UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 359-vHouse of COMMONSMINUTES OF EVIDENCETAKEN BEFORE
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This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and reported to the House. The transcript has been placed on the internet on the authority of the Committee, and copies have been made available by the Vote Office for the use of Members and others.
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Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither witnesses nor Members have had the opportunity to correct the record. The transcript is not yet an approved formal record of these proceedings.
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Transcribed by the Official Shorthand Writers to the Houses of Parliament: W B Gurney & Sons LLP, Hope House, Telephone Number: 020 7233 1935
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Oral Evidence
Taken before the
on
Members present
Sir Patrick Cormack, in the Chair
Rosie Cooper
Mr John Grogan
Mr Stephen Hepburn
Lady Hermon
Kate Hoey
Dr Alasdair McDonnell
Mr Denis Murphy
Stephen Pound
Mrs Iris Robinson
________________
Witnesses: Mr Norman Baxter, former Head of the Serious Crime Squad, Police Service of Northern Ireland, and Mr David McWilliams, former Detective Chief Inspector, Police Service of Northern Ireland, gave evidence.
Q286 Chairman: Before we begin - and I
welcome our witnesses - could I slightly break with precedent because I do
notice that there is a member of the other place present in the room. Could I just congratulate her on her elevation
to that place and wish her happiness there!
We are most grateful to you, gentlemen.
We met very briefly in
Mr Baxter: Thank you, Chairman. Norman Baxter, retired Chief Superintendent from the Police Service Northern Ireland. I have been senior investigating officer in the Omagh bomb inquiry from 2002 until my retirement last November. This is David McWilliams who was my Deputy Senior Investigating Officer.
Q287 Chairman: And you both of course are retired now from the PSNI?
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Mr McWilliams: Yes.
Q288 Chairman: When did you retire?
Mr McWilliams: I retired in September of last year.
Q289 Chairman: Last year? And you Mr Baxter?
Mr Baxter: Last November.
Q290 Chairman: So you are very recently retired. Do either of you wish to say anything by way of opening submission?
Mr Baxter: Just a few remarks, Chairman. Having reviewed the evidence and the material which the Committee has been listening to, there is a number of things I would like to say in terms of clarification, but, first of all, I would like to express my personal disappointment that no-one has been brought to justice for these terrible murders after so long.
Q291 Chairman: I think we are at one on that.
Mr Baxter: It is a matter of personal regret that that has not been achieved. In reading through the evidence, Chairman, I think there has been a blurring of understanding of the language which emanates from the intelligence community. People within the intelligence and investigation community speak in term of information, intelligence and evidence, and in respect of those three things they are distinctly different from a professional's perspective. Information is regarded as almost raw data which is received. Intelligence is information which is analysed and produces what is known as an intelligent product, which can either be predictive, which forecasts something which may happen, or reflective, which helps investigators deal with something in the past. Evidence is the translation of information through witnesses and documents to something that can be placed before the court. I would have to say to the Committee that when statements are made that all intelligence has been passed to the police, it cannot be assumed, nor is it the case, that all information has been passed to the police because the information that is used to develop intelligence which has been discarded as of no intelligence value will not be disseminated, and information which has formed part of the intelligence part will not also accompany the intelligence part. So when people speak about 'all' intelligence being shared, that is not declaring or stating that everything has been shared. From a police investigator's perspective, investigators try to turn information into evidence, not intelligence into evidence. Intelligence should point investigators to where the information which can be translated into evidence can be found. Those are very brief comments.
Chairman: That is very helpful.
Lady Hermon: That is very helpful.
Q292 Chairman: So what you are saying to the Committee is that the intelligence gathering is designed to discover where the information is and it is the information that forms the basis of the evidence?
Mr Baxter: Intelligence collectors collect information for the purposes of identifying future attacks or identifying material that could help investigators in theory, so they collect information. Your Committee, from what I gather, is examining whether all intelligence was shared, and certainly Sir Peter Gibson's report, from what I can see, has been a full and accurate assessment of the dissemination of intelligence.
Q293 Chairman: We will come on to that. Thank you very much indeed. Did you have anything to add at this stage, Mr McWilliams?
Mr McWilliams: No, just that I agree with the comments that
Q294 Chairman: Thank you. Would both of you briefly like to put on the
record the role that you played in investigating the bombing on
Mr McWilliams: My role was as one of the team of the investigation ---
Q295 Chairman: And at that stage your rank was Police Inspector?
Mr McWilliams: Yes, Detective Inspector. I was Detective Inspector in the CID at the time and when the bomb occurred I was full time into the Omagh bomb investigation. In May 2000, on the retirement of Detective Chief Superintendent Houston, the Deputy SIO at that stage Mr McArthur became Senior Investigating Officer and I then became deputy to him.
Q296 Chairman: And you, Mr Baxter?
Mr Baxter: I was appointed Senior Investigating Officer in May 2002.
Q297 Chairman: Whereabouts were you at the time of the bomb?
Mr Baxter: I was attached to the RUC Complaints and Discipline Branch as a Senior Investigating Officer.
Q298 Chairman: Based in
Mr Baxter: In
Q299 Chairman: So in 2002 you became the Chief Investigating Officer.
Mr Baxter: In the Omagh bomb inquiry.
Q300 Chairman: And in assuming that role you had the assistance of Mr McWilliams?
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Q301 Chairman: And therefore you worked closely together until your respective retirements?
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Q302 Chairman: Thank you. You referred briefly to Sir Peter. Before bringing in colleagues, I would just like to ask you two questions: first of all, have you read the full Gibson report? Have you seen it?
Mr Baxter: I have not read the full report. I have read the redacted report.
Q303 Chairman: The same as the Committee.
Mr McWilliams: I have read parts of the redacted report.
Q304 Chairman: Did either of you give evidence in writing or in person to Sir Peter?
Mr Baxter: I gave evidence to Sir Peter on a narrow band of subject matter.
Lady Hermon: What was that?
Q305 Chairman: May I just ask Mr McWilliams?
Mr McWilliams: No, I did not give evidence to the inquiry.
Chairman: If you would like to answer Lady Hermon's question.
Q306 Lady Hermon: A narrow band? What did Sir Peter focus on? Did he leave something out that you thought was material?
Mr Baxter: No, he interviewed me in respect of knowledge that I had which was specific knowledge because I was not attached in 1998, I could not be of any assistance to him in terms of giving him background detail, but in respect of my role within the inquiry he asked me issues connected to that. There is nothing disparaging or nothing that should be read into me saying a narrow band. I was not being interviewed about the full range of his inquiry.
Q307 Chairman: You were not there at the time and therefore you did not have immediate knowledge of it, but you had some knowledge acquired during your period of running the team; he considered that was relevant and he asked you about it?
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Chairman: Mrs Robinson?
Q308 Mrs Robinson: You are very welcome. The day
of that bombing will always stay with me, as it does with most people in
Mr Baxter: I do not disagree with his report. I would take a different view of some of the evidence he gave to the Committee in terms of the use of information which may have been available and which it could have been put to at the time of the explosion. I think Sir Peter takes the view that there was nothing there that could have helped the Omagh bomb inquiry team. I suspect that that is not correct.
Q309 Lady Hermon: Why?
Mr Baxter: I am not in a position to know what was or was not being conducted by the intelligence community, but if such things as telephone numbers, either on the day or in the period leading up to Omagh, were available within the intelligence community that should have been shared at a very early stage with investigators. I think Sir Peter has indicated a different view that it would not have been of assistance.
Q310 Chairman: This is a fairly important area. You are saying that you do not view this in the same way as Sir Peter views it?
Mr Baxter: From an investigative perspective. I think in fairness to Sir Peter he does indicate he was not at the criminal bar, but from my perspective Omagh cannot be seen as an individual incident. Omagh was the last in a series of incidents dating into the middle of 1997, and so there is a long lead-up to the Omagh explosion. There has to have been information, I am not talking about the intelligence but the information which sits behind the intelligence which may have been of value in the early days of the inquiry.
Mr McWilliams: Although it is difficult to know in that we do not know what that was, if there was anything in existence.
Q311 Chairman: Since the publication of Sir Peter's report have you communicated any of your concerns to him?
Mr Baxter: No, I have not, Chairman, partly because Sir Peter's inquiry was dealing with a specific area and I think he addressed that fully and accurately, and I think his report is correct. I know of nothing that would suggest that material was withheld, to use the term of material which he uses.
Q312 Chairman: Do I infer from what you say that you would rather he had had a wider remit?
Mr Baxter: It would be my view - and I do not know want to be disparaging to politicians - that the inquiry which the Prime Minister announced was far away from the terms of reference that Sir Peter Gibson was given, and therefore the expectations of the families who are still seeking closure were raised to a point that Sir Peter could not meet because he was looking at a narrow area of intelligence work.
Q313 Chairman: But let me just return to the question - and that is very helpful - do you believe that if Sir Peter had had a wider remit or more time, because he was very time constrained as well, we could have had a more helpful report?
Mr Baxter: Chairman, since I was appointed Investigating Officer there have
been a number of inquiries into intelligence.
We have Deputy Chief Constable Tonge from Merseyside who reported in
2003 that all intelligence had been shared.
We have had the Police Ombudsman for
Q314 Chairman: Should have been shared - and was not?
Mr Baxter: There is no record anywhere in the inquiry that information relating to these matters was shared.
Q315 Dr McDonnell: That is very useful. Could you give us some sense, Mr Baxter, of what your understanding is of where Sir Peter made reference to the 'cautious' way in which the Special Branch behaved? Do you think that was referring to the caution of information versus intelligence and only letting go of the stuff they were absolutely sure of? What do you understand where he makes this reference to cautious
Mr Baxter: I am not sure what he means nor do I think in the way in which he has written it has been helpful because it could mean anything.
Q316 Dr McDonnell: He says that GCHQ passed all relevant intelligence fully and promptly to Special Branch South and to RUC Headquarters. Are you aware of any intelligence information reaching Special Branch North, not just intelligence but such information as we have talked about?
Mr Baxter: North region?
Q317 Dr McDonnell: Yes, did they get the same intelligence or were the left out of the loop?
Mr Baxter: I cannot answer that because I do not know, Chairman, it is outside my knowledge.
Chairman: Not to your knowledge?
Q318 Dr McDonnell: And you have no idea how promptly the information was passed, if it was passed, to Special Branch South or to RUC Headquarters?
Mr Baxter: When you talk about intelligence, I am not sure exactly what was passed because we are speaking in general terms, but what we do know is that I think it is 8 September ---
Mr McWilliams: Either 8 or 9 September.
Mr Baxter: 8 or 9 September a document was produced with the names of eight suspects which is formally recorded within the inquiry.
Q319 Chairman: May I just ask Mr McWilliams, you were there, you were on the spot, you were a CID inspector, and you must have had the most terribly difficult time, emotionally and in other ways, because you would know many of the people who were caught up in this ghastly crime. Did you feel that you were able freely to go about your duties with all the information that you truly wanted or did you feel things were being withheld from you?
Mr McWilliams: No, I felt at the time that if there had have been - I am saying if there had have been - intelligence or information that could have assisted, that it would have been passed on.
Q320 Chairman: So you did not feel that you were being starved or deprived of the tools that you needed?
Mr McWilliams: No, from my experience as a CID investigator over a large number of years there always could be reasons why information/intelligence could not be shared, whether it is to protect the source of that intelligence or the methodology. There could well be a reason, or whether it has been assessed and it is of no value, or thought to be of no value.
Q321 Mr Murphy: Could I ask the gentlemen to explain what the procedures were that were in place at that particular time, the link between the RUC, Special Branch and GCHQ because it seems to be quite confusing in some of the evidence that we have taken. Sir Peter himself actually says: "The arrangements in place at the time allowed for RUC Special Branch to make requests in respect of further dissemination of any GCHQ material that might have existed. The records show that no such request was made." What were the procedures in place? Was it your position to actually request GCHQ to provide you with any information or would you have expected that GCHQ, had they had any information, would have passed it down the line?
Mr Baxter: I do not want to be negative but I do not know what the procedures were in 1998 because I was not in Special Branch nor was I working with GCHQ, so I cannot help you. What I would say is that it is hard to believe that any state organisation with information which would help solve the murder of 29 people would not ensure that it was passed or given to the investigators. I think any organisation which had information and did not do that is culpable.
Q322 Mr Murphy: Bearing in mind that GCHQ were quite specific in what could be done with any information that was passed on, it was for the eyes only of the person who requested it, and if they wanted to pass it on to someone else they had to receive permission from GCHQ. There has already been an admission that that system has now changed but that system in itself would have prevented the information being passed on readily.
Mr Baxter: I accept that but I come to the moral position that people should not hide behind photo calls.
Q323 Mr Murphy: We are suggesting the opposite actually, that we would genuinely like to find out whether indeed the procedures that were in place at that particular time, and obviously everyone that we have spoken to has said it could not have prevented the bombing, but there is an indication that if information had been passed on much quicker then it could have assisted in arresting suspects much earlier. That is really the angle that we are coming from.
Mr McWilliams: It is difficult to answer in that we do not know what was there as the investigation team in that the senior investigating officers would be in contact with the head of Special Branch where intelligence or information would have been passed.
Q324 Mr Murphy: But in your experience was intelligence passed on readily and regularly from GCHQ through Special Branch to yourselves?
Mr McWilliams: I do not know that. I cannot answer that.
Q325 Chairman: I think Mr Murphy is asking some important questions. Look, you two gentlemen, who are here entirely of your own accord, and we are extremely grateful to you for agreeing to come and volunteering indeed to come, were living with this ghastly crime from the day it was committed, Mr McWilliams, until, you told us, the day you retired from the force.
Mr McWilliams: That is correct.
Q326 Chairman: You, Mr Baxter, were drafted in some three or four years later.
Mr Baxter: That is correct.
Q327 Chairman: But again you worked on this for a number of years until you retired. During that period of your detailed investigations, did you remain of the same mind or did you as you probed deeper, as you looked at people's contributions, feel that things could have been done better at the beginning, more information could have been shared at the beginning, and that that might have led, in the words of Mr Murphy, and I think I quote him more or less accurately, to some of the villains being apprehended in consequence?
Mr Baxter: I think the point is very good, Chairman. I think the Committee should address a wider issue and that is the series of bombs which had been carried out which were being detonated from 1997. We had Markethill, I think it was October 1997, we had Moira in January 1998, we had Portadown, we had Lisburn in April 1998, and at each one of those terrorist incidents there was a point of intervention which could have disrupted this terror gang.
Q328 Lady Hermon: Do you think in fact the same could have been said of Omagh?
Mr Baxter: When I say disrupt, post-incident investigation, there could have been opportunities to arrest this gang after Lisburn, after bombs in May, July, and even after Banbridge.
Q329 Chairman: Why in your opinion were those opportunities not seized then?
Mr Baxter: Because, Chairman, investigators did not have access to the intelligence which Mr Tonge's investigation and review of intelligence in 2002 to 2003 produced to me, an intelligence document which contained intelligence relating to 16 terrorist incidents. That intelligence, to my knowledge, was not shared with investigators after those incidents.
Q330 Dr McDonnell: Are you telling us, and this is the nub of the thing, that there was intelligence which came to light later that would have been very useful at the time?
Mr Baxter: Not to prevent those incidents but to ensure that the investigators after those incidents would have had an opportunity to look at suspects and to have them arrested prior to the Omagh bomb.
Q331 Chairman: And if those people had been arrested, the Omagh bomb might not have happened?
Mr Baxter: That is speculation.
Q332 Chairman: Yes, I know, I am just asking for your comments.
Mr Baxter: Certainly disruption may have prevented it.
Q333 Chairman: Do you think, with your long career in the police force, that that would have been a likely outcome with earlier apprehensions?
Mr Baxter: Chairman, this bomb team had free reign from the middle of 1997 and the authorities, wherever they were, allowed that to continue.
Q334 Lady Hermon: Did the bomb team live
within the jurisdiction of
Mr Baxter: Some in
Q335 Chairman: And we have to choose our words carefully because nobody has been convicted of this crime and those who have fallen foul of the civil case are appealing, but, in your opinion, this was a team of people who were involved in, implicated in, plotted a number of outrages?
Mr Baxter: It was a team of people who had broken away from the Provisional IRA,
some of them were still in the Provisional IRA, working in groups among
themselves, not clearly defined as we would know them today as the Real IRA and
Continuity IRA, but they were working in the south Armagh and north Lough area,
and I am afraid the authorities and the Government had their eye off the
ball. I think it is inconceivable on
mainland
Q336 Chairman: You have made an exceptionally serious comment just then when you said authorities had their 'eye off the ball'. Which authorities do you have particularly in mind?
Mr Baxter: I would have to say, Chairman, if I may be free to say so ---
Q337 Chairman: Of course.
Mr Baxter: In the post-1998 settlement there was a drive by the Northern
Ireland Office to ensure that security was reduced in certain areas and, as a
serving police officer, I was aware that that was happening, so we had Cloghogue
and other border checkpoints where the soldiers were moved off the road, not
stopping cars. We had soldiers not
allowed to patrol areas. The security
policy was a failure and these people were coming freely into
Q338 Chairman: I do not want to misquote you and we do not want to misquote you or misunderstand you, but are you saying that there was a political imperative that was actually preventing the full exercise of security duties?
Mr Baxter: I would be saying that quite clearly.
Q339 Chairman: You are saying that clearly?
Mr Baxter: Quite clearly.
Chairman: And that is not an unfair summary of what you are saying?
Q340 Mrs Robinson: And can I say, Chairman, that we would have been saying the same thing at that time.
Mr Baxter: I do not want to be political on this, Chairman, but I personally was at meetings where commanders were disputing with their seniors officers about the removal of troops from areas because they felt it was leaving people vulnerable.
Q341 Lady Hermon: And you are able to say
that, Mr Baxter, because of course you were in Southern Region at that stage
when the bomb when off in 1998? You were
based in Southern Region in
Mr Baxter: I was but this policy was post 1994.
Q342 Lady Hermon: 1998 or 1994?
Mr Baxter: Post 1994 there was a continual drift towards demilitarisation in order to satisfy certain political groupings.
Q343 Kate Hoey: Mr Baxter, did you say any of this to Sir Peter or was it not relevant or was he not in any way interested in this?
Mr Baxter: It was not relevant to Sir Peter's inquiry. I am just giving you my view on if someone asked could the bomb have been prevented. I do not know if it could be specifically prevented but what I do know is there were opportunities to intervene after each explosion.
Q344 Chairman: And those opportunities were not seized?
Mr Baxter: These people were not arrested.
Q345 Kate Hoey: Because it would have been politically incorrect to so do?
Mr Baxter: I am not saying why, I am just saying, having looked at the linked incidents, the investigators did not have the intelligence which I was provided by Mr Tonge's team in 2003 which would have been available post incident. I am not suggesting in any way that the intelligence community permitted the bombs to happen, but certainly investigators were hampered by the lack of dissemination of information.
Q346 Mr Hepburn: Who would not have passed on that information that you saw in 2003?
Mr Baxter: The intelligence community, whoever was in charge of the intelligence community. I cannot say who takes the political decisions ---
Q347 Mr Hepburn: We are talking about organisations not individuals but when you say the intelligence community, who do you mean in the intelligence community?
Mr Baxter: The intelligence community covers an array of organisations.
Q348 Chairman: Of which a principal is GCHQ?
Mr Baxter: No, a principal would be the Security Service, but I am not laying blame with any particular organisation. There seems to have been a policy and that policy was not to disseminate.
Mr Hepburn: That is amazing.
Q349 Chairman: That brings a new dimension to our enquiries.
Mr Baxter: We almost have the same situation today where we have a blind eye being turned to dissident activity, and I have to say the border is exposed again. It would be remiss of me not to advise this Committee that you could be sitting here in ten years' time discussing another atrocity because the Government and the authorities have failed to acknowledge what is happening. The border is wide open and the same pattern of attacks is happening ---
Q350 Lady Hermon: That is a very serious criticism of the PSNI and the former Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde, who has consistently warned of the threat from dissidents, and his now successor Matt Baggott and his entire leadership team. That is a very serious criticism.
Mr Baxter: I am not criticising PSNI. I am simply saying that we are almost seeing a repeat of the pattern of incidents leading up to Omagh in 1998.
Q351 Mrs Robinson: Chairman, can I just ask Norman, are you then indicating that you see it as a political grip on what can and cannot be done in terms of dealing with the dissidents, in the same way that you felt there was a political hand gripping action that could have halted - and we are not saying it would have done but it could potentially could have stopped - the Omagh bomb and that you see political interference repeating itself here?
Mr Baxter: What I see is almost a fulfilment of the nursery rhyme of the Emperor's
New Clothes where everybody is saying it is wonderful. I am not directing criticism against anyone
other than I just see the absolute vulnerabilities again in the border areas,
no security, with large parts of
Q352 Chairman: I do have to say though this is rather taking us away from Omagh, which is the purpose of today's meeting. We have been told consistently, both in public and in private, by Sir Hugh when he was Chief Constable that the dissident threat was of a very high order. We have also as a Committee travelled with PSNI and Garda Síochána around the border, and I am concerned obviously by some of the things you say, but we have been impressed by what we have seen and what we have heard. Could I bring you back to Omagh, which is really what we are here to deliberate on today. You have said that whatever may or may not be the situation now, that had there been a greater willingness to apprehend, to arrest fairly well-known members of a gang, it is conceivable that Omagh would not have happened because it was the same gang that was responsible, in your view, for a number of atrocities? That is what you are saying to us?
Mr Baxter: I think it is quite clear from the trial of Sean Hoey that the same gang was responsible for those cases in which he was charged.
Q353 Mr Hepburn: In the series of events that culminated in the atrocity at Omagh - Lisburn, Banbridge - you are saying that information came into your hands in 2003 that intelligence had not been given in those instances to the PSNI (the RUC at the time) information was not given to them by the intelligence community, so it is the same sort of allegation or the same sort of suggestion that the Panorama programme was making about Omagh - that the intelligence information was not passed on to the PSNI hence this Omagh tragedy could take place?
Mr Baxter: The Panorama programme dealt with stuff from GCHQ of which I have no knowledge. I can simply tell the Committee that the Tonge report which was delivered to me contained intelligence which the original investigating officers in 1997-08 had no vision of.
Q354 Chairman: I know Lady Hermon has some particular questions on these matters and I would like her to ask them.
Mr McWilliams: Can I say there is one point.
I may disagree with
Mr Baxter: Yes.
Mr McWilliams: In respect of Omagh.
Mr Baxter: I think he confirmed that all the intelligence for Omagh had been passed over. I am speaking about what I call these missed intervention points before Omagh.
Q355 Dr McDonnell: Could you give us an example of what you mean by a missed intervention point?
Mr Baxter: If we take Lisburn, which is one of the linked incidents, a car bomb, there was an opportunity, had investigators been given the identities of the bomb team, to carry out searches of the properties or the homes of suspects.
Q356 Dr McDonnell: But you are not suggesting that these people were in the sights of the police or security services and somehow or other managed to scramble away on their exit from Lisburn?
Mr Baxter: Some of these people lived in
Q357 Chairman: It was policy that it was not disseminated?
Mr Baxter: It seems to be.
Q358 Stephen Pound: Is it possible to say who established that policy? Was this political? I appreciate that you have touched on this but what you are saying here today has ramifications far beyond this Committee room and will be listened to with extraordinary interest, inevitably. Do you think this is a localised operational police decision or do you think it was a direct political decision from the UK Government?
Mr Baxter: I do not know the answer to that, but I do think the Government must have some responsibility in ensuring that systems are proper and correct, but I do not know.
Q359 Stephen Pound: You just saw the evidence of it is what you are saying?
Mr Baxter: I am just saying that intelligence was shared with me in 2003 that was not shared pre the Omagh bomb with investigators.
Chairman: You have deduced as a result. Lady Hermon?
Q360 Lady Hermon: If I might direct the first question to Mr McWilliams since you were there from the very beginning. Could I just ask you quite clearly what information did your investigation team receive from - and let me go through these in order - RUC Headquarters, Special Branch Southern Region and Special Branch Northern Region, where Omagh is based? When did you receive it and what intelligence, information, or indeed evidence, did you draw from that?
Mr McWilliams: I do not know where the intelligence that we did receive came from. It would have come from Special Branch but what Special Branch, which region, I do not know. The first intelligence we got was actually on either the Saturday night of the 15th or the Sunday morning, which led to a number of arrests in the Omagh area on the Monday. We then moved on and, as far as I am aware, the first intelligence in relation to the grouping that we believe was involved in Omagh came on I think it was either 8 or 9 September.
Q361 Lady Hermon: And at what stage were you actually given the names of the alleged bombers or terrorists and their mobile telephone numbers, the ones who had been identified with the bombings from 1997 right through to 1998, preceding the Omagh bombing, when did you actually get that information?
Mr McWilliams: In relation to the names, we were given intelligence in relation to a number of individuals. As I say, I cannot remember whether it was 8 or 9 September. In relation to telephone ---
Q362 Lady Hermon: Mobile telephones.
Mr McWilliams: That was as a result of investigations over a number of months where we analysed millions upon millions of billings and telephone calls, et cetera, and came up with the analysis in relation to personalities involved.
Q363 Lady Hermon: If those mobile numbers and the owners of those mobile numbers had been known to GCHQ, for example, or the other intelligence services, for what reason would those have been withheld from the investigation team looking at the mass murder of 29 dead people and two unborn children murdered in Omagh? Why would anyone withhold that information?
Mr McWilliams: I do not know. I cannot answer that.
Q364 Lady Hermon: Could I ask both of you in sequence, were either of you made aware that there had been a telephone call preceding the Omagh bombing on 15 August, that there had been a warning given that there would be an incident in Omagh? Were either of you aware of that?
Mr McWilliams: Yes, I was aware there was a telephone call in relation to a possible incident to take place that was made on 4 August.
Q365 Lady Hermon: Were you told immediately on 4 August?
Mr McWilliams: Yes, because it was actually received by one of my detectives. No, I was not on 4 August because I was on leave until just before the bomb.
Q366 Chairman: Was this the threat to the police station?
Mr McWilliams: Yes, it was, but then that was proved to be not correct.
Q367 Lady Hermon: Mr Baxter, were you aware that there had been a threat?
Mr Baxter: Absolutely.
Q368 Lady Hermon: Even though you were in Southern Region at the time you were aware there was a threat?
Mr Baxter: No, I would not be aware of that until I became SIO. I think the answer to that, Chairman, has been established that that information was not disseminated on 4 August. Again, we are back to this information which was received; it is analysed by the intelligence community, it is deemed not to be correct, so therefore it is not disseminated.
Q369 Chairman: It is very important to put on record that the threat of 4 August was not a major bombing of Omagh, it was a threat specifically to the police station, and having analysed that you decided that it was a hoax?
Mr McWilliams: It was not analysed by myself. It was analysed by other persons.
Q370 Chairman: Those who analysed it decided it was a hoax?
Mr McWilliams: Yes.
Mr Baxter: I would have to say that the current Ombudsman has found this year that that call was a coincidence after their investigation.
Lady Hermon: Thank you, that is helpful.
Q371 Chairman: Sir Peter notes that Special Branch South briefed the CID investigation team twice on "the basis of an all-source intelligence picture", to quote his words, on 20 August (five days after the bomb) and then on 9 September. You have referred to 9 September, Mr McWilliams, but you have not referred to 20 August. Is that because you did not know about it or because it just slipped your mind?
Mr McWilliams: No, I was not aware of anything that was passed on 20 August.
Q372 Chairman: So when you saw Sir Peter's report that was the first you knew of that?
Mr McWilliams: Yes.
Q373 Chairman: So you did not know about that even though you were the chap on the spot until the beginning of 2009?
Mr McWilliams: I certainly did not know about it. Whether any of the senior officers in the investigation team knew of it, I cannot comment for them.
Chairman: Thank you very much for your frankness and your honesty. Could we move to Kate Hoey please.
Q374 Kate Hoey: Could I just ask you a little bit about the Police Ombudsman investigation and the report that came out of that. How useful and wide-ranging do you think it was?
Mr Baxter: The 2001 report?
Q375 Kate Hoey: 2001.
Mr Baxter: I would probably prefer not to comment directly on it, but one of the outworkings of the Ombudsman's report was that the families and the relatives look at the intelligence community now through the lens of conspiracy. I spent a lot of time investigating the allegations which Kevin Fulton made to the Ombudsman's Office. He has made a written statement in the presence of his solicitor saying that the information was not factual. Therefore his claims in 1999 to the Ombudsman were misleading to the Ombudsman and he has now said basically he was lying in his statement. Having said that, I would not like to comment on the Ombudsman report.
Q376 Kate Hoey: The Secretary of State, when he gave evidence to us earlier this year, kept saying that this Ombudsman's report had dealt with all the matters relating to how quickly Special Branch had passed on intelligence to detectives, and he basically said there is no need for any further inquiry, everything was covered by the Ombudsman. Do you think that that is correct?
Mr Baxter: The Police Ombudsman conducted her inquiry, we have Deputy Constable Tonge's intelligence review and we now have Sir Peter Gibson's review, and I think society has to accept the integrity of what people are saying to them in terms of intelligence in respect of Omagh. So I do not think any further inquiry into the sharing of intelligence would be helpful, but I think it may bring some closure to the families if something was looked at the wider policy surrounding how security was applied in the period leading up to Omagh because intelligence does not sit in isolation; it is just one part of policing and security.
Q377 Kate Hoey: Can you just clear one thing up for me because in the 2001 report the Ombudsman criticised the report of a failure to inform the operational commander in Omagh of this telephone warning given to the RUC on 4 August that Omagh would be the target. Did you know about that telephone warning? Did anybody know about that?
Mr McWilliams: As I say, I was on leave at the time but I was made aware of it once the bomb had taken place.
Q378 Kate Hoey: So they did know about the warning? So why would the Ombudsman say ---
Mr McWilliams: The detective that actually received the telephone call informed myself and the Deputy Senior Investigating Officer.
Q379 Chairman: After the 15th?
Mr McWilliams: On the 15th, yes, in that ---
Q380 Kate Hoey: So what was the Ombudsman actually criticising then?
Mr McWilliams: I do not know.
Lady Hermon: Chairman, could I clear up one small point.
Chairman: Of course.
Q381 Lady Hermon: Am I not right, Mr Baxter
and Mr McWilliams, that there is an absolutely fundamental principle within
policing in
Mr Baxter: You see, you would have to be so naive to think that the Secretary
of State, and his predecessors, sits in
Q382 Lady Hermon: Tamper with policing?
Mr Baxter: Yes, I would use the word 'tamper'. One of my responsibilities before I retired was to conduct a review of on-the-runs, that is persons who are outside the jurisdiction. I can assure the Committee that there was an extremely unhealthy interest by officials in the Northern Ireland Office about prioritising individuals who were on the run and about ensuring that they were cleared to return to the North. That was done through ---
Q383 Lady Hermon: Yes, but with the greatest respect, Mr Baxter, those were on-the-runs. We are talking here about - and again I will use the term - the mass murder of 29 people plus two unborn children, and are you really saying to us that despite all of those deaths, that somehow within the RUC they were influenced by politicians in investigating the bomb?
Mr Baxter: I am saying that you would have to be naive to believe that the Secretary of State and his officials, or her officials in the past, did not directly intervene in policing. I can give the Committee one example where Dr Mowlam rang a duty inspector when I was on duty ---
Q384 Mrs Robinson: And let a certain person go free.
Mr Baxter: When Martin McGuinness was stopped, he telephoned her and she rang the police to get him released. I think you would be extremely naive to think that these things do not go on. I am not saying it is, "Chief constable, you have to do this," but it is a cultural or a nurturing sort of relationship so that policy is delivered in policing.
Mr Murphy: Surely, Mr Baxter, there is a significant ---
Q385 Chairman: We go back therefore to the point that you assented to earlier when I said that you believed certain things were not disseminated because of the political imperative?
Mr Baxter: No, I did not say that, Chairman. Can I clarify: I am satisfied that all the intelligence in relation to Omagh was disseminated. I am also satisfied that from that intelligence the Omagh bomb on that day could not have been prevented, but what I am saying is that there were a number of opportunities in the past where this group could have been disrupted, but some policy exists ---
Q386 Chairman: That is the point. When I put the words about the political imperative, you agreed that because of that there had been a failure to take action earlier against the gang.
Mr Baxter: No, I want to be clear, Chairman. What I was saying was that there was a political pressure in relation to the de-escalating of security. I have no knowledge about who set the policy on dissemination.
Mrs Robinson: Chairman, I think in all of this we have to bear in mind that right up until today our Government is involved with placating, and you know ---
Chairman: We must not enter into a debate here in front of the witnesses but it is interesting to get this information and these views. Mr Murphy, I cut you off a moment or two ago, for which I apologise. I would like you to come in and then I want to bring Rosie Cooper in.
Q387 Mr Murphy: The only point I was going to make is there is a significant difference, surely, between allowing Martin McGuinness to have an early night when he has been arrested and a deliberate policy to ease off policing in areas in the full knowledge that there are some people out there intent upon murder and mayhem?
Mr Baxter: Yes, first of all I would have to disagree, I see it as a huge constitutional intrusion for a Secretary of State to telephone a police officer ---
Q388 Mr Murphy: I am not suggesting that it was the right thing to do.
Mr Baxter: That to me was hugely wrong. Secondly, to consider that de-escalation of security in the face of a threat did not happen, I would have to say that it is happening today, and that is a policy.
Q389 Mr Murphy: That is contrary also to the information that we have been receiving from the former Chief Constable. They are out there doing everything they can to try and prevent this. You are saying that is not the case?
Mr Baxter: I live in a border area and people are frightened. Police officers cannot drive in the streets. They have no helicopters. They are hiring private helicopters with civilian pilots who have not got licences to fly over urban areas. We have chaos in terms of security policy and a closure of police stations in areas that need policing.
Q390 Rosie Cooper: I have to say we visited
Mr Baxter: What part of
Dr McDonnell:
Mr Murphy: To be fair we had an armed escort.
Q391 Rosie Cooper: That is our experience: the first time we had to be flown in; thereafter we have always driven in, and the policemen have been free to speak to us and have been very happy with the level of security and policing. Can I get to my questions. Telephone intercept evidence is not admissible in court. It was not in 1998 and is not today. Do you actually believe that if you had transcripts of those intercepts that that would have had evidential value and, if you would, could you also perhaps describe how long - we have heard about the numbers, nine months, that were spent just trying to identify the telephone numbers - it would have taken you to perhaps work through those records to find an evidential train connecting them all?
Mr Baxter: First of all, if there were transcripts, it would depend what was in the transcripts. You cannot say it could be turned into evidence because there may be nothing there that is useful.
Mr McWilliams: It could even be coded, it could not be interpreted.
Mr Baxter: So it is not easy to answer that question.
Q392 Rosie Cooper: So would it have been of any use to you? If you had been able to use intercept evidence, do you believe it would have been of use to you?
Mr Baxter: If it existed it would depend what was said.
Rosie Cooper: For example?
Q393 Lady Hermon: For example, as John Ware suggested in evidence to us and in his programme, I think he mentioned a phrase "a brick in the wall". Is that a key phrase for a particular bombing that you would recognise?
Mr Baxter: In terms of transcripts, that in itself would mean very little. You would have to prove the chain of who was listening, the issue of the warrants and then the circumstances in which that was said. But if such a phrase was said and you were able to prove through outside analysis where that phone was at that time, and you had an explosion, yes, it would be very significant evidence. But it is all speculation.
Q394 Rosie Cooper: Am I to take it then, in essence, you do not believe that would have been of very much use because you do not know what was said, it might have been in code and a tone might have changed or whatever, people might believe they were being listened to. Are you saying that you do not think it would have made any difference?
Mr Baxter: I do not know because I do not know if there was material of value.
Q395 Chairman: Do you think it is likely that it would have been of value?
Mr Baxter: The key would be the telephone number that sat behind it.
Q396 Chairman: It has been suggested that some numbers were fairly much in evidence and that it would have been quite easy to trace a common use of those. What is your attitude to that?
Mr Baxter: Well, I would suspect if the intelligence community knew that telephones were used on a bomb mission, then it was their moral if not statutory duty to ensure that the investigators knew. I can tell you, Chairman, there is nothing in the Omagh bomb inquiry papers to indicate that any telephone numbers were disseminated in relation to 15 August or any date prior to that.
Chairman: No information of dissemination of any telephone numbers?
Q397 Lady Hermon: So the first you became aware of them as the investigators was nine months later after trawling through BT records?
Mr McWilliams: It may not have been nine months. It was actually three for four months in that once we started getting a picture for Omagh we then looked at other incidents.
Mr Baxter: Could I correct a piece of evidence, Chairman. It was not until Deputy Chief Constable Tonge's report in 2003 that I knew that.
Q398 Mr Grogan: The crux of your evidence seems to be that the intelligence that became available in 2003 for the incidents that happened before Omagh, you say, were not made available to the investigating teams at the time?
Mr Baxter: To the best of my knowledge.
Q399 Mr Grogan: To the best of your knowledge. You also make a comment about your views on the policy of de-escalation and political interference and so on. Just to be absolutely clear, the reason for the intelligence not being disseminated prior to the Omagh bombings, you are not saying that that was political interference, are you, because you are not sure why it was not disseminated?
Mr Baxter: I do not want to confuse the Committee. I am not suggesting that there was political interference in relation to intelligence collection or dissemination. What I have said is that in the face of an on-going threat of bombings from 1997 there was a de-escalation policy which was inspired by political thinking. So on the one hand you have a policy to de-escalate so as not to annoy a certain community, or a constituency within a community. I am saying that. In terms of dissemination of intelligence I am not saying the Government set that policy but there was a policy.
Q400 Mr Grogan: Right. How do you know there was a policy? You say there was a policy not to disseminate information from the security services to the local police. How do you know that?
Mr Baxter: I am saying policy in the sense of it happened time and time again.
Q401 Mr Grogan: Time and time again was this series of incidents leading up to Omagh?
Mr Baxter: Yes.
Q402 Mr Grogan: Just finally then, given that general pattern of activity at the time leading up to Omagh, both Hugh Orde and Peter Gibson have concluded there was no reason to believe that Omagh specifically would be the target of an attack in August.
Mr Baxter: I think that is correct.
Chairman: I want to bring Mr Hepburn in briefly for a final question on this and then we will move into private session.
Q403 Mr Hepburn: Just to ask some questions about this telephone call, this warning, about an attack on the police on the 15th. Obviously you lived in extraordinary circumstances over there so threats against the police must have been a common-day occurrence. How often did you get those sorts of warnings? How often would a warning come in like that that there was going to be an attack on the police in Omagh on a specific date in the future? How often did that happen?
Mr Baxter: It is very hard to say but I would say it was quite a unique call. People generally do not, to my knowledge ---
Q404 Mr Grogan: So you got a unique call that a specific event to a police officer or policemen was going to occur on a specific date in the future, on the 15th, and then, all of a sudden, it was said it was a hoax?
Mr Baxter: I am not sure it was that simple. If I come back to the formula, that was information that was assessed by Special Branch, who looked at the names of the people involved and looked at the nature of the information and the addresses and all the circumstances, and they decided that it was not of value, so therefore it was not intelligence, so therefore it was not disseminated.
Q405 Lady Hermon: But despite that assessment you think it was quite unique?
Mr Baxter: The call was probably unique.
Q406 Lady Hermon: Was it the right assessment, do you think?
Mr Baxter: In hindsight, yes, it was the right assessment, from an intelligence perspective. You could argue that had the commander in Omagh been given that he may have introduced some additional security measures in the time. I do not know.
Q407 Chairman: And those additional security measures might have led to the apprehension of that car that blew up?
Mr Baxter: Once again we are into speculation.
Chairman: We are into speculation, of course we are, but it is legitimate for members of the Committee to be concerned about these matters.
Q408 Kate Hoey: Chairman, just before we go into private session could I ask both Mr Baxter and Mr McWilliams - and again thank you very much for coming - what made you decide that you wanted to come and give us evidence on this?
Mr Baxter: I had not decided. I was at a
meeting in
Q409 Kate Hoey: Do you feel better because you have actually been here today and said certain things?
Mr Baxter: No, I feel no different, you know.
Q410 Chairman: We are very grateful to you for coming.
Mr Baxter: I obviously was invited to come to see if I could be of assistance and that is why I came.
Chairman: You sadly had to miss that meeting but it was the fact that these gentlemen had had such a close connection with Omagh that we did this. I am going to suggest that we take up your kind agreement to have a brief private session with you, so the shorthand writer may remain and we will take a note of the evidence, but could I ask that the public gallery be cleared.