CHAPTER 4: TECHNICAL
ANALYSIS
GEOLOGICAL DISPOSAL OF HLW AND ILW
4.19 The evidence given to us shows that there is
a strong international scientific and technical consensus that
there is enough confidence in geological disposal of HLW and ILW
to make it worthwhile to work towards it (see Chapter 3 and, for
example, p 136, QQ 957-959). Only a small minority in the geological
community, and in other disciplines, feel that there is so little
confidence in geological disposal that it should be abandoned,
or that it should cease to be the focus of most R&D (see,
for example, Friends of the Earth, pp 322-328).
4.20 Various courses of action can be defined which
involve proceeding with geological disposal, using surface storage
until one or more deep repositories are available. At one end
of the scale is the strategy followed over the last decade in
the United Kingdom, in which the surface storage period was planned
to be as short as possible, and it was envisaged that the repository
would be finally sealed when all the wastes had been emplaced[28].
In the middle of the spectrum of courses of action is a strategy
with a surface storage period prior to emplacement in a repository,
and a long time in which a repository is kept open with wastes
in a retrievable form (see, for example, p122, QQ1706-1714, QQ545-547).
At the far end of the spectrum of courses of action is indefinite
storage of long-lived wastes on the surface, combined with an
R&D programme on longer-term management methods including,
perhaps, geological disposal (see, for example, Friends of the
Earth, P318).
Status
of knowledge
4.21 The main scientific determinant of the way to
proceed with geological disposal is the ability to predict the
performance of a deep repository over the hundreds of thousands
of years it will take for the radioactive constituents of the
wastes to decay to very low levels. By "performance"
we mean the capability of all the parts of a repository to prevent
releases of radionuclides and/or to slow down their rates of movement
into the surface environment. Assessments of repository performance
are necessarily probabilistic because it will never be possible
to predict exactly what will happen over such long times. Rather
the aim is to identify possibilities and to quantify, or at least
describe, uncertainties. Performance assessment is a mixture of
quantitative analyses, using mathematical models (for example,
of radionuclide migration with groundwater), semi-quantitative
analyses ("scoping calculations") and qualitative reasoning[29].
Similarly, the criteria by which the adequacy of predicted repository
performance will be judged are both quantitative and qualitative[30].
4.22 . The research carried out to date world-wide
has increased considerably the ability to assess repository performance
over very long times.[31]
Initial "guesstimates" about the rates at which waste
packages will corrode and the rates at which radionuclides will
be leached out of wastes into groundwater have been replaced by
firmer estimates, based on better understanding of the physical
and chemical processes involved. Very simple generic models of
rates and patterns of groundwater movement and radionuclide migration
have been superseded by models founded on site specific hydrogeological
and geochemical conditions. Some processes which were omitted
entirely from early performance assessments can now be included
(for example, the generation of gases such as hydrogen when metallic
wastes and waste canisters corrode under anaerobic conditions
in a repository).
4.23 . Nevertheless, there are still significant
gaps in knowledge. One of the most important for a deep repository
in the United Kingdom concerns the effects of future changes in
climate on rates and patterns of groundwater flow. It is possible,
using probabilistic techniques and palaeoclimatic data, to generate
a series of possibilities for how climate may change in the future
and to provide probability estimates for these sequences of climatic
conditions. Thus probabilistic predictions can be made of rates
and magnitudes of changes in sea level, and of the timing and
extent of future glaciations. Means to predict the effects of
climate changes, particularly glaciations, on rates and patterns
of groundwater flow are, however, at present incomplete. Techniques
such as palaeohydrogeology, in which attempts are made to reconstruct
past groundwater conditions as an indicator of future ones, are
in their infancy.[32]
4.24 Similarly, advances in scientific knowledge
are needed before the effects of seismic events on groundwater
flows can be predicted with any confidence. For fractured rocks,
in particular, there are problems in characterising the rock in
enough detail to be able to model groundwater flow through it,
without disturbing it so much that repository performance is affected
(Q 925). While rates of generation of bulk gases can be quantified
if groundwater conditions are known, much less has been done on
the effects of gases on water flow patterns and on the transition
period when a sealed repository is resaturating. Quantitative
prediction of the rate of evolution of chemical conditions within
and around a repository is not yet possible[33].
For example, for a repository with a cementitious backfill, it
is not known how long it will take to establish the conditions
in which the solubilities of most radionuclides will be very low,
nor how the movement of the minerals in the backfill will affect
radionuclide migration. A further major type of uncertainty is
the extrapolation of the results of short term laboratory experiments
to thousands of years, and longer. This applies to canister corrosion,
waste leaching and the sorption of radionuclides on geological
media. These gaps in knowledge are not a reason for postponing
action: they are a reason for increased effort.
Repository
Timing
4.25 In the technical evidence presented to us the
predominant scientific view is that enough is known to begin a
deep repository site selection process in the United Kingdom (for
example, p29, p136, p224, p245). It will be necessary to begin
by establishing clear site selection criteria (geological and
other), then to perform desk studies to identify sites for preliminary
field investigations. The next steps are to decide which sites
merit more detailed investigations and to carry these out (pp
254-255). Based on scientific and technical considerations, we
estimate that these steps are likely to take at least a decade.
The need to build public confidence (see Chapter 5) could prolong
this.
4.26 To plan interim surface storage arrangements
and repository related research it is essential to take a view
on how rapidly to proceed with repository construction and operation
once the repository site (or sites, see para 4.4) has been selected.
Concerns about the ability to monitor and retrieve the wastes
are a major consideration here. We believe that it is essential
not to proceed from one stage to the next until there is a sound
technical basis for doing so, and ideally the programme would
contain no, or very few, points of no return.
4.27 A repository can be built and operated so that
there is monitoring during the operational period (eg of the integrity
of waste packages) and so that it is relatively easy to retrieve
wastes if necessary (eg Q1417). The repository operational period
can, in effect, be made one of underground storage. It will also
be possible to retrieve wastes after a repository is backfilled
and sealed, although retrieval would then be more difficult and
might pose significant risks to the workers involved (eg Q1418).
In developing a repository design it is necessary to decide how
much ability to monitor and retrieve should be built in, for both
the operational period and after closure, without compromising
long term safety (Q 1011)[34]
[35].
4.28 In our opinion, the best course of action would
be to begin repository construction without undue delay after
site selection, and to place wastes in the repository in such
a way that they can be monitored and retrieved, only backfilling
and sealing the repository when sufficient knowledge has been
judged to be gained. We do not believe that the length of the
period for which the repository is to remain open needs to be,
or should be, prescribed precisely now, but it is necessary to
have some idea of how long it might be. The minimum would be several
decades, to allow sufficient time for research and observation
of waste packages underground. To proceed more rapidly to repository
closure would not give the flexibility to adjust development programmes
in the light of research findings, and would be unlikely to satisfy
desires for monitorability and retrievability.
4.29 We believe that it is important that repository
operation starts within the next fifty years, before a major programme
of store replacements or refurbishments, perhaps with repackaging
of intermediate level wastes, is required[36].
We are therefore not in favour of delaying the start of the United
Kingdom site selection process until further research has been
carried out. Expert opinion is that such research might take a
decade or two (Q 938). Adding this to the one or two decades for
site investigation and selection, and a few years for construction
and commissioning, means that a repository would only just be
ready to receive wastes fifty years from now. There would be no
leeway in such a programme, and a danger that the latter stages
would be carried out with undue haste. We believe that research
is best carried out in parallel with site selection, and subsequently
when wastes are emplaced in a monitored and retrievable way.
4.30 The above course of action might be described
as a combination of surface storage, underground storage and geological
disposal, or a phased approach to geological disposal. It is the
course we favour.
INDEFINITE
STORAGE
4.31 We use the term indefinite storage to mean storage
on or just below the ground surface while R&D is carried out
on longer-term options. Such a strategy implies that something
else will be done with wastes eventually, but that it is not known
now what this will be or when it will occur. This differs from
permanent storage, which carries no implication of different actions
in the long term, and which is not a tenable strategy (see, for
example, Cm 2919 and evidence from Friends of the Earth, p318).
4.32 Surface storage of conditioned, packaged wastes
in modern facilities for several decades is feasible and safe
(p 156, p 160). Beyond periods of this length it will be necessary
to refurbish stores extensively and perhaps replace them. Repackaging
of wastes may also become necessary [37].
4.33 Storage for several centuries raises much greater
problems. The major one is the likelihood of societal breakdown.
World-wide, there are many examples of civilisations which have
appeared and disappeared within a century. If this occurred to
our civilisation, stores, wastes and packages would degrade, and
R&D on longer-term management options would cease. Eventually
there would be rapid and substantial leakage of radionuclides
into soils and groundwater, and perhaps into the atmosphere. Even
a lesser change in society would be serious if it led to stores
falling into disrepair, and wastes and packages degrading to such
a degree that it would be risky to retrieve packages and very
difficult to convert wastes to a stable form again. The maintenance
of facilities does not always receive the economic priority that
it deserves.
4.34 Over several centuries there could be climatic
changes (particularly sea level rises) which would make it necessary
to move wastes to new stores in other locations. This would entail
risks, particularly to workers. Another concern is that over centuries
the foundations and reinforcement in stores could weaken, making
them more vulnerable to earthquake damage. Again this would necessitate
building new stores and moving wastes to them.
4.35 A further problem with indefinite storage is
the R&D programme to accompany it. We have not been able to
find in the evidence presented to us, or in the literature, any
definite suggestions as to what R&D might be carried out to
look for new long-term management options. Many methods have been
thought about, and some have been the subject of much research,
but has been found to be more promising than geological disposal
for the ILW and HLW which exists now and which will arise from
the current civil and defence nuclear programmes (see Chapter
2). In view of these difficulties we do not favour indefinite
storage as a policy.
RESEARCH
REQUIREMENTS
4.36 With a phased approach to geological disposal
of the type outlined above, research would be carried out in three
steps:
· before the deep repository site selection
programme starts and while it is in progress;
· after the site (or sites) has been selected,
during repository construction and waste emplacement;
· while wastes are underground in monitored
and retrievable form, before the repository is sealed.
4.37 In each phase there would be a need for multi-disciplinary
research, covering, in particular, geology, hydrogeology, geochemistry,
and the materials science relevant to the behaviour of wastes
and their packages under disposal conditions. Processes in the
surface environment (the "biosphere") also merit attention,
primarily from the point of view of how they affect conditions
at depth (for example, how changes in sea level and rainfall could
affect groundwater flow).
4.38 The first phase of research would be largely
generic and would be partly aimed at assisting site selection
and repository design. It will be important to address the wastes
which were not included in the Nirex deep repository programme
(vitrified high level waste, spent fuel, depleted uranium, surplus
plutonium etc). For some of these wastes much can be gained from
research carried out in other countries. Development of means
to build into a repository the ability to monitor and retrieve
the wastes should be included, because there has been little work
on this in the United Kingdom to date. Although the ability to
monitor and retrieve wastes while the repository is open is the
first priority, it would be valuable to consider what could be
done for the post-closure period.
4.39 The second phase of research would be mainly
site specific. It would include experimental work at the repository
site (or sites), in addition to site characterisation activities.
The third phase of research would be a continuation of the second,
but with the addition of observations of waste packages and groundwater
conditions in the repository.
4.40 As well as disposal related research, it would
be necessary to carry out some work on surface storage. Amongst
the aims of this R&D would be to provide better estimates
of the length of time for which such storage could be maintained
without carrying out major operations, and to develop the technology
for repackaging wastes. This would be needed if there were unforeseen
delays in the repository development programme.
4.41 It has been suggested that future United Kingdom
R&D on geological disposal should include establishing an
underground laboratory at a site which will never be used for
a repository. While such a laboratory would have been valuable
in the past, there would be little merit in having one in the
future if a search for deep repository sites were to be started
soon. United Kingdom researchers have made good use of underground
laboratories in other countries for generic studies. They could
continue to do so until our site selection process was complete
and then move on to site specific research.
4.42 We have had various suggestions put to us as
to topics on which research is particularly required (see, for
example, The Royal Society P365, and RWMAC, September 1998[38]).
It would not be appropriate to comment on details of these topics
now. When there is agreement on the national strategy, a comprehensive
research programme should be set out, linked to milestones in
a repository development programme (assuming that geological disposal
is to be pursued). The DETR project on a research strategy for
HLW and spent fuel disposal provides an indication of how such
a research programme could be developed, and will contain information
which is valuable in establishing a research programme for disposal
of all long-lived wastes[39].
DEVELOPMENT
OF REPOSITORY SAFETY STANDARDS
4.43 The current United Kingdom standards for the
long term safety of a deep repository are those given in the 1997
Environment Agency / SEPA / DoE Northern Ireland document entitled
"Disposal Facilities on Land for Low and Intermediate Level
Wastes: Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation", which
is known for short as the GRA. This document takes into account
NRPB advice on radiological protection objectives for waste disposal[40].
For repository operation, including the whole time for which a
repository is open, the HSE would apply standards based on their
"Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Plant" (SAPS)[41],
as well as the Ionising Radiation Regulations (currently being
revised in the light of the 1996 European Directive on basic safety
standards for radiation exposure of workers and the public).
4.44 As is evident from its full title, the GRA would
not apply to a repository for HLW, nor for one for co-disposal
of HLW and ILW. For this reason alone new safety standards would
be needed if an integrated strategy for all long-lived wastes
is put in place. More importantly, the GRA will need to be revised
and expanded as a repository development programme progresses,
so that it specifies in more detail the principles to be applied
in repository design and the safety-related criteria to be met.
4.45 The current GRA contains only one numerical
standard for long term safety: the target that the risk that an
individual human being will suffer a serious health effect (fatal
or genetic) from any releases of radioactive material from a sealed
repository should be less than one in a million (10-6)
per year. It is clear that one numerical standard will not be
enough. There is confusion about what the risk target means, and
concern that it does not address aspects such as cumulative releases
of radionuclides to the surface environment, the extent of environmental
contamination and deleterious effects on organisms other than
humans. It is also possible that the figure of 10-6
will need to be revised in the light of technological and medical
developments, and changes in societal expectations.
4.46 It would also be anticipated that an expanded
GRA would contain many more qualitative requirements. The majority
of standards in the SAPs are qualitative "engineering principles",
which reflect accumulated knowledge of what is good practice in
the design of nuclear plants. The GRA should be developed in a
similar way and might become as extensive as the SAPs.
CONCLUSIONS
OF TECHNICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4.47 It is essential that the United Kingdom has
a comprehensive and integrated strategy for the management of
all long-lived wastes. The strategy should set out the long-term
management methods for all existing wastes, for all those wastes
which are certain to arise from the current civil and defence
nuclear programmes, and for all those materials that are at present
held in store and which are likely to be declared wastes (see
also para 4.50). The United Kingdom inventory of radioactive wastes
should be expanded to include all such materials, so that it becomes
a better tool for use in strategy development. The strategy should
take full account of plans for decommissioning reactors, so that
there are no inconsistencies in timing of waste arisings and the
provision of storage and disposal facilities. In developing the
strategy the long-term management of nuclear powered submarines
and their fuel should be considered fully and MoD policy should
be brought into line with, and incorporated in, the national strategy.
4.48 There is a spectrum of possible courses of action
which the United Kingdom could follow for the management of its
long-lived wastes which has been identified in the course of this
enquiry, from "early disposal" in a deep repository
to indefinite surface storage. In an early disposal strategy a
repository would be constructed as soon as a suitable site could
be found and the repository would be finally sealed There is a
spectrum of possible courses of action which the United Kingdom
could follow for the management as soon as all wastes had been
emplaced in it. We are not in favour of such a strategy because
it has too many large irreversible steps, with too little flexibility
and opportunity to build technical confidence. Nor are we in favour
of indefinite storage of wastes on the surface: this relies too
heavily on human intervention and societal stability over many
centuries.
4.49 Our strong preference is for a phased approach
to geological disposal, in which wastes are stored on the surface
whilst a site is found and a repository is constructed, and then
emplaced in a repository in such a way that they can be monitored
and retrieved. The repository would be kept open while data are
accumulated from the monitoring and from additional research.
When there is sufficient confidence to do so the repository would
be backfilled and sealed. Monitoring would then continue and it
would still be possible (but difficult) to retrieve wastes.
4.50 To proceed with repository site selection and
design, it is essential to know what wastes will be placed in
it. Thus decisions are needed soon on whether materials which
are not yet declared to be waste are to be so declared. It is
possible that more than one repository will be required to take
all long-lived wastes and this has to be recognised before a site
selection process begins.
4.51 One or more United Kingdom deep repositories
should be operational within 50 years, so that no major programme
of store replacement or refurbishment, or repackaging of intermediate
level wastes, has to be undertaken.
4.52 When there is agreement on the national strategy
a comprehensive research programme should be set out, linked to
milestones in repository development. The first phase of research
would be largely generic, to assist repository site selection
and design. The second phase of research would be mainly site
specific. The third phase would include observations of waste
packages and groundwater conditions in the repository. The current
United Kingdom standards for the long-term safety of deep repositories
should be revised and expanded as the repository research and
development programme progresses.
4.53 Small users of radioactive materials who produce
limited quantities of LLW that will decay quite rapidly to LLW
should commission a study of the options for management of this
waste. The options considered should include the provision of
a national decay store (to allow the waste to decay to LLW prior
to disposal), and direct disposal to Drigg. They should then make
a formal proposal to regulators and Government for their preferred
option.
4.54 Plans should be made for the establishment of
a new LLW disposal facility, to open before Drigg closes. The
Government should also consider alternatives to landfill disposal
of less active LLW and produce a national policy that is accepted
by local authorities, landfill operators, the nuclear industry
and organisations outside the nuclear industry that currently
dispose of LLW to landfills.
28 Review of Radioactive Waste Management Policy,
Final Conclusions, Command Paper (Cm) 2919, 1995. Back
29
The Royal Society, Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Deep
Repositories, 1994. Back
30
The Environment Agency, SEPA, Department of the Environment for
Northern Ireland, Disposal Facilities on Land for Low and Intermediate
Level Radioactive Wastes: Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation,
1997. Back
31
The Royal Society, ibid.. Back
32
The Royal Society, ibid.. Back
33
The Royal Society, ibid. Back
34
QuantiSci, High-Level Waste and Spent Fuel Disposal Research
Strategy: Project Status at the Half-Way Point, report DETR/RAS/98.006,
May 1998. Back
35
RWMAC, The Radioactive Waste Management Committee's Advice
on The Interim Report of the High Level Waste and Spent Fuel Disposal
Research Project, November 1998. Back
36
Health and Safety Executive Nuclear Safety Directorate, Intermediate
Level Radioactive Waste Storage in the UK: A Review by HM Nuclear
Installations Inspectorate, November 1998. Back
37
Health and Safety Executive Nuclear Safety Directorate, ibid. Back
38
RWMAC, The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's
Advice on the Scope and Content of the Core Scientific Research
Programme on Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal. Back
39
RWMAC, The Radioactive Waste Management Committee's Advice
on The Interim Report of the High Level Waste and Spent Fuel Disposal
Research Project, November 1998. Back
40
Doc. NRPB 3, No.3, 1-3, 1992 Back
41
HSE, Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Plants,
1992. Back
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