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Lord Morris of Aberavon: My Lords, this Terrorism Bill is the Government's fourth counter-terrorism Bill in five years. I start off from the premise that, if the need is there, it has my support. But measures, in the absence of a consensus, can run into difficulty, as this Bill has.
The overwhelming need is to preserve the balance between the liberty of the subject and the need for the rest of us not only to have our liberties but our lives preserved. I am sure that this would be the approach of the families of the victims of the July bombings.
The duty of balancing is for us in Parliament. There are two controversial parts of the Bill: first, the period of detention without charge; and, secondly, the revised offence of glorifying terrorism. Despite the way the first has been handled, and I pity the Home Secretary who has sought to take the blame, I was inclined to support the Government in their proposal to detain without charge for up to 90 days, provided they could get over the objections of Article 5 of the Human Rights Act. Perhaps I may say in passing that encouraging chief constables to campaign for the 90 days is not the right way of doing things. My local chief constable is reported as saying "It would not be appropriate". A line must be drawn between what is right and what is not right, and sometimes that is difficult without a written constitution. I suspect that many would agree that reproducing letters drafted by the Home Secretary must cause just a little raising of an eyebrow.
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I bear in mind the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. Although I reached the conclusion that the case for the desired 90 days was not proved, I was prepared to give the Government the benefit of the doubt, particularly as there is now weekly supervision after 14 days by a High Court judge and the sunset clause. I fear that the 28 days passed by the other place is too short for a few important cases. In an age of international terrorism—with the tentacles of crime extending well beyond our shores, different jurisdictions, the problems of translation and of computer networks, the multiplicity of SIM cards for mobiles phones running into hundreds and many names for the same person—the case for extending the period of detention without charge is formidable.
One factor has fortified my views more than anything is that, following surveillance, the need for a much earlier arrest than before, if the wrongdoer is to be stopped in his tracks before he causes mayhem, is imperative. If he slips the gathering noose before enough evidence to charge him is available, it could be too late and the deed would have been done. The extra time may be needed to fill out the gaps in the evidence. It is not the case of a simple murder that is being investigated. There is no magic in the figure of 90—90 days is unproven, as a figure. It could be 42, 60 or even 90. I believe that there should be more than 28 days in those few important cases. Why we cannot have a code of practice, with proper safeguards for allowing wider questioning after charge than the present arrangements, baffles me.
Neither do I accept the Government's stance against the use of intercept evidence in court. I understand that the United Kingdom is the only country, other than Ireland, to have an absolute prohibition in place. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, has given his views in the strongest of terms.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights has given its support, subject to safeguards. Public interest decisions on evidence are taken every day in our criminal courts by our judges, even by a mere recorder, as I was for 20 years or more. They have to consider the position, and, if they hold against the Crown, then the Crown has to consider its own position. Why should there be a blanket position in the world that we are now living in?
I now come to the new offence of glorifying the commission of acts of terrorism, past, present or future, which other people may understand as direct or indirect encouragement to similar acts. A judge will have to direct the jury as to the ingredients of this offence. There is no time for me to set out before this House the kind of direction that I had prepared, but I believe that a jury will not find it all that easy—I refer to the test of recklessness and the problems of indirect incitement. The only comfort I draw is that in the original draft Bill there were other options of "celebrating" or "exalting", whatever that may mean, terrorism. In Clause 20(2) the definition of "glorification" includes,
What a catch-all definition! Example after example has been given in another place of conduct that might be considered questionable, from Mandela to Palestine and, nearer home, Ireland. What are we likely to achieve, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, again,
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, that certainty is a fundamental requirement of our criminal law.
Incitement to commit terrorism is already covered by a range of criminal offences. What is the need for a fresh offence, so poorly drafted and, on the floor of the court, not all that easy to prove? That is my view, having spent most of my life in the criminal courts.
Why have those one or two who now preach hate not been arrested by the existing law? I know there are difficulties of collecting evidence, but do the authors of this Bill believe that it is more likely to prosecute under these new provisions?
A junior Minister in the other place said that she had been asked to speculate on what kind of phrase might make people fall foul of the new provision. The only example she could give, "comfortably" she said, was where someone said:
"'Wasn't it a fantastic thing that happened on 7 July',"—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/05; col. 392.]
knowing that the likely effect would be to encourage their audience in acts of terrorism. Really, is this the best that can be said on behalf of the Bill? Would members of any congregation rush out and plan acts of terrorism on that basis? Most English juries I have known, in a long life, are more hard-bitten than that.
If the existing law is not strong enough to encompass the worse and most obvious acts of encouragement, I suggest to the Government that they should go back to the drawing board. I would then listen carefully to what the need is, and what more appropriate proposals to deal with them were before us.
At the moment, I am certainly not with the Government on this issue. The Minister said in another place that we must have "practical, effective and workable legislation"—this clause is not.
5.40 pm
Baroness Cox: My Lords, in general I welcome the Bill's measures to contain terrorism. My concern is whether it is too late, and perhaps even too limited. For example, as long ago as August 1999, a film on Channel 4 showed two leading Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammed and Abu Hamza al-Masri lecturing to a large crowd in Friends' Meeting House in London. They proclaim that they do not believe in the law of this land but only in the law of Allah, and describe how they will kill us "kaffirs". Then, more seriously, they teach terrorist tactics, such as how to put up anti-aircraft nets with balloons and explosives, and how to bring down aircraft coming into London
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airports. An explosives expert is asked whether this is feasible, and his answer is yes. Those two militant leaders emphasise that that is only one example and urge every man present in the hall to go away and devise a similar terrorist tactic himself because it is jihad in this country—kill or be killed.
That was long before 9/11. How many young men and women have since been inspired by those two leaders to develop terrorist tactics to use in this country when the time is ripe? How many have gone abroad to learn the militaristic tactics of jihad in jihads elsewhere? Why did it take so long for Abu Hamza and Sheikh Bakri Muhammed to be contained and why were they allowed to continue teaching terrorism in this country for so many years?
I reluctantly return to an issue that I have repeatedly raised, but to which I have had no satisfactory answer from the Government or the relevant authorities. On 12 January 2000 I was speaking in your Lordships' House about that film and about the teaching of terrorist activities in this country when unprecedented interference to the microphones drowned my voice. The interference ceased 10 seconds before the end of my speech. It is entirely compatible with some kind of jamming. I was advised by the authorities here that it was caused by "a faulty microphone", but I have since been advised that a thorough investigation showed no problems with the sound system, leaving as the only plausible explanation that it was intentional interference by someone with inside access.
I took independent advice from international experts whose analysis I am willing to make available. They robustly disagreed with the replies that I had been given. They claimed that the only technically feasible and statistically reasonable explanation was that it was an inside job. They pointed out that such jamming is easy to achieve and that it demonstrates the ability to penetrate the security of Parliament, shows contempt for democracy, was a specific threat to me, and a general threat to anyone who dares to speak critically about Islamists.
Having failed to elicit any serious response from authorities here, my concern was renewed by a newspaper report in the Sunday Times on 30 July 2000 entitled:
Some excerpts are relevant, such as:
"A Sudanese businessman who has been linked by the American CIA to the world's most wanted terrorist is the leading shareholder in a company that provides security systems to the House of Parliament . . . Salah Idris, 48, whose pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was flattened by American cruise missiles after it was linked to Osama Bin Laden . . . owns 25 per cent of IES, a company specialising in high-technology surveillance and security management".
The article claims that that firm also provided such equipment to New Scotland Yard, British Airways, Texaco and other blue chip firms.
I cannot comment on the allegations that Salah Idris has links with terrorism, but his ownership of the pharmaceutical factory demonstrates his close relationship with the Islamist regime in Khartoum.
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When Parliament resumed, I tabled a Written Question. The reply on 9 October 2000 confirmed Salah Idris's involvement in that firm. It admitted that the firm also installed surveillance equipment in the Royal Courts of Justice and provided digital playback systems for New Scotland Yard, but that Salah Idris had no day-to-day involvement in running the firm.
I put the matter, if not my mind, to rest until, after the horrors of 9/11, a journalist informed me that Salah Idris had increased his shareholding to 75 per cent. An article in the Observer on 14 October 2001 confirmed that and quotes the marketing manager of IES saying:
"We provide security for some of the most sensitive sites in the UK, right up to government Ministers and the Army".
A subsequent article in the Observer on 4 November 2001 revealed that Salah Idris also held a 20 per cent stake in the security firm Protec. The article states:
"Salah Idris . . . has multi-million pound investments in two British security firms through a secretive offshore company. These firms act as security consultants and supply security systems at 11 nuclear installations in the UK, including Dounreay and Sellafield. They also have security contracts with some of Britain's top potential terrorist targets, including Canary Wharf, the House of Commons and Army bases. The companies would have highly sensitive details of all the facilities where they install equipment".
I shall repeat the two questions that I have asked before, for which for four years I have received no satisfactory answer. They are germane to the Bill and to its wider implications. First, does either existing or proposed legislation provide protection against financial penetration of and influence in UK institutions of key political military and strategic significance?
Secondly, as Oliver Letwin in another place asked when he was shadow Home Secretary:
"In the current climate, people will be rightly concerned about the Observer's allegations, which raise very serious questions. They require an urgent response. Either the Government cleared Mr Idris of any wrongdoing, or they should launch an immediate investigation".
Before concluding, I point to similar concerns demonstrated by Dr Rachel Ehrenfeld, expert on financial institutions and director of the American Center for Democracy, and her analysis of an American security firm, Ptech. That firm develops enterprise blueprints at the highest level of US Government and corporate infrastructure, which hold every important functional, operational and technical detail of the enterprise. Ptech's clients in 2001 included the US Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, Customs, Air Force, the White House, IBM, Sysco, Motorola and many others.
She claims that examples of information gathered by using Ptech's capabilities would include: a complete blueprint of a nuclear waste disposal site; the security procedures required to access military bases during transfer of nuclear waste materials; details of security rules and procedures; and specifications for Smartcards as implemented in various defence facilities, which could be used to make templates for unauthorised production of fake Smart IDs for potential use by terrorists.
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Ptech's Middle East branch, called Horizons, received projects directly from Ptech and is used to outsource projects for Ptech's clients. They include the Saudi Bin Laden Company and the Afghan-based BTC—Bin Laden Telecom. Among Ptech's top investors and management in 2001 was Yassin al-Qadi who was listed as a specially designated global terrorist on 12 October 2001.
Rachel Ehrenfeld continues with a long list, and concludes, as do I, with a question. She asks:
"How could a small, Saudi-based company with questionable terrorist connections obtain significant government and business contracts . . . even more importantly, are there other Ptechs around?".
I do not comment on Rachel Ehrenfeld's disturbing analysis, but I echo her questions. Does the Bill ensure that terrorists are not using their money to buy into our national infrastructure to undermine our economy and security from within? Does it adequately provide measures to prevent such infiltration? I hope that the Minister will answer those questions and provide assurances on those serious issues.
5.49 pm
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