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Russia 20
Memorandum submitted by Irina Isakova
RESUMED NATO- Russia Council.
Despite mutual complains about the ineffectiveness of the NATO-Russia Council (it was established for consultations between individual member states and Russia in the Rome Declaration, 2002), both Moscow and NATO member states confirmed their interest in resuming work on issues of mutual concern under this format. However, the NRC failed as a 'red line' channel of communication in a period of crisis in August 2008. A preliminary date for a reopened full-scale formal meeting of the NATO-Russia Council is set for 29 April 2009.
At the same time the introduction of a special unit dealing with Russia within NATO in addition to the changes in the NATO decision making process and de facto creation of a new multi-tier alliance could be seen by Moscow as a sign of departure from the basic principles of the Founding act (1997). The assumption that Moscow is put in a niche to deal with the ' consolidated' NATO position with no flexibility to address the issues of concern will damage the position of those in Moscow who support contacts with NATO and the NRC format.
Points of tension: 1. Enlargement. Despite the fact that both Ukraine and Georgia failed to receive MAP for NATO membership at the last summit, the alliance confirmed 'the open door principle' and its Bucharest 2008 decision to welcome both countries in due course. The tensions regarding further NATO enlargement will continue. A compromise reached on modification of the accession process meant abandoning MAP as logo and shifting the focus of pre -membership assisstance to existing institutions, like NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission. Following a decision by the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2008, the main focus of the pre- NATO assistance programme is to be placed under a new instrument (Annual National Program), which is expected to supersede the Annual Target Plans. This approach creates possibilities for the countries in question to sort of 'slide' into the security arrangements with the multi-tier NATO. · Moscow will continue to oppose the enlargement. There is a risk that the so called 'blurred membership' in NATO could create additional tentions in relations with Russia by bringing the alliance towards potential conflict with Moscow bypassing the consensus decision.
2. Missile Defence. In September 2008 President Medvedev issued an order to the RF Missile Defence to be able to prevent nuclear and terrorist attacks on the RF soil by 2020. The creation of the adequate Missile Defence is marked as one of the counter strategy priorities, including deployment of the operational tactical missile Iskander in the Kaliningrad region as a response to the US/ NATO MD deployments in Czech Republic and Poland. Though the renewed START negotiations provide time space for sorting some of the concerns over MD, it is obvious that overall Moscow rejection of the MD plans is permanent. In addition since 2001/02 there is an assumption shared by some Russian specialists that some elements of supporting infrastructure of the Missile Defence system might be considered for future deployment in the Baltic region and might automatically require an increase in the alliance capabilities to defend it. Thus, prolonging the time of the accession to the CFE by non-CFE states was seen useful to NATO members from Moscow's point of view until all of the elements of the NATO Missile Defence architecture were considered to be in place. Any special guaranties (under Art. 5) given to the new member states, are to be automatically judged by their link to the MD deployment plans. 3. Energy Security. A possibility of energy security to become one of the core NATO missions as the result of the alliance transformation plans creates anxiety between Russia and NATO. In view of different interpretations of the energy security needs to be covered by the NATO missions, it is becoming essential to clarify the functions, means and objects for the new tasks. Making energy security as one of the core NATO missions is counterproductive, as it allows looking at the energy issues as a zero-sum game. Providing military guarantees by the alliance for the security of the energy infrustructure and energy corridor/ pipelines outside the territories of NATO member states create additional challenges to the security of the alliance and/ or undermines its core functions. Possible agenda for the resumed NRC.
1. Afghanistan. Afghanistan is one of the main areas of common interest. At the Bucharest Summit (2008) NATO and Russia agreed on the conditions for transit through the Russian territory (air space and rail) of non-lethal cargo for the NATO-led force ISAF. The details for the lethal cargo via Russian rail are still to be negotiated. However, till the announcement of the closure of the Manas air base (Kyrgyzstan) for the operation support of the ISAF, ISAF did not use the possibility of the transit. · Moscow interest in co-operation with NATO on Afghanistan is genuine. It is based on the shared need to counter the drug trafficking from Afghanistan and to deal with the threat of Taliban/ Islamic insurgency from Afghanistan to Central Asia and the Russian mainland.
According to the Russian FSS (FSB), the main short term threats to national security of Russia and Central Asia are coming from Afghanistan and Afghanistan/ Pakistan bordering areas, where the Taliban forces and terrorist organisations, managed to regroup and were planning direct military actions in the CA region. This information was revealed at the SCO conference on regional security on 15 April 2009.[1] The proliferation of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia increased dramatically since the start of NATO operation in the region. Moscow is keen to synchronize its counter drug activities with the ISAF. It urges ISAF to take action against the producers of opium, while it is targeting the distribution chain. However, there is no agreement in this area since even the NATO member states have different policy approaches to the problem on the ground. Moscow is interested in the success of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as long as it is guided by the UN mandate. But it is not prepared to accept the permanent military US/NATO presence in Central Asia. However, there is no evidence to believe that the Russian government could violate agreements on the supply route to ISAF via its territory. However, there are additional conditions for the military cargo transit via the Russian territory. Moscow insists on special arrangements to be made between NATO and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Russia-led regional security grouping. · Moscow has a long-term interest in opening possibilities for cross-institutional co-operation on Afghanistan, setting a framework for NATO / CSTO security co-operation in the region, or NATO/SCO information exchange channel. Till recently NATO resisted any engagement with the regional groupings over Afghanistan. In February 2009 the CSTO ministerial session took a decision to create a Rapid Response Force (all member states, but Uzbekistan, contribute personnel and technical capabilities to the units). The CSTO and Russia in particular are engaged in training police officers for Afghanistan and contributing to the security sector reform, in counter drug trafficking operations, like CSTO/Iran operation 'Channel'. Russia became more proactive in negotiations with the Karzai government in recent months. In addition, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, where Pakistan, Iran have observer status, has a functioning contact group on Afghanistan. And Moscow is promoting co-operation between NATO/SCO as well. 2. Military-to-military contacts. There were several contact groups within the NRC framework that proved to be mutually beneficial, like the one on theatre missile defence, or peacekeeping, etc. Though after August 2008 events some of them are more difficult to reopen than other, the need to re-establish a pattern of confidence building between NATO and Russia is essential. Joint actions between NATO and Russian units in peacekeeping missions or emergency relief operations are possible to consider for the future deployments. Such options were debated for at least a decade[2]. There is a positive example of practical implementation, as a special double-headed C2 arrangement for the NATO-led Stabilisation Force in Bosnia. However, in the present political environment and due to the interoperability challenges any possibility for proper CJTFs is available primarily in the maritime environment (for instance, in anti- piracy operations, in non-proliferation missions, such as SPI initiatives).
The re-established CBMs in the naval sphere could be sensitive to disruption if accompanied by the NATO/ US pressures to modify the existing maritime legislation, especially applied to the regions which are seen as an intense areas of competition, like the Black Sea and Caspian region. For instance, attempts to modify the Montreux Convention only reinforce Russian concerns and threat perceptions over NATO intentions in the region, while the 'open door principle' for NATO membership is applied to Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, etc. 4. The Arctic.The Arctic region is of high strategic importance for NATO and Russia. Though in principle co-operation between NATO and Russia in the Arctic is possible, in short and medium terms it is rather unlikely that the NRC would carry the main burden of co-operation in the area. It is mainly going to be shared by other international organisations, where the NRC might have only some piece of action.
1. The high Arctic territories, seen as a key to significant untapped natural resources, such as natural gas, oil, methane hydrates, minerals and living marine species, have increasingly been at the centre of mounting disputes between the United States, Canada, Norway, Russia, and Denmark in recent years as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice. In addition the broad and fundamental security interests in the Arctic region include such matters as missile defence and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight. In addition it has been the main training area for the Airforce, Navies and their submarine fleets.
Last year the NATO member states and Russia intensified military training and exercises in the Arctic. It reflected the increasing tensions on political issues, as well as a need to use the traditional areas for combat training. The level of training does not exceed the normal operational necessities. Nevertheless, it creates additional tensions between NATO member states and Russia. The most recent exchange of grievances between NATO and Russia were regarding NATO military exercises in the Norwegian territorial waters and the US led sub training exercise ICEX-2009 in late March / April 2009, which Moscow interpreted as a deliberate demonstration of force projection capabilities. Presently Russia has the most equipped fleet of icebreaking vessels, needed for the sustained maritime activity in the Arctic. However, it was confirmed that ice breaking vessels were going to be build for and purchased by the US, Canadian, Chinese, German and Swedish navies.[3]
2. The Arctic remains an important geopolitical region for Russia. Moscow is ready for a direct dialogue within the framework of international organizations to debate issues related to the region, but not with NATO. A Russian proposal on creating security structures in the Arctic region is to be submitted for the discussion at a ministerial meeting of the Arctic Council on 29 April 2009. The Arctic Council as the intergovernmental forum, which comprises Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Canada, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States, was established in 1996 to protect the unique nature of the Arctic region. The US firmly objects to turning this international forum into a formal institution with a mandate in security sphere.
3. Moscow's rejection to put the Arctic on the NATO exclusive agenda is based on the following arguments:
· Presently there are unsolved legal issues related to the territorial shelf among the Arctic Circle states. Under international law, the Arctic Circle countries, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia, each currently have a 322-km (200-mile) economic zone in the Arctic Ocean. However, there are unresolved territorial disputes. Moscow considered it unwise prior to legal settlement of the claims to focus the debates on the future cooperation in the region within the framework of the military alliance, where Russia is not a member.
· The United States and Canada have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea. The United States and Russia are abiding the terms of the maritime boundary treaty concluded in 1990, but it was not put into force, as the RF did not ratify it. Other territorial claims or territorial sensitivities were expressed by Denmark, Sweden, the UK.
· In 2001 for the first time Russia turned to the UN for clarifications of its arctic borderline. Moscow has pledged to submit documentary evidence to the UN on the external boundaries of Russia's territorial shelf by the end of 2009 and complete the legalisation of its claims by 2015. Russia has undertaken two Arctic expeditions - to the Mendeleyev underwater chain in 2005 and to the Lomonosov ridge in the summer of 2007 - to support its claims to the region, which is believed to be rich in oil and gas. About 20% of Russia's GDP and 22% of Russian exports are produced in the area. On the September 2008 session of the RF National Security Council the Arctic shelf was named as a guarantee of Russia's energy security and significant resource base for Russia in the XXI century. In September 2008 the same meeting of the National Security Council President Dmitry Medvedev urged to define the extent of the Russian continental shelf in the Arctic and called for a new Arctic frontier law as soon as possible.
· In April 2009 Russian Parliament introduced amendments to the internal law on the rights of indigenous communities. The amendments minimize the possibility of influence of the Arctic indigenous communities on decisions regarding the territories of their traditional settlements. The decision was aimed to neutralize an international, the US and Estonia led campaign to use the international legal framework for promoting internal opposition to Moscow's plans to develop its Arctic shelf.
4. The North Navigation Route, that links Western/ Northern Europe to the Far East is partly controlled by the RF as it lies in its territorial waters.
· The changing ecological situation in the Arctic, in Moscow's opinion, for the first time raises the issues of potential risks of foreign invasion, flows of illegal migration, etc. on the northern territory of Russia.
5. Moscow and Washington both defined its priorities in the Arctic by adopting national strategies for the region: · In March 2009 the Russian Security Council posted on its website a document, "The fundamentals of Russian state policy in the Arctic up to 2020 and beyond," which outlined the country's strategy in the region, including the deployment of military, border and coastal guard units "to guarantee Russia's military security in diverse military and political circumstances." [4] By 2020 Russia is to create a group of forces to protect its political and economic interests in the Arctic, but does not plan to militarize the region. The prime focus is on the effective system of coastal security, the development of Arctic border infrastructure, and the presence of military units of an adequate strength," an official said. The Arctic Group of Forces will be part of the Russian Federal Security Service. Another goal of the new strategy is to "optimize the system of the comprehensive monitoring of the situation in the Arctic," including border control at checkpoints in Russia's arctic regions, coastal waters and airspace. The vessels from the North and Pacific fleets will assist the in guarding the national borders. The document also prioritizes the delineation of the Arctic shelf "with respect to Russia's national interests." The strategy envisions increased co-operation with neighboring countries in the fight against terrorism, drug-trafficking, illegal immigration and environmental protection.
· On 9 January 2009 President Bush signed a similar strategy document. The National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25 establish the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic region.[5]
Russian foreign policy goal: A new national security strategy for the period 2008 to 2020 was presented at the Security Council in March 2009. The document final presentation was postponed for a month leaving time for amendments to be introduced as reflections on the developments with the West / NATO in particular. The new strategy would embrace the foreign policy concept signed into force by Medvedev last July and also a rather ambitious development plan for Russia upto 2020. Medvedev's strategy for international and domestic developments is based on principles of '4I: institutions, investments, infrustructure and innovation'. All elements of Medvedev's strategy presuppose extensive involvement with international community. Instead of dropping a curtain on 17 years of attempts to integrate Russia into the western institutions, the leitmotif now should be the intensified engagement.
17 April 2009 [1] http://www.ria.novosti.ru, 15 April 2009 [2] Isakova Irina, NATO plus' CJTFs for Eurasia: is co-operation possible?', in Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1999, London: Brassey's, 1999, pp. 93-109.
[3] http://navy.ru/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=19741 [4] Russia to deploy special Arctic force by 2020 - Security Council, RIA Novosti, Moscow, 27 March 2009. [5] http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm |