Letter from the Attorney-General of Australia
the Hon Daryl Williams AM QC MP
Dear Mr Hastings
Thank you for your letter of 28 July 1998 concerning
judicial review of Government action in Australia and parliamentary
privilege. I was interested to learn of the review of parliamentary
privilege currently being conducted by the Joint Committee. I
understand that you have already been in contact with the Clerk
of the House of Representatives and that the Clerk has provided
you with some information on the Parliamentary Privileges Act
1987 and related case law.
I note that the Joint Committee is interested
in the extent to which Australian courts use parliamentary proceedings
in judicial review of Government action and policy. In particular,
you ask to what extent applicants for judicial review are able,
in practice, to criticise in court a Minister's reasons for a
decision given in Parliament or use parliamentary material as
evidence that the Minister misdirected himself or acted for an
unauthorised purpose. Your letter indicates that practice in the
United Kingdom is that announcements on virtually all major Government
decision on policy are made to Parliament and that the courts
often need to take account of what is contained in Hansard
when considering ministeral decisions.
This issue does arise from time to time in Australian
courts although, for the reasons I indicate below, it is not perhaps
as significant here as it appears to be in the United Kingdom.
As a background comment, I note that Australian
courts have no jurisdiction to review Government policy. Any need
by a court to ascertain or consider Government policy would be
in the context of examining the legal validity of a particular
Government decision or action. This context could arise, for example,
where the basis of a challenge to a decision was that the decision
was made in accordance with a policy without regard to the merits
of the particular case, or that the decision was made in bad faith
or for an improper purpose. Even in this context Australian courts
are generally, and are certainly at the Federal level, precluded
from examining the policy or administrative mertis of a particular
Government decision or action. This constraint has been affirmed
by the High Court of Australia in the case of Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185
CLR 259 at 272.
For the sake of completeness I menton that there
are, however, various administrative tribunals in Australia which
have power to examine the administrative merits of Government
decisions or action. An example of such a tribunal at the Federal
level is the Administrative Appeals Tribunal established by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act).
I also note that my response is essentially
limited to the position regarding the Federal Parliament in Australia,
to which the Parliamentary Privileges Act relates, although I
am not aware of any significant difference in relation to the
various State parliaments.
Against this background, I now address the issues
that you have raised.
Following passage of the Parliamentary Privileges
Act in 1987, Justice French of the Federal Court considered the
use of parliamentary proceedings in judicial review of administrative
action in the case of Hamsher v Swift (1992) 33 FCR 545.
I enclose a copy of the decision for your information (not
printed). In that case the applicants sought to use a statement
made by a Minister in the Parliament as evidence that a certain
decision had been made by the Minister. Justice French expressed
the clear view that subsection 16(3) of the Act prohibited the
use of the Ministerial statement in this way because it would
amount to drawing an inference from proceedings in Parliament.
The effect of the Parliamentary Privileges Act is that statements
made by a Minister in the Federal Parliament will not be admissible
in court or tribunal proceedings for the purpose of challenging
a Government decision or action. Justice French noted, however,
that the applicants could rely on certain extra parliamentary
statements made on behalf of the Minister to support their challenge.
Given the rules and process of administrative
decision making in Australia, it is unlikely that an applicant
for judicial review would suffer from being unable to rely on
privileged parliamentary material to challenge a decision, including
a decision made by a Minister. At the Federal level section 13
of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977
(the ADJR Act) requires that decision makers provide a written
statement of the reasons for a decision on request. Such statements
frequently provide the basis for challenging an administrative
decision. Section 28 of the AAT Act contains a similar provision.
Where section 13 does not apply, or is considered by a court to
be inadequate, a court could adopt other measures such as ordering
discovery of documents held by the Minister or his or her Department,
subpoenaing such documents, or permitting cross-examination of
the decision maker. In addition, Freedom of Information legislation
might be available to obtain access to relevant Ministerial or
Department documents.
In Australia, more general policy statements
are often announced in Parliament. The practice of Ministers,
and of Departments, however, is to also make such policies widely
available to the public in the form of media releases, pamphlets,
handbooks and so on. Indeed, section 9 of the Federal Freedom
of Information Act 1982 requires departments to make available
for inspection and purchase by members of the public documents
that are used by the agency and its officers in making decisions
and recommendations. This includes manuals, rules, guidelines,
practices and precedents. For example, while section 499 of the
Migration Act 1958 requires that the Minister table any
general policy directions, such as the Government's Criminal Deportation
Policy, in Parliament, the Policy is also published in an adjunct
to the Departmental Procedures Advice Manual and is available
for inspection and purchase at regional offices of the Department
of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs. Because of this, it
is generally not necessary to rely on parliamentary proceedings
to establish the content of such policies. This is one of the
reasons that the Act has not proved inhibiting to judicial review
of administrative action.
I trust this information is helpful and I would
be pleased to offer the Committee any further assistance it may
require. I would also be very grateful to receive a copy of the
Committee's report in due course as this is clearly a matter of
continuing interest.
Daryl Williams
4 November 1998
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