Joint Committee On Human Rights

4.2 The Government has made a compatibility statement under s.19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill provide a further explanation of the Government's assessment of the Bill's compatibility with Convention rights.[152] The Explanatory Notes explain, briefly, the Government's view on the human rights implications of the Bill. Broadly, they explain that the European Convention on Human Rights allows States a wide margin of appreciation in relation to fertility treatment and assisted reproduction or the use of embryos for research. There is no European consensus on these issues. This accurately reflects the current approach of the European Court of Human Rights to these issues. The Government's view is that the provisions in the Bill are compatible with the Convention rights to life (Article 2, ECHR); respect for private and family life (Article 8, ECHR); the right to marry and found a family (Article 12 ECHR); and the right to enjoy those rights free from discrimination (Article 14, ECHR).

4.3 Attempts to argue that embryos and foetuses have independent rights to life under Article 2 of the ECHR (for example in trying to prevent an abortion) have consistently been unsuccessful.[153] Against this background, the provisions in the Bill cannot be challenged on the basis of the Convention rights of the embryo or foetus. Although Article 12 ECHR protects the right to found a family, it is widely accepted that this right is a negative rather than a positive one. There is nothing in the case law on the ECHR that recognises a positive right to access assisted conception services.[154] Once facilities are made available by the State, however, these services must be provided without unjustified discrimination.

4.4 The Explanatory Notes explain that the Government consider that there are a number of provisions in the Bill which enhance rights protection, including the extension of legal parenthood to same sex couples and the availability of parental orders to unmarried and same sex couples).[155]

4.5 In so far as these provisions reduce the risk of discrimination in relation to fertility treatment, we agree with the Government that the provisions in the Bill which extend parental rights in relation to same sex couples and unmarried couples are human rights enhancing measures.

4.6 We wrote to the Minister on 27 November 2007, to raise a number of issues which we considered capable of raising significant human rights issues.[156] The Minister of State for Public Health responded on 14 December 2007.[157] We publish this correspondence as Appendices to this Report. We consider a number of significant human rights matters, below.

Access to donor information

4.7 The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) is required to maintain a register of information which relates to the provision of treatment services to any identifiable individual or the keeping or use of gametes of any identifiable person or an embryo taken from an identifiable woman. It also must keep a register of information about people who are born as a result of donor conception. Currently people over 18 who are on that register may request a search for certain information about their donor or information about any person they may be planning to marry. People under 18 may also search the register to check that they are not related to anyone they are planning to marry. It is generally prohibited to disclose information held on the register, except as provided by certain exemptions.[158]

4.8 Clause 24 of the Bill re-enacts significant parts of the existing rules on the register. New provisions will permit applicants to inquire about potential relationships with proposed civil partners; donor conceived people who are over 16 will be entitled to information about the number, sex and year of birth of their donor-conceived half siblings and donors are to be given limited rights to request information about the number, sex and year of birth of children born as a result of their donations (provided that children will not be identified by the disclosure of that information). In light of the recommendations of the Committee on the Draft Bill, the Bill proposes to permit anyone over 16 to search the donor conception register for non-identifying information about their donor and to search the donor conception register in order to check whether they are related to any person with whom they are intending to enter into an "intimate physical relationship". The Bill has also been amended to require the consent of proposed partners to a search of the register for information which relates to them.

4.9 There is no general right to access personal information recognised by the ECHR. However, in certain circumstances, the right to respect for private life protected by Article 8 ECHR may impose a positive obligation on the State to enable an individual to discover important personal information about genetic history or health.[159] Decisions which restrict access to information, including identifying information, about an individual's genetic parents must strike a fair balance between the interests of the genetic parent, the legal parent, the wider public interest and the interests of the person who would like to discover more about their personal history and parentage.[160] Our domestic courts have recognised that the interest of children of donor conception in their genetic history engages the right to respect for private life under Article 8(1) ECHR.[161] Neither the domestic courts nor the European Court of Human Rights have taken a decision on where a fair balance should lie in these circumstances.

4.10 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that a child has, as far as possible, the right to know his or her parents.[162]

4.11 We wrote to the Minister to ask for an explanation of the Government's view that it was appropriate to limit access to the register to people who are 16 and full access to the register to those aged 18. We asked the Minister to explain why any person who was considered "Gillick-competent" should not be allowed full access to the register to search for identifying and non-identifying information about their donor.[163] The Minister explained that it was the Government's view that the Bill:

Strikes a fair balance between the interests of the donor and the donor conceived person and those of the legal parents and the donor conceived person…The Department considers that the donor conceived person will almost certainly be mature enough to cope with the different types of information at the different ages. The donor conceived person's parents will have been provided with non-identifying information about the donor by the clinic at the time when they received the treatment. If they have concerns that they may not have access to all the information which is available - for example, that the donor may have provided more as time passes - they can enquire of the clinic, or the HFEA. They can choose whether to share this information with their child before the child reaches 16.

4.12 The Minister went on to explain why, in his view, it was appropriate to distinguish between access to identifying and non-identifying information:

The Government considers that by age 18 most young people will be relatively mature and that this will be of benefit to them in making the decision as to whether to request identifying information, as well as in handling the information when received … It will also be beneficial for parents if identifying information is given when the donor conceived person has reached 18, since the introduction of another person into the family, however notional, will be bound to have an impact. […]

The Department considers that enabling donor-conceived people to obtain identifying information about their donor below the age of 18, would dissuade some donors from choosing to donate their gametes. The advice of the National Gamete Donation Trust is that donors would be unlikely to come forward in the first place if their identifying information is to be given to a 16 year old. The Department considers that it is justifiable, for the purposes of Article 8(2) of the Convention, and for the purposes of Article 14, read together with Article 8, for it to maintain the age for accessing identifying information at age 18 to ensure that a sufficient number of donors are willing to continue donating their gametes.

4.13 The Government does not consider that "Gillick-competence" is an appropriate trigger for access to the register. The Minister explained that "a bright line rule" is justifiable in order to "ensure legal certainty and to maintain confidence in the regulatory system". The Minister emphasised that a child's right to know his or her parents, as guaranteed by the UNCRC should be interpreted broadly, subject to national law, and can cover the right to know legal, as opposed, to biological parents.[164]

4.14 In our view the provisions in the Bill concerning access to donor information are unlikely to give rise to a significant risk of incompatibility with the Convention, either in terms of the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) or the right to enjoy that right without discrimination (Article 14 ECHR). We have one outstanding concern. The domestic courts have consistently accepted that distinctions based on age can be justified if they are not manifestly without reasonable foundation. The House of Lords have said that "bright-lines" of this type are best decided by Parliament[165] We consider that clear, objective, justification must be provided when an age-based provision engages individual rights. In light of the weight being placed by the Government on the effect that a lower threshold for access to identifying information may have on potential donors, we call on the Minister to provide further information about the evidence base for its view that providing identifying information to 16 year olds or to Gillick-competent children would deter potential donors and undermine fertility services. We recommend that the advice of the National Gamete Donation Trust on this issue is published to allow parliamentarians and others to scrutinise effectively the Government's view.

The "need for a father"

4.15 Currently, the law provides that no woman shall be provided with fertility treatment unless account has been taken of the welfare of "any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father)".[166] The Bill proposes to replace "the need of that child for a father" with "the need of that child for supportive parenting".[167]

4.16 We agree with the recommendation of the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee that this gender specific reference should be removed.[168] These provisions have been the subject of lengthy debate in the House of Lords.[169] The European Court of Human Rights has recognised that where adoption facilities are provided, they must be provided without unjustified discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Without justification, such distinctions may be in breach of the right to respect for private life without discrimination (as protected by Article 8 and Article 14 ECHR).[170] Similarly, the Convention prohibits unjustified discrimination between married and unmarried parents for the purposes of recognition of parental responsibility, or wider family law decisions on access and custody.[171]

4.17 Since it may reduce the risk that there could be unjustified discrimination against single mothers, or those in a same-sex relationship, in the provision of fertility treatment, we consider that the removal of the gender specific reference to the "need for a father" is a human rights enhancing measure.

4.18 The introduction of the term "supportive parenting" requires a broad, subjective analysis of the ability of those seeking fertility treatment to provide an appropriate environment for a child.

4.19 We welcome the requirement in the Bill that the HFEA Code of Practice provides guidance on the meaning of "supportive parenting".[172] Appropriate guidance must be issued by the HFEA to help providers of fertility services understand the extent of their obligation to consider the welfare of any child and to ensure that the need to consider 'supportive parenting' is not applied by providers of fertility services in a way which still carries a risk of unjustified discrimination against same sex couples and single women.

Safeguards for personal information

4.20 There are a number of provisions in the Bill which deal with the powers of the HFEA to store and to share information. The HFEA may disclose information to any person to whom it contracts out its functions, where it is "necessary or expedient" for the purpose of carrying out those functions.[173] The common law of confidentiality will not apply to disclosures made pursuant to these regulations, but the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998) will.

4.21 The HFEA will also have a broad power to assist other public authorities in any way it thinks fit.[174] Traditionally information held by the HFEA has been subject to a stringent prohibition on disclosure and that information has been subject to a higher standard of protection than information held in other contexts, including other medical information.[175] During debates in the House of Lords, a number of practitioners in the field highlighted that this could lead to circumstances where doctors were not permitted to share information lawfully with other medical professionals.[176] The Bill proposes a number of new broad exemptions to the prohibition on the disclosure of information obtained by HFEA or any of its contractors or agents. Notably, this includes a broad exemption for disclosure to third parties exercising the functions of the HFEA or exercising the functions of a licence holder (acting under a license). The Secretary of State will retain a power to make further exemptions from the prohibition on disclosure of information.

4.22 The Bill also introduces a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations authorising disclosure of information from the register of information relating to donor conception (including of any identifying information) for medical or other research which he considers "necessary or expedient" in "the public interest".[177] The Bill enables the Secretary of State to create a body to oversee the processing of information under this clause. However, the Bill does not require the Secretary of State to subject his decisions to oversight; nor does the clause specify any particular composition, characteristics or responsibilities of this potential oversight body. The common law of confidentiality will not apply to disclosures made pursuant to these regulations, but the DPA 1998 will.

4.23 Increasingly provisions for information sharing create broad gateways for the disclosure of personal information to bodies or individuals for administrative convenience without adequate safeguards for the protection of the individual right to privacy on the face of the Bill.[178] The Minister has explained that it is the Government's view that the provisions in the Bill adequately protect the right to respect for personal information and that the broad powers in the Bill are necessary to introduce new "flexibility". The Minister explained:

practical experience over the past 16 years has shown that further exceptions are necessary. The Bill will lift the prohibition in relation to disclosure by the HFEA or a licensed clinic in essentially the same types of circumstance - for example, with relevant consents, for the purpose of the exercise of its functions, to assist another body in the exercise of its regulatory functions, in accordance with regulations made under Section 33.[179]

4.24 We are concerned by the number of provisions in this Bill which provide for disclosure of information, including identifying information, to unspecified public bodies or other persons for broad or undefined purposes. Where personal information is protected by the creation of an offence of unlawful disclosure, any additional protection offered by the criminal sanction may be undermined by ill-defined or broad exemptions. It remains our view that safeguards for the protection of personal information should be included on the face of any Bill which provides powers for the collection and storage of personal information.[180] We are particularly concerned that the trigger for many of the proposed information sharing gateways includes a test of whether disclosure would be "expedient". In fact, during our scrutiny of the Offender Management Bill, the Government accepted that this test may not meet the requirements of necessity needed to justify the disclosure of personal information (Article 8(2) ECHR).[181] We asked the Minister whether expediency was adequate to provide protection to the right of individuals who have disclosed personal information to HFEA to respect for their private life.[182] We focused specifically on the residual power of the Secretary of State to make regulations providing for the disclosure of information for research purposes. The Minister told us that whilst the power is broad, the Secretary of State will still be required to exercise his discretion in a manner which is compatible with the right to respect for private life (Section 6 HRA, Article 8 ECHR).[183]

4.25 The Bill should be amended to make clear on its face that where the information to be disclosed engages Article 8 the test of necessity must be met. We recommend that all references to the power to disclose personal information, or enable the disclosure of personal information, as and when it is "expedient" are removed.

Contracting out by the HFEA

4.26 The HFEA will be a public authority bound by Section 6 of the HRA to act compatibly with Convention rights. The Bill provides that the HFEA may contract out any of its functions other than those excluded by enactment, expressly by the Bill or by the Secretary of State.[184] The Courts have chosen to limit the circumstances in which private bodies exercising certain contracted out functions may be subject to the application of the Human Rights Act.[185] Against this background, we have consistently expressed our concern about the power of public authorities which act in areas likely to engage individual rights to contract out their functions.[186]

4.27 The Bill provides that the HFEA may not contract out any of its powers relating to the grant, revocation or variation of licences; powers of entry, search or seizure or any power to make subordinate legislation. These are important limitations which limit the circumstances where the functions of the HFEA may be exercised in a way that leads to a serious infringement of Convention rights without recourse to the remedies of the HRA. Outside these limits, however, there remain a number of functions exercised by the HFEA which may engage individual rights. For example, it is a function of the HFEA to maintain the register of information relating to donor conceived people. This is a function which may engage the rights of those receiving treatment, donors and donor conceived people to respect for their private lives. The Minister confirmed that the Government proposed that the HFEA should be able to contract its functions out to a body which was not itself a public authority, but that it was the Government's view that there were adequate safeguards in the Bill to ensure that an individual would retain a remedy against the HFEA. He explained that:

[New] Section 8C(5) ensures that the HFEA retains responsibility for the functions carried out by a third party contractor. Section 8C(5) provides that anything done in the exercise of any function to which an arrangement relates, will be treated as if it had been done by the HFEA itself. The same protection applies to omissions […] Given that the HFEA is a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, anything that is done incompatibly with the Convention rights will be unlawful under Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act and the victim will be able to bring a claim under that Act against the HFEA. Section 8C(5) therefore ensures that the HFEA will retain liability for any non-compliance with the Human Rights Act in the exercise of its functions regardless of whether it performs those functions itself or contracts them out. The position of third parties will therefore remain unaffected by reason of a contractor exercising the function.[187]

4.28 We welcome the attempts in the Bill to limit the circumstances where the HFEA may contract out their functions. We do not share the Government's confidence that the Bill will ensure that the individual will retain a remedy against the HFEA for any breaches of Convention rights which are a result of the action or inaction of a contractor. In any event, we disagree with the Government's assertion that contracting out in these circumstances will not undermine the protection offered to third parties by the Human Rights Act. As we have consistently pointed out in our reports on this subject, a remedy against a commissioning public authority offers significantly less protection to a service user than the direct application of the HRA to a service provider. Without the direct application of the HRA, there will be no incentive to service providers exercising contracted out functions to take a positive approach to the rights of their service users.[188]

Donor conception and birth certificates

4.29 The Draft Bill Committee "recognised the force of the argument that the fact of donor conception should be registered on a person's birth certificate". They considered that this could create an incentive for parents to tell a child of the fact of his or her donor conception. They recommended that the Government give this matter further consideration, while recognising that the issue was complicated and raised issues of "privacy, as well as human rights and data protection".[189]

4.30 A number of amendments were tabled in the House of Lords for this purpose. Possible schemes included: (a) imposing a requirement that short, or long birth certificates reflect donor conception, for example by the inclusion of the phrase "by donor"; and (b) that any birth certificate include a "code" or a "symbol" which would denote donor conception.[190] A final amendment proposed that the Bill should include a duty on the HFEA to review the arrangements for birth registration and donor conception "from time to time".[191]

4.31 The right to respect for private life generally requires that measures that compel people to disclose personal information to others must be justified by reference to a legitimate aim (Article 8 ECHR). Inclusion of information about donor conception on a birth certificate would require parents to disclose to the Registrar the fact that they received certain medical treatment and that their child was a child of donor conception, engaging their right to respect for personal information relating to their treatment (Article 8 ECHR). A more serious question would be raised if the inclusion of this information on the birth certificate would require a donor conceived child to disclose the details of their conception to third parties: would it become public that a child was donor conceived every time they were asked to provide their birth certificate? Inclusion of information relating to status or genetic history on a birth certificate could be justified if it served a legitimate aim (such as, protecting the rights of others). However, any interference would need to be proportionate to that aim.

4.32 In this case, the aim would be to enable more donor conceived people to discover that they are donor conceived. There would need to be objective evidence that any proposed scheme would achieve this aim. In debates, doubt has been raised over the ability of any scheme related to birth registration to meet this goal, not least as it may encourage parents to provide false information to the Registrar of Births.[192]

4.33 The Government has considered the potential impact of these proposals in the right of parents and children to respect for private life (Article 8 ECHR) and has so far resisted any amendment to the Bill which would change the requirements for registration of the birth of a donor conceived child.[193] We share the Government's concern that proposals to amend the process of birth registration raise serious concerns about the privacy of donor-conceived people. Conflicting views have been raised over the value of the proposals, including whether a change would lead to more people becoming aware of their status and whether or not a change would be welcomed by donor conceived people. We note that the Government have made a commitment to keep this issue under review. The Government plans to consult with relevant stakeholders on whether a full public consultation should go ahead in 2008-09.[194] We consider that the registration process should only be changed if there is objective evidence that it is necessary and that the change will not have a disproportionate impact on the ability of donor conceived people to keep their birth status private if they wish to do so.

Other issues raised by the Bill

4.34 A number of additional issues have arisen in the course of the Bill's passage through the House of Lords which also may raise human rights concerns. Although we have not raised these in correspondence with Government, we consider two issues below, in order to inform debate.

CONSENT AND STEM CELL USE

4.35 The creation, use and storage of human admixed and other embryos for the purpose of a research project requires the effective consent of the donor of the cell or nucleus.[195] A number of scientists and research professionals have expressed their concern that the proposals in the Bill could stifle developing stem cell research. Their concerns focus on two issues: (a) the retrospective effect of the provisions on consent where cells or tissues have already been collected and where no explicit and specific consent exists and they are anonymised or donors are untraceable and (b) the inability of parents to consent on behalf of children to the use of their cells. For example, in a letter to The Times, dated 21 January 2008, the group explained:

We fully agree that in the future such consent should be a requirement and that it would be wrong to use previously donated cells if there were good reason to believe that the donor would have specifically objected to their use in embryonic stem cell research. However, many existing cell and tissue samples and cell lines were donated, for any research purpose, by patients (now untraceable) with particular diseases before this sort of research was imagined).[196]

4.36 A separate issue arose in respect of research on childhood diseases and consent:

The Bill does not currently make any provision for parents or guardians to consent on behalf of their children. This has the regrettable side effect that it will in future be impossible to carry out embryo research using cells for sufferers of serious or life threatening diseases that exclusively affect and usually kill children…This removes a vital route to increasing our understanding of the development and causes of these terrible diseases.[197]

4.37 The Government resisted these arguments on the basis that a stringent consent based regime would be necessary to meet the requirements of the Human Rights Act and Convention rights.[198] The Government has made a commitment to reconsider the provisions on consent and are expected to bring forward two sets of amendments for this purpose in the House of Commons. The Government considers that amendments to provide exceptions to the rule on consent must be accompanied by appropriate safeguards to meet the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.

4.38 The Government has correctly identified that the use of genetic material to create an embryo without consent will engage the right to private life, as protected by Article 8 ECHR. The Minister explains that new evidence has persuaded the Government that limited exceptions to the requirement for express consent may be justified, if accompanied by appropriate safeguards. These safeguards have not yet been identified.[199] We accept that in principle, the requirement for consent to the use of genetic material for these purposes is not absolute and that in some limited circumstances proceeding without consent may be justified. We note any human admixed embryo or any other embryo created for the purposes of research must generally be destroyed after 14 days.[200] We consider that the right to respect for private life is engaged when dealing with individual genetic material. The Government relies on the right of autonomy and the fact that the European Court of Human Rights have recognised that Article 8 ECHR incorporates the right to respect for decisions about whether or not to "become a parent".[201] While this case law is relevant, we do not consider that a direct analogy can be drawn between parenthood without consent, and the use of genetic material to create an embryo for the purposes of research, subject to a short time frame and subject to regulation by the HFEA.

4.39 Any amendments proposed by the Government and containing safeguards for the protection of human rights should be published at an early stage to allow for effective scrutiny.

4.40 In debate, the Government has explained that the provisions in the Bill which relate to consent are necessary to meet the right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.[202] This issue was not considered in the original Explanatory Notes accompanying the Bill. We accept that the Government may not have anticipated any objection to these provisions. Although new Explanatory Notes have been produced to accompany the Bill on its passage from the House of Lords to the House of Commons, neither of these issues has been addressed. In order to find a full explanation of the Government's analysis of compatibility with Convention rights, we have had to follow the debates, and then obtain a letter from the Minister sent to members of the House of Lords and deposited in the House of Lords Library. Where the Government provides a further explanation of its views on the human rights compatibility of provisions in a Bill, it would assist effective scrutiny if this explanation were included in the Explanatory Notes which accompany the Bill when it passes from the first to second House.

ARTIFICIAL GAMETES, RESEARCH AND FERTILITY TREATMENT

4.41 Members of the scientific community have raised significant concerns about the potential for the Bill to stifle emerging research on the development and use of artificial gametes. Broadly speaking, this research involves the creation of sperm and embryos. The Bill currently provides that although artificial gametes may be created for the purposes of research, they cannot be produced for the purposes of fertility treatments. Amendments were proposed in the House of Lords which would widen these provisions, for example, by introducing a regulatory power to extend licensing powers to use for treatment. The Government resisted a number of these amendments by reference to human rights arguments. For example, at Third Reading, resisting an amendment which would extend to treatment only provided to a man and a woman, the Minister explained:

The Government's concern relates to Article 14 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 8 on the right to privacy. The Government are concerned about whether the technique is available for same-sex couples or whether they will be treated differently. If they are treated differently, the Government's view is that this must be justified to comply with Article 14 ECHR. Techniques for same-sex couples may be a lot further off or unsafe at this moment, and different treatment may be justified, but we are exploring these issues and will consider them further in the Commons.[203]

4.42 There is no right to fertility treatment using existing technology, let alone any potential forms of treatment which may be developed in the future. However, should treatment be available, any distinctions in relation to access must be justified. We welcome the Government's commitment to look again at these amendments on this basis.[204]

151 Joint Committee on the Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill, Session 2006-07, Report on the Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill, HL Paper 169-I/HC 630-I. Back

152 Bill 70 EN, paras 260 - 263. Back

153 See Paton v United Kingdom (1980) 3 EHRR 408, in which the applicant unsuccessfully challenged the Abortion Act 1964 on the basis that permitting an abortion to proceed without his consent as the father would be in breach of the rights of the foetus under Article 2 ECHR and his right to private and family life as protected by Article 8 ECHR. See also Vo v. France, App. No 53924/00, Judgment of 8 July 2004, in which the applicant unsuccessfully claimed that it was in breach of the right to life enjoyed by the foetus for French law to fail to require the doctor who had negligently caused her to have a miscarriage to be prosecuted for unintentional homicide. Back

154 Evans v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 7 March 2006, App. No. 6339/05. In this case, the Grand Chamber rejected the applicant's claim that it was in breach of her rights under Articles 8 and 12 to require her former partner's consent to the use of embryos which they had created and frozen after her treatment for cancer left her infertile; See also Dickson v United Kingdom, App No 44362/04, Judgment 4 December 2007. In this case, the Grand Chamber decided that a blanket policy which barred access to artificial insemination for prisoners, other than in very limited exceptional circumstances, was disproportionate and in breach of the applicants' right to respect for private life as protected by Article 8 ECHR. Back

155 Part 2. Back

156 Appendix 8. Back

157 Appendix 9 Back

158 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Section 31. Back

159 See for example, Gaskin v. UK (1989) 12 EHRR 36. In this case the applicant successfully argued that a failure to provide for independent adjudication on whether individuals should lawfully be permitted to withhold their consent to his accessing files held on his early years foster care was in breach of his right to respect for private life under Article 8 ECHR. The Court concluded that the applicant had a vital interest in receiving information necessary to understand his childhood and early development. Back

160 Odievre v France, App. No 42326/98, Judgment 13 February 2003, paras 44 - 49. This case concerned French legislation which allowed women who gave birth and surrendered their child for adoption to do so anonymously. The applicant alleged that it would breach her right to private life if the identity of her genetic mother could be concealed subject to her consent to disclosure. The Court considered that French legislation which would allow a woman to waive anonymity in certain circumstances and to consent to identifying information being presented would strike a fair balance between the rights of the genetic mother, the applicant and the wider interests of society. In this case, there was no violation of Article 8 ECHR in the decision to allow identifying information to be withheld. Back

161 Rose v Secretary of State for Health [2002] EWHC 1593 (Admin). Back

162 Article 7. Back