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Russia 06 Memorandum from the Government of Georgia
The Government of Georgia is grateful for this opportunity to present its views to the Select Committee on Defence. The Government of Georgia is also profoundly grateful for the United Kingdom's support for Georgia after the Russian invasion of our country on August 7, 2008. At the outset, we offer the Committee these key points, which are elaborated in our submission: · Russia has been fostering conflict in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region since the fall of the Soviet Union, aiming to destabilize and subjugate Georgia-and to simultaneously send a message to countries throughout the post-Soviet space. · The reason Moscow gave for its invasion of Georgia-to stop a genocide-was debunked by all credible international observers. When its forces occupied positions throughout Georgia and bombed civilian infrastructure, it became clear that Russia's goal was largely unrelated to South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. It sought to assert itself in its neighborhood; thwart NATO expansion; exert ever-greater control over Europe's energy supplies; and punish a flourishing democracy on its borders. Its leaders announced that they sought the replacement of the democratically elected Government of Georgia. · Russia should not have a veto over whether Georgia, or any other sovereign nation, is able to join NATO or any other international organization; · Coherent policy of towards Russia is very important; otherwise, using illegal and violent means, Russia will be able to capitalize on differences of opinion to exert its influence in the region, with serious consequences for global security; · Georgia seeks a constructive relationship with Russia, but it cannot tolerate occupation and annexation of its sovereign territories; there must be respect for the rule of law. · There can be little doubt that one way or another, sooner rather than later, the Russian Federation would have manufactured a pretext for its invasion-regardless of the actions of the Government of Georgia. Georgia now feels it is our responsibility, together with the international community, to recover from the invasion, rebuild the country, and reassert the common values that tie together the Euro-Atlantic community. This paper is organized as follows: 1. Background: The Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region 2. The Russian Escalation 2004-2008: Military & Political Escalation Before the Invasion of Georgia 3. The August 2008 War 4. The Aftermath of the Russian Invasion 5. Implications for the UK, NATO & Georgia
Background: The Conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region 1. Georgia is an ancient country with a rich and distinct culture. It has been an independent state at the crossroads of Europe for nearly three millennia. The Georgian language is one of the oldest spoken languages, with a unique alphabet which is 23 centuries old. Georgia was known to the ancient Greeks as the country of the Golden Fleece and formerly was known as the Kingdom of Colchis for western Georgia, and Iberia for the east. Georgia has been an integral part of the Hellenic and Roman worlds. Later, as one of the oldest Christian civilizations, it served as a European outpost in the east. 2. As Georgia regained its independence in the early 1990s, Moscow deliberately fostered conflict in the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region to destabilize Georgia. 3. In Abkhazia, the Russian Federation has been using Abkhaz separatists as proxy fighters to carry out attacks against Georgian citizens and interests. Russia provided manpower, military equipment, money, and ideological support.
4. During the civil war of 1992-93, Russia's actions in Abkhazia led to the ethnic cleansing of Georgians, Jews, Greeks, Estonians, and others from Abkhazia. In total, over 400,000 residents of Abkhazia were forced to flee, fundamentally altering the demographics of the region and leaving it in control of the minority Abkhaz; as of today, almost none these IDPs have been allowed to return. In addition, over 12,000 people were killed; more than 20.000 homes burned and looted; schools, nursery schools, cultural centres, churches, architectural and historic monuments razed. Property valued in the tens of billions of dollars was destroyed. 5. Following this first conflict, Russia undertook the de facto annexation of Abkhazia, integrating it into the Russian Federation through military, political, economic, financial, trade, legal, administrative, and other means. 6. In South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, meanwhile, Russia stoked ethnic clashes beginning in the early 1990s. This resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the regional capital of Tskhinvali and other villages in the region. Ossetian militias, armed by Moscow, killed hundreds of ethnic Georgians, expelled over 12,000 from their homes, and destroyed Georgian villages. The weak Georgian Government of the time was forced to sign the Dagomis Accord that gave Russian troops the status of "peacekeepers." Instead of peace facilitation, however, during the following 16 years Russia actively supported separatist groups and openly assigned Russian officials to govern the de facto separatist regimes and military. 7. In the subsequent decade, and leading up to its August 2008 invasion, Russia systematically sought to exert control over these Georgian territories; by keeping them in limbo, outside the control of the Georgian government, Moscow was able to subvert Georgian sovereignty by arming and supporting separatists and thus sending a message to the entire post-Soviet region-that Russia would not back down from its sphere of influence.
The Russian Escalation 2004-2008: Military & Political Escalation Before the Invasion of Georgia
8. Close observers are unanimous in their assessment that the Russian Federation had been preparing its invasion of Georgia for years. A few significant milestones in this plan include: the long-term ethnic cleansing of Georgians from the conflict zone to homogenize the populations; an illegal campaign of passportization in the conflict zones since July 2002 to manufacture "Russian citizens" to protect; the abrogation of international agreements regarding economic and arms sanctions in the separatist territories; the extension of legal links to South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia in April 2008; an intense anti-Georgia propaganda campaign; and a rapidly escalating illegal military buildup in the conflict zones (from spring 2008 onwards). 9. In the years following the election of a legitimate democratic government in Georgia in 2004, Russia repeatedly rejected Georgian peace proposals. Beginning in 2004, the Georgian Government proposed many times to launch a genuine peace process for South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia. Years of stalemate had left all ethnic populations in both conflict zones impoverished and without any effective protection of basic rights; Georgians in particular were targeted and persecuted on ethnic grounds. The Russian Federation and separatist leaders rejected Georgia's peace initiatives-which included broad autonomy, guaranteed language/cultural rights, economic rehabilitation projects, and so forth-each and every time they were proposed-even when the international community backed the initiatives. 10. As a result, South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia became hubs for acute criminal activity, including kidnapping, extortion, counterfeiting, smuggling of arms and drugs. At least one case of nuclear smuggling was confirmed. 11. Simultaneously, Russia gained a stranglehold over the separatist governments in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia. As of 2005, Russian military and civilian officials seconded from Moscow effectively have been governing South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia. 12. In spring 2006, Russian forces illegally built a forward military base in the strategically located town of Java (north of Tskhinvali). This base would play a central role in the August 2008 war. 13. In November 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili that he would impose "the Cyprus model" on Abkhazia. 14. On March 11, 2007, Mi-24 helicopters that according to the UN investigation could only have come from Russia attacked Upper Abkhazia in the middle of the night. On August 6, 2007, as verified by an independent international investigation, a Russian fighter aircraft dropped a Kh-58 anti-radiation bomb just short of a newly upgraded radar facility. It landed unexploded in a farm field. Russia denied responsibility in both instances, claiming that Georgia had attacked itself with military capabilities it does not possess. Nonetheless, after both attacks, Russian Special Envoy for CIS Countries Valery Kenyaikin made clear that Georgia deserved these "punishments." 15. Then, in spring 2008-following the recognition of Kosovo and in advance of NATO April Summit, at which the extension of a Membership Action Plan to Georgia would be considered-Moscow began an acute escalation of the confrontation with Georgia. Specifically, in March, Moscow illegally lifted an arms and economic embargo that had been imposed by the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1996 on Abkhazia. 16. In April, Moscow sharply escalated tensions by decreeing the establishment of legal links between Russia and the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region; this was a form of de facto annexation of Georgian territory and drew sharp rebukes from the entire international community-including the EU, NATO, the US, the OSCE, and others, who called for the immediate reversal of this Russian decision. 17. On April 20, a Russian fighter jet downed an unarmed Georgian drone over Georgian airspace, an act of aggression confirmed by formal UNOMIG and OSCE investigative reports. 18. In the following weeks, Russia continued to unilaterally increase its troop strength in Abkhazia, without fulfilling its legal obligation to seek the consent of Georgia; among other moves, it deployed paratrooper units, which were incompatible with peacekeeping. 19. Then in direct contravention of all peacekeeping norms and agreements, Russia introduced additional offensive military troops and heavy weaponry in Abkhazia, actions verified by UNOMIG. Russian Railroad Troops undertook a "humanitarian effort" to repair the rail line between Sukhumi and Ochamchire, a naval base Russia would use in its invasion of Georgia two months later. 20. In July, as the efforts by Georgia and the international community to advance peace proposals for Abkhazia gathered pace, the focus of Russian provocations suddenly shifted to South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. Separatists attempted to assassinate the S. Ossetian unionist leader, Dimitry Sanakoyev; approximately a dozen armed provocations followed in subsequent weeks. 21. Russia conducted large-scale military exercises dubbed "Caucasus 2008" (July 15-August 2) in the immediate vicinity of Georgia's northern border. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the exercises, involving over 8,000 troops and 700 pieces of military hardware, were aimed at preparing for "special peace enforcement operations" in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region. During the exercise, anti-Georgian leaflets were distributed entitled "Know Your Enemy". 22. Russian troops participating in this military exercise did not re-deploy at its conclusion. 23. Meanwhile, Moscow and its proxy separatist forces repeatedly rejected a German-mediated peace initiative and refused to attend peace talks scheduled in Berlin. Shortly before the war the OSCE Chairman in Office also proposed talks in Helsinki between South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region separatists and the Georgian Government; the separatists rejected the proposal.
The August 2008 War 24. Early in the morning of 7 August, after days of escalating provocations by separatist militias in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, Russia sent troops across the internationally recognized borders of Georgia. Russia was enacting a premeditated, meticulously prepared plan to change by force the borders of a European democracy and overthrow its elected government. Russian President Medvedev said as much shortly after the war began: "Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has privileged interests." 25. The Russian invasion was quick and fierce. Russia breached four points on Georgia's border within 24 hours; at their peak, Russian troops on Georgian soil numbered 40,000, accompanied by hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles. Russian jets made scores of bombing raids daily throughout 30 cities and villages of Georgia, while Russia's Black Sea fleet blockaded Georgia's coast and occupied its strategic port of Poti. The latest official casualty figures show 413 Georgians died during the war, including 228 civilians. 26. Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control-and after confirmation that an armored Russian land force had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel. 27. Russia's invasion and occupation was characterized by the following: 28. Relentless attacks on civilian sites and infrastructure (railway bridges, civilian airports, port terminals etc). The goal of these Russian bombings appears to have been to destroy the Georgian economy and thus destabilize the democratic government. 29. A brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing that forced a new wave of over 140,000 ethnic Georgians to flee their homes in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia, as well in villages outside the conflict zone. 30. The occupation of strategic areas outside the conflict zones-including the port of Poti and the main East-West highway-and the establishment of a 20-kilometer wide "security zone" around the conflict zones. 31. An intense international propaganda campaign to blame Georgia for starting the war; among other assertions, Russian leaders claimed that 2,100 South Ossetians had been killed in a "genocide" by Georgian forces before Russia invaded. On September 11, Human Rights Watch said fewer than 100 had been killed in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, including military; in December, the head of the Russian Prosecutor-General's investigative committee, Alexander Bastyrkin, declared that the number of South Ossetians killed throughout the entire war was 162. 32. An unprecedented cyberwarfare campaign that seriously degraded the ability of the Government of Georgia to communicate, and debilitated for long periods both public and private-sector websites in Georgia (initial cyber attacks started even before August 8, also were made on Georgian websites outside the country). 33. Ruinous "ecocide" attacks that aimed to destroy Georgia's environment and its natural resources. Russian jets repeatedly launched firebombs into Georgian forests, while also instigating oil spills off the Georgian coast. The Aftermath of the Russian Invasion 34. On August 12, the Russian Federation signed a ceasefire and withdrawal agreement negotiated by the French President. Since then, Russia has serially flouted the agreement by refusing to withdraw to pre-conflict positions within Georgia, failing to facilitate the return of IDPs, by being part of campaign of ethnic cleansing of ethnically Georgian residents, as well as barring access of the European Union Monitoring Mission to the occupied territories. 35. Most egregiously, on August 26, Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region as independent countries, underscoring that its invasion of Georgia was part of a broader, premeditated plan to redraw the map of Europe. 36. In areas within its control, meanwhile, Russia is acting with impunity, continuing its campaign of ethnic cleansing and preventing international diplomats and humanitarian organizations from accessing the conflict or "security" zones. 37. On February 5, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's special envoy for Georgia, Goran Lennmarker, declared: "(In South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region), there is now a situation where you have had de facto ethnic cleansing, where refugees have their homes and wish to go back." 38. Russia is transforming South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia into Russian garrisons, also in violation of the ceasefire agreement. There are approximately 4,000 Russian troops in each of Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, with tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, rockets, and air defense batteries. 39. Furthermore, construction has apparently been completed at two Russian military bases in South Ossetia/Tskhinvali Region, including the Ugardanta base begun in 2006. In Abkhazia, Moscow has landed fighter and transport aircraft at the Bombora former Soviet military airfield near Gudauta, which Russia agreed to quit under the 1999 Istanbul Agreements. Construction at Bombora is underway. Russia also has announced plans to refurbish the former Soviet naval base at Ochamchire, and it is building a new base at Okhurei, at a strategic point between Ochamchire and Gali. 40. Moscow is using its invasion, prepared over years, to rebuild its empire, seize greater control of Europe's energy supplies and punish those who believed democracy could flourish on its borders. Europe has reason to worry. Implications for the UK, NATO & Georgia 41. Today, Georgia is a country under Russian occupation. More than 8,000 Russian soldiers remain illegally deployed on Georgian soil. We wish to state that a ceasefire does not constitute a legalization of occupation; it merely separates forces. The terms of the ceasefire agreed with the intervention of the European Union continue to be repeatedly violated. Russian forces have not withdrawn to pre-conflict positions; internally displaced persons are not being allowed to return to their homes; 14 Georgian policemen have been killed since the ceasefire entered into force; and European Union monitors do not have access to the occupied areas. 42. Georgia will not be diverted from its commitment to building a democratic, rule-of-law based, pluralistic society. The events of August were designed to derail Georgia's political choice and send a message to the neighborhood and wider European audiences that Russia has re-established a sphere of privileged interest. Georgia rejects this claim and will continue to consolidate a democratic, market-oriented society shaped by European values. 43. Georgia is a strategic link to alternative energy supplies and their transit westward; a potential overland supply route to Afghanistan; and an emerging economic and telecommunication bridge to eastern markets. It is the firm conviction of the Georgian Government to advance cooperation and partnership in all these areas, together with members of the western alliance-notwithstanding past and current attempts by the Russian Federation to disrupt these expanding networks. 44. The Black Sea is bordered by two EU member states and one candidate country. It is also bordered by three NATO member states. The invasion and militarisation of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation alters the strategic balance in the Black Sea. 45. Russian justifications for the invasion of Georgia are Orwellian. The Russian Federation has abused and distorted the principle of "right to protect" by illegally distributing passports en masse to populations just across its border; it has used violence to subvert the principle of territorial integrity; it has armed, trained, and equipped violent separatists; and it has lent material assistance to local paramilitaries who have committed gross human rights abuses, including ethnic cleansing. 46. Georgia is not and has never been a threat to any of its neighbors. As such Georgia reserves the right to exercise its choice with regard to its alliances and relations with other nations. Georgia's policy is to advance its integration into trans-Atlantic institutions and therefore rejects any claim that it belongs to anyone's sphere of influence.
11 February 2009 |