REGULATION
24. In contrast to the procedure relating to the
application of Articles 81 and 82, the Merger Control Regulation
(Regulation 4064/89, as amended) introduced a compulsory system
of prior notification for "concentrations" with a Community
dimension. Companies risk fines and the invalidity of their transaction
if they fail to notify. Concentrations generally must not be put
into effect before notification or before the concentration has
been declared compatible with the common market by Commission
decision. The Commission must carry out an initial examination
within one month of notification to ascertain whether the merger
falls within the scope of the Regulation and if so whether serious
doubts are raised as to its compatibility with the common market
(Phase I). If such doubts exist a further examination (up to four
months in length) is set in motion to determine whether the concentration
creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which
competition would be significantly impeded (Phase II). Where the
Commission finds that a concentration significantly impedes competition,
it must declare it incompatible with the common market. The Commission
has power, however, to accept undertakings from the parties to
avoid prohibiting the merger. In practice the vast majority of
mergers notified are cleared at the end of Phase I.
25. The procedural rules governing the notification
and appraisal of concentrations are set out in the Merger Control
Regulation and the Implementing Regulation.[22]
To assist it in the performance of its task the Commission has
coercive powers of enquiry analogous to Articles 11 and 14 of
Regulation 17. Before any final (end of Phase II) decision on
the concentration is reached the parties must be told the case
against them and given the opportunity to respond. The Commission
may order remedial action to be taken if it considers such action
necessary. It has powers to impose fines and penalties to back
up its powers of enquiry and powers to take suspensive and remedial
action. During the procedure the Commission may be assisted by
the competent authorities of the Member States. As in cases under
Articles 81 and 82, decisions of the Commission are subject to
judicial review by the Community Courts.
PHASE II PROCEEDINGS
26. The role of the Hearing Officer was extended
in 1990 to include merger cases. Mergers that cannot be cleared
in the first month are subject to a detailed investigation and
assessment during the Phase II proceedings. Though, unlike Article
81 and 82 cases, there is no question of an "infringement"
of competition laws, the procedure is a contentious one, at least
in the sense that the Commission, if it wishes to proceed to a
decision prohibiting the proposed merger, must set out its case
to the parties and give them the opportunity to respond. The Commission
must supply a statement of objections to which the parties can
respond in writing. They may also have an oral hearing, typically
a two day event, in which third parties, particularly those objecting
to the merger, may play a prominent role. The Hearing Officer
has an important role in allocating time between the parties and
third parties, and ensuring that the issues which are pursued
are relevant and the potentially combative meeting proceeds smoothly.
There were 12 hearings in 1999.[23]
27. The merging parties do not always ask for an
oral hearing because in order to avoid a decision of incompatibility
they may, given the strict four month timetable for Phase II,
prefer to devote more time to negotiating undertakings with the
Commission. Typically the Commission will not deliver its statement
of objections until the end of nine weeks and the parties may,
in practice, have only days in which to inspect the Commission's
file and submit their written reply. There may be as little as
a fortnight between the statement of objections and the oral hearing.
The parties to the merger, mindful of the imminence of the three-month
deadline for the submission of proposals for remedies, may decline
the opportunity for an oral hearing. They may take the view that
a clearance of the merger should be obtainable from the Commission
in return for concessions, and that the time remaining would be
better used in negotiating a mutually acceptable package. Or the
parties may call for a hearing, but rather than contesting the
analysis, arguments and assessments in the Commission's statement
of objections and arguing for an outright clearance (of which
there have been very few at the end of Phase II proceedings) use
it to stage a debate on remedies to any perceived competition
problems the merger might cause.[24]
9 Competition Practice 8th Report 1981-82, HL
paper 91. Back
10
Article 5 of the 1994 Decision. Back
11
The 'equality of arms' principle ensures that each party to a
proceeding should have an equal opportunity to present their case
and that no party should enjoy any substantial advantage over
their opponent. Dombo Beheer: Judgment 27 October 1993,
Series A no 274, p19, para 35. Back
12
Article 11 (2) of Regulation 2842/98 Back
13
Article 4(2) of Regulation 2842/98 Back
14
Article 12(3) of Regulation 2842/98 Back
15
Article 10 of Regulation 2842/98 and Article 7 of the 1994 Decision. Back
16
The Committee is grateful to the Commission for supplying an example
of a Hearing Officer report. The document was supplied on a confidential
basis and is not printed with this Report. Back
17
The style and format of the report would seem to depend much on
the Hearing Officer himself as well as the nature of the case.
Dr Johannes reported that when he was Hearing Officer "In
about 70 to 75 per cent of all cases the report consisted of two
sentences: "I share the opinion of the service as the assessment
of Article 81/82." The second sentence: "The parties
did not claim any violation of the right of defence and I myself
could not see any" - signature" (Q 241). Back
18
QQ 165,174, 177. Back
19
Article 9 of the 1994 Decision only entitles the Hearing Officer
to go direct to the Competition Commissioner (Q 227). Back
20
Q 181. Back
21
QQ 223, 225, 228, 230. Back
22
Regulation 447/98. Back
23
Q 3. Back
24
Alec Burnside, The governance of EC Merger Control - Bumps
in the level playing field, Paper presented to the EC Merger
Control 10th Anniversary Conference, Brussels, 14-15 September
2000. Back