UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 276-iii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE

defence committee

Russia: a new confrontation?

Tuesday 24 March 2009

MS OKSANA ANTONENKO

MR DENIS CORBOY and SIR ANDREW WOOD

Evidence heard in Public Questions 154 - 238

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 24 March 2009

Members present

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S Borrow

Mr David Crausby

Linda Gilroy

Mr Mike Hancock

Mr Bernard Jenkin

Mr Brian Jenkins

Robert Key

Mrs Madeleine Moon

________________

Memorandum submitted by Oksana Antonenko

Examination of Witnesses

Witness: Ms Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, gave evidence.

Q154 Chairman: Good morning. This is a further evidence session in our inquiry into Russia. Ms Antonenko, thank you very much for coming to give evidence to us. We have quite a few questions to ask you and we are going to try to get through your evidence by about 11.15. Would you care to introduce yourself very briefly and tell us about yourself?

Ms Antonenko: Good morning. I am Oksana Antonenko. I am a Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where I have been working since 1996. My area of expertise covers the Former Soviet Union area with mostly security policy of Russia, security issues in the South Caucasus, particularly the Georgian/South Ossetian conflict where I have been facilitating for three years the track to the Georgian/South Ossetian peace process. I also focus on arms control issues and the security of Central Asia and also as far as it relates to Afghanistan.

Q155 Chairman: Thank you very much for your very interesting memorandum in which you said, plucking a couple of sentences out of - wholly out of context no doubt: "Russian security policy elites feel that vulnerability comes from regions adjacent to Russia's borders, which it has sought to dominate for centuries. As one expert observer said" - that was James Sherr, who was before us in a recent evidence session, "Russia has gone from a cold war to a pre-cold war security mindset." What would you say that Russia's objectives are in those areas it regards as its near abroad?

Ms Antonenko: I would say that, in my view, Russia has tried, ever since the end of the Soviet Union, to develop a new relationship with the countries of the Former Soviet Union. In my view, this has not yet been a very successful exercise. During the last almost twenty years, Russia repeatedly claimed in its foreign policy doctrine, in its defence doctrine, and all sorts of foreign policy statements, that the CIS area is a priority area for Russia's foreign policy. However, both Russia's instruments that had been used in the region, as well as Russia's objectives, remain very unclear and often times very contradictory. I think overall the Russian objective in the region is to see the countries adjacent to Russia's borders to be stable and secure, because there is still very much a perception in Russia that the threats to its security may originate close to its borders. Of course, we have seen in August this year one example where that has proven to be true. At the same time, Russia's policy in the area, in my view, has not been very conducive to strengthening that security in the areas adjacent to its borders because it has been based very much on a zero-sum thinking, which has been strengthened the more Russia became stronger itself, because it sees itself as the only - or it has an ambition to become the sole guarantor of a regional security system, in which Russia is a dominant player. It perceives the engagement of other global powers, including the United States, as well as regional powers such as the European Union increasingly, and organisations like NATO as a threat to Russia's security per se even if objectively speaking those players actually help to promote security and stability. Therefore, the rivalry, the great power rivalry, the zero-sum thinking, has been the main factor in defining security dynamics in Russia's post Soviet space, and therefore undermines this objective of creating a stable environment around Russia's borders.

Q156 Chairman: You said "as Russia has become stronger"; do you believe Russia has become stronger over the last ten years?

Ms Antonenko: Yes, I certainly believe that. I think the strength is not necessarily based on an objective definition of Russia's military capabilities or Russia's economic power, which of course has been substantially affected by the current global economic crisis; but I think Russia has become a much more assertive and confident player, both globally and regionally. It has now more resources available as a result of its continuing economic growth; and despite the current economic crisis, I think the economic situation remains in the short term at least a relatively stable one compared with all other countries in the post-Soviet areas. It is still able to maintain a substantial defence budget, which will grow in the next several years, according to President Medvedev. It also has other resources available, economic resources to not only provide investment but to provide loans. We know that in the past several months Russia has offered substantial loans to support economic development of the countries of the post-Soviet area, particularly in Central Asia. There are also now apparently negotiations on providing loans to possibly Belarus and Armenia. There are obviously ambitions and resources that Russia has now to become stronger. There is also a growing understanding of itself in Russia as an important player in the world, and one that now not only plays a role as one of the poles in the world, but also, increasingly, as one of the key players in shaping the new world order. We have seen in the last several months a number of very ambitious initiatives coming from Russia, starting from Medvedev's proposals of course of negotiating and concluding a new European security treaty, and ending with a whole set of proposals which Russia put on the table on shaping the global financial system. In that sense, Russia sees itself as an important player that wants to shape the global world order, and in that sense it is now much stronger than it was, for example, ten years ago, when they had no such views.

Q157 Mr Borrow: I want to take you back to an earlier comment you made. You said that in your view the threat to Russia came from its neighbours, by which I assume you mean former members of the Soviet Union. I was not quite clear whether you meant that there was a real threat to Russia from neighbouring countries or whether you meant that those neighbouring countries were an area of instability, rather than a direct military threat to Russia. Can you clarify that?

Ms Antonenko: Yes. Of course, when they say there is a military threat to Russia, it means that the countries along Russia's borders remain in many ways very unstable, and therefore the instability in those countries will evolve or will influence the stability in Russia itself. Again, in the South Caucasus we have seen the existence of the so-called protracted and often-called frozen conflict, which has had an impact in Russia, and will have an impact in Russia if, for example, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict escalates, which will have an impact on the entire Caucasus region. In Central Asia, equally, the instability and growing radicalisation as well as trans-border crime and drug-trafficking from Afghanistan, represents a very substantial threat to Russia's security, given that its borders with Central Asia remain not very secure, and in many ways open. Instability in Ukraine, I would say, could also represent a challenge to Russia, given how much Russia is connected to Ukraine, both historically but with everyday human ties.

Q158 Mr Crausby: Specifically on Ukraine, you talk about instability in Ukraine, but what are the prospects of Russia using military force in Ukraine in the same way that they did in South Ossetia?

Ms Antonenko: In my view, there is no such a prospect at all. I cannot imagine under any circumstances at all Russia using military force in Ukraine. Having said that, Russia could, and in my view is, participating - is involved in possibly influencing the domestic situation in Ukraine by supporting certain forces in a very unstable political environment in Ukraine, but I cannot imagine any possibility of Russia using military power because, again, the perception in the population in Russia about the closeness of ties between Russia and Ukraine - more than 30 per cent of Russians have relatives in Ukraine. The exchanges of travel and human contact that exists will make it absolutely impossible, in my view, to get public support. Such public support that existed when Russia used military force in Georgia, for example - there has been overwhelming support across the entire spectrum of the political elite in Russia. In Ukraine I cannot imagine that happening.

Q159 Mr Crausby: In regard to the Sevastopol base, what are the prospects for tension in Sevastopol with the expiry date of 2017? Is it a time bomb, this issue of the use of the base; and what is the timescale effectively for negotiation? I assume that 2017 is the date you expect the Russians to leave, should that be the case, but that will not happen overnight, will it? When will the negotiations start, and could that be a potential problem?

Ms Antonenko: It seems to me that the Ukrainian Government has not yet made a very clear decision that they want to see the Russian bases in Sevastopol closed in 2017. If that decision is taken, I would assume it would take at least, I would say, five years, to actually close down the base; so of course the negotiations will have to start relatively soon. However, it seems to me that it is unlikely that these negotiations will be put in a way which can provoke a political crisis. It seems to me that both Russia and Ukraine are preparing to make decisions. For example, on the Russian side it seems to me that the decision to open military bases in Abkhazia, including the construction of big military base in Ochamchire, which will involve building a big port facility, is in a way preparation for relocating parts of the Black Sea fleet to that location. For the last three years there has been a specially allocated investment within the Russian defence budget to start developing facilities near Novorossisk to build Russia's own base on its own territory for stationing elements of the Black Sea fleet. I think there are people in Russia who are seriously thinking of planning for possible withdrawal of the Russian Black Sea fleet from the Crimea, and I think there is still enough time to prepare for that. In terms of the Ukrainian domestic situation, the closure of the Russian base in Sevastopol at the moment, in my view, will present a substantial threat to domestic stability in Ukraine, given that at the moment at least the population of Crimea certainly supports the continued presence of the Russian fleet as well as having substantial economic benefits from it. I think that if the Ukrainian Government is determined, or if it makes a decision to withdraw the base, it will have to prepare very carefully this situation, in my view, mostly in regard to its own domestic stability. However, I think Russia is able to address this issue.

Q160 Mr Jenkin: You said something very interesting, and maybe it is important for us to understand Russia in these terms; that it is not that they regard the CIS states as a direct threat; it is just that what they represent is a threat to Russia's existence in that if Georgia becomes a modern democratic state right on the border of Russia, that in itself threatens the nature of the Russian oligarchy and the rather retro regime that exists in Russia, just by being a good advertisement for a liberal democracy. Would you agree with that? Is that why they want to maintain an influence over these CIS states?

Ms Antonenko: Certainly within Russia, particularly the current government, sees the so-called coloured revolutions as a direct threat to Russia; there is no doubt about that, and that has been very much the factor that shaped the perceptions of the West in the late Putin administration and now even during Medvedev's time in office. Equally, Russia does not view the so-called democratic coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as a grass-roots democratic process but they rather view it as a crude American intervention to change the regimes in those countries and to install what the Russians see as anti-Russian regimes. At the time of the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, in my view that is a completely wrong assessment, and it was an attempt by the population in those countries to bring about more democratic governance. The problem in both Ukraine and Georgia is that since that time there has been a very substantial deterioration, in my view, of the democratic processes in those countries. In Georgia this is particularly true, with a number of very fundamental democratic principles such as independent judiciary, such as balance of power, existence of opposition, freedom of media, being violated. As long as the West simply presents Georgia in those terms, as a kind of beacon of democracy still today, I think Russians will be more and more convinced in their minds that it is not a true democratic process; it is just a Western ploy. If the West and the European Union in particular is doing a lot in that area, and genuinely engages with Georgia in bringing about democratic change, I do not see what Russia can do in terms of affecting the fundamental democratic transformation in Georgia, if that takes place. We have the precedent of other countries in the post Soviet area trying to move closer to democracy, and some countries being more able to slowly develop a kind of competitive, pluralistic system. That has not actually affected Russia's relations with those countries. If there is a genuine democratic process I do not think that Russia sees it as a threat.

Q161 Mr Jenkins: You have partly answered the question I had in mind when you said that Russia requires some degree of stability in those countries on its border, and rightly so. However, some of the actions that Russia have taken and some of the utterances they have made have tended to crate instability in the very areas where they want stability, in the very countries. Is their greatest goal at the moment stability, or influence in those countries, and does it see the fact that it is losing influence in those countries as in itself an act of instability within those countries?

Ms Antonenko: I think in the minds of Russian policy-makers the two things, stability and influence, come hand in hand. There is a genuine belief - and we have heard that repeatedly articulated by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin - that Russia views regional stability being dependent on Russia being able to play a key role in the region. Of course, the first real experiment we are having in terms of changing the paradigm is post-August Georgia, where we now see the European Union being very much engaged on the ground in Georgia, and Russia is almost completely absent. It is totally absent of course now in terms of its relations with Georgia, either in the economic sphere where it is still enforcing a blockade in Georgia, or politically. There are no pro-Russian forces in the Georgian Government in opposition now. In this sort of situation the presence of the European Union is acknowledged by Russia as a stabilising force. We will see how that is going to develop. If for the next five years or more we have a situation where Russia and the European Union slowly establish a modus vivendi in the region - and the new initiative that has just been announced, the Eastern Partnership Initiative, is very interesting in that regard because it creates not only bilateral relationships between the EU and those countries, but also a multilateral forum where all those countries together with the European Union sit around the same table with Russia being absent from that. It is a very interesting experiment in that sense. I see real promise of Russia slowly being able to review its attitudes, and acknowledge, as it did after August, that there could be other stabilising forces in the region. As far as Central Asia is concerned, similarly we see a changing pattern. In the last ten years Russia has moved from claiming to be a sole guarantor stability and predominant influencing player to engaging in a real sharing of influence and power with China, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which the role of China in Central Asia has grown substantially, while Russia's own influence in Central Asia, both economic, political, and increasingly in the security sphere, has been declining. Again, that has not produced a conflict; rather it has produced a new type of relationship with China, which is complex, and Russia acknowledges that it is no longer the sole player. For example, at the end of August, I was in Tajikistan during the time of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. None of the SCO countries have recognised the situation in South Ossetia, despite the substantial pressure that was put on them by Russia. They all stood behind China in articulating this position to Russia, and yet since that time there has not been any crisis, either within the SCO itself or in relation to Russia's Central Asian space. Here again Russia is willing to accept that it is not a sole player.

Q162 Robert Key: Please could we turn to the question of Article 5 guarantees, to which you have drawn attention in your memorandum! Should NATO have explicit contingency plans for the possibility of Russian action against NATO members such as Estonia?

Ms Antonenko: I think so, yes. I am clear that the August war has raised many fears and concerns, very legitimate ones, in my view, among the countries that have a very difficult history with the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire. I think they have a very legitimate right to be reassured; otherwise the credibility of the NATO alliance will very much be put in doubt. The question is, what is the best way to reassure them? There have been a number of proposals on the table. In my view, the strategy you are suggesting is the right one; it is to have credible contingency planning and greater investment in the development of infrastructure and facilities and capacities within those countries, including protecting them against cyber attacks. However, I do not think that to create a standing force assigned for territorial defence purposes is the right way to go, because this will send a wrong signal and may not be seen as credible, given that NATO countries are obviously busy with other commitments, including in Afghanistan. My opinion is that a force separately assigned to territorial defence may not be its first priority. However, in my view, contingency planning is extremely important.

Q163 Robert Key: Do you think that the Secretary of State for Defence was wrong in what he said in Krakow on 19 February, when he called for an allied solidarity force of 3000 personnel?

Ms Antonenko: I do not know whether he was wrong. In my view, it is a commitment that will be too difficult for NATO now to implement, given the other pressures that exist within the alliance, particularly with regard to the mission in Afghanistan and the new requirements for this mission with the new US administration committing more troops and expecting the allies to commit more troops. In addition, if this force is de facto seen as a way to protect Estonia or Poland against Russia, in my view 3000 men is not a credible type of force. The contingency plan involving all elements of NATO policy and its toolbox of instruments is a more credible reassurance.

Q164 Robert Key: Estonia has told us that it would like to see a high-profile of NATO and its forces as a deterrent in Baltic, for example air policing: do you think that would be seen by the Russians as provocative?

Ms Antonenko: We need to be mindful of the way Russia views NATO commitments. At the time of the first NATO enlargement, when NATO signed the founding act with Russia there was a very clear pledge on behalf of NATO not to deploy new permanent infrastructure bases in new member states. It is very important to see how that pledge can in principle be observed, because of course with the absence now of the CFE treaty - in the current time frame we may see a revival of the CFE, although I doubt that - it is important that we have a clear commitment by NATO and hopefully by Russia which is observed. At the same time, there is still enough room within these commitments for highly symbolic and visible reassurances for Estonia and other countries, which need to be put in place.

Q165 Robert Key: The cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 were very, very effective. I think they were the only occasion on which one state has intervened in another state in this way. One of the problems appears to be that the law of armed conflict clearly does not apply, and there is no other international law in this area: is that something that the international community should be concerned about?

Ms Antonenko: Yes, I think so. It is certainly understood that any future war will involve the very important dimension of cyber security, and that is something for which NATO needs to develop a consensus and instruments with which to address it. When you renew international law, which may be a new treaty or new agreements, it could possibly be included as an agenda item in the new discussions with Russia, either in the Russian NATO Council or within the discussion of the Medvedev proposals, to discuss the obligations the countries have to prevent this kind of attack, so that they see them as part of their vital security interests.

Chairman: There were significant cyber attacks on Georgia shortly before August 2007.

Q166 Robert Key: Yes indeed, but Georgia has a small sector of information technology, whereas Estonia is the most wired country in the European Union and depends almost wholly on their system not only for government but for civilian interaction. Can I ask finally about the impact of climate change on the northern shores of both North America and the Russian Federation? We have been told that Russia is focusing once again on trade routes across the north of Canada and the Arctic shores. Does this have the potential or seeds for new confrontation between North America and the Russian Federation in the Arctic?

Ms Antonenko: There are two views on that. One view is that it has a lot of potential for confrontation because it is an area that has not been regulated, where each country at the moment is trying to implement unilateral policies, and that can potentially lead to conflict. At the same time, I personally think that it is also an area for opportunity. If there is one area where NATO and Russia in the long run would have a common interest in avoiding conflict, because if a conflict started it would have a huge impact on the security of Russia and the main NATO countries, it is the Arctic. If we need to develop a new agenda in which operative security mechanisms can be applied and developed within a multilateral forum, this is, in my view, the most important opportunity. I hope we will take that on, because I cannot imagine that NATO and Russia will be content with developing just a unilateral posture in that area.

Q167 Mr Hancock: In your very interesting memorandum to us you suggest that it is high time somebody should start to re-boot the NATO/Russia relationship. How would you suggest that can be best achieved, and who has to start that process?

Ms Antonenko: If one summarises the argument, the strategy we used before the August war, in building relations with Russia, was counter-productive because, in my view, it was based on false assumptions and expectations on both sides. On the NATO side the assumption was that the more meetings and working groups and committees they had, the more approximation and rapprochement there would be with Russia to develop common perceptions and capabilities. On the Russian side the perception was that the Russia NATO Council is a kind of back-door membership to NATO. In both cases they were wrong, and there was a huge disappointment in the relationship, even before August. As a result, even before August, starting from last year, the bilateral programme of activities of Russia NATO had been almost suspended and there was no plan of action approved. I think that we should use the pause in the relationship after the August conflict not only to send a signal to Russia, which was the right thing to do - that "business as usual" could not be pursued with Russia until it implemented its commitments - but at the same time to re-think strategically how we approach the relationship with Russia. There is no doubt in mind that it is very much in NATO's interests to have a productive and constructive relationship with Russia, and to avoid by all means possible a new confrontation and entrenchment of the Cold War attitudes. In my view, in regard to the new strategy the motto should be "the less the better" in a way. We should stop thinking about creating a multitude of instruments, committees and meetings, but instead focus on the few very clearly targeted areas, where Russia and NATO clearly share common interests and where they can develop not just dialogue but common actions. The Arctic is clearly one of those areas. The second area is Afghanistan, where NATO and Russia have a common interest in seeing Afghanistan stabilised.

Chairman: We will come on to that.

Q168 Mr Hancock: Your answer really begs the question. Do you believe that Western leaders really understand Russian diplomacy and what Russia is seeking? Do they have a clear vision of what Russia wants for itself and how it sees itself?

Ms Antonenko: I think the West is very much divided about this, and it is no secret. Some countries within NATO and the EU see Russia very much as a member of the Euro/Atlantic community, which needs to be brought closer and possibly integrated in some way. Other members of NATO see Russia as a new threat. We discussed about the need to reassure some of the new member states of NATO that felt threatened after the August events. In my view, it will continue to be a challenge to bridge this divide. The only way we can achieve that is to focus on the narrow window of opportunity where there is a consensus within NATO on those areas that have to be addressed, like cyber security and the Arctic, or Afghanistan and arms control. Slowly through that interaction we can build a new type of relationship, which will help bridge the divide with the West and over time change Russia's attitudes. It is very important to note that when Medvedev became President, all the statements that came out from Russia clearly prioritised a relationship with the West. There is almost no appetite in Russia now either for a so-called new cold war or confrontation with the West, or moving away from the West towards China. We have seen repeatedly, even after the August events, Russia's attempts to position itself as a member of the Euro/Atlantic community. Of course, it wants to position itself within that on its own terms, and of course we need to have a very long conversation with Russia about the consensus model. We have to remember that in 1975, when the first Helsinki process was negotiated, it took six years and 4,600 different proposals were discussed. If we are now embarking on a new project, in my view it is a window of opportunity to start integrating Russia.

Q169 Mr Hancock: Do you see a convergence of opinion now coming from the President, as opposed to the Prime Minister, and is there a shift of power from the Russian White House back to the Kremlin; or is Russia's foreign policy still very much in the Prime Minister?

Ms Antonenko: I think Russian foreign policy is an area where the President is increasingly playing an important role. Domestic policy is somewhat harder to judge.

Q170 Mr Hancock: Is he making the policy or following it?

Ms Antonenko: I think he is making the policy too. Clearly, the August events have been a very shocking development for the Russian President, who came to power at least personally convinced and articulating this very pro-Western agenda, and that represented a setback. We have now seen re-emergence of the emphasis on multilateralism, on creating a new relationship with the West, and on international law. In my view that does not exist at least in Putin's view of the world, which is very much based around realpolitik, in rivalry and competition and making Russia strong in this rivalry. Whether at the end of the day the concessions that Russia would have to make if it were to be admitted into the Euro/Atlantic community fold is something that President Medvedev can implement. It has yet to be seen.

Q171 Mr Hancock: What could or should NATO do to positively allay Russia's fears about what their objectives are? Do you think NATO has clear objectives, or do you think they are so vague they could be misrepresented or misinterpreted by anyone?

Ms Antonenko: They are not vague. As I said, the members of NATO are divided, and often times Russia tends to pick up the views of the individual NATO members and interpret them, when it suits it, as NATO policy, and in other ways not to interpret it as NATO policy. For example, is missile defence a NATO policy or just a US policy? There has been a shift: Russia saw NATO policy, and it is now increasingly presented as just a US policy. Enlargement is another very painful issue of course, which will remain very painful; but not only the August events but the domestic situation involving Georgia and Ukraine have made it less likely that this issue will be on the agenda in the foreseeable future, and therefore it offers us room for discussions with Russia where those most difficult issues are not on the agenda. If we shift from that divisive agenda over NATO enlargement, missile defence and other issues, to a more cooperative agenda, including Afghanistan, the Arctic and other issues, we can achieve much more in terms of bringing Russia into the process. There are people in Russia and in the political establishment who see the relationship with NATO developing in a positive direction and want to achieve that. Nobody wants to see confrontation with NATO because clearly Russia is not going to win from that.

Q172 Mr Jenkin: It is a fantasy, is it not, that NATO is a threat to Russia? It is a complete fantasy, and we should be quite robust about telling them so, should we not? We are not a threat. We do not want to threaten Russia.

Ms Antonenko: The perception of threat often times is very subjective.

Q173 Mr Jenkin: They use that, do they not, as sand in the face of Western diplomacy to try to disrupt what else we are doing, and get themselves more cards to play? It is disruptive, is it not?

Ms Antonenko: There is a part of the Russian political elite and policy-making community that genuinely believes that NATO is a threat, and this is because they have a profound mistrust of what NATO officials say; they do not tend to listen to that because they dismiss it as NATO's attempts to mislead Russia. They look at NATO capability, and they see that increased, while Russia's own capability decreases. Given that they are not members of NATO and do not make decisions within NATO, they conclude that NATO is a threat.

Q174 Mr Jenkin: You described two views: that Russia is becoming a threat to us; and that we should include them in the Euro/Atlantic area. Is it possible to hold both views, is it not? But the way they behave is sometimes threatening - cyber attacks, over-reaction in Georgia - that is aggressive, threatening behaviour; but on the other hand it is reported that George Robinson invited Putin to consider joining NATO. Should that not be our long-term objective? It was suggested to us by an albeit minority party when we visited Moscow. Should that not be the long-term objective? Should we not welcome Russia as a member of the Western democratic family of nations, to put them round the table on an equal basis, rather than allowing themselves to isolate themselves? Would that not demonstrate that we are genuinely friendly?

Ms Antonenko: You are right that it is possible to hold both views to see if some elements of Russia's behaviour as threatening, and at the same time to be committed to bringing Russia into some new Europe/Atlantic security system, which will discourage Russia from behaving in a threatening way. That is possible, and therefore I personally think it is completely legitimate to reassure the Baltic States and other NATO members, while at the same time pursuing a dialogue with Russia. On the question of whether it is wise to offer Russia membership, we have to remember that all Russian leaders have at one time or the other expressed tentative aspirations to joining NATO. We heard that from Gorbachev, from Yeltsin, and from Putin in 2000. President Medvedev is the only one who has not said it so explicitly. That is something that is more a theoretical than practical question at the moment. Just saying that is not going to add confidence. We need to see it as a long-term process, that some time in the future Russia could join NATO. That will require NATO to transform itself fundamentally.

Q175 Mr Jenkin: And Russia to transform itself fundamentally!

Ms Antonenko: Yes, Russia too, of course - Russia even more so, absolutely. What I mean is that in the meantime it is important to build on these proposals from Medvedev to create a Euro/Atlantic security community, loosely defined, in which certain principles are agreed ideally, and legally binding. That will be very difficult.

Q176 Mr Jenkin: Values!

Ms Antonenko: Values, of course - principles and values in my view are the same thing; that you treat your neighbours in a certain way; you avoid using force and there is a very clear understanding. You again have a commitment to sovereignty and integrity of state, et cetera. There is a whole set of issues that needs to be agreed, including arms control, transparency, et cetera. In my view, this is a realistic prospect rather than talking about Russia being a member of NATO, which is very, very theoretical.

Chairman: And Afghanistan, which we need to come on to now.

Q177 Mrs Moon: It is very interesting - you talked about the rivalry and competition that goes on between Russia and Europe, but you also talked about the need for cooperative security. Your last description of going forward was on the Shanghai Cooperation route that was taken with China and neighbours there. How much, in terms of Afghanistan, is it in Russia's interests for NATO to be as committed as it is, and is that also the basis of a new relationship between NATO and Russia perhaps?

Ms Antonenko: There is clearly a shared interest in Afghanistan. Russia does not want to see NATO fail in Afghanistan and the radical Islamic forces again coming to power and threatening both the immediate region and global security. In that sense, Russia is interested to see NATO remaining in Afghanistan and reinforcing its presence. There is a growing scepticism in Russia whether military presence on the ground is contributing to stabilisation of Afghanistan in the long run. There is a growing perception not only in Russia but increasingly in Central Asia that the NATO presence in the way that it is now being used, is part of the problem not part of the solution in the long run in Afghanistan. We have seen Taliban and radical elements gaining momentum in Afghanistan. The most important threat that Russia feels immediately from Afghanistan is drug-trafficking. The volume of drug-trafficking from Afghanistan has not increased but it expanded substantially during the period of the NATO presence there. Thirdly, there is very little regional involvement by states that are potentially the most threatened by instability in Afghanistan but which also have a lot to contribute in terms of their links and experience. Russia sees itself also as part of that regional grouping, which needs to be involved bilaterally or through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation). Russia has been offering a dialogue for almost four years between CSTO and NATO on Afghanistan. The CSTO has a regional security grouping, including Central Asian states except Turkmenistan, as well as Belarus and Armenia. It has been increasingly involved in Afghanistan, including in the areas of training, police, and defence reforms and supplying the Afghan military. On the NATO side, because of the US position, there has been a complete unwillingness to have that kind of dialogue develop. I understand that the Obama administration will reconsider that, and there have already been various signals coming out of Washington that they might accept a dialogue. It will be preferable for them to establish the NATO/SCO and NATO/CSTO dialogue rather than just working with Russia bilaterally, because involving other Central Asian states as well as China will be more productive, as they have more to contribute to stabilising Afghanistan, rather than only speaking to Russia.

Q178 Mrs Moon: In terms of bilateral relationships with Russia, is it unhelpful at the moment that some NATO states are to make bilateral agreements in relation to the transport of equipment to Afghanistan? Rather than lots and lots of bilaterals, should there be a clear agreement of cooperation with Russia set out for NATO generally in regard to equipment?

Ms Antonenko: There has been a Russia/NATO agreement signed in Bucharest, and that has been observed ever since that time, including through the times post August when the relationship has been difficult or suspended; Russia has still implemented its part of the bargain in terms of allowing the non-military cargo to go through. In terms of the NATO-wide strategy on the northern supply route, I think it will be better if it is articulated within NATO. Of course, some NATO countries, including particularly the United States and Germany, feel that it would be easier for them to sign bilateral agreements, and they have no time to wait, in a sense, for the NATO consensus to emerge and for NATO and Russia to negotiate the agreement. They feel they can do it better bilaterally. Germany and Russia, for example, already have that sort of agreement. In the longer run it will be useful. For example, NATO has a special forum where it meets with all Central Asian states together to discuss Afghanistan. It will be useful to bring Russia into that, and within that forum to start discussing a more comprehensive agreement on all supply routes because we need a number of them, not only for non-military but also military supplies.

Chairman: A very quick final question from Mr Brian Jenkins, and a very quick answer, please because we need to get on!

Q179 Mr Jenkins: You feel that Russia and China can sit down and do a deal. Is this because Russia sees China as a legitimate entity because it has a border with Russia, and it sees NATO however as being merely an American puppet in Europe, therefore, because it has no border, and it sees the European Union as having more efficacy because it has a border? Does that work into Russia's concept at all?

Ms Antonenko: It is a difficult question to give a quick answer! The quick answer is that China has been very, very clever in the way it approached Russia in the post-Soviet space; it always gave very reassuring messages, acknowledging Russia's role et cetera, while behind the scenes and slowly building its own presence in the region. In the case of NATO we have the reverse situation where a lot of ambitions were articulated straight away, even before the real influence and real presence was established; so we had a very negative dynamic, which then influenced the real cooperation. The other dynamic in regard to China was more productive, when Russia and China solved border disputes together; it helped the Central Asians to slowly build on that confidence. That has happened, and it is totally the opposite in the case of NATO enlargement.

Q180 Chairman: Thank you very much. We have a problem that NATO has a large number of different countries, whereas China is one.

Ms Antonenko: Absolutely.

Chairman: Ms Antonenko, thank you very much indeed for your evidence; it has been both helpful and fascinating.

Memorandum submitted by Sir Andrew Wood

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr Denis Corboy, Director of Caucasus Policy Institute, King's College, London (and former EU ambassador to the Caucasus), and Sir Andrew Wood, Associate Fellow at Chatham House (and former UK Ambassador to Moscow), gave evidence.

Q181 Chairman: Would you like to introduce yourselves, please?

Sir Andrew Wood: My name is Andrew Wood. I used to be, at the end of the last century, the British Ambassador in Moscow, and since then I have returned to Moscow a great deal basically on commercial business. I am also a member of Chatham House.

Mr Corboy: I am Dennis Corboy, and for the last five years I have been Director of the Caucasus Policy Institute, King's College, London. Until 1994 I was the EU Commission representative in Georgia and Armenia. I went back to Georgia again in 2002 as an envoy of the European Commission, so my focus has been on the Caucasus and in recent times particularly in Georgia.

Q182 Chairman: Can I begin by asking you, Sir Andrew - and thank you for your memorandum, which was very helpful indeed - you said: "Russia and NATO often appear to exist in a parallel world and do not have a dialogue in depth so much as the two entities talking and engaging in shouting past each other." Do you think the Russian leaders misunderstand Western diplomacy and that perhaps Western diplomats misunderstand Russia? If you do think that, what are the consequences?

Sir Andrew Wood: I think the Russians are particularly good at setting an agenda. They are particularly good at tactics. They are not necessarily quite so good at strategy. The Russian foreign policy establishment is quite a small one, and it tends to lag behind real events. The attitude within Russia to the West in general, to NATO in particular, and especially the United States, is part of the defining mechanism by which Russians recognise themselves as Russians. That leads to automatic - what to us are total distortions. Mr Jenkin rightly said during the previous witness's very articulate (if I may say so) presentation that it is a fantasy that NATO is aggressive. It is a fantasy that grips a lot of people within Russia, however. At the moment I think there are the beginnings of a differentiation within Russia as to the attitude towards them. I referred in my memorandum, perhaps rather briefly, to the process of military reform that is going on. The essential thrust of that is that the Russian military should be shrunk dramatically. There is a very logical case for that. It is not necessarily a case that suits those in charge of the Russian armed forces at present, who make a very nice thing in various ways out of being a major conscript force, but it is a logic that is there. It will, in my view, be a leading indicator for future Russian foreign policy attitudes whether or not the process of reform becoming a more strategic, focused force continues. On the Western side, I was recently in Berlin at a seminar for British and German participants. As I say, it is no secret that the attitudes within Germany towards Russia and the attitudes within Britain towards Russia are - not across the board but in general there is a different attitude. That gives Russia the opportunity to both regard NATO as a sort of generalised threat, and to pick and choose among the countries with which it has dialogue - this is a whole group of countries - 27. It knows very well that there is a huge variety of attitudes towards it. It actually has a great deal of diplomatic manoeuvre within NATO and affecting NATO.

Mr Corboy: I think that Russia misinterprets NATO's actions quite wilfully. I have often asked the question, and if we look at the reasons for that there is a deep sense of grievance. Russians will often tell you that they have a sense of betrayal because they perceive, I think wrongly, that Secretary of State Baker allegedly gave a commitment that there would be no major NATO extension. I do not believe that commitment was given because it does not make any logic, when you look at the unification of Germany; but they have this deep-seated belief that they have been betrayed. This is very much a backdrop to trying to get things back on an even keel, because I am very convinced that there is no better alternative than to treat Russia as a partner. We have to work in that direction, no matter what aspect of this we are looking at.

Sir Andrew Wood: I agree with the last sentiment, but I would just like to remark that, first of all I was in Washington at the time and there was no such commitment given; second, even if there had been, it would have been a commitment to the Soviet Union and not to Russia. Russia regards itself in every possible way as the successor to the Soviet Union, and therefore what Mr Corboy said is perfectly true about the way that many Russians think; but, nonetheless, it is a bit of a false perspective.

Q183 Chairman: If the mythology has grown up within Russia, it is an issue that has to be dealt with.

Sir Andrew Wood: Absolutely.

Q184 Mr Crausby: It is the same question I asked to Ms Antonenko on the question of Ukraine. What is the likelihood of Russia using military force in Ukraine in the short term or long term?

Mr Corboy: I would agree with what Ms Antonenko said. I do not see this as a real danger. I do not think it is in Russia's interests to have a conflict with Ukraine. It is not, in my opinion, the next flashpoint. If there is a next flashpoint, it is probably in Georgia - and you will probably come on to that - but I do not rate it. I would not consider it.

Q185 Mr Crausby: You do not see any problems in the Crimea?

Mr Corboy: Yes, it is very hard to know how this would play out. It is a very specific situation where the population of the Crimea - I know a number of them are receiving Russian passports. The political situation of Ukraine is not stable, and it could play into all of that, but I do not really see military intervention by Russia in Ukraine. I believe that if settlement is not reached about Sevastopol that Russia has other alternatives now in Abkhazia to have its naval base there.

Q186 Mr Crausby: Do you have a view on the outcome of the negotiations on Sevastopol and what you expect them to do?

Mr Corboy: I do not think we know what the Ukrainians are going to put on the table; we have to wait and see.

Q187 Mr Crausby: You do not believe that will cause any problems in the sense that Russia has alternatives?

Mr Corboy: I really do not see - I have a feeling that there will be a settlement here. It depends. There are so many ifs and buts and so many unknowns about what is going to happen with Ukrainian politics. It is very hard at this point in time to know. I agree with what was said earlier on, that it will need at least a five-year run-in to 2017 before the lease runs out.

Q188 Mr Crausby: You would expect negotiations to be imminent!

Mr Corboy: They should start in the next couple of years, I would say. The political situation in Ukraine is not such that that is on the agenda immediately.

Q189 Chairman: We heard what Ms Antonenko said about building of a port in Abkhazia. Do you think that was a factor that came into the events of August of last year?

Mr Corboy: Yes, I tend to believe, having looked at much of the evidence - and there is very conflicting evidence about the August war - I tend to be one of those who have come to the conclusion that after the Bucharest summit that Russia had started to make some preparations for what happened in the August war. The evidence of this that struck me as important was the change in the equipment provided to the peace-keepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The training exercise that took place in the north Caucasus -----

Q190 Chairman: That was an annual event, was it not, that training exercise?

Mr Corboy: I am informed that the training was a rehearsal in a sense for having to move into South Ossetia. There was the movement of the Russian navy to the Black Sea where they were ready, poised to act, and the landing of those 4000 naval troops in Abkhazia within 24 hours of war breaking out. There again, the Russian view is that they were - on 7 August the attack on Tskhinvali was provocation that they were reacting to. The evidence is on both sides, but I think that there is very little doubt that Russia was preparing for such an eventuality. It now has achieved some of its objectives. It has established military bases in south Caucasus; it will have naval bases in Abkhazia; but it has not effected a regime change in Tblisi, which was one of its major objectives. Among the people commentating on these things, they are saying that the next flashpoint would be in regard to what happens at the end of April or May of this year because of the unfinished business because they feel that certain in elements in Moscow will feel that this should put a stop to a Caucasian country ever joining NATO. There is a danger that if something is not done that that is the way it would still go. I do not accept this argument for one reason. They misinterpret the EU monitors. The presence of EU monitors is very different from the presence of OSCE or UNIVIC for this reason. For Russia to take an action in Georgia this year would mean a confrontation with the EU, and the EU is a very different animal as far as they are concerned. It is their largest customer. They want good relations with the EU and they would not be prepared to face EU sanctions. I think the danger of another war this summer has been grossly exaggerated.

Q191 Chairman: We now have two months to see whether you are right!

Sir Andrew Wood: Can I comment on that and Mr Crausby's question? Basically, I do not think they give a toss about the EU and they keep demonstrating it in almost any context that is presented. They should but they do not. They have no faith the EU would ever stick together and present a united front for very long. On a historical record that is pretty much accurate, I would have thought. I agree that the chances of a further direct intervention in Georgia now are a bit limited, but possible. I also agree that that is a more of a danger than a direct military intervention in Ukraine, which for all sorts of reasons a lot would have to go wrong before anything like that happened. The Sevastopol question is so far into the political distance for Russia and the Ukraine that it is not an immediate flashpoint in that sense. In the attitude both to Ukraine and to Georgia, there is a very long-standing and deep-rooted assumption by the present ruling people in Moscow that they have a right to dictate what goes on in those countries. I note Prime Minister Putin's reaction to an investment conference in Ukraine yesterday, which was attended by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the new Commissioner for External Relations, in which the proposal was that we should work together with Ukraine to improve and modernise the pipelines. Putin said that this is absolutely not serious: "It seems to me that the document about which we are talking is at minimum ill-considered and unprofessional because to discuss such issues without the main supplier is simply not serious." That seems to me very indicative of an attitude. There is in principle no reason whatsoever why Ukraine and the EU should not cooperate to make better pipelines. Ukraine is an independent country and we are entitled to have relations with it as we wish; but in Russian eyes that is an emotional shock, including because they would like to have control over Ukrainian pipelines. I think that is a far more serious threat than military intervention. As I said, a lot would have to go wrong before that.

Q192 Chairman: Thank you. I note that Mr Corby is nodding.

Mr Corboy: To some extent, yes.

Q193 Mr Hancock: Could I ask you a similar question to the one I asked before about the balance of power in Russia and where the clear political lead is coming from now. Is it coming from the President and the Kremlin or is it coming from Mr Putin and the White House? Is there a divergence now which could cause some sort of instability in their attitude to foreign policy?

Sir Andrew Wood: Personally, I think there is a potential for instability, and that there is a bit of a different attitude but it is one that is also tactically useful. There is a little bit of the soft cop/hard cop about it. Prime Minister Putin's personal political style has often been to put off a decision and to let debate and suppositions develop and subsequently to take his own decision. I do not believe, and more to the purpose, nobody of influence that I have met recently in Russia believes, that anyone except Putin is in charge. If you pose the theoretical question: "Could Putin be dismissed? It is the President's right to appoint his own Prime Minister" the answer is clearly, "No, that is just not going to happen" - absent some huge popular outcry against Putin, which, again, is not on the cards. You could perhaps describe the Russian Government as a frozen conflict. We are all familiar with that sort of sensation, it is not untypical of any country, but, nonetheless, it is particularly, because in logic the President holds the power, in practice he cannot exercise it.

Q194 Mr Hancock: If it is not going to be in Georgia, do you see that Russia's willingness to lend quite substantial sums to Armenia as a ratcheting-up of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh? Do you think Russia would be supportive of Armenia taking action in that field as being a potential bigger threat than Georgia?

Sir Andrew Wood: I would defer to Mr Corboy but I would be surprised if that were the case.

Mr Corboy: I would think that Russia is supporting Armenia. It is its strongest ally in the Caucusus. The signs are that there is progress being made with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh and I think Russia is generally wanting to see a solution there. I do not see it as taking sides. They certainly do not want to see greater hostilities with regard to NK.

Q195 Mr Hancock: It is Bernard's point - he made it earlier and he does it very well - that nobody could seriously contemplate NATO presenting any real threat to the interests of Russia. Can they?

Sir Andrew Wood: I think you can, if you suppose that Russia has, as it has repeatedly said, a right to a privileged sphere of interest from which outsiders must exclude themselves. There is this recent business about the Ukraine pipelines. The Russian Energy Minister talks about the integration of Ukraine into the legal sphere of the European system as far as energy is concerned. That, to them, is illegitimate. To us it is perfectly normal, in principle - I mean, we know the Russians do not like it, but there is nothing objectionable in principle about it. Similarly they, I think, would see it as in the nature of a threat if Belarus suddenly became a more liberal place and if the EU, let alone NATO, began to establish closer relationships with the East European, former Soviet states. That just makes them feel uneasy. I find, anyway, that in a discussion with Russia about the potential for instability within Russia which is there, they quickly go to an apocalyptic situation where all the various bits of it drop off. One can understand the North Caucusus is a particularly dangerous and unstable place from that point of view, but they start to fantasise about the Chinese taking over the Far East and so on and so forth, so this fear of a country breaking up is very real. That extends to a feeling that a cause of that could be a loss of their right, as they see it, to control former Soviet states - with the exception of the Baltics, which sort of do not count.

Q196 Mr Hancock: Do you share that view?

Mr Corboy: Yes. It is the psyche that one is looking at here, this issue of the privileged sphere of influence which so frequently has been mentioned by President Medvedev on a number occasions. Again this weekend at the Brussels forum we saw Mr Labarov saying that the EU Eastern Partnership was a sphere of influence. I think there is an important distinction to be drawn here. When a sovereign country enters into a voluntary alliance or a voluntary agreement which it does for its own reasons and its own interests, there is very big difference from a sphere of influence being claimed by a country over another sovereign country which does not want that sphere of influence to be carried out. I do not know if you have seen Mr Lavrov's remarks this weekend at the Brussels Forum, but they do not seem to get this distinction. It is a fundamental one, I think.

Q197 Mr Hancock: Going back to what you were saying, that it is very easy for Russia not to take the EU as seriously as they ought to, because they know they can always pick countries offering bilateral agreements and what-have-you and they have been very successful in doing that. Is it not also in Russia's interests to keep the divergence of opinion within NATO? The questions of missile defence and enlargement they will always put at the top of the agenda, because it automatically starts with NATO being in a difficult position. They are behind the black ball immediately. Russia will always start the negotiations with NATO and their discussions with NATO by raising those two issues first, so they keep the Alliance split apart. We heard earlier that it would be good if we could find common things to talk about with Russia, but Russia does not want that to happen because it suits them, does it not, surely, to keep NATO in this situation where they are divided on the two key issues that will always be at the top of the Russian agenda.

Sir Andrew Wood: Absolutely. Add into the mix that they have a particular animus towards the United States - which is presently a little bit tested because it is difficult for them to ignore the fact that President Obama is more appealing to world opinion than his predecessor was, but I do not really think that it is likely to be a significantly different relationship between the United States and Russia for the foreseeable future.

Q198 Mr Hancock: Really there is very little that NATO can do to change that situation, is there?

Sir Andrew Wood: No, I think Oksana was right, in that we should look for areas in which we can talk. Obviously it is true that we want to engage with Russia, but engagement and containment are not opposites. Actually there are areas where we do not agree with Russia, and they have no qualms in pointing out where they think we are doing wrong, so I do not see any reason why we should not perhaps return the favour.

Q199 Chairman: Mr Corboy, you were nodding at that.

Mr Corboy: I would add one thing. I think the United States pressing the reset button is of very considerable significance because it is changing the mood language, it is changing the atmosphere of even the language. I have just been in Washington talking to many different people and I sense a totally different approach to looking at relations with Russia. There is a sense, certainly on the US side, that it is time to prioritise your interests while at the same time not compromising principles. When you look at the prioritising of these interests, the first one is nuclear proliferation. When you look at the order of magnitude of these problems - and we can also come to Afghanistan and all the other places and other issues, but just to take one example of the nuclear proliferation issue and Iran - imagine a nuclear Iran with Russian protection. This sort of situation, if we do not develop this partnership with Russia, it is a horror story to talk about it but it is not something that is totally impossible, and it would have implications not just for the Middle East, which are terrifying, but could have enormous international and worldwide implications. I think it behoves the UK and the West in general to prioritise our interests. I am not denying that we should keep principles, which are extremely important, but another priority must be to have Russia in support in regard to stabilising Afghanistan. That clearly must be a priority. A third is defeating terrorism. We also need - I think this is a strong European feeling - to ensure an energy security agreement with Russia for Europe. These are very important priorities, along with other priorities, but these are interests which are of such major importance that the reset button I think has brought us to a new place - and a better place in my submission.

Sir Andrew Wood: I suppose setting the reset button was inevitable and correct. You can isolate areas where it would be good to co‑operate and we should try, but I am not sure that Russia will recognise its strategic interest in behaving as we would wish towards Iran. It has not been particularly helpful so far really. The Russians are usually much better at saying why something is not possible than coming forward then with anything very positive about it. They do have an interest but it is a question of whether they think it is worth acting on now.

Q200 Mr Jenkin: Sir Andrew, your memorandum talks about the benefit of acting bilaterally. The Defence Secretary John Hutton recently suggested - rather out of the blue, in my view - that there should be a NATO "allied solidarity force". How does that fit into the Americans pushing the reset button? Is that a relevant intervention?

Sir Andrew Wood: You are better informed than I am about the Minister's statement. I am not sure where the force would be or what it would be intended to achieve.

Q201 Chairman: Mr Corboy, do you know anything about the allied solidarity force?

Mr Corboy: There is a bit of a fog there, but I understood it to permit other NATO members to release troops for Afghanistan, to make it easier for them, to give them that sense that their home security was looked at more closely. That is the way I understood it. And, also, because the rapid-reaction force proposals which have been on the NATO table for some years have not made progress.

Q202 Mr Jenkin: How would Russia react to the formation of a solidarity force amongst the Eastern European states of NATO?

Sir Andrew Wood: This would be particularly in reference to Eastern Europe?

Q203 Mr Jenkin: That is what I understand.

Mr Corboy: This was 15,000 constantly available and 15,000 troops in training, I understand. As I think was said earlier on by Oksana Antonenko, it is not a threat to Russia but it might reassure countries that we would like to see contributing more forces to the Afghanistan NATO effort to make it more easy for them to do so. That is my understanding of the proposal.

Sir Andrew Wood: The Russians would certainly regard it as a threat.

Q204 Chairman: It would not necessarily be any different from the rapid-reaction force, would it?.

Sir Andrew Wood: No, but it would be a splendid excuse to make a noise if they wished to make a lot of noise. And they would be likely to wish to make a lot of noise so that we would back off.

Q205 Mr Jenkin: Might I get back to the question of Iran. We are in a new era. President Obama has sent this letter to President Medvedev, which seems to be getting a fairly cold reception. Ambassador Rogozin told me in a meeting in Paris yesterday that Russia does not regard it as possible that Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future, so that they seem to be rejecting a basic premise of the offer that President Obama has made. Coming back to your point, Mr Corby, does Russia want Iran to have a nuclear weapon, so that their protests are just a cover for that, because they like the disturbance that a nuclear alarm would cause in the West?

Mr Corboy: I am always trying to see a rational Russia there. If Russia is rational it should want to seek to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear threat. You might disagree.

Sir Andrew Wood: No, I do not. I do not disagree with that at all, but I would draw a distinction between the short term and the long term. There is always a temptation in the short term to be Iran's friend and to be, from Tehran's point of view, preventing the wicked Americans or whoever from putting undue pressure on you. There are clear advantages in that, and if you suppose that Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon anyway, you can make that into long-term common sense. It is not that unreasonable. The chances of Iran getting a nuclear weapon must, according to everything I understand, now be within the limits of the possible anyway.

Q206 Mr Jenkin: Finally, on this sphere of influence question, would it be a mistake for the UK or the West collectively to concede a sphere of influence?

Sir Andrew Wood: Absolutely. I could tell you why too, if you would like.

Q207 Chairman: Yes, please do.

Sir Andrew Wood: I think this would be of great harm to Russia, for a start, because I believe that Russia has the potential, and I would say the wish for it to happen, to turn into a stable democratic state, but at present it is not turning in that direction at all, it is turning into the perpetuation of rule by a very small group of people without the capacity for self-renewal. Its economic position is not nearly as healthy and good as it should be for the longer term. That too is associated with a wish to control from the centre. It was recently pointed out to me that there are three cement makers in Russia and 6,000 in China - or it might be 6,000 in one and 3,000 in the other, but a huge disproportion. Russia is a country of monopolies, of gross inefficiencies, and the only way that it is going to become the prosperous and excellent country it has every right to be is through having a much looser and more credible political system there.

Q208 Mr Jenkin: So a policy of tough love.

Sir Andrew Wood: A policy of tough love.

Q209 Mr Jenkin: And ultimate NATO membership?

Sir Andrew Wood: If Russia changed in the direction that I would hope it to change, then that would be a realistic possibility, but NATO membership does include some attachment and guarantee of continued attachment to some basic values.

Q210 Mr Jenkin: They would have to stop murdering journalists in the streets.

Sir Andrew Wood: That would be one very desirable change, yes - including our streets.

Mr Corboy: If we accept spheres of influence or Russia having a sphere of influence, it would very seriously undermine our commitments to the sovereignty and independence of these democracies. I do not think we could possibly go that route. I do not think it is acceptable that we would not continue to support the sovereignty and independence of these countries.

Q211 Chairman: Bernard Jenkin has been pursuing the issue of NATO enlargement to the inclusion of Russia. What about NATO enlargement in relation to Ukraine and Georgia? Do you think we were right in NATO to withdraw the prospect of membership action plan from Ukraine and Georgia and Bucharest? How did Russia react to that?

Mr Corboy: I do not think there was any compelling security reason for admitting Ukraine and Georgia at this time. I think the question one should ask is: Is enlargement in the interests of NATO at this time? Eventually Ukraine and Georgia should be, once they are ready for it, members of NATO, and in the meantime we should find measures to reassure their sovereignty and clearly defend their sovereignty and to give them the ways of preparing. That is why this NATO-Georgia Commission and NATO-Ukraine Commission can play a very important role and can, in the view of many people, be as effective as MAP. We made a great mistake in politicising and exaggerating what MAP meant. MAP is a process which could last a long period of years. It became politicised as being the great thing that Georgia and Ukraine were aiming for, but I think what has happened now is a much more satisfactory situation both from the NATO point of view and for both Ukraine and Georgia. They have within these commissions the possibility of doing as much, if not more, under MAP.

Sir Andrew Wood: I would agree with much of that, except in one brutal sense. If I were a Georgian I might well feel, because I would feel that I had been attacked, that I might not have been attacked if I at least had had MAP status. It is the sort of question personally which I wish had never come up, because it is all the wrong way round. More attention to EU membership, particularly for Ukraine, seems to me to have priority over NATO membership and would be more appealing to the people in Ukraine as well. In an ideal world, that is what would have happened, I think. However, if you look back to what happened in East Europe, exactly the same dilemmas were there then, and, again, we went for NATO membership first and EU membership followed on from that. I suppose that set some sort of precedent and I think that helped to stabilise the situation in Eastern Europe at that time. As Mr Corboy says, the MAP process is extremely long and would not really have committed anyone to anyone, so we could have pressed ahead with that but it would have been, in practice again, against the publicly expressed hesitation and so on of major countries within NATO, so it would have been both long and incoherent in meaning if you were sitting in Moscow. I do not think it probably would, in practice, have made any difference to what happened in Georgia, but I can understand why, if I were a Georgian, I might think it had been abandoned in South Ossetia.

Q212 Chairman: When we were in Georgia a view was expressed to me by some people that, although Russia protested against the recognition of Kosovo, Russia was relieved and pleased to be able to use that recognition as an excuse for what later happened in Georgia on the basis that the European Union and others who recognised Kosovo walked into a trap. What is your reaction to that suggestion?

Mr Corboy: It is a very fanciful theory.

Q213 Chairman: Fanciful?

Mr Corboy: Yes. I mean, Russians do play chess, and if you look at it in that way they could have seen moves down the way. But, no, I do not subscribe to that.

Sir Andrew Wood: I would be more sympathetic, possibly because I also spent eight years of my life in Yugoslavia and was ambassador there until late 1989. The Russians certainly saw - and they can make out a perfectly plausible case for so seeing - what we did in Kosovo as a legitimate reason for them to do similarly "humanitarian" actions elsewhere. The recognition step, they had made that link before. They had said to us very clearly, "If you recognise Kosovo then we will recognise, among others, Aphasia and South Ossetia.. So they did what they said. One can argue about whether they had any justification for it but I do think that it gave them a plausible excuse. What I do not think is, had we not recognised Kosovo, that they would then have refrained from doing what they did in South Ossetia and Asphasia, because they already had control over them both before and this was just a matter of consolidating it.

Chairman: Thank you. Moving on to energy issues, Linda Gilroy.

Q214 Linda Gilroy: Thank you, Chairman. We have received quite a bit of evidence from witnesses about different aspects of energy security. It would be quite difficult to encapsulate all of that, but one of the things we have been led to believe is that Russian gas and oil supply is depleting fast. Some of it is being wasted, particularly the gas in flaring. We ought to pay as much attention to gas as to oil, that we should, in looking at the infrastructure issues, which you have both already touched on, include looking at the fact that there may not be enough gas to fill the pipelines. The other issue which, having served on our Climate Change Bill, I find fascinating is that climate change just does not rate on the Richter scale as a bad thing in Russia; in fact, it is seen as probably being a benign thing in both opening up agricultural land in Siberia, and of course in the Arctic opening up the prospect of access to further gas and oil. What are your different perspectives on energy supply as a security issue? Should NATO have a role in enhancing energy security of its members? If so, what should it be?

Sir Andrew Wood: Energy security is one of those wonderful terms that can mean everything to everyone. I agree with everything you have said. There is a serious problem, a very predictable problem, coming up in terms of supply of gas to Europe from Russia. That may be mitigated because demand in Europe will cease to rise. It may be mitigated, rather more theoretically, if Russian energy conservation and so on improves. The Russians use their own gas for domestic purposes at the same level as these four countries together: UK, India, Japan and Italy, although our countries produce 13 times their GDP if you add them all together. There is a huge, huge area for better use of gas inside Russia. They are raising prices and maybe that will begin to have an effect. I think there is an enormous amount which Western companies could do to help them in that regard and I know that Western companies are very willing to do that. But the scale of investment needed and the shifts of attitudes needed to improve Russian use of its own gas, in terms of using less, is huge, and the scale of investment required for the development of the major fields that they have, the development of which is necessary for supply to recover to the sorts of areas of previously projected European demand, is even huger. That is just vast. If I were Prime Minister Putin and I asked the head of Gazprom whether he could do it, of course he would say yes, and after I had been in office for a very long time, I might even begin to believe him, I do not know, but I do not see how the Russians by themselves can raise either the money or the expertise to do this. It seems to me to follow that this is an area which, in a way, like it or not, will become an area for co­‑operation. But the Russians are very much - and understandably from their point of view - focused on the idea that we should guarantee to take x amount at an agreed price for as far as in the future as they can get it. That is not the way that the Western market works or I think is likely to work, so I think there will be a good deal of discussion and a good deal of argy-bargy and fighting in a kind of fog before any real resolution comes about.

Q215 Linda Gilroy: Is it a matter for NATO? Is the extent of the threat to security of gas supplies particularly in Eastern and parts of Western Europe?

Sir Andrew Wood: I know NATO does have programmes and interests in this and it is quite a good way of getting nations to talk to each other in a reasonable coherent fashion within the West. Maybe the EU would be a slightly more natural way to do it. But I think the trouble with the involvement of NATO is that it instantly turns it into a somewhat military issue and gives too much weight to the word "security". Of course we all want to think when we turn the gas tap on it is going to come.

Q216 Linda Gilroy: But it is not just a matter of supply being short, it is also a matter of supply being interrupted.

Sir Andrew Wood: Yes.

Q217 Linda Gilroy: I think we had evidence from one source that suggested that has been fairly extensive, much more than the high profile cases that have hit the press. In that sense, is the Secretary General of NATO right in beginning to give some profile to that as an issue to which NATO needs to turn its attention?

Sir Andrew Wood: I think NATO needs to turn its attention to it but I would not think that NATO ought to be the lead organisation in this. I think the initiative that we have apparently just taken with the Ukraine, to talk to them and to try to improve their pipeline infrastructure, is a very good one. I can see various reasons why it might not be particularly welcome in Moscow, but in principle it is a good one.

Mr Corboy: I tend to agree with most of all that, but Russia needs Western investment and Western technical support for its oil and gas industry. The reluctance on this side is clearly understandable after the treatment of BP and the treatment of Shell. The size of the investments are so great that it would have to be a very different climate that that investment took place in. The priority, I think, of having alternative sources of energy is fundamental. There will be reductions in the demand for energy, presumably for the reasons you are mentioning, but there should be alternative sources. This is why Nabucco is important and that it is why we should, if possible, support all alternative sources: liquid gas development and transport and so forth. There are many, many areas where you can look to other alternatives. On the question of giving NATO a role on energy security, I would caution here that the Russian reaction is likely to change the whole way of looking at energy issues if we put it into the NATO situation. I would submit it is much more the task of the EU. It is where NATO energy security is handled in a different sort of climate. I think it would be unwise to bring in NATO and put this in a NATO framework, frankly. Even apart from the Russian reaction, which would be very negative, I think it would change the nature of that equation.

Sir Andrew Wood: Can I seize the opportunity just to make a point which really I think builds on your question? All the time we find ourselves talking about "Russia wants this" or "Russia wants that", first of all, there are many Russias and many interests in Russia, and, second, I think we always have to draw a distinction between the short-term interests of someone and the longer-term interests of the country as we see them. It is an obvious point but it is easy to forget.

Q218 Linda Gilroy: Mr Corboy, you would, however, agree that in order for the Caspian countries to fully develop their resources, they do need some security from some source, and, therefore, if it is not NATO, it needs to be the EU that guarantees the security of the pipeline to enable them to supply. I think some of those countries have a better perspective on how the energy markets work.

Mr Corboy: You are talking about the pipelines coming through Georgia.

Q219 Linda Gilroy: Yes.

Mr Corboy: Through Turkey and onwards.

Q220 Linda Gilroy: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan all have an interest.

Mr Corboy: I do not think it is a job for NATO, quite frankly.

Q221 Linda Gilroy: But it is a job for somebody.

Mr Corboy: There is not, in my submission, any military threat to these pipelines from Russia. It is a matter of creating an understanding of energy security issues in a way that there is not such a threat.

Q222 Chairman: So the accident that happened to the pipeline in August was coincidence? Accident?

Mr Corboy: The alleged bombing near BTC.

Q223 Chairman: Or whatever it was.

Mr Corboy: I am sceptical about those. There were bombs dropped in many places. I do not know that and I doubt very much that Russia was targeting the BTC pipeline. I think it would seem to suit the Georgian case that it was to be presented as an attack on the pipeline. I am doubtful.

Q224 Richard Younger-Ross: You talk about long term and short term. In the short term there was an economic crisis. Some analysts have argued that the financial crisis will encourage Russia to push for a more moderate co‑operative policy, but this Committee heard from Edward Lucas, who argued in oral evidence that it may lead to a more aggressive Russian foreign policy. What are your views on how the crisis is going to affect Russia's foreign policy?

Sir Andrew Wood: I believe it will certainly have a tactical effect. They would be rash not to see what they can get out of the new US administration, at any rate for the next few months, and then we will see what happens after that. I do not think it is possible to predict much further ahead than that. They also continue to need a good financial relationship with the West and with Western business. I think again it would be rash to switch straight to, as it were, an assertive and aggressive foreign policy. However, to say that because they are in deep economic trouble they become less assertive I think is a step too far. Again including because it is bound to be involved in the whole process I mentioned earlier, military reform, it would suit some people within the Russian hierarchies to argue that the danger from the West remains very high and therefore we should not try this shrinking of the Armed Forces. It would suit other people to argue the opposite. It will become, I think, very unclear like that. What I do think is more likely than not to happen is that the will to buttress the monopolistic structure, the state-related structure of the Russian economy, will probably increase. If the present people in power feel themselves threatened by the changes in their economic fortunes, which they may and they probably to a certain extent do, their reaction is much more likely to be to increase control than to loosen it. Even though, as I think I said earlier, the strictly logical thing for them to do would be to return to the deep necessity to restructure their economy and to look at improvement of the infrastructure and so on. I think they are still in a mood of supposing that things will not last too much longer, the good times will return and prices will go up again, and they can sort of relax again. So I think they are still thinking short term but the longer-term danger is greater control, not less.

Mr Corboy: I would agree with that. I think the financial crisis could make Russia a more difficult partner. You know the argument, I suppose there is sort of an increased danger, that when you have internal financial problems and financial difficulties and a very autocratic state there are voices there which would advocate a more aggressive foreign policy. The danger of that one has to be aware of. It brings me back to the reset button: hopefully the reset button will put some of these dangers out of the way but this remains to be seen. This is why one should have a dialogue, not just on the security issues we have discussed but we should also aim to have an economic dialogue with Russia. I am sure there are ways in which we can help Russian trade and Russian investment and we should openly advocate Russian membership of WTO, for example.

Sir Andrew Wood: Which we do.

Mr Corboy: We do but I think we could do a bit more to facilitate that.

Q225 Richard Younger-Ross: You would say there is an opportunity.

Mr Corboy: No, I just think to show a willingness to help Russia during the financial crisis is important.

Q226 Chairman: You have both talked, I think, with some sympathy about the need for Russian modernisation of its Armed Forces, but in this financial crisis will Russia be able to afford to do it, because they have to find, as I understand it, accommodation for all of the soldiers who leave the Armed Forces - something like 250,000 officers - presumably much of it in Moscow, where they cannot afford the property prices. How are they going to afford that modernisation?

Mr Corboy: I think that would be delayed, in my view.

Sir Andrew Wood: I think they could afford it relatively easily. They do have quite large reserves and, notionally, at least, I am sure that if they were willing to talk about it maybe we would be even willing to help. I recall we had a fairly good programme in my day in Moscow about re-educating and helping to relocate ex-military. If they were willing to pursue it, that would be a practical thing to achieve. However, this is highly conditioned by the memory that this is by no means the first time that the Russians have proclaimed reforms and significant changes in their Armed Forces and, so far, the officer corps in general has been extremely successful in frustrating it. We shall see.

Q227 Richard Younger-Ross: On the issue of their reserve, you said they could afford it quite easily. According to The Economist the oil price slump has caused currency reserves to fall by more than $200 billion in six months to $388 billion. That is nearly a third off in six months.

Sir Andrew Wood: Yes.

Q228 Richard Younger-Ross: But you still think that is not going to give them a problem.

Sir Andrew Wood: If they were really seriously going to shrink their officer corps by two-thirds, that is a quarter of a million houses or something like that, on the assumption that they do not have any at all. It is of that sort of order of magnitude. It is perfectly true that Russia construction costs are absolutely heroic. For example, the cost of one millimetre building the Moscow ring road was approximately the same as the total cost of that very elegant Norman Foster bridge, so there are areas here which it might be difficult to manage but, in principle, I do not see why that should not be possible.

Q229 Mr Crausby: With the price of oil falling so dramatically and the prediction for some that there will be serious public spending cuts, what are the prospects for political instability within Russia? Outside of the costs of military reorganisation, what are the political implications of making hundreds of generals redundant at such an unstable economic time?

Mr Corboy: That is one of the reasons that I said I think they would slow their proposed military expenditure. They would do it for that reason and also because of their financial situation. They do want to keep their reserves up. There are still very substantial reserves, I point out: $380 billion is a substantial reserve which would see Russia through whatever difficulties, certainly up to the end of 2010. But I do not see unrest in Russia getting out of control. Look at what happened in Vladivostok in the two recent incidents. There is sufficient control. The regime has sufficient control. They are not bothered by outside public opinion on these issues as to how they handle unrest. I would think that there is not a great danger of social unrest following these developments.

Sir Andrew Wood: It seems to me that the fear that there might be social unrest is a very real political factor. It seems to me, personally, unlikely that there will be such unrest that it will get out of control - the North Caucusus, perhaps, apart. That is an area of serious unrest and violence. The fact that they are afraid of it is itself a political reality and can cause them quite easily to make mistakes. What they did in Vladivostok was just daft, but, anyway, it provoked riots, and they do not like that. It worries them, not unnaturally. But your question had a second part to it, I am sorry.

Q230 Mr Crausby: Is it the ideal time to get rid of hundreds of generals at a time when you are concerned about political unrest.

Sir Andrew Wood: Sympathy for the military has become progressively more limited. The conduct of the Armed Forces and the treatment given to conscripts is sufficient to cause a major riot in most countries, so I think that, yes, some of those people would have sympathy because they would attract memories of glory and the Soviet Union's past and that sort of thing. It is also true that the military have been quite successful over the years, including in Yeltsin's time and Gorbachev's time, in becoming people who on an individual basis have political weight and can frustrate things, but there is no tradition of the military as a group taking on the state.

Q231 Chairman: What does Russia mean by their proposal for the European security architecture? How should we react?

Sir Andrew Wood: We have reacted in a curious way, with the EU saying we should discuss it. That seems to me a curious reaction because it should have been NATO rather than the EU. At any rate, the EU does not normally talk about NATO in security architecture, so that to me was an oddity.

Q232 Mr Jenkin: You had better get used to it.

Sir Andrew Wood: I think we probably have. But the Russians would have noted that and that is grist to the mill they would like, which is for everything to rest on propositions whose legal force would remain untested. The Russian record of subscribing to and fulfilling the agreements they have signed is not particularly distinguished, so I personally would have no faith at all in replacing NATO with a set of agreements whereby we would all promise not to interfere with each other's internal affairs and so on and so forth. I think that would simply not work. Anyway, our own record suggests that we would not necessarily respect it. The Westphalia model does not really apply so easily. We are bound to talk to them about it. The best way of talking about it is to get them to elaborate their ideas and put more flesh on the bones. We have already, I think, successfully added in human rights, and the other provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Accords would remain of critical importance to us. Any such architecture would be made to imply that they had no particular rights over Ukraine or Belarus or anybody else, so I think we could use it and we should use it as an area in which we should discuss things. Do I think it is going to lead to practical results? I think it is outside the realm of a sensible prediction.

Mr Corboy: I have a slightly different view, I am afraid. I do think we should have a dialogue on the security architecture, but let us be aware what Russia is likely to want. Russia wants to have an equal say, would like to have a veto. It clearly wants to be an interlocutor, certainly on security and on energy, for those countries that it sees as near abroad. I think one of the reasons behind the proposal for a new European security architecture is that they want to reduce the humanitarian dimension, as Sir Andrew was saying. They want less of OSCE, they want less human rights monitoring of elections, promoting democracy and all that. We do not really know what they want. I think we must see what would come of it. "Helsinki plus" I think was the expression they used. I think some other people said "Helsinki zero minus five" would be a more correct description. I still think, in spite of all these problems that will come down the road, and we can see them coming, we should open a dialogue on the European security architecture. I agree it should be perhaps more in the NATO sphere than the EU sphere, but, then again, I am hoping that EU and NATO are going to work much more closely as a team on all these issues.

Q233 Chairman: When you say "We do not really know what they want" do you think they know what they want? Or were they just chucking a stone in the pond to see what came out?

Mr Corboy: I do not know that they have fully put together what they are going to look for in this. I think they have just pitched it out there, as you say, as a stone. There probably is a lot of reasons why we need to look at the security architecture again. There are lots of things that happened, not least Kosovo and other things, where we need perhaps a bit of time.

Q234 Linda Gilroy: Is the OSCE, where the debate appears to be going to at least start, in fact the right place to start it?

Mr Corboy: "What other forum is there?" is the question. It is the most likely forum.

Q235 Linda Gilroy: Does that allow them to engage in a constructive way?

Sir Andrew Wood: No.

Mr Corboy: No, it does not. Frankly, Russia has made a lot of problems for the OSCE, as you know. I am not 100 per cent in saying it is the ideal, but it is the only organisation that is sitting there at the moment which has all the ingredients so that you could have such a conference about it. But maybe some other forum, some other method should be found rather than going into the OSCE.

Sir Andrew Wood: It seems to me that while the Russians do not have the detail in the proposals particularly worked out, they do have a pretty clear agenda. They think that an organisation where security rests on three legs: the United State, the EU and Russia, is the right model. That clearly excludes a number of countries. It is paying an undeserved, elaborate complement to the EU which they do not really mean to the EU. They look on this as a US-Russia issue and they would very much like to get back, including for psychological reasons, to what they see as the good old days of the Soviet-United States diarchy. I do not think that is going to be a very practical proposal, and I think in discussing Russian ideas about security, which we should always discuss and listen to and be prepared to talk about, we should not hasten to accept the implication that the present arrangement is ineffective.

Q236 Mr Jenkin: Whatever dialogue we are having it is still going to be in the context of what next happens in Georgia, which is the requirement to renew the UN mandate, the requirement to sustain the OSCE mandate, which is the only organisation that patrols on both sides of the new line of control. What do you we expect Russia to do in the UN on Georgia? If they chose to veto, for example, a UN resolution that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Georgia and renewed the UN mandate, how should we respond to that?

Mr Corboy: The mandate has recently been renewed. Perhaps that does not sound very helpful but what is going to happen -----

Q237 Mr Jenkin: It comes up again in June, does it not?

Mr Corboy: To the end of June, that is correct. It is not in Russia's interests to make further difficulties with regard to either the UN(?) or OSCE mandate in my opinion. They have achieved most of what they wanted to achieve in the war. As I have said, my understanding is that they are quite happy to have come this far: they are there and they are consolidating what they have achieved. The worry I have is for the stability of Georgia itself. I have serious concerns about the events which will happen on 9 April next, where there would appear to be a build-up of plans to have major unrest, which both sides, the opposition and the government, are not being terribly reasonable about. The opposition are not being reasonable, in that they are claiming something that is not sensible or achievable. They want to have the President go. That is not an achievable objective in the immediate future, in my view, and the great danger is the street unrest which would follow. Hopefully you will not have the same turn of events as happened in November 2007, but continued instability in Georgia could be a trigger for other developments to happen and other people to restore stability. It takes very little to create an incident on that border. All you need is the shooting of a couple of Russian soldiers. That provides the pretext, particularly, then, if there is unrest south. I think it is a worrying, unstable situation which we would have to monitor carefully between now and what happens in mid April. But the signs are that there is a great deal of stress and a great deal of concern. With the rhetoric of conspiracies being disclosed of Russian money being given to the opposition to stir up difficulties, and certain arrests in the last two days of very minor people in the opposition party, it does not augur well for getting through the next two months with a stable internal situation in Georgia. I think that is the biggest danger we face.

Sir Andrew Wood: That must be right, but I think a great deal depends, looking at Russia, how their polity evolves. They have, if they wish, to be brutal about it, a wonderful opportunity in Georgia just to seize the lot or find an excuse to do so. And it would not be difficult, I suppose. At the same time, however, that would just add to the difficulties they already have in North Caucusus which are exacerbated by what they did in August of last year.

Mr Corboy: I agree with that very much.

Sir Andrew Wood: I think it is a very unstable and worrying situation, yes.

Q238 Linda Gilroy: That would surely make it very difficult to discuss a new security architecture on any sensible basis.

Sir Andrew Wood: Certainly if you add "on any sensible basis" yes.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed, both of you, for another fascinating session. Our next session on Russia will be our final one. We are most grateful to you.