THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS OF 13 OCTOBER
1999
50. The Commission was due to publish in October
1999 its second set of annual progress reports on the applicant
countries. It did so: and—not entirely unexpectedly—it
accompanied them with new proposals for taking the enlargement
negotiations forward[29].
The proposals are summarised here; we discuss them in Part 5.
51. In his speech to the European Parliament on 13
October 1999 presenting the Commission's proposals[30],
the President of the European Commission (Commissioner Prodi)
said:
"The Copenhagen criteria[31]
are so fundamental that the European Council meeting in Luxembourg
[in December 1997] and Cologne [in June 1999] recommended opening
further accession negotiations only with countries which meet
them. If we apply these recommendations to the letter, it rules
out opening negotiations with most of the remaining applicant
countries since they do not meet the criteria. The risk in taking
this 'hard line' approach is that the countries concerned, having
already made great efforts and sacrifices, will become disillusioned
and turn their backs on us. Their economic policies will begin
to diverge, and an historic opportunity will have been lost—perhaps
forever. In the changed political landscape of Europe, especially
in the Balkan region, some countries may also let slip the progress
they have made towards democracy and human rights, and the European
Union will have seriously failed the people of those countries".
Accordingly, he said, the Commission would recommend
to the Helsinki European Council [in December 1999] that
"accession negotiations be opened in 2000
with all candidate countries that have fulfilled the Copenhagen
political criteria and have proved ready to take the necessary
measures to comply with the economic criteria—ie Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia".
It would however remain the case that candidate countries
must fulfil all the Copenhagen criteria before being admitted
as EU Member States.
52. Moreover, the Commission is proposing some caveats
in the case of Bulgaria and Romania. The opening of negotiations
with Bulgaria should be conditional on "a decision by the
Bulgarian authorities before the end of 1999 on an acceptable
closure date for [the four unsafe units] at Kozloduy nuclear power
plant and upon a confirmation of the significant progress accomplished
in the economic reform process". For Romania, the opening
of negotiations should be conditional on "the confirmation
of effective action announced by the Romanian authorities to provide
adequate budgetary resources and to implement structural reform
of child care institutions before the end of 1999" and on
"a further assessment of the economic situation … in
the expectation that appropriate measures will have been taken
to address the macro-economic situation"[32].
53. As for Turkey, Commissioner Prodi said that although
it should be considered as a candidate country, negotiations should
not be opened until Turkey met "the Copenhagen criteria,
and in particular the political criteria with their clear emphasis
on human rights". The Commission makes detailed recommendations
for enabling Turkey to "benefit from that status [as a candidate
country]", including the adoption of an Accession Partnership[33].
54. The Commission is also proposing a change in
the negotiating process. In future, rather than opening an equal
number of chapters simultaneously with all candidates, "the
nature and number of negotiating chapters to be successively opened
with each candidate country will be determined by the EU applying
the principle of differentiation, that is taking full account
of each candidate's progress in preparing for membership under
the Copenhagen criteria". This would mean, said Commissioner
Prodi, that
"each applicant country will proceed at
its own pace, be assessed on its own merits and join when it is
finally able to meet all the obligations of membership".
He suggested that the EU should "open only those
chapters which can realistically be concluded in the short and
medium term".
55. The procedure for closing chapters would also
be revised. The Commission says:
"Ideally, negotiations should inject increased
momentum into the candidates' preparations for membership. The
procedure for provisional closure of chapters not directly linked
with the state of preparatory progress, as applied until now,
may have the contrary effect" [34].
All chapters provisionally closed are to be re-opened
from the beginning of 2000 "in order to allow newly adopted
EU acquis, not yet addressed during the negotiations, to
be included". The Commission proposes that the opportunity
should be taken to ensure that the candidates' preparations in
the relevant area are in line with their commitments, and that
this should be one of the criteria in future in reaching a decision
as to whether any chapters can be provisionally closed. We note,
however, that the Commission's formal proposals do not incorporate
Commissioner Prodi's suggestion that a target date should be set
for the closure of each chapter.
56. The Commission welcomes the fact that some candidates
have already set themselves target dates for the conclusion of
negotiations, or for accession. But it does not suggest that the
EU should commit itself to any such dates until it has "a
fuller assessment of each candidate's situation both in the negotiations
and in preparations for membership"[35].
57. The Commission also proposes that the notion
of a "reasonable" transition period should be clarified.
It suggests that:
"For the areas linked to the extension of
the Single Market, regulatory measures could be implemented quickly.
Any transition periods should therefore be few and short. For
those areas of the acquis where considerable adaptations
are necessary and which require substantial efforts, including
important financial outlays (in areas such as environment, energy,
infrastructure), transition arrangements could be spread over
a definite period of time provided candidates can demonstrate
that alignment is underway and that they are committed to detailed
and realistic plans for alignment, including the necessary investments"[36].
58. The Commission believes that it will be possible
to "conclude negotiations with the most advanced candidates
in 2002". It therefore "considers that the process of
institutional reform must be oriented in such a way that the very
substantial changes that are necessary as a condition for enlargement
will be in force in 2002", so that decisions can be
taken from that date "on the accession of candidates that
fulfil all necessary criteria"[37].
59. The Commission document also looks beyond the
current candidate States, saying that the EU has been criticised
in the past for
"not addressing broader geo-political questions
such as the prospect of membership for countries which are not
currently in the enlargement process or the kind of relationship
the EU wants to have with non-candidate European countries"[38].
It distinguishes[39]
between groups of countries "based on their eligibility for
and aspiration to future membership":
- countries such as Switzerland and Norway which
meet the criteria but "are not currently pursuing membership";
- the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania,
which "aspire to EU membership but are far from meeting the
criteria", to which the Union is ready to offer "the
perspective of future membership provided they work together with
the Union and among themselves to implement a strategy of stabilisation
for the region", and would in the meanwhile offer Stabilisation
and Association Agreements[40];
- other neighbours to the East (where the Partnership
and Co-operation Agreements were an excellent basis on which to
build) and to the South (where the Union should complete its offer
of Association Agreements)[41].
Commissioner Prodi said that now was the time to
work together "with our neighbours for whom membership is
not an issue but with whom we want close and constructive relations
... to construct a wider European area of peace, stability and
prosperity".
THE REPORT OF THE "THREE WISE
MEN" ON THE INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT
60. In September 1999 Commissioner Prodi invited
a group consisting of former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene,
ex-German President Richard von Weizsäcker and former British
Minister of State Lord Simon to "identify institutional problems
which needed to be tackled and to present arguments indicating
why they needed to be dealt with by the IGC". Their report[42],
presented on 18 October, is not a document which is formally subject
to Parliamentary scrutiny, but we have considered it because of
its relevance to the enquiry[43].
61. The report notes that the Amsterdam institutional
protocol[44]
envisaged a two-stage approach to institutional reform: "a
limited reform before the first enlargement, a comprehensive reform
before the number of Member States exceeded twenty". It suggests
that "positive developments in the accession process since
Amsterdam have blurred this distinction", and that therefore
"an effort at comprehensive reform should be undertaken right
now". It accepts the deadline of concluding the IGC by the
end of 2000 as "imperative", but nevertheless "advises
a somewhat broader agenda" (suggesting that this need not
prolong the process if the IGC based its discussions on a proposal
from the Commission).
62. The report therefore proposes that:
- as well as considering the size and composition
of the Commission, the IGC should consider strengthening the authority
of the Commission President and clarifying the individual responsibility
of Commissioners;
- the extension of qualified majority voting contemplated
in Amsterdam should be extended to second and third pillar matters;
for the first pillar, it should be accompanied by a parallel increase
in the role of the European Parliament through the extension of
co-decision ;
- a rule should be agreed on how to allocate seats
in the European Parliament to Member States once the upper limit
of 700 MEPs[45]
is reached;
- the IGC should consider suggestions put forward
for the reform of other institutions;
- the question of external representation of the
EU "should be revisited";
- the procedure for flexibility[46]
laid down in the Treaty should be simplified.
63. The report notes other areas which it recognises
as important but where it has no specific proposals (like the
re-weighting of votes), or where it considers that proposals would
be premature (like the Council's method of functioning and the
European Parliament's working methods). It considers that any
necessary reforms which do not require Treaty changes should be
considered at the same time as those which do, "so as to
make a comprehensive reform effective".
64. The report also proposes that, in order to speed
up the process of Treaty changes in future, the present texts
should be divided into two parts. The "basic Treaty"
would include only "the aims, principles and general policy
orientation, citizens' rights and the institutional framework";
those clauses would be subject to the current procedure of modification
through an IGC with ratification by each Member State. The remaining
clauses could be modified by a decision of the Council and the
assent of the European Parliament. And it suggests that the IGC
should also consider the need for new steps on the common policy
on security and defence, because the new institutional arrangements
which that will entail might require Treaty changes.
65. The report recognises that agreement of this
entire package on the necessary timescale is an ambitious goal,
but concludes:
"At this crucial moment in its development
the European Union should not lower its sights. It should rise
to the challenge and formulate ambitions commensurate with that
challenge".
29 These are the documents on which this enquiry is
based. Back
30
Subsequent quotations in this section attributed to Commissioner
Prodi are from the same speech. Back
31
See paragraph 37 above. Back
32
Composite Paper, p 28. Back
33
Ibid, p 37. Back
34
Ibid, pp 29-30. Back
35
Ibid, p 31. Back
36
Ibid, p 30-31. Back
37
Ibid, p 31-32. Back
38
Ibid, p 1. Back
39
Ibid, p 2-3. Back
40
Ibid, p 34. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
these Agreements would be offered "once these countries meet
the EU's conditions on human rights, economic reform and democratic
principles, and demonstrate their commitment to regional co-operation"
(p 26). Back
41
Ibid, pp 34-35. Back
42
The Institutional Implications of Enlargement, Report to
the European Commission, 18 October 1999. Back
43
Our comments are at paragraph 99. Back
44
See paragraph 49 above. Back
45
Specified in Article 189 EC. Back
46
An important innovation of the Amsterdam Treaty was to introduce
flexibility clauses allowing a core of Member States to establish
closer co-operation using the institutions, procedures and mechanisms
provided for in the EC Treaty and TEU. There are additional criteria
for such cooperation under the First (Community) Pillar
(Article 11 EC) and the Third (Intergovernmental) Pillar (Article
40 TEU). Back
