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EU 107: Letter to the Chairman from the Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Western Balkans
Thank you for your letter of 25 November
reporting the Foreign Affairs Committee's visit to Serbia,
Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH).
Serbia
1. You raise several important issues
surrounding Serbia.
On your first point regarding the Dutch block on the implementation of Serbia's Interim Agreement, we have lobbied the Netherlands to
shift its position on this issue many times over the last year, including at
Ministerial level. I have personally raised this issue with Foreign Minister
Verhagen on several occasions. We have also raised the question of the
definition of "full co-operation", where the Netherlands government has said that
the best proof would be the arrest of Ratko Mladić and his transfer to the
International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As you mention in your letter, Prosecutor
Brammertz has indicated that he will not use the phrase "full co-operation". Nevertheless,
it is possible that Prosecutor Brammertz's very positive assessment on Serbia's
co-operation with ICTY, delivered on 3 December to the UN Security Council,
will have an impact on the Dutch position. I attach the relevant section of his
report, for your information.[1]
2. On the issue of Serbia's
co-operation, I attach a Written Ministerial Statement which will be laid
before Parliament on Monday 7 December.[2]
This makes clear that the Government welcomes Brammertz's very positive
assessment of Serbia's
co-operation, and assesses that their efforts amount to full
co-operation.
3. You raise the issue of security and
disposal facilities at the Vinca nuclear site. The UK is not directly contributing to
security or disposal costs. However, there is agreement for the Russian Federal
Centre for Nuclear and Radiation Safety to remove spent nuclear fuel from the
Vinca site and transfer it to Russia.
This €25million project is part financed by EU donations, as well
as by Serbia, the IAEA,
the US, and the Czech Republic.
Kosovo
4. Our efforts to help Kosovo join international
organisations are led by the priorities of the Kosovan Government. The range of
organisations that could be joined is huge, so we encourage Kosovo to consider
membership of those which will be of most practical benefit and where the membership
process is likely to be successful. Once Kosovo has taken a decision to apply, we
show our support by explaining to other countries the benefits membership would
bring not only for Kosovo but also for the organisation and its members. Where
there is a vote, we support Kosovo and lobby on its behalf for a favourable outcome,
as we did successfully when Kosovo applied for IMF and World Bank membership.
5. Kosovo is keen to join the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the FCO is in regular contact with
the Kosovan Government and the EBRD on this matter, helping to create an
atmosphere conducive to Kosovo's application being approved. British Missions
to other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, assess the
prospects of Kosovo's membership so that we can provide sound advice to the
Kosovan Government.
6. On Kosovo's prospective membership of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union, we undertake to research membership criteria and the
procedures and will provide support to the Kosovo Assembly should it decide to
apply. The active interest taken by Members of Parliament, including through
the All Party Parliamentary Group on Kosovo, can only help any future Kosovan
application to the IPU. I regularly lobby Foreign Ministers of sympathetic
states to recognise Kosovo, as do my Ministerial colleagues at FCO and
officials worldwide. The votes cast on Kosovo's application for IMF and World
Bank membership and New Zealand's recent decision to accept the appointment of
an Ambassador from Kosovo show that support for Kosovo runs much wider than the
countries who have formally recognised.
7. The UK Government's principal contribution to
supporting rule of law in Kosovo - including to the judiciary - is through the
mentoring, monitoring and advising activities of EULEX Kosovo. Five British
secondees are currently working in the justice component of EULEX. DFID, with
funding from the Conflict Pool, also provides support to Kosovo in establishing
its Constitutional Court
through a project delivered by local experts. This includes training of legal
advisers, lawyers and municipal officials. There are no current plans to
suggest the introduction of close protection for judges in Kosovo. However if the Kosovan Government were to raise this with us, we
would be willing to look at ways of sharing UK expertise in this area.
8. Kosovo's municipal elections on 15 November
were a success. The British Embassy in Pristina will continue its programme of
outreach to encourage participation in the second round of mayoral voting on 13
December and in the municipal and mayoral elections in Parteš/Partesh and North Mitrovica/ë next year. We continue to impress upon
the Kosovan Government the importance of participation of all communities in
these elections for the legitimacy of the institutions concerned and for the
successful integration of all communities in Kosovo. We are also working
closely with the International
Civilian Office and EU representatives in Kosovo on their plans for outreach to
communities in northern Kosovo.
9. I fully appreciate the benefits
that effective levels of UK
representation can bring to delivering the UK's policy aims of conflict
prevention in Kosovo. Due to limited and committed budgets, further
funding is highly unlikely to be available for additional UK
secondments this Financial Year. For 2010-2011, Departments are currently
looking at priorities across the range of Conflict Pool programmes, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. We are therefore not yet able
to say how many staff we will second to individual missions (such as ICO and
EULEX). However,
the UK
remains fully committed to civilian missions under the European Security
Defence Policy as a key tool to manage international crises and to prevent and
resolve conflict, including the EULEX mission in Kosovo.
10. I am
determined that the FCO must do all it can to ensure that the international
missions to which the UK
contributes are maintained at the right level to fulfil their mandate and
ensure value for money. Kosovo is no exception and with regards to the UN and
OSCE missions, whilst the UK's
ability to directly control its financial obligations is limited, we strive to
ensure appropriate levels of commitment through contacts with the relevant
secretariats and through the UN and OSCE finance committees.
11. With regards
to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), there has been a substantial decrease from
a 2008/2009 presence of 4,900 to a current presence of 500 now that EULEX has
reached Full Operating Capability. Some concern has been expressed in the
Security Council that UNMIK's current operating strength and mandate should be
maintained. The UK
will nevertheless continue to seek an optimal size for UNMIK against its
current remit, taking full account of the changing political and security
environment and the presence of the other international missions.
12. The proposed
OSCE Unified Budget for 2010 outlines a 16% cut in the OSCE Mission in Kosovo's
(OMIK) resources, equating to €4.4 million. We fully support this and will
press strongly for its adoption. We have long argued for a significant decrease
in OMIK's funding, which last year amounted to more than 15% of the total OSCE
Unified Budget. We acknowledge that there remains important work for the OSCE
to do in Kosovo, but strongly believe the Organisation cannot be a surrogate
for Kosovan Government responsibility.
13. The UK Government is working closely with NATO
to ensure that during KFOR's transition to a Deterrent presence, a safe and
secure environment is maintained at all times. The transition will be a gradual
process, with three distinct 'gates' - each requiring approval from the North
Atlantic Council (NAC). Each decision regarding
troop reduction will be based on the political and security environment at the
time. NATO will ensure that the force, which will
include reserves, fully meets the evolving security requirement.
14. The British Embassy in Pristina will not
acquire biometric capture capability by the end of 2009. A business case for
the necessary equipment is being considered by UKBA decision-makers. If
approved, the equipment should be in place in Spring 2010.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
15. Constitutional reform is not a formal
requirement for the closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), but
reforms to make Bosnia and
Herzegovina more functional will be
necessary for progress towards EU integration. Whilst the UK will
therefore support constitutional amendments designed to make the state more
effective, the exact nature of changes to the constitution needs to be agreed
internally by Bosnian politicians. The EU/US initiative has given Bosnian politicians
an excellent opportunity to come to an agreement on making constitutional
changes as well as completing the conditions and objectives required for OHR
transition, and the UK
has been vocal in its support of this initiative. On a visit to Sarajevo on 5-6 November
this year, I expressed my strong support for the ongoing talks and urged the
leaders of all the country's main parties - including Milorad Dodik of the SNSD
- to engage in the process and work together to reach agreement.
16. You highlighted potential risks associated with
the "time lag" between EU accession for Croatia and BiH. The UK will
continue to make every effort to encourage BiH in its European perspective.
This is one of the reasons that we are investing so much time in BiH, and why we
remain strongly supportive of the High Representative/EU Special
Representative's efforts to drive reform. We will continue to defend robustly
the principle of conditionality, so that the draw of EU integration can be used
as a lever to encourage reform in BiH and cooperation between its politicians.
17. Transition from OHR to EUSR, once the necessary
objectives and conditions have been fully met, remains the UK's long-term aim. Following
transition, the EUSR will not retain the Bonn Powers, as these are specifically
linked in legal terms to the High Representative. However, the UK has
consistently supported the view that the reinforced EUSR should not just offer
the 'carrots' entailed in closer EU integration, but should also wield the
necessary "sticks" to discourage acts which undermined the state or
failed to comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Government has
consistently argued that the strengthened EUSR would need strong powers to
replace the former OHR ones. These would include the explicit right to
recommend EU measures against individual politicians (such as travel bans or
asset freezes), the ability to influence decisions on EU funding granted to
BiH, and the power to make recommendations as to BiH's progress towards EU
accession.
18. Whilst the current situation in BiH is stable,
the UK
is conscious of the potential future risks of instability. I continue to make
clear to my European colleagues that, while it is right for the EU to be
planning for how the force can best be reconfigured to support our common
objectives in BiH, it would be unwise to decide whether and how this
reconfiguration should take place before we have clarity regarding the nature
and timing of OHR transition. Planning for the option of reconfiguring EUFOR to
a smaller, training force has been carried out, but on the clear understanding
that the planning to date is without prejudice to an eventual decision.
UK Visa Policy
19. Since the UK
does not participate in this element of the Schengen acquis and is not bound by
the EU Common (Schengen) Visa List, we will not be lifting visa requirements
for the nationals of Macedonia,
Montenegro and Serbia to travel to the UK. However, we take note of the
European Commission's proposal that these countries should move to visa free
travel within the Schengen area as of 19 December 2009 and we welcome the
progress that these countries have made against their individual Schengen visa
liberalisation roadmaps.
20. Commencing in 2007, the UK undertook a global review of its
own visitor visa regimes - the Visa Waiver Test. The results for the Western
Balkan countries did not warrant lifting the visa regime for any of the
countries. The next Global Visa Waiver Test is not scheduled to take place
before 2011, at which point the UK
visa regimes in place for Western Balkan countries will be reviewed.
I would be happy to discuss any of the
answers given above in more detail when I give evidence to the Committee on 9
December.
6
December 2009
[1]Para 30,
Report of Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, provided to the Security Council under paragraph 6 of
Security Council resolution 1534 (2004)
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionStrategy/completion_strategy_13nov2009_en.pdf
(See Annex II)
[2] HC Deb, 7
December 2009, col 2WS http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091207/wmstext/91207m0001.htm#0912073000011
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