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Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, I know that several noble Lords later in the debate will talk about the great anxiety in university libraries regarding Clause 2. I want specifically to ask the Minister whether the Government have looked properly at the problems for the few universities that have specialist departments for the study of terrorism.
In a powerful speech at Third Reading, my right honourable friend Kenneth Clarke took the terrorist threat very seriously. But he, as I think did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, suggested that the Bill adds little, if anything, to our present legal protection. He said,
"at heart I still suspect that this is gesture politics, padded out with measures to make it look more convincing".—[Official Report, Commons, 10/11/05; col. 521.]
Whatever one thinks about the rest of the Bill, perhaps that is the cause of the problems of Clause 2. It is put in as padding, with insufficient thought of its side effects.
The matter was first brought to my attention by a letter from the Vice Chancellor of the University of Strathclyde, in Glasgow, passed to me by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. The noble and learned Lord is Chancellor of the university but, being a serving Law Lord, feels unable to speak on this somewhat controversial matter. There is great concern at Strathclyde that the wide and uncertain definition of terrorist publications in Clause 2 could lay librarians, and indeed the university's governing body, open to a criminal offence.
When I contacted the University of St Andrews, it had far greater worries. It has an institute for terrorism studies. Professor Wilkinson of that institute, I was told this morning by a distinguished expert on this matter, is recognised as the foremost non-lawyer expert on terrorism in this country. That is high tribute from a lawyer. Professor Wilkinson and the institute see to it that part of the university library at St Andrews is allocated specifically to material relating to terrorism. In that section are books, journals and video recordings of television programmes, including recordings of Arabic television stations' programmes. In addition, the library is hoping to have deposited with it material from an organisation specialising in Iranian studies.
All this is obviously a vital resource for important present-day study of what motivates terrorists, how they behave and how events may be shaped in the future. The problem at St Andrews is how, in the face
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of Clause 2, a librarian will know what material he can legally put into the library. The books and videos most enlightening to the researchers are likely to be precisely those described in Clause 2(2) as terrorist publications,
Yet under Clause 2(1), it is a criminal offence to loan or enable others,
with a penalty of up to seven years' imprisonment on indictment, or six months in Scotland on summary conviction.
Should a librarian be charged with such an offence, under subsection (8) his defence would be, as referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, that he had not examined the publication, he did not suspect that it was a terrorist publication and he did not himself agree with it. In the terrorism section of the St Andrews library, a librarian would clearly have examined an item; it would not be in library if he had not. It might well be on the shelves because it was a terrorist publication: no defence there. On the third point, the Home Secretary has said categorically that those who simply transmit material that does not reflect their views cannot be caught by the Bill. The Scottish Confederation of University and Research Libraries, along with the British Library and others, have sought legal opinion on this matter. They are told that across all universities, it is likely that the librarian will find the defence in Clause 2 very difficult indeed to maintain. If that is so, I would have thought that at St Andrews it would be virtually impossible.
When the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, replies to the debate, can she tell the House in responding to this important matter whether in the drafting of Clause 2 the Government have taken properly into account the particular position of libraries at universities which specialise in the study of terrorism? If she cannot give a certain response today, I would be grateful if she would write to me before we reach the Committee stage because I regard this as a very serious matter. I suspect that Clause 2 needs considerable amendment, and if the matter hangs on the redefinition of "terrorism" which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to produce in due course, what on earth is the University of St Andrews to do in the mean time?
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Baroness Hayman: My Lords, in introducing the Bill my noble friend on the Front Bench said that we need legislation dealing with terrorism that is comprehensive and up to date. I echo her words. But I also believe that we need legislation that has been scrutinised and honed as finely as possible to ensure that it is as effective and targeted as can be achieved. I hope that we will conduct the further stages of the Bill in exactly that spirit.
Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, I welcome the creation of the new offence of acts preparatory to terrorism. This proposal, first mooted many years ago, was considered by the
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Newton committee, of which I was a member, and recommended to the Government. It is very important, particularly in relation to the period of detention before charge, a point to which I shall return in a moment.
In the context of the powerful speeches made by my noble friends Lady Symons and Lady Ramsay, with whose analysis of the threat, danger and reality of terrorism I agree entirely—we live with the reality of terrorism, not the threat of it—we must also remember the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hurd. At heart we all understand that our greatest assurance of security comes from intelligence gathering by the police and the security services. Once we know about potential perpetrators, the investigative and legislative court procedures fall into place. That is fundamental to our protection.
But we are legislators and as such we are hard-wired to find a statutory solution to problems. It is part of the parliamentary DNA to do so. It is the weapon for which we reach. When we add to the armoury of powers needed by the police to protect us and when we discharge our duty of making sure that that armoury is fully stocked, we must also recognise that sometimes we do not get it completely right. One point that struck members of the Newton committee as they considered the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was the number of provisions contained in that Act which had never been used. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, recently tabled an interesting Written Question on the use of the Terrorism Act 2000, which was answered on 16 November. The Written Answer reproduced a complicated table of 24 separate offences under the Act. I understand that in the five years since the Act has been in place, there have been some 23 convictions under the range of 24 offences—six appearing on the table in the Written Answer.
Earlier this year passionate debates were held in this House about the absolutely essential nature of control orders. In October, the Answer to a Written Question on such orders indicated that currently there are only three in use. Some will say that this is because those Acts, those pieces of legislation, are effective as deterrents. We have already discussed, however, that for the particularly virulent and dangerous form of terrorism that we are facing, deterrence is often not a solution.
We have to ask ourselves whether the ways in which we are legislating are fit for purpose. I welcome charges of acts preparatory to terrorism, because that will be one solution to the problem to which 90 days was the police's answer, which is the difficulty of bringing charges in situations where investigations—as has eloquently been described—take a long time, have great inherent difficulties or cross international jurisdictions. To be able to bring the intermediate, preliminary charge of an act preparatory to terrorism will be enormously helpful to police. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, of the ways it would be possible to continue to investigate, to question if necessary—although I understand
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questioning is not a lot of good with this particular group of suspects—and to build up a case on potentially more serious charges.
In the longer term, the answer to this challenging set of circumstances is not to be found in some magic number of days that people are allowed to be detained before charging. We should look again at what was stated in our report and what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who will speak for himself later, also said, together with what has been quoted, about the possibility of a completely different form of judicial oversight in such cases prior to charging. That would allow confidence in the system, but equally allow the police enough time to build up the case and to protect the public while doing so.
When the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor gave evidence to the Constitution Committee of this House a couple of weeks ago, he indicated that he had not in any way ruled out further investigation of that possibility. I believe that it could square the circle of the difficulties that we find ourselves in when wishing to give the police the opportunity to do their job properly, when wishing above all to protect ourselves, our families and our fellow citizens, and, equally, when not wishing to do it by means that would be counterproductive or ineffective.
4.58 pm
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