1.  As always, in this Report we ground our analysis in the human rights standards with which the Government's counter-terrorism measures must be compatible, and we proceed from a full recognition that the Government has a duty to protect people from terrorism, a duty imposed by human rights law itself. We also remind Parliament of one of the central and enduring insights of the Newton Committee of Privy Councillors which reported on the operation of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: that counter-terrorism measures ought not to be extraordinary measures in a special category of their own, but, as far as possible, part of the ordinary criminal law of the land. (Paragraph 5)

2.  The Government has failed to consider these alternatives to extending pre-charge detention as a coherent package. Taking these measures in combination, we do not think it can be said that there is really any gap in public protection which warrants taking the extraordinary step proposed by the Government to increase pre-charge detention up to a maximum of 42 days. (Paragraph 8)

3.  We are extremely disappointed by the Government's failure to provide a substantive response to a substantial report on the issue which has proved the most controversial in the context of the current Bill. We look forward to the Government at the very least responding to the recommendations we have identified above. (Paragraph 11)

4.  The fundamental flaw in the Government's proposal therefore remains: it confuses parliamentary and judicial functions by attempting to give to Parliament what is unavoidably a judicial function, namely the decision about whether it is justifiable to detain individual suspects for longer. (Paragraph 15)

5.  We would not expect to have received the legal advice provided by the Law Officers to the Home Office, which we accept would be legally privileged. However, we are disappointed that the Law Officers were not even able to confirm that, in their view, the Bill is compatible with the UK's human rights obligations and does not risk giving rise to breaches of human rights in individual cases. We see no reason why Parliament should not have received at the very least a summary of the reasons why the Law Officers regard the Government's 42 days proposal as being compatible with the UK's human rights obligations. In our view, on a matter as significant and sensitive as the proposal to increase the maximum period of pre-charge detention, it is important that Parliament is fully informed about the views of the Law Officers, especially in light of what has subsequently been learned about Lord Goldsmith's view at the time of the 90 day proposal. (Paragraph 32)

6.  We remain of the view that the Threshold Test would benefit from proper parliamentary scrutiny and debate, which to date it has never received. (Paragraph 46)

7.  Given the importance of where the threshold for prosecution is set, and in particular the implications for an individual's liberty, in our view the Government's approach fails properly to reflect the strong constitutional presumption that interferences with an individual's liberty require express statutory authorisation, or leaves too much discretion to the DPP. We are not therefore persuaded by the Government's argument that it would be constitutionally improper to place the Threshold Test on a statutory footing or to introduce some independent safeguards. (Paragraph 48)

8.  In our view, the availability of bail with conditions would enable the police to continue their investigation of those suspected of terrorism offences who do not pose a risk to public safety or a flight risk, while at the same time maintaining some control over them through bail conditions. We therefore recommend that the Bill be amended to make court-ordered pre-charge bail with conditions available in relation to terrorism offences. (Paragraph 56)

9.  A prison governor falls a long way short of a judge as an independent safeguard against abuse and we note that the Government has provided no evidence to substantiate its assertion that prison governors thoroughly scrutinise any police requests for production of a suspect for questioning. "After the event" judicial powers to exclude evidence obtained by oppressive means are also inferior to legal safeguards designed to prevent such oppressive questioning happening in the first place. We therefore remain of the view that the requirement of judicial authorisation and strict time limits must be set out on the face of the legislation. (Paragraph 60)

10.  In our view, it should be possible to draft a limitation on the scope of post-charge questioning which confines it to new evidence but defines new evidence in such a way as to include material which has only become available, for example, as a result of analysis of computer material which was already physically available. (Paragraph 62)

11.  The Government says that amendments to the control orders framework are not necessary because the judgment in MB already makes it human right compatible. We do not agree that the effect of the judgments in MB are as clear as the Government contends, as is borne out by the continued litigation and appeals about precisely what the case requires. We remain of the view that it is better that words appear on the face of a statute than that they are "read in" to the statute by a judgment the precise effect of which might not be very clear even after careful study. We suggest the amendments to give effect to these recommendations. (Paragraph 97)

12.  In our view, the Government's justification for this measure, that the current law may be incompatible with Article 2 ECHR in this respect, is highly questionable. The law of public interest immunity applies to inquests and already provides the Government with the opportunity to persuade the coroner not to disclose certain documents or information because to do so would damage the public interest, including national security. (Paragraph 117)

13.  The proposed solution of specially appointed, security-cleared coroners would, in our view, clearly not be compatible with Article 2. In any case where the State is potentially implicated in the death which is being investigated, a coroner appointed by the Secretary of State, instead of by the normal method, would not satisfy the requirement in Article 2 ECHR that the investigation be carried out by a person independent from those implicated in the events. The fact that the coroner has been directly appointed by the Secretary of State for the purposes of the particular inquest would be fatal to any appearance of independence. (Paragraph 119)

14.  We therefore recommend that the clauses concerning coroners' inquests be deleted from the Bill and the issue returned to in the context of the forthcoming Coroners Bill. (Paragraph 120)