Memorandum submitted by the South East Wales Transport Alliance (CBPS 40)

On behalf of the South Wales Transport Alliance (Sewta) Rail Group, the following comments relating to rail services as they affect South Wales are offered as evidence. The views of the South West Wales Transport Consortium (SWWITCH) have been included where appropriate.

Even before the creation of the All Wales Franchise there have been concerns over the changes to rail services being introduced. Usually, and because the legislation does not provide for it, the changes were introduced without consultation with local authorities or regional groupings - in other words, the views of future stakeholders or their objections were seemingly ignored.

As a result of the changes that have affected cross-border rail services, direct links were lost between West Wales, Bristol and the south west of England, Cornwall and more importantly, direct access to Eurostar services, then still using London, Waterloo Station. In the latter case, this service was curtailed initially, at Bristol and run in two sections, then later replaced by the new West Wales to Manchester service to Cardiff, a Cardiff to Bristol service and then from Bristol to London - hardly passenger friendly but, it happened, despite complaints from various authorities and councils along the route.

This is by no means the only consequence of the new railway map of Wales. It is well known that rail passengers - and especially the elderly or single female travellers do not like changing trains, yet everything that has happened mitigates against through services from Wales into the English regions. We have long commented and warned of the growing tendency for Cardiff to be regarded as "Wales", with destinations to the west being ignored in terms of direct services. Having said that, many cross-border train companies also tend to think that Wales begins at Newport, with the stations at Chepstow, Caldicot and Severn Tunnel Junction being forgotten as destinations in their own right for people travelling to or from England.

While it is appreciated that one should not look back but forward, it is worth mentioning that until a few years ago there were direct services from Swansea, and therefore, Bridgend, Cardiff and Newport, to York, Newcastle, Birmingham and Manchester, as well as to Penzance, Paignton, Portsmouth and Westbury. There were also connections at Newport on to the Manchester to Paignton service. Had Operation Princess happened, then there would have been direct services to Glasgow and Edinburgh both from Cardiff and Swansea.

It is obvious that changes to the railway map of services have been the result of grouping services for new franchises. Whilst this obviously has operational advantages, like much else that has affected the railway industry - and to some extent, still does - it reinforces the impression that everything is done for operational or resource reasons rather than passenger benefits.

The whole concept appears to be to create a network of interchanges, whereby the lengths of journey times are and the number of changes required to make a specific journey is inevitably increased. While appearing to offer choice it also, restricts choice due to the way services have been grouped. As noted above, passengers do not like changing trains.

Included in the Sewta (and SWWITCH) responses to the Cross Country, Great Western and All Wales franchises was an appeal to increase the number of trains that travelled west, beyond Cardiff. Apart from the obvious benefits from obtaining additional services more or less at marginal cost, this would provide greater passenger choice and reduce significantly, the need to change. It is recognised that there would be rolling stock issues resulting from this proposal but if included as part of the franchise proposal as was suggested in the responses, they would not have been as significant as trying to introduce them now.

Taking passengers to nodal points, where it is possible to change to other services highlights another problem facing Welsh travellers. When leaving Wales, there is virtually, a clock-face timetable along the South Wales Main Line, with trains for London running every hour from Swansea and every half-hour from Cardiff and Newport, interspersed with the hourly Manchester service and the Maesteg to Cheltenham service. However, once these services reach a node then the principle starts to fall apart. Co-ordination of services is not a priority and does not appear to be a requirement of the different franchises which seem to have been let without regard for existing passenger flows or services - but are nevertheless, neatly grouped in somewhat illogical ways, based on the use of minimum resources rather than journey patterns.

For example, the direct service to Birmingham from Cardiff via Chepstow, which served intermediate stations such as Bromsgrove has been replaced by the Manchester service and now requires a change of trains at Hereford. Unfortunately, at Hereford, the trains miss each other by a matter of minutes and the 50 minutes or so, which is spent sitting at Hereford, waiting for the next train to Birmingham to arrive, needlessly extends journey times.

Allied to the connectional problems are those of inadequate train length. It is not appropriate for longer distance services to be composed of a two-car set and there are increasing examples of overcrowding, a situation made worse by passengers brought to nodes, joining already overcrowded services. This is especially true on services between Cardiff and the south of England which frequently leave Cardiff with reservations on more than half the available seats and further into the journey - for example, the Cardiff to Bath section of the First Great Western Cardiff to Portsmouth Harbour service - experience crush loading or, unpleasant travelling conditions. Similar conditions exist on rugby international days for passengers joining Cardiff-bound services at Hereford.

Returning to the cross-border connections, mention has been made of the clock-face timetable in operation for trains leaving Wales but the exact opposite is true for passengers returning from the English regions to south Wales. This means that services along the South Wales Main Line are bunched into a short period of time each hour, then there are no trains for the remainder of the hour.

Appeals to the various train operating companies to remedy the situation have drawn the information that it is a result of pathing difficulties at the nodes - Gloucester, Birmingham, Shrewsbury, Manchester, Bristol and even Swansea. This again highlights the problems in devising franchises without regard for connecting services, which operationally, can create capacity problems at the node.

While the above comments have concentrated on the inter-regional services, the same comments regarding extending services beyond Cardiff apply equally, to the First Great Western London to Cardiff semi-fasts. These currently terminate at Cardiff rather than continuing to Swansea, whereby they could provide a clock-face half-hourly service throughout the day between Swansea, Cardiff and London, rather than just in the morning peak from Swansea and to some extent, the evening peak from London. The benefits arising from frequency enhancements are well known.

Mention has been made of the disfunction between franchise requirements and passenger needs and nowhere was this shown more explicitly than in the withdrawal of the region's main peak period train.

Although not leaving London at peak period, by the time the 1515 London Paddington to Swansea service arrived at Newport and Cardiff, it ran at the times most passengers wanted to travel. The train daily arrived at Cardiff carrying an overload with many passengers standing. At Cardiff, although many passengers left the train they were replaced by passengers travelling further west, who joined the many who had travelled from London, Reading and Bristol Parkway to these destinations. Thus, the train left Cardiff on a daily basis at capacity or, with an over-load.

On the introduction of the new First Great Western franchise, unbelievably, this train was terminated at Cardiff at 1715, in the middle of the evening peak period when the majority of passengers were travelling to destinations further west. This was allowed to happen despite objections from all sides because quite simply, it saved a train set. The passengers' needs were shown to be secondary to stock utilisation and the resultant notional savings.

It could be argued that there was no need for this train to have been terminated at Cardiff as a slight re-juggling of the rolling stock workings would have allowed it to continue to Swansea by sending a set, which terminated at Hereford, back to Bristol at night rather than this particular working.

The remaining services leaving Cardiff for Swansea around this time were unable to cope. The withdrawal of the 1715 First Great Western train to Swansea neatly placed the problems it caused on Arriva Trains Wales, which did not have the capacity or, rolling stock to respond to increased demand. Thus, the 1704 Cardiff (from Manchester) to Carmarthen was so overloaded that special arrangements had to be put in place for the 1738 Cardiff to Swansea, which originates at Holyhead, to stop at additional stations en route to Swansea, while the 1721 to Maesteg could not even clear Cardiff without passengers being left behind.

In an appalling display of buck passing, none of which helped the passenger, the problems caused by the termination at Cardiff of the 1515 from London Paddington were ignored - probably in the hope it would go away - both by DfT and First Great Western and which body drove the termination of this train and the reasons behind the decision, remain a mystery.

Underlying these events were three facts.

· The loadings on the 1515 from London Paddington to Swansea were already known before the changed timetable was introduced, yet this was ignored by either DfT or First Great Western.

· Secondly, the needs of passengers were proved to be secondary to the prospect of saving a train set which was wrongly stated to cost around £1 million per annum, as it ignored the fact that the set was in use for the whole day prior to the 1515 journey and in reality attracted only marginal costs.

· Thirdly, and denied at the time, it has now been agreed by DfT and FGW that there was an imbalance in the number of seats provided between Newport and Swansea in the morning and evening peak periods which equated almost exactly to the loss of 400 seats caused by the withdrawal of the 1515 high speed train between Cardiff and Swansea in the afternoons.

Even now, the situation remains unaddressed as comments such as "The problems seem to have sorted themselves" are still being made. They have not - and it has not been anything that the rail industry has done which draws such comment. In reality, it is the passengers themselves. They have suffered the most and have been forced to change their travelling habits. Regrettably, and confirmed by survey and observations, some have given-up using public transport completely.

The reason for highlighting this experience is to show that there is no joined-up thinking when franchises are devised and let that will allow or encourage train operators to serve the travelling public. More opportunities need to be provided to the Welsh Assembly Government to be able to influence service levels on cross-border franchises. Their lack of powers to instruct DfT is disadvantaging Welsh services. The curtailment, noted above, of the 1515 Paddington to Swansea service at Cardiff is a clear example but there are others, such as the removal of stops at Severn Tunnel Junction on the Cardiff to Portsmouth route (since overturned by FGW). Equally, there has been no real improvement to the Cross-Country services serving Wales.

It has to be recognised that constraints exist but, perpetuating them is not in the interests of the passenger yet, are seemingly encouraged. Also evident, is the lack of an over-all approach to the operational railway which takes heed of passenger needs and not, as has been the case for too long, operational need. In a Welsh context, either there is a specific instruction to ensure the interests of Wales are recognised and protected by DfT or, the powers which the Welsh Assembly Government has over all rail services and franchises running services into Wales need to be re-examined. The current situation begs the question, "What chance is there for a coherent approach to cross-border rail services against such a background?"

From a Sewta perspective, the following suggestions are made to improve the journey experience.

· There needs to be a move away from the idea which seems to prevail in the rail industry (or DfT perhaps,) that a train to Cardiff is regarded as serving Wales. There are still around 120 miles of railway beyond Cardiff which need to be properly served.

· Extending more trains westwards beyond Cardiff will improve journey opportunities to a wider catchment area and more importantly, should significantly reduce the need to change trains. The current situation that to get out of Wales means a change of one or more trains needs to be altered.

· While recognising the conditions that apply at the nodes noted above and at franchise interfaces, connections need to be co-ordinated to provide more convenient journey opportunities. Similarly, a degree of priority needs to be given to cross-border or even cross-franchise services to ensure that services do not need to be bunched together at the end of their journeys.

· If a clock-face timetable can be operated in the outbound direction, it should be possible to do so on the return working.

· Local councils or regional groupings must become statutory consultees for changes within the rail industry.

· DfT should explain why, following consultation, objections or suggestions are ignored and an appeals procedure introduced to deal with such matters.

Finally, there are a lot of good things happening on the railway at present. Unfortunately, events such as those mentioned above mask them.

20 March 2008.