SIR HUGH ORDE OBE, MR DREW HARRIS AND MR DAVID COX

15 JULY 2009

  Q20  CHAIRMAN: Yes. The general view that we have formed is that there was a distorted reception of Eames/Bradley because of the emphasis that was given to one particular recommendation, which was possibly a misguided one. Would you like to say a word about that?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: On the recommendation, as I said, the terms of reference were very clear. I am absolutely convinced that none of the recommendations would have been put forward if they had not had substantial pressure from a number of people in the hearings, many of which of course were private. It is not really for me to comment on individuals. I think in its collective the interesting stuff for me, as a police officer, was this widening of outcomes to victims, which allowed people just to tell their story. I have listened to many. Many people find that important; they want to get their story on record and they do not really want anything else. Information recovery is optimistic but there is no reason why you should not aspire to achieving more information for victims. For me, the victim focus remained. It expanded the opportunities for people. That was the important stuff. I think you are right that it was hijacked by one recommendation, which was probably unfortunate, but the Secretary of State has made his position clear on that.

  Q21  CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much indeed for that. Are there any other questions on this subject that anyone wishes to put to Sir Hugh? Sir Hugh, we are going to be reporting also on Omagh, as you will know, and you will have seen that only this week the Committee has produced a brief report expressing its concern that in spite of repeated requests, as the Chairman, I was not allowed on behalf of the Committee—and the Committee waived its own rights in this matter—to have the full version, or read the full version, even under supervision, of Sir Peter's report, which is four times longer than the published version. We appreciate of course that you were not in Northern Ireland at the time of this ghastly atrocity, and there is no possible means of criticising you or your current command for anything that may have happened, or may not have happened; but you will fully appreciate all the concerns. From what you have seen and gathered since you have been in Northern Ireland, are you entirely satisfied that no action could have been taken by those investigating the bombing at the time to arrest the likely perpetrators immediately after the bombing?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: I think it would have been, simply from a logistic angle, impossible. I have read the full report, but I am minded of what I can say in public.

  CHAIRMAN: Of course.

  SIR HUGH ORDE: I have read Sir Peter's evidence obviously to this Committee. I am at one with him on saying you could not have prevented that atrocity from taking place, and the blame for that bomb lies fairly and squarely on the Real IRA. Much has been said, and of course we do hold some responsibility. We had a major reinvestigation under my command to try and bring justice to the families through a proper legal criminal trial, which of course failed in terms of the fact that Mr Hoey was acquitted by Judge Weir—and his writing of that is fairly clear. It was a determined, genuine effort to bring some sort of resolution to the families, which failed as a prosecution. I am absolutely clear in my mind that I have never seen anything that tells me that that bomb could have been stopped.

  Q22  CHAIRMAN: What about the recent civil action where four individuals have been named as responsible: does this make any difference from a policing point of view?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: I will ask Drew to deal with the detail, but of course the criminal standard of proof is way higher. There is no assumption of innocence in a civil matter. Drew may want to touch on the complexity of it. We are still trying to reinvestigate the crime obviously.

  Q23  CHAIRMAN: Of course.

  MR HARRIS: The crime is under reinvestigation at the moment following the Ombudsman's report into the actions of the two police officers who were heavily criticised during the trial. The Police Ombudsman reported in February. We have reopened the case and we are trawling through all of it again—but a note of caution would say that we need to find substantial new evidence before a criminal prosecution could be mounted. We have obviously reviewed the full judgment in respect of the civil trial, and it really does not give us any openings. The standard of proof and rules of evidence in civil cases are entirely different from criminal prosecutions. It also has to be borne in mind that while this civil action was being prepared, we were also preparing for a criminal prosecution that took place through 2006 and was judged upon in December 2007. That criminal prosecution is where our primary responsibility lay. Our primary responsibility still remains in trying to bring people to justice for their criminal actions.

  Q24  CHAIRMAN: Are you hopeful of success?

  MR HARRIS: I sound a note of caution, because to successfully mount a prosecution in the face of Judge Weir's comments we need to find substantial new evidence. We have been over this ground several times and the whole investigation was very thoroughly reviewed on a number of occasions, and then led to a prosecution. The investigation was led by Detective Chief Superintendent Norman Baxter, who is now retired. That was a very thorough investigation. Nevertheless, we want to be absolutely certain of what we have in our possession and whether there is anything more we can do. New legislation has obviously come into play since the original offence around SOCAP where people can be brought in and admit their part in a crime, and in turn provide evidence. We want to explore all of those possibilities before we come to a final determination around the criminal investigation. We would want to communicate that first to the families, and we have not finished that process.

  Q25  CHAIRMAN: No, of course. One accepts the sensitivities. You will know that the families group is arguing, and has argued for some time, for a public inquiry, and has put that point to this Committee. The Committee has made no judgment on that. Do you believe that this is something that could be of help?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: I think it is a matter for others, Sir Patrick. If there was a public inquiry, I would make sure that every scrap of information they sought from us they would get to form a judgment. My personal view is that I think we need to look at the history of public inquiries and ask: does it bring any outcome to the families; or does it simply raise expectations that are then not taken forward? More interesting is the point Drew made around new legislation. We have been very successful already in using that legislation to our advantage, in one of the most appalling cases in the terrorist criminal history in Northern Ireland and secured substantial convictions on killers who previously would have got off. I think there are some avenues there. We should never say it will never end in a prosecution but I do think that being utterly honest with the families—as I have been after the Hoey trial—I would say it is highly unlikely, but you never know. We never knew in the case of Robb and McIlwaine that someone would come in and step forward and be amenable to a process which has never been available before. It has been tested to destruction in that trial. The judgment runs to about 93 pages. It is a very strong judgment, and I do think that is a really interesting avenue for dealing with historic cases.

  Q26  DAVID SIMPSON: Sir Hugh, for the record, are you entirely satisfied that any relevant intelligence was transmitted from GCHQ to Special Branch, not only in accordance with procedures but as expeditiously as was practical to do?

  MR HARRIS: If I could first touch on some of the detailing behind that, Chairman. In late 1997 and 1998 there was a bombing campaign going on within what was then primarily the South Region of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. There were bombing attacks in Portadown, Moira, Lisburn, Banbridge, Armagh and Newry, and so a lot of the focus of the Special Branch investigation was upon Mahon Road, and the Special Branch, which was based there, led on the intelligence investigation. There was a specific team set up to do that, a small team. They developed their relationship with GCHQ around their specific expertise and how they could assist that investigation; but that investigation was very tight and very secret, and only a small number of officers within the RUC knew of its existence—probably no more than two dozen. That gives you an idea of the sensitivity of the investigation that was ongoing. In respect of the intelligence that came across from GCHQ, that was received by that team, and then acted upon. We are convinced at this moment in time, as far as we can be—because obviously we are not sitting in GCHQ—that information was passed and was passed expeditiously. I have seen it described as a customer/client relationship, but in some ways it was a two-way street because obviously other parts of our investigation also informed that relationship and how it developed. An intelligence investigation would have a number of elements, and the relationship with GCHQ would only be one aspect of that investigation.

  Q27  DAVID SIMPSON: If any relevant intelligence was passed, in Sir Peter Gibson's words, "promptly and fully", why does the CID have to spend nine months trawling through 6.4 million phone records to identify suspect mobile phones? That question may be self-explanatory, but nevertheless it is 6.4 million. Why was that?

  MR HARRIS: There are a couple of elements I wish to highlight there. Briefings were conducted by the Special Branch in respect of the intelligence. At the time Special Branch in South Region wanted to compile an all-source intelligence assessment of what had happened. It was not based solely on the relationship with GCHQ but there were other factors at play in terms of that investigation. The atrocity itself happened on the Saturday, and the picture started to come together on the Monday, two days later, when all avenues were in a position to be explored and then feedback received. So it was on the Monday 17 when this started to come together. There was obviously a lot of pressure on Special Branch in South Region to come up with answers to conduct their investigation thoroughly and promptly and to explore all avenues. On 20 and 21 August briefings were given to CID officers; 20 August was RUC CID officers and 21 August was a briefing to senior Garda detectives on the intelligence that we had at that time. No record exists of that briefing, so it is difficult to go in to confirm exactly what was talked about, but certainly names were talked about. The next briefing was 9 September, and that highlights eight individuals, the role they played in the acquisition of the maroon Cavalier vehicle that was used in the bombing atrocity, their part in the subsequent manufacture and delivery of the bomb to Omagh, and the part of individuals in the whole bombing atrocity and the conspiracy around it. However, that did not include details of mobile phones; it was names and addresses and an assessment as to their specific role. In not handing over mobile phone numbers, that is what Sir Peter refers to as being cautious. From this distance, 11 years later, and from my own assessment of it, I have to conclude that there are a couple of elements in that. One was the sensitivity of the relationship with GCHQ and then the sensitivity of the particular phone numbers. We do know that after that briefing on 9 September, on 10 September immediately investigations started into telephone billing. In February 1999 telephone numbers have been identified, and three of those phones were recovered in house searches when arrests were made. The difficulty around those phones is that all the billing proves, and all of that analysis, is the presence of phones in a particular area and the movement of those phones; it does not prove the presence of an individual, and the witness evidence which would have proved that was lacking.

  Q28  MR MURPHY: Following on from that, would you say that the procedures that were in place at the time of the bombing, in other words the way that that information was passed from GCHQ to Special Branch and the way Special Branch dealt with that, have been changed, so are different now?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: They are fundamentally different. One of the key objectives when I took over, having been involved in scenes of crime inquiries formerly, was to make sure that we got joined up. It is not a criticism. I had an opportunity, which was perhaps denied others, in the new dispensation to create a crime operations group, which Drew commands, which now deals not only with all intelligence, be it national security or crime—and the cross-overs are apparent to everyone in this room—so you have one place that can make the assessment and then decide what to do. Also, you have the experts in terms of the detectives to follow up on those investigations. It is a very different structure than it was then.

  Q29  MR MURPHY: There was a suggestion that any information that was passed from GCHQ to Special Branch could not be passed to a third party without the explicit permission of GCHQ and indeed GCHQ had also to authorise the form in which that information was released. During that period, could that have affected the investigation?

  MR HARRIS: That is correct. The information in effect is shared by computer monitor. Some of it would have been printed off, but only for a short time, and then would have been returned to GCHQ. In effect, the RUC did not actually own that information. It was lent to them and to use it in any form beyond a very tight group would have required permission and in a form of words to be agreed between either RUC headquarters in terms of Special Branch, or Special Branch in South Region with GCHQ. That would have required some negotiation.

  Q30  MR MURPHY: Would that have been one of the reasons Sir Peter said that it had been done in such a cautious way?

  MR HARRIS: No such requests were made from RUC Special Branch to GCHQ so it is impossible to put a time line on it. In my view the caution expressed is around the tightness with which the telephone number details were held.

  Q31  MR MURPHY: That is no longer the case; that system has now changed?

  MR HARRIS: The system we have in place now is that where you have intelligence—because I have sight of all intelligence but also I am responsible for crime investigations—I am in effect the gatekeeper. We would appoint a senior detective, a CID officer, to review the raw intelligence, and then recommend what should be given to the senior investigating officer, and agree upon a form of words. It is detectives who are looking at the raw product and deciding what is useful for the investigator and in what form it should come across as. Then we were a larger organisation in some ways, and CID and Special Branch were separated; now all serious crime investigation and intelligence sits under my control under one head, and it makes it easier to manage that relationship and the flow of information. As seen in recent investigations, the pressure now is around managing that exchange and ensuring that that exchange of information is expeditious and as full as possible, and that requires a two-way conversation. The lessons—and bitter lessons they are—have been learnt from this experience, yes.

  Q32  CHAIRMAN: Mr Harris, may I ask you two brief things. You have seen Sir Peter's full report, presumably?

  MR HARRIS: Yes, I have.

  Q33  CHAIRMAN: I do not know whether you can answer this question, but you did say that on 20 August and subsequent briefings, certain names were mentioned. I think you said there were eight.

  MR HARRIS: That is correct, yes.

  Q34  CHAIRMAN: Do those eight names include the four named recently in the civil action?

  MR HARRIS: Yes. I would say of that briefing, and particularly in regard to one of the eight, that that briefing has stood the test of time. The subsequent investigation and the very thorough investigation by Detective Chief Superintendent Norman Baxter threw up no other particular suspects in this, and so the care and skill which went into that briefing has stood the test of time. It has been described as "cautious" but it has stood the test of time, and we would not contradict it now.

  CHAIRMAN: That is extremely helpful.

  Q35  KATE HOEY: Sir Hugh, have you had a chance to read the evidence given to us by Mr McCue when he came to see us?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: He was the lawyer?

  KATE HOEY: Yes.

  SIR HUGH ORDE: Yes, I have.

  Q36  KATE HOEY: I wondered if you wanted to comment. Do you feel overall on reflection you would have done anything differently in the way you and the whole force handled the Omagh families over the last number of years? There were some mild criticisms of the fact that they have not had letters answered and were treated in an arbitrary way by some of your colleagues and yourself.

  SIR HUGH ORDE: Yes, I did read that, and it caused me some concern, especially around the letters. That surprised me, frankly, and I have asked some questions. It is highly unusual, certainly at that level, for us not to acknowledge letters. Indeed, I had a human rights lawyer fully engaged in this as well as many senior detectives trying to deliver what we could to the inquiry, and it was difficult because we were dealing with a live criminal investigation and trying to service, as we could, a private civil matter, and there is some conflict there. We were criticised by the lawyer, I note, in the evidence he gave to the Committee. In relation to the families, it is just so difficult to even try and put yourself in the position of those families. I have met them on a number of occasions, up to and including with the Prime Minister, and I have done my best to provide the information from the moment I took over; so I am disappointed if they feel hard done by, by the seriousness with which we took this investigation, because I did my best. There is a limit to how much one can do. I think it would be right to say that at the Prime Minister's meeting the raw emotion is still there, and I utterly understand that. There does come a point where I do think honesty is absolutely essential, which is why after the Hoey trial, I was utterly honest and said: "In my judgment, unless we are lucky, frankly, or we get a really significant witness step up, probably involved to the point where legislation we can now put to good use, I do not think there is a likelihood of a judicial outcome." I am disappointed if they feel we did not treat them well. I know that huge effort was put in by my organisation from the word go, and we tried to deliver that, but if we failed I utterly understand they feel we have not done as much as we could. I feel sorry about that. I do not feel I could do any more than I have.

  Q37  KATE HOEY: No, I just wanted you to be able to put that on record. Do you think there will ever be any compensation given to them? I know it is not in your power, but on reflection?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: It is very hard to judge. I understand the lawyer made that particular point. Going after money is difficult, but I think it is something that will be pursued.

  Q38  CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. It is helpful to have all that on record, Sir Hugh. Can I ask you three final questions as we are nearing the vote. First, would you like to make a comment on how the Policing Board encompassing Sinn Féin has improved things, because you did argue fairly strongly for devolution of policing and justice, and I am assuming it is based on your experience there. Could you give us any update on that other appalling murder, in which, as you know, the Committee has taken a great interest, namely that of Paul Quinn? Finally, would you like to tell us what advice you would like to give to your successor?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: Thank you for that—especially the last one! In terms of the Policing Board and Sinn Féin, whether I like the structure of the Policing Board or not is actually irrelevant. It was a structure declared by Patten, and it has stood the test of time. One of the greatest strengths—indeed, looking at last weekend, every member of the public had—well, the larger parties—is represented by someone on the Policing Board. As David pointed out, it has not been an easy ride some of the time, and, frankly, party politics sometimes plays around at the expense of policing within that environment. But it is very public. The Board reminded me that I have been to 63 of the 65 meetings during my time. I take it that seriously. I try my level best to be there because it is that important. It is the most visible form of accountability we have got, and I think that is a really good thing. In terms of devolution of policing and justice, again it is not whether it is right or wrong, it needs to happen. I do think there is a huge strength in giving responsibility in that stark way to local government. Politics becomes slightly more complicated when people are making statements that might cost me £200,000-300,000. If it has to come to me to deal with public order because of a politically created situation, it is not going to a hospital, it is not going to a school; it is coming to me. It gives a really sharp focus on what we should be focusing on, which is community policing at the front end against this difficult threat, so I think that is fine. It is an important thing, and certainly the feedback from the community is that they are up for it, and I think that is a good thing. I will ask Drew to touch on the Paul Quinn matter.

  MR HARRIS: We continue to stand ready to assist Garda Síochána with this inquiry. The last executive action in terms of arrests was late last year. They conveyed prisoners to Antrim and assisted obviously with that. There have been no charges as yet. I think I should really get a further account from colleagues in Garda S-«ochána where they are with that, and I could supply that.

  CHAIRMAN: Would you do that and write to the Committee because we did go to Crossmaglen. We met the Quinns formally and informally on a number of occasions, and were greatly impressed by their courage and dignity and by the way in which their neighbours and friends had rallied round them. I think that the meeting at Crossmaglen was one of the most amazing any of us have attended. We would be grateful for the latest up-to-date information there.

  Q39  KATE HOEY: Sir Hugh, when do you visualise seeing people applying to the Northern Ireland Police Force and being accepted and interviewed and being treated in the same way in terms of whether they are the best person for the job the way it is in the rest of the United Kingdom?

  SIR HUGH ORDE: It is a simple matter of fact that in 2011 the special measures end. The tragedy at that point is, I will be full. I will not be losing 440 officers a year because Patten's special measures end around severance. I would guess we would be recruiting between 70 and 90 people maximum, so of course the opportunities are even fewer. In the last competition I had 10,000 people applying for 440 posts. That is where it ends. It will end in 2011. There is no intention, to my understanding, to extend it, so that is when it will be on a purely merit basis.

  Q40  CHAIRMAN: I cannot allow you to evade the last question—advice for your successor!

  SIR HUGH ORDE: I will try! The first point I would make is that there are some outstanding candidates. Some very experienced police officers have stepped up and said they want the job, which is great. It is great for my organisation. My only advice would be to manage risk. We are in a risk business. If you look at where Northern Ireland has moved on, it is not what me or my senior command team have done, it is the local sergeant, the local inspector, the local constable, who has made a decision to do something differently, recognising there is a risk to it and managing that risk in an appropriate way. As a consequence, policing has moved on, and communities have done likewise. That would be my only advice—that and "trust your people" because the police officers in my organisation and support staff are outstanding people and they have delivered a Northern Ireland which has 23% less crime than it had seven years ago.

  CHAIRMAN: Sir Hugh, you are very modest in your answer, but we would all say—and I would certainly echo the comments of my two colleagues here from Northern Ireland—that you have provided outstanding leadership. That does not mean that the Committee has always agreed with everything that you have said, but wherever we have had to make mild criticism in reports, I hope that it has always been constructive and helpful. I think that you have been amazingly responsive when we have made suggestions, you and your officers, and we are enormously grateful to you. In this context, because we have not yet had devolution of policing and justice, this Committee can speak on behalf of the people of Northern Ireland to say that we thank you for what you have done. We wish your colleagues who remain every success in supporting the new Chief Constable, whoever he or she may be, and we wish you every success in your new appointment.