(2) LIMIT ON MAXIMUM DURATION OF
A CONTROL ORDER
85. We accept that the question of whether there
should be a maximum limit on the duration of a control order is
a difficult one. We can see the force in the Government's argument
that it is under a duty to take some positive steps to protect
the public if it has reason to suspect that a person poses a risk
to the public from terrorism. On the other hand, severe restrictions
on liberty of indefinite duration are extremely problematic in
human rights terms, and involve an ever-growing risk of subjecting
those who are under such controls to inhuman or degrading treatment
contrary to Article 3 ECHR, or to the interferences with their
Convention rights to privacy and respect for private life becoming
disproportionate. Although the Home Secretary denies that individuals
are indefinitely subject to control orders, the fact is that several
of the controlees have already been the subject of their orders
for a considerable time. According to the Home Secretary's own
information, two individuals have been on control orders since
they were introduced almost three years ago, and a total of seven
of the current 15 on control orders have been on control orders
for more than two years.[87]
It is likely that two (we do not know precisely how many) were
also detained in Belmarsh under the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security
Act 2001 before that.
86. The availability of a control order for a finite
period might also serve to focus the efforts of investigators
to come up with material which can be used as evidence in a criminal
prosecution rather than rely on the indefinite availability of
a control order.
87. We do not
believe it is sufficient to rely solely on the courts to ensure
that the operation of an individual control order is not indefinite
or so prolonged that it breaches human rights obligations. We
see the force of Lord Carlile's suggestion that there could be
a statutory presumption against control orders being extended
beyond a maximum duration of two years other than in genuinely
exceptional circumstances. On balance, we are in favour of a maximum
limit on the duration of a control order, both as an important
safeguard of the liberty and mental health of the individuals
concerned, and as a discipline on the investigative and enforcement
authorities to find material capable of being the basis for a
criminal prosecution within a reasonable time. Beyond prohibiting
severe controls of indefinite duration, however, human rights
law does not provide any clear answer as to what that limit should
be. We recommend that Parliament should debate the principle of
whether there should be a maximum limit on the duration of a control
order, and if so what that limit should be. We will propose an
amendment to the Counter-Terrorism Bill to enable such a debate
to take place.
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