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Business
3.15 pm
Lord Grocott: My Lords, with permission, I have two brief business announcements. The first concerns a Statement, which, with the leave of the House, we will take later this afternoon. The Statement concerns the European Union, Croatia and Turkey. It will be repeated by my noble friend Lord Triesman and it will come immediately after the three opening speeches—that is to say, after the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill.
The second comment concerns timings for today. As the House will recall, yesterday we accommodated 76 speakers to finish before midnight, which was no mean achievement. We suggested a six-minute time limit and, to put this as sensitively as I can, several people have said to me that the suggestion that speeches should be accommodated within six minutes in no way diminished the quality of the debate. That might be a text for future reference. We will see whether we can perform the same trick again. Today we have 46 speakers but, as the House knows, we aim to finish by about 10 o'clock. We will certainly achieved that and hear the Statement as well—again, if people are able to accommodate their speeches within six minutes. I make that suggestion again, with a reminder that six minutes means that. As someone suggested to me that I was not clear enough yesterday, perhaps at the risk of boring the House I may repeat that when the figure 6 appears, the six minutes have gone.
Civil Aviation Bill
Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and ordered to be printed.
Borough Freedom (Family Succession) Bill [HL]
Read a third time, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
Racial and Religious Hatred Bill
3.17 pm
The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor (Lord Falconer of Thoroton): My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Scotland of Asthal, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. I am sorry that my noble friend cannot be here this afternoon, but a family illness means that she has had to be called away to the West Indies. I am sure that all Members of the House will join me in sending her our good wishes.
I keenly anticipate this debate—in particular, the maiden speech of my noble friend Lady Corston, because she has been involved in these matters in her distinguished chairmanship of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I also keenly anticipate the maiden
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speech of my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock because he is the chairman of Heart of Midlothian Football Club at a time when they are enjoying unparalleled success—thanks entirely to his chairmanship.
I will of course attend the opening and closing speeches and as much of the debate this afternoon as possible but, with your Lordships' leave, I will have to leave to attend the swearing in of a new judge and to meet Peers during the course of the afternoon.
This is an important but controversial Bill. The gap in the criminal law that it seeks to address allows people to stir up hatred against others on the grounds of religious belief or lack of religious belief.
Lord Waddington: My Lords, strictly speaking, that is quite untrue, is it not, because the Public Order Act prevents the sort of behaviour to which the noble and learned Lord has just referred?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: No, my Lords, it is not. The problem with the Public Order Act is where you are addressing people other than the people whom you are insulting or abusing with a view to stirring up hatred among them against a particular religious group. That is not currently covered by the criminal law, and that is why there is a gap that needs to be covered. Let us be clear, it is a small gap in the criminal law capturing, as I just said in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, behaviour that is not already covered by the existing common law offences of incitement or by offences in the Public Order Act. It is nevertheless a gap in the law that can be exploited by those who seek to sow the seeds of hatred against some of our most vulnerable communities. These are rule issues, not theoretical issues. Muslims of all races, including white Muslims, have been victims of hatred. And incitement to hatred against so-called infidels and apostates by religious extremists is also a very real phenomenon in some communities.
I am sure that we all accept as a matter of principle that this is something that the criminal law should seek to address. Indeed, the Association of Chief Police Officers' representative, when asked by the Select Committee on Religious Offences about the disturbances in Bradford in 2001, said that the sort of material this offence would outlaw,
"did significantly impact upon the situation . . . I agree that incitement to hatred on religious grounds would make a significant difference in terms of our ability to deal with this kind of material".
The offences in the Bill are all the more necessary because there is an inequality in the level of protection provided to Jews and Sikhs and to other faith groups. Jews and Sikhs, as a result of case law, are protected from having hatred stirred up against them under the existing offences of incitement to racial hatred. We believe that the same level of protection should apply to all faith groups and to those without religious belief.
Again, I am sure that most of your Lordships will agree that this is a laudable aim—that it cannot be right that the law protects some communities and not others. The question is whether we have achieved our
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aims in the Bill and the argument here is whether, as drafted, the Bill would have unintended and unacceptable consequences in relation to freedom of speech.
The Bill will impact on freedom of speech just as the incitement to racial hatred offence does. That, we believe, is right because there are words and actions that should have no place in civilised society. But, of course, what we must guard against is going too far, and this will be—I am sure—the central focus of the debate this afternoon. We believe that the Bill will not have an undue effect on freedom of speech. In particular it will not stop the telling of jokes about religion or the ridiculing of faith. It will not close down debate about religious beliefs or stop artists from dealing with religious subjects.
We believe that this will not happen for the following reasons. First, the offences require that the language or behaviour be "threatening, abusive or insulting". Legitimate debate and discussion about those who follow a particular faith does not use that type of language. Secondly, the person accused of the offence needs to have either intended that his language or behaviour would stir up hatred against others or for it to have been likely that his actions would have that effect. Comedians do not intend to stir up hatred and their performances are not likely to do so. The third safeguard is that it is about stirring up hatred. This is a high threshold. Hatred is about intense dislike. It is not about ridicule or contempt.
The hatred also needs to be directed against a group of people, that is against a community defined by its religious beliefs or lack of beliefs. It is not about protecting individuals and it is not about protecting their beliefs. It is not, despite what some might say, a new blasphemy law. Next, the Bill does not criminalise anything done in a person's home. It will not catch what is said at a private occasion in somebody's home no matter how offensive it might be. Finally, the prosecution of any of the offences proposed in the Bill requires the consent of the Attorney-General. This is an important safeguard that will ensure that only the most serious cases come before the courts. The Attorney-General's consent is, of course, in addition to the Crown Prosecution Service's public interest and evidential tests—
Lord Wedderburn of Charlton: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for his summary of the nature of the Bill, some parts of which will no doubt be challenged in the debate, but can he at this early stage help us by telling the House whether the Government intend to introduce any definitions of the many uncertain terms on which he spoke?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, in relation to words such as "hatred", no; we do not intend to produce any definition in relation to that because it is a word that a jury could perfectly well understand. As to "threatening, insulting or abusive behaviour", again we have no intention to introduce a definition because, again, that is something that a jury could perfectly well understand. As regards "religious beliefs", no, again,
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because that has already been defined by case law. A religious belief, to be a belief protected by the Bill, will need to attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. The belief, in order to be a religious belief protected by the Bill, must be worthy of respect in a democratic society and not incompatible with human dignity. So the answer is no; we believe the law has sufficient safeguards in relation to that.
As I say, the question is whether we have achieved our aim. I have given the six reasons why I think we have achieved it. For all these reasons we think that the Bill will not have the impact on freedom of speech that opponents claim it will. The racial incitement offence which already exists has not had this effect although it covers not only Jews and Sikhs but also nationalities. I do not think that the impact of extending this protection to faith groups will be any different. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights, when considering the proposals—
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