Written Evidence Submitted by Dr Mary Hobley

 

Introduction

1. This evidence draws on my experience in Nepal spanning over two decades of engagement with aid agencies, government and in particular local people. I have worked with AusAID, DFID (previously ODA), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and with the World Bank, as a researcher and also as an independent consultant to the design, review and evaluation of their programmes. Much of this work has been in the forest sector where I am recognised as one of the main international commentators on community forestry - an approach to forest management which has been pioneered to a high degree of success in the middle hills of Nepal.

2. In recent years my work has moved away from a direct focus on forestry to a wider engagement on issues of the state and citizenship and in particular on issues of extreme poverty and exclusion, on questions of power and who has voice to control decisions and access to resources. I draw on my work in community forestry and also recent work on local governance to illustrate the issues affecting DFID's programme in Nepal.

3. The opinions expressed are my personal observations and independent views.

 

A) Aid modalities

4. One of the key issues to understanding DFID as a player in the aid process is to understand the wider aid and political context in which it operates. Some of the problems facing Nepal are a direct consequence of the ways in which aid has been and is currently being delivered and the risks that this entails to the peace-building process and the development of a long-lasting political settlement.

5. Impact of conflict The approach to development was significantly interrupted by the 10 years of conflict which effectively brought to a halt the wider processes of state-building and left development agencies with limited space in which to continue to provide support to services and infrastructure. This, in its turn, shifted the development process with most agencies, including DFID, focused on delivery of quick impact activities through non-government organisations, as it was increasingly difficult or impossible for many government staff to operate in districts or lower down.

6. Effect of project silos on democratic development This is a significant and important shift which has major ramifications for the state-building attempts of today, as now there are a proliferation of central projects reaching down to the local-level, contracted by donors through non-government organisations (which in many circumstances act more like private management companies) bypassing any nascent local government structures and delivering services and money directly to local people. This has and continues to undermine the emergence of democratic accountability between citizens and the Nepalese state. Effectively the main lines of accountability lie outside the state directly to projects and thus to donors.

7. The tendency by donors to view development through the lens of a particular sector or project makes it more difficult to see Nepal through the eyes of its citizens and to appreciate the combined effects of all these projects and programmes at local level on local politics and on individuals. The crowding out of political space by projects and interest groups remains a major barrier to building processes that can sustain peace.

8. Civil society organisations as programme 'instruments' Over the last two-three decades there has been a major emphasis on community-based organisations (CBOs) in Nepal as a means to deliver the multiple projects and programmes. Groups have been responsible across a range of sectors for successfully delivering services to their members, mobilising labour and financial assets to support individual and group-based development. These groups range from forest user groups, agriculture groups, water groups, health and non-formal education groups, through to many small savings and credit groups.

9. There are now at least 400,000 of these organisations both (a) managing a range of resources and services and (b) acting as the voice of their members and their interests. These two roles are rarely distinguished with the result that there is scope for the capture of benefits and the exclusion of certain groups and individuals.

10. Despite the incontrovertible success of group-based development for some, it has remained relatively unchallenged as a development approach despite the abundance of evidence from Nepal to indicate that groups, are in many circumstances highly exclusionary both of the extreme poor and socially marginalised. In addition they often reinforce existing power and patronage structures. Since groups are the main channel through which services can be obtained, group membership is an essential part of securing benefits. Thus, it is common to see households holding membership in several groups, particularly those households that are more capable and have the resources to afford the time and the costs of group membership. Commonly poorer households have membership of fewer groups and for the extreme poor they are often members of no groups and so have highly limited access to services and fora to influence resource allocation and decisions.

11. Although these groups have been very important and were a key element of social cohesion particularly during the conflict, for DFID and other donors, community participation through user groups and participatory processes is often presented as a substitute for democratic accountability.

12. In my opinion, it is now time to reassess the community-driven development thinking that underpins much development practice (and not just in Nepal) and to consider carefully the local government system to be supported.

13. Building local political structures for decision-making In a period of post-conflict state-building and in the absence of locally elected political structures, these CBOs, particularly the forestry user groups (as groups with natural resources and funds) are beginning to occupy the political space left empty by the lack of elected local government; they have become the engines of local development and have to an extent supplanted the role of local government. At the same time other interest groups, with donor funding behind them, are also beginning to occupy these political spaces, the political parties are rapidly securing these community based organisations (CBOs) as political entities and co-opting them to increase the reach of their membership and the role of the parties at the very local level. The state cannot and should not solely interact with its citizens through interest groups, there must be clear mechanisms through which citizens can directly engage with the state and its representatives and hold them to account.

14. In my opinion, this is a key moment in time for Nepal and what is really required is a serious understanding and view of how local democracy is to be developed to ensure (a) that it is not co-opted by a series of interest groups, whose voices tend to be partial and are often highly exclusionary and (b) that donor funds are used to incentivise democratic development.

B) Social exclusion

15. DFID's work with the National Planning Commission and World Bank on social exclusion has been highly influential and helped to influence debate and policy in terms of understanding how exclusion has been a key part of the underlying causes of Nepal's history of conflict. I continue to believe that these understandings of exclusion remain critical to the future of the peace process, but I also consider it is critical to continue to see exclusion as an active process and not as an outcome of a passive process. For this reason, understanding how development practice pushes forms of exclusion is a critical part of any donor assessment.

16. Currently what we are seeing with the focus on social exclusion (and attempts to target the poorest and marginalised), community-driven development and local governance (where there is no locally elected political representation) and social protection is potentially a dangerous coming together at the local level of several forces that could lead to greater problems of patronage and exclusion.

17. The systems being put in place allow for patronage to be more finely developed; CBOs have the ability to determine who should or should not gain access to a service or resource; they also have the capacity with direct funding to determine who should or should not gain access to loans. These closed systems have limited mechanisms for accountability and in many cases are carefully controlled by the elites. (A recent study I conducted across six projects (funded by different donors) showed how there was widespread manipulation of poverty/wealth rankings by households to ensure that they were in the right category to get access to particular benefits which were tied to these wealth categories).

18. In my opinion, the critical issue at this stage is to help to build - for a new generation and a young population - a real stake in Nepali society. This should be at the local level and in many dimensions viz. economically, socially and politically. Local economic development, as supported by DFID's strategy for job creation, is an important part of building the conditions for a nation where citizens have a strong stake in its future. As argued above, support to establishing local democratic structures would build local representatives' stake in the future of their areas. Although national level sector programmes with NGO implementing agencies are relatively easy to deliver a range of social services, in practice these projects limit the political space for voice and contribute little (or at best indirectly) to private sector job creation and enterprise.

C) Future approach

19. Despite the conflict, Nepal is a country with great potential for democratic development - with settled agriculture, historic property rights and the absence of warlords and small transient/mobile communities. DFID as lead bilateral donor is in a key position to influence and support this agenda.

20. Currently the future peace and stability of Nepal are uncertain; the recent proclamations by the leader of the UCPNM on autonomous provinces, the encouragement of forest invasions by landless people in the far west, as well as a call to further revolution and bloodshed illustrate compellingly not just the importance of winning the peace at the national level but also of ensuring the peace through actions at local-level.

21. However, DFID is well placed to continue to be an important player in Nepal, advocating for democracy and inclusion of the voiceless. As the White Paper suggests 'the UK will increasingly put politics at the heart of its action. We need to understand who holds power in society, so we can forge new alliances for peace and prosperity....... In the future, understanding political dynamics will shape more of our programmes.' (DFID White Paper 2009 p.73).

22. In my opinion DFID must engage with the sub-national level at a state-political level rather than community or sector-wise and be positioned for this as soon as the political and security conditions make it possible. This may not be compatible with sector-wide programmes and community development approaches that have been supported to date.

23. An agenda for sub-national action would include:

a) Maintaining the political economy understanding Understanding both the political and power dynamics at the sub-national and local levels and the effects of aid programmes on these dynamics must be a critical element of future DFID work in Nepal.

b) Advocacy for voice and creating stakes and voices at the sub-national levels An effective and capable state - let alone a responsive state and inclusive society - must also be a "joined up" state - with structures between the national level and the community level/individual. Without such structures, there is little scope to build up a sense of social identity and to build the stake in the future for leaders and citizens that is so critical to securing the peace. This is the arena where conflict grows and where conflict can be resolved. Donor resources can never be neutral - care must be taken to be clear as to what donors are incentivising and to ensure that they are doing no harm.

c) Doing no harm DFID has an important role in supporting development processes that build a long-term political settlement. Such change takes a long time and can go through difficult periods but requires sustained support. This should redefine the relationships between citizens and the state and allow the development of accountable political systems at national and local levels - where citizens have voices that are not just mediated through interest groups or only heard through membership of community organisations and to be careful not to continue to reinforce a patronage system that maintains exclusion.

In particular, DFID should be supporting (moving towards supporting) the development of local governance structures that provide the deliberative space at local level that can be taken over by elected local government when the constitution is finalised.

d) Clarifying what to incentivise To be effective, local governments require predictable, discretionary funds, in a form that requires politicians to be accountable to their councils and electorates rather than donors (i.e. sub-national budget support). This is necessary to allow councils to make meaningful local development decisions, with the ability to make choices between different interests. Despite the lack of elected local government, it is the right moment to put in place the conditions for accountability at district, municipality and village-level.

This would mean that more programme/project-based financing should move on-budget at the sub-national level as currently most money flowing into villages is tied to predetermined projects that may not necessarily respond to the local context and livelihood requirements. Currently policy targets are set centrally, the means are determined by the projects and all that is left to the lowest level is to identify beneficiaries. Such processes - especially where the identification of beneficiaries is a personalised act - sets the conditions for corruption, both in terms of party politicisation and individual paybacks.