THE ELECTORAL REFORM SOCIETY

  1.1  The Electoral Reform Society is a well established and respected membership organisation which campaigns for improvements to democracy and elections. We conduct high-quality original research into elections and are regarded as an authority on the use of different voting systems in the UK.

  1.2  Our campaigning activities are underpinned by several key principles: That representative democracy should remain the cornerstone of democratic engagement in the UK, and should be strengthened at every level; that our democratic processes should promote diversity and inclusiveness; and that engagement and civic participation is a public good.

  1.3  We welcome the Home Affairs Select Committee's holding of a one-off evidence session on Government proposals for direct elections to police authorities. We are motivated to submit written evidence to the Committee to express our concerns about the effects on local democracy of the current proposals.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

  2.1  The Electoral Reform Society would caution that direct elections to police authorities may not be a suitable development for policing or for democracy. We are concerned that they represent a distortion of representative pluralist politics and could indeed heighten fear of crime and mistrust within a community.

  2.2  If the proposals are to go ahead then we have serious concerns that a First Past the Post electoral system is being proposed for direct elections to police authorities. First Past the Post would not allow for the creation of diverse and representative authorities which would be essential for such a sensitive policy area.

  2.3  There are practical problems with creating equitable constituencies out of the existing Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership areas, especially in large cities such as Birmingham and Manchester where the creation of artificial boundaries would create problems for representing a community as whole.

  2.4  Our attached modelling of the results shows that there would be clear political majorities on many of the elected police authorities which raises questions on politically influenced policing.

  2.5  The proposals would not lead to a fair reflection of the diversity of political opinion across the country. The 2007 election results would have given the Conservative Party a vast majority of the police authority seats (65.2%) despite polling only 35% of the vote. Labour would be almost absent from a say in the policing of most of England outside the metropolitan areas in a bad election like 2007, while the party would dominate the metropolitan areas almost entirely in an election like 2005.

3.  EVIDENCE

Problems with direct elections to police authorities

  3.1  Whilst we welcome the Government's intention to make policing more democratic and more effective in responding to the needs of the local community (Green Paper para 1.71) we reflect that direct elections to police authorities may not sit comfortably with key democratic principles.

  3.2  Representative democracy: We have concerns that single-issue elections, and elected representatives who are elected to focus on one specific issue, may be at odds with principles of representative and pluralist politics. Politics is about weighing up often competing interests and reaching decisions in the best interests of the community as a whole. We are concerned that the requirement felt by elected Crime and Policing Representatives (CPRs) to deliver their election promises on crime reduction could be at the expense of other issues such as community cohesion.

  3.3  Inclusive and diverse politics: All elections have an element of negative campaigning as for all non-incumbent candidates there are incentives to emphasise the failings of those currently in post. For police authority elections this could be particularly damaging as candidates will face incentives to exaggerate crime and the failings of the police. There is a real risk that campaigns will accentuate fear of crime and this fear is itself damaging and inhibiting to society in general.

  3.4  Extreme parties will be able to use police authority elections to scapegoat minority groups, with resulting harm to community elections even if the extreme candidate is not elected.

  3.5  Participation: Turnout for single function posts may well be very low if elections are held separately from those for other levels of Government, although if they are held alongside other elected bodies the police authority election may be overshadowed and the desired accountability obscured. Low turnout can be exploited by organised minorities (particularly extreme parties) to win with a small share of the vote. This is a particular worry under First Past the Post elections.

Problems with First Past the Post

  3.6  Policing is a unique responsibility which often involves judging the competing claims of different sections of society. Police authorities need to have representation from more than the dominant local political opinion or social group. However in creating FPTP single member constituencies the government would be creating a monopoly for the majority (or more likely, the largest minority).

  3.7  The experiences and priorities of women and ethnic minorities are necessary in ensuring accountable policing. Academic research has repeatedly demonstrated the single member FPTP is the worst electoral system for ensuring that those elected are socially representative.[1] The Government's own Review of Voting Systems noted that international experience is that counties with proportional systems do better at women's representation.

  3.8  In areas such as the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Lancashire and Greater Manchester, where there are substantial ethnic minority populations, but which nowhere amount to a local majority, there would be a risk of a police authority elected by FPTP lacking this important dimension of representation. Ethnic minorities are under-represented among MPs elected from these areas (with a lone ethnic minority Labour MP from each area), and with larger units to elect police authority members one can expect the under-representation to be even worse.

  3.9  It is worth noting that the 10 Members of the Metropolitan Police Authority who have been directly elected onto the London Assembly include two black representatives (Jeanette Arnold and James Cleverly) and six women. A proportional system is used for this election.

  3.10  Under FPTP it is possible for a local minority whom the majority of the local electorate oppose to win sole representation on the police authority—for instance a BNP member representing Burnley might have been elected in a year such as 2003.

Practical problems

  3.11  In some county areas such as Lancashire and North Yorkshire it is impossible to create equitable units by coupling or subdividing each CDRPP area.

  3.12  With larger authorities such as Birmingham or Manchester subdivision is only one possible solution. It involves creating artificial divisions of an area which as a whole reflects a local identity, and the periodic review of those boundaries.

  3.13  The use of multi-member constituencies would allow for identifiable communities to be grouped into constituencies with stable boundaries and allow representation of minority views within each community.

Problems with likely outcomes

  3.14  As is consistently the case with FPTP elections, the political representation on the proposed police authorities would not mirror the intentions of voters.

  3.15  ERS Modelling on the 2007 election results shows that the Conservative Party would win a vast majority of the police authority seats (65.2%) despite polling only 35% of the vote. Labour would be in a similar excessively strong position in areas such as West Yorkshire (in 2005). However, Labour would lack any elected representatives on 10 police authorities and have only 10 members out of 176 in the three southern regions (East of England, South East, South West).

  3.16FPTP often works produce heavy majorities. This distorting effect may be particularly undesirable in police authorities where the there is a need to maintain the operational independence of policing free from political control.

  3.17  Based on 2007 results, the Conservatives would have an overall majority of elected representatives on 26 police authorities, the majority if England. Labour would be almost absent from a say in the policing of most of England outside the metropolitan areas in a bad election like 2007, while the party would dominate the metropolitan areas almost entirely in an election like 2005.

  3.18  In some cases, it is not simply a majority of the elected membership of police authority that could be achieved. Based on the 2005 modelling, six police authorities in England would be likely to have a complete political majority—where the directly elected members for one party would have a majority over other elected members from other parties, AND the existing independent and magistrate members. (Assuming this is the existing arrangement of five independent members and three local magistrates) For 2007 modelling this number goes up to seven, and they would all be Conservative majorities.

  3.19  These estimates could increase if several councillors also sit on the authorities as they are likely to be from the existing majority party on the council.