Geography and history
41. In evidence to the Committee, the Secretary of
State for Defence acknowledged that the Petersberg tasks "are
not precisely defined and quite deliberately so; that would give
a great deal of flexibility…we would simply have to make
a judgement according to the particular circumstances." (Q360).
However, this absence of clarity concerning the tasks for an
EU-led force raise serious issues about the type of force requirements
for elaborating the headline goal and for making the European
capability credible.
42. Few witnesses ventured to define possible future
scenarios for Petersberg-style missions, but there are several
examples from the past decade of defence missions which might
fall within the technical remit and definition of an EU-led mission
using all or part of the 50-60,000 strong force. Bosnia and Kosovo
are the most obvious, but one could also consider the Italian-led
operation in Albania in 1998 and, further afield, the UN-led missions
in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, East Timor and Sierra Leone. Surprisingly,
a scenario like Rwanda was seen as particularly appropriate for
EU involvement by Mr Richard Hatfield, Policy Director of the
Ministry of Defence. He told us that "Were that situation
to come up again, it could be done under European Union auspices
but it would not be done under NATO auspices because NATO has
no security role in relation to Central Africa." (Q360)
A UN mandate for this type of operation would be important in
shaping the character of such deployments both inside and outside
Europe. The list of possible defence missions demonstrates not
only the range of potential tasks, but also the distances which
may be involved.
43. The list also demonstrates the seriousness of
the tasks involved: they extend well beyond gendarmerie
functions and involve active peacemaking, and in many cases could
involve loss of life. They may demand extremely sophisticated
and expensive command, control, communication and logistical support
over considerable distances. These elements will only be available
if further expenditure is made in developing the necessary capabilities.
44. In theory, geographical limits have not been
set for the Petersberg tasks. This was defended by General Naumann,
who told us "that we should not try to identify … areas
of potential intervention for either NATO or the European Union,
we should leave it to a case by case decision"; but he accepted
that in practice limits will apply: "Of course, we will
see limitations with regard to our capability since much is being
determined by transport capabilities, by logistics." (Q309).
45. There is however, no agreement as to where practical
limits lie[20].
Lord Wallace speculated that "an operation in Rwanda or,
heaven knows, Congo or in the further Gulf is about as far as
we are talking about" (Q50), although Dr Malcolm Chalmers
of the University of Bradford believed that "It is clear,
however, that the "in-area" does not include sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East or Central Asia. It is still difficult
to see either NATO or the EU playing a significant role in organising
collective military operations in these "out-of-area"
regions." (p149)
46. Geographical diversity creates differences of
priorities. Those Member States on the eastern border of the
EU share concerns about and with central European neighbours.
For southern Member States, the Mediterranean is an important
concern, especially in respect of political and economic issues
in the eastern Aegean and in the (former French) North African
states.[21]
The accession of Finland and Sweden has strengthened a northern
perspective and raised the profiles of issues in the Baltic and
Barents Seas region, not least relations with Russia. Moreover,
different interests in different geographical regions have often
made it difficult to agree on a common EU approach. French and
Belgian engagement in Zaire and Rwanda embarrassed some Member
States, and, as pointed out by Dr Chalmers, any future EU action
in Africa "would first have to overcome the continuing commitment
of some European states (especially France and the United Kingdom)
to national spheres of influence in the continent." (p.150).
Furthermore, Greek interests in the southern Balkans hindered
collective EU recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.[22]
47. Whatever the definition of the geographical limits,
it seems likely that the European Union will be most concerned
with tasks in its neighbouring areas. Even here it may be difficult
to reach agreement on such tasks when they arise, since global
as well as regional interests may be involved. For example, just
as Greek sympathy towards Serbia made it difficult for the EU
to act with common accord in the Balkans, so, in one scenario,
the historic sympathies of the Turks towards the Azeris and their
enmity with the Armenians might affect any EU involvement in the
southern Caucasus[23].
Russian interests in states which were part of the former Soviet
Union may in practice further limit where the EU governments feel
willing and able to act.
The dividing line between NATO
and the EU
48. As well as defining when it will be suitable
for an EU-led operation, it will also be necessary to define who
will lead such an operation. The Helsinki Declaration's aim is
that the EU should develop the capability to undertake the full
range of Petersberg tasks, but it is clear that some of the Petersberg
tasks will be best left to NATO. Mr Jones Parry told us that
"If one looks at how we would have responded to Kosovo, I
find it deeply unattractive to imagine the European Union taking
on that exercise. For anything on that scale it must be a NATO
exercise." (Q6) On some occasions the non-EU members of
NATO (and in particular, the US) will wish to participate in certain
EU-led missions: according to the United States Embassy, "It
is overwhelmingly likely that in any situation where anyone's
military involvement on a significant scale is justified, and
where there is a consensus in Europe to undertake a military operation,
the United States would be part of the operation." (p213)
49. As is the case with the multinational Eurocorps[24]
currently deployed in Kosovo, the EU's rapid reaction force may
often be part of a NATO-led operation. As pointed out by Lord
Wallace, "A large part of the purpose of this initiative
is of course to provide a better European contribution to such
an American-led exercise" (Q39). At the moment, the EU is
not suited to managing the full range of Petersberg tasks, and
nor is it clear that the EU will ever lead the full range of Petersberg
tasks. It is therefore unrealistic to divide the lines of responsibility
in such a way as simply to delegate territorial defence to NATO
and Petersberg tasks to the EU. This is reinforced by the fact
that an EU-led capability will as a matter of course need to ensure
NATO—and especially US—backing when it becomes involved
in any situation where conflict may escalate.
50. The EU lacks key capabilities that both NATO
and more specifically the US have, and this will be discussed
in the next chapter. Evidence suggests that it is inconceivable
that the EU would undertake missions without US consent, but such
missions could be undertaken without US participation. This appears
to be generally accepted: for example, Rear Admiral[25]
Pierre Sabatié-Garat, the Defence Attaché at the
French Embassy, told us that "we do not see any situation,
any scenario, where we will act against the US interests, that
would be a nonsense." (Q192) For the successful conduct
of EU-led operations it is reasonable to assume that NATO would
be given the first right of refusal to lead an operation[26].
It is, however, important to note that this particular sequencing
of events is not accepted by some EU Member States. This is a
sensitive issue for the French Government which opposes explicitly
offering NATO first right of refusal on all missions. Nevertheless,
as Lord Robertson has made clear, in practice the US Government
effectively holds a veto over any EU operations because of its
position in NATO and because of its manifestly superior capabilities.
51. There are many risks for the EU in getting involved
in the full range of Petersberg tasks. This term covers a broad
range of activities from active peacekeeping to crisis management.
There is an important distinction between "peacekeeping"
where agreement between warring parties exists for an intervention
force, and "peacemaking" which could amount to war.
This latter task is currently unsuitable for the EU. Moreover,
the EU will need to demonstrate restraint in involving itself
in situations that have the potential to escalate. At the very
least, the EU must only involve itself in such missions when it
can either manage escalation with its own resources (in the case
of small operations) or when it can expect assistance from the
United States (for larger operations). The Secretary of State
for Defence acknowledged this when he told us that "I cannot
foresee a situation in which, for a major commitment of the kinds
in the Balkans, we could take such a decision without the active
support of the United States." (Q384) What is absolutely
imperative is that the EU must not lead an operation before it
has achieved the full range of necessary capabilities or can rely
on the assistance of NATO. There may be a temptation, if the
political need for an operation arises, to conduct an EU-led mission
for symbolic purposes before the EU is ready to do so. This must
not happen. We should accept that this means that no action may
take place in circumstances when the EU would be reluctant to
embark on an operation when the US was not prepared to be involved,
but where the EU feared that the situation might escalate to a
point where US involvement became vital. The next chapter makes
clear that it may be some time—and after considerable investment
in particular areas—before the EU has the range of necessary
capabilities.
20 Although in the case of missions outside the EU's
surrounding regions, such missions would be performed under the
authority of the United Nations. Back
21
See, for example, Menon, QQ 447-449. Back
22
A number of EU governments have given full diplomatic recognition
to the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Back
23
See for example Park, Q400. In such a scenario, the consensus
of Russia and Iran would also be important. Back
24
The Eurocorps was established in May 1992 at a Franco-German Summit.
The 50,000 strong corps initially comprised French and German
troops and now includes forces from Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Spain. Its remit is to operate within article V of the WEU
and article 5 of NATO. For further details, see Andreani (Q83). Back
25
Now Vice-Admiral. Back
26
For more consideration of why NATO should have first right of
refusal, see paragraphs 72-73. Back
