GS 69: Letter to the Committee Specialist from the Parliamentary Relations Team, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FAC GLOBAL SECURITY: THE MIDDLE EAST INQUIRY REPORT - ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE PAPER

1. Thank you for your letter of 24 January 2008 regarding the Government Response to the FAC reports on the detention of Royal Navy personnel by Iran and on Global Security: The Middle East.

This letter covers your questions on the Government's response to the Global Security: The Middle East report.

2. The Committee would like to know how the Government envisages the challenge of Hamas will be dealt with within the Annapolis process.

3. The Government will continue to insist that the international community should not lose sight of Gaza, which must be an integral part of a future Palestinian state. The Annapolis Conference on 27 November 2007 officially launched bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas and their respective negotiating teams continue to meet. There has been no concrete outcome on Gaza from those talks. It is essential that these negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian teams continue to be substantive, positive and robust.

4. As we have made clear, it is for Hamas to decide whether they wish to be part of this process and accept the necessary conditions for dialogue. They have yet to do so.

5. Paragraph 57 of the Government's response refers to multilateral discussions aiming to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. The Committee would be grateful for an update on the status of these negotiations.

6. There are two international processes with the aim of securing a legally binding instrument to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions: within the UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the "Oslo Process".

7. The Oslo Process aims to conclude "by 2008" a legally binding instrument to "prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians". Detailed consideration of a draft text of a treaty began at a meeting in Wellington (18-22 February). Negotiations conclude in Dublin (19-30 May). A signing ceremony is expected to be held in Oslo in the Autumn.

8. At the CCW Meeting of State Parties in November 2007, a negotiating mandate on cluster munitions was agreed. Under this mandate a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was tasked to negotiate a proposal to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and report on progress to the next Meeting of State Parties in November 2008. The GGE began its work in January and has the following meetings scheduled: 7-11 April, 7-25 July, 1-5 September and 3-7 November. Our aim, and that of our EU partners, is for the CCW to adopt a legally binding instrument by the end of 2008.

9. The Committee recommended that the Government "explicitly state whether it believes that, in the light of information now available, Israel's use of cluster bombs was proportionate", but the Government's response does not appear to do so. The Committee invites the Government again to explicitly state whether it believes this was the case.

10. The Government set out its position on the Israeli use of cluster munitions in its response to the Committee.

11. Paragraphs 66 to 69 of the Government's response refer to the cluster munitions clearing operation in Lebanon. The Committee wishes to know what progress has been made on clearance, and whether Israel has provided the relevant maps.

12. Since the conflict 138,000 unexploded sub-munitions, including 7,000 cluster sub munitions have been cleared. As at 31 December 2007, 962 individual cluster strike locations have been confirmed, which cover an estimated 39 million square metres.

13. Between August 06 and Dec 07, 32.6 million square metres of land has been cleared. The initial estimate at the start of clearance was a contaminated area of 32-million square metres. This has now increased to 38.7 million square metres.

14. The key statistics are that:

· 25% of the land has now been cleared to a depth of 20cm;

· 43% cleared of all surface threat (will be subject of evaluation, as to whether it will need to be cleared to 20cm);

· 16% has been returned to the communities, as a result on non-mine clearing activities;

· 16% remains uncleared;

15. We understand that the Government of Israel has now provided some data on its use of cluster munitions in south Lebanon to the UN. The UN is currently assessing this information. Continued dialogue between and the UN and the Government of Israel on this issue is essential and we continue to urge Israel to pass all relevant data to the UN. In addition, Israel must co-operate fully with the UN to ensure that the data it provides is fully understood and made as useful as possible to those planning and undertaking clearance of munitions in south Lebanon.

16. Paragraphs 77 and 78 of the Government's response refer to diplomatic engagement with Syria. The Committee notes the decision by France to suspend some contact with Syria until it improves its policies towards Lebanon. It wishes to know whether the Government is considering adopting a similar approach.

17. The UK is increasingly concerned by the unhelpful role that Syria is playing in Lebanon. We believe that Syrian interference in Lebanon is prolonging the current political crisis.

18. The UK will continue to conduct a critical dialogue with Syria over its regional behaviour, delivering the clear message that its interference in Lebanon is unacceptable. This dialogue will include meetings between ministers when we judge that this would be helpful

19. We continue to urge Syria to make the right strategic choice. Should Syria take a more constructive approach to its region, we will be prepared to respond. But we remain disappointed by Syria's response

20. Paragraph 88 of the Government's response refers to the Rafah crossing. The Committee would like an update on the situation at Rafah, and the impact it has had on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip.

21. The UK remains concerned by the situation at Rafah. The breaches in the wall, which started on 23 January, were fully sealed by the Egyptian border guards on 3 February. However on 4 February there was an exchange of gunfire across the Rafah crossing between Egypt's security forces and Palestinian militants.

22. On 28 January, the Foreign Secretary, along with his European counterparts in the General Affairs and External Relations Council, called for the continuous provision of essential goods and services, including fuel and power supplies, from Israel into Gaza. In addition, the Government announced support for the proposal by the Palestinian Authority to take control of the crossings. Officials are in close contact with the parties, EU, UN and the US to help secure this and supports the Arab League's efforts on this issue. The EU stands ready to resume its border mission at Rafah as soon as conditions allow.

23. The Government has carried out no assessment on the effects of the breaches at Rafah on the humanitarian situation. The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) situation report on Gaza of 29 January states that ''access to Egypt and its shops may have provided some psychological respite from the closure of the Gaza Strip but 1.5 million Gazans still rely on Israel for all their supplies''.

24. Paragraph 122 of the Government's response notes the Committee's recommendation that the FCO publish a strategy paper its approach to the Middle East and promises to "reflect further" in the light of the Government's National Security Strategy and the Public Service Agreement on Conflict Prevention. The Committee wishes to know whether any conclusions have arisen so far from this reflection.

25. The Government continues to reflect on how best to set out its Middle East Strategy and awaits the publication of the National Security Strategy.

28 February 2008