United Kingdom Parliament
Publications & records
Advanced search
 HansardArchivesResearchHOC PublicationsHOL PublicationsCommittees
Select Committee on Treasury Ninth Report


5  Public expenditure issues

International Financial Reporting Standards

IMPLEMENTATION TIMETABLE

63. In last year's Budget the Government announced that, "in order to bring benefits in consistency and comparability between financial reports in the global economy and to follow private sector best practice", the annual financial statements of government departments and other central government bodies would be prepared using International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adapted as necessary for the public sector, in place of UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (UK GAAP). The transition to IFRS was scheduled for 2008-09, along with the first set of Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), which would be produced on an IFRS basis.[230] In this year's Budget the Government announced that the transition to IFRS and production of the first WGA would be delayed for one year to 2009-10, because the original timetable had proven too short for some Government departments to achieve.[231] Treasury officials told us that the Ministry of Defence and Department of Health, two departments with complex budgets and large numbers of assets, found the timetable "too stretching". The Department for Communities and Local Government also had concerns about coordination with the implementation of IFRS by local authorities.[232] Professor David Heald, a member of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board and a Special Adviser to this Committee, argued that the primary problem at both the Ministry of Defence and Department of Health related to the accounting treatment of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) assets: for the Ministry of Defence, it was the sheer number of PFI assets that would have to be reviewed; for the Department of Health the main issue was that funding allocations for 2008-09 had already been set, and changes to PFI accounting on the initial timetable would result in many NHS bodies breaching their statutory financial obligations.[233] Mr Elwyn Eilledge, the Chairman of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board, viewed the fact that some departments were unable to move to IFRS on the original schedule as "extremely disappointing".[234]

64. Several members of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board suggested to us that the Government's original timetable for implementation had been over-optimistic. Mr Eilledge said that "the timetable was always extremely tight, of course, and these things inevitably take a long time, frustratingly so".[235] Mr Wild pointed out that the private sector had had five years to implement IFRS, and some companies had still only just managed to meet the deadline. He contrasted this timeframe with the Treasury's initial implementation period of one year, and commented that "having watched the private sector move, I was really concerned about the [Government's] original timetable of a year".[236] Mr Eilledge also noted that the private sector did not have the problem of accounting for PFI to grapple with as had the public sector.[237] Professor Heald concluded:

Given the five-year timetable available to the private sector for IFRS conversion, together with the linkage in the public sector between accounting and the budgetary funding of organisations such as NHS bodies, the one-year timetable announced in Budget 2007 was over-ambitious.[238]

We are disappointed that the Government has been forced to delay the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards for the public sector until 2009-10, but not altogether surprised. The proposed timetable of one year for implementation was over-ambitious, and considerably more stretching than the five-year transition period enjoyed by the private sector. The Treasury appears to have misjudged the scale and complexity of the issues involved in the transition to International Financial Reporting Standards, in particular the issue of accounting for private finance initiative assets.

SHADOW ACCOUNTS

65. Members of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board told us that they had recommended that all departments that could do so should produce 2008-09 shadow resource accounts on an IFRS basis alongside their accounts on a modified UK GAAP basis.[239] Treasury officials confirmed that those Government departments in a position to do so would produce shadow accounts from 2008-09.[240] Professor Heald argued that these shadow accounts ought to be thoroughly reviewed by the National Audit Office, and that the Treasury should adopt a "trigger-point strategy, with clear milestones, and regularly report progress to Parliament", arguing that otherwise there would be a severe risk of further delays.[241] It is important that momentum towards the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards is maintained and, in that context, we welcome the Treasury's assurance that those departments in a position to do so will produce shadow accounts on an International Financial Reporting Standards basis from 2008-09. We recommend that the Government, in its response to this Report, state whether those shadow accounts will be reviewed by the National Audit Office and whether the opinions of the National Audit Office on those shadow accounts will be made public.

ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF PFI ASSETS

66. Professor Heald explained that there was wide variation in the proportion of private finance initiative (PFI) assets held off balance sheet across departments, and argued that these differences were heavily driven by the identity of the auditor—because the National Audit Office had been stricter about balance sheet treatment than the appointed auditors of the Audit Commission—and the control framework. This inconsistency was facilitated, in Professor Heald's view, by the scope for arbitrage between Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 5A (published by the Accounting Standards Board) and the revised Treasury Technical Note 1 (published by the Treasury as an interpretation but which effectively became treated as a competitor standard).[242] Mr Eilledge also referred to this arbitrage between the two different interpretations, which had led the Financial Reporting Advisory Board to push the Treasury towards removing the Technical Note.[243] However, before a formal recommendation was made to the Treasury by the Financial Reporting Advisory Board, the 2007 Budget had announced the intended implementation of IFRS from 2008-09, which would have rendered both FRS 5A and the Technical Note obsolete.[244] The 2008 Budget decision to delay IFRS implementation might mean that the Technical Note could still be in use until 2009-10 and arbitrage between that and FRS 5A could continue to be possible. We are concerned about the potential for arbitrage between Financial Reporting Standard 5A and the Treasury's Technical Note 1 on accounting for private finance initiative (PFI) assets, creating the potential for different interpretations of appropriate PFI accounting treatment. We recommend that the Treasury, in consultation with the Financial Reporting Advisory Board, seek to ensure that PFI accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards is implemented across the public sector in a consistent, effective and transparent manner.

Efficiency

THE 2004 SPENDING REVIEW EFFICIENCY PROGRAMME

67. At the time of the 2004 Spending Review, the Government established a target to achieve efficiency savings across central and local government with an annual value of £21.5 billion by 2007-08. We have examined progress against this target on several occasions during this Parliament, expressing concern about the measurement and verification of reported savings, particularly in relation to the issue of whether service standards have been maintained.[245] In this year's Budget, the Government announced that, by December 2007, departments and local authorities had reported delivery of efficiency savings with an annual value of over £23 billion.[246] At the same time, the Government rejected our previously expressed doubts regarding service standards:

The Government does not accept that there are unresolved issues concerning the effects of the current Efficiency Programme on service delivery. All efficiency initiatives in the SR04 Programme have associated balancing quality measures to monitor service output and no efficiency gain will be scored as 'final' until maintenance of service quality is evidenced.[247]

68. The Government stated that, of the savings of £23 billion reported by December 2007, 87% were already classified as 'final'.[248] Treasury officials indicated that such a classification often arose from a dialogue between individual departments and the Treasury.[249] In subsequent written evidence, the Treasury said that its "challenge process looks at a range of issues including whether service quality is being robustly measured". The Treasury confirmed that, in the case of any gains that were not robust and or where it had not been demonstrated that quality had not been affected, the gains would not be counted. The Treasury stated that it was too soon in the process to provide examples of disallowed gains.[250] However, Treasury officials also said that "we will certainly make available all the evidence when we finally say that we have or have not met the targets".[251]

69. In a recent Report, we examined the transfer of responsibility for oversight of the efficiency programme from the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) to the Treasury, concluding that:

we are not convinced that the Treasury's Public Spending Directorate is suitably placed to play an effective role in supporting and challenging departmental efficiency programmes. It is not evident that a role in questioning the validity of claimed efficiency savings is compatible with the task of ensuring that public spending limits are adhered to.[252]

Our concern was echoed by Professor Talbot, who argued that "the shift of responsibility for overseeing the programme into HM Treasury in the name of 'mainstreaming' removes what was clearly a useful 'check and balance' in the semi-independent role which OGC played".[253] An effective oversight role is essential to the overall credibility of the programme, to which Professor Talbot also referred:

The Gershon programme probably has produced substantial savings and these are probably bigger than any similar programme in the past 20-30 years but the combination of questionable reporting and over-ambition has undermined the public credibility of the effort.[254]

In reporting the final outcome of the 2004 efficiency programme, it will be crucial that the Treasury provides convincing evidence that the gains reported as 'final' have been achieved without a diminution of service standards. The credibility of such evidence would be enhanced by the reporting of instances where savings have not been included within the final reported total because such evidence has not been provided. The completeness and transparency with which the final outcome of the programme is reported will be an important test of whether HM Treasury can perform the roles of challenge and oversight in relation to the programme previously undertaken by the Office for Government Commerce.

MEASURING EFFICIENCY IN THE PERIOD 2008-09 TO 2010-11

70. For the period from 2008-09 to 2010-11, the Government has set a target of savings with an annual value of £30.54 billion to be achieved by the last of those years. All of the savings must be cash-releasing and measured net of implementation costs, leading us to characterise the targets as "stretching and highly ambitious" in our Report last November on the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review.[255] In the same Report, we called for clarification of the method for calculating baselines for monetary savings.[256] The Government response explained that each department's baseline was "generated from their respective 2007-08 near-cash resource Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL) plus capital DEL baselines, minus depreciation and minus any grants to local government, with minor other adjustments in some cases". The Government stated that the efficiency target in percentage terms was calculated by multiplying the baseline by 1.033 and then deducting the baseline total.[257] However, the Value for Money Delivery Agreements indicated that departments are using different methods for calculating the savings achieved. For example, in the case of HM Treasury, the minimum projected savings have been calculated as the difference between projected programme expenditure and so-called "counter-factual" expenditure based on a 'do nothing' scenario of baseline costs increasing by general inflation.[258] The Department for Work and Pensions has used a different method for calculating its "counter-factual spending profile", assuming that pay will increase in line with the pay remit and that other costs will rise in line with current estimates of GDP growth. [259]

71. Further issues relating to the measurement and classification of efficiency savings in the coming years have emerged from the recently-published Value for Money Delivery Agreements. The Ministry of Defence included within its projected "efficiency" savings spending reductions that would come from, for example, "gradual reductions in Gazelle helicopter flying hours, reflecting their lack of utility on military operations", and from "accelerated withdrawal of the Jaguar reconnaissance aircraft from service".[260] The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs indicated that, within the Animal Health and Welfare programme, savings of £120.88 million would be generated through a variety of mechanisms including "transfer of full or partial costs to industry where the activity is of clear benefit to the industry itself and charging—again for activities in these instances which are of clear benefit to the individual recipient of that service".[261] We raised with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the question of whether the label of efficiency might be applied to what were in fact service reductions. He emphasised the primary role of individual Secretaries of State in reaching such judgements and said that each case had to be examined on merits.[262] However, he also saw a role for the Treasury as part of an "iterative" process: "You cannot leave everything entirely to a department any more than you can leave everything to the Treasury because unless the department owns the decision, in my experience, not a lot will happen".[263] He indicated that he would be "happy to return to the subject" of how efficiency gains were measured.[264]

72. Professor Talbot suggested that measurement problems in the new Value for Money Delivery Agreements seemed "acute".[265] Our predecessors noted that the Efficiency Technical Notes that were the precursor of such Agreements were examined by the National Audit Office prior to publication against agreed criteria relating to clarity of savings, measurement methods, data quality, service continuity, and readability.[266] There are a number of unresolved measurement issues relating to the efficiency programme for the period from 2008-09 to 2010-11. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government—

  • set out the value for money baselines for each department;
  • explain whether a consistent method is used for calculating "counter-factual" expenditure increases and, if not, why not;
  • set out the circumstances in which it is appropriate to treat reductions in service as efficiency savings; and
  • clarify the circumstances in which a net reduction in expenditure arising from a transfer of costs to the private sector by charging or other means constitutes an efficiency saving.

We further recommend that the Government invite the National Audit Office to examine the published Value for Money Delivery Agreements and that the Government consider the case for publishing updated and improved Agreements in the light of such examination.

The Saving Gateway

73. The Saving Gateway is a cash saving account for those on lower incomes which provides a financial incentive to save through "matching", whereby the Government makes a specified contribution for each pound saved by the account holder up to a certain limit.[267] The Saving Gateway was first proposed by the Government in April 2001. An initial pilot project ran for 18 months from August 2002. In the 2004 Pre-Budget Report, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that there would be a second pilot project beginning in 2005, which ran with six variant forms between February 2005 and March 2007 in five pilot areas. In January 2005, our predecessors looked forward to "the Government moving as quickly as possible … to national availability of the Saving Gateway scheme".[268] We have considered the Saving Gateway twice in the present Parliament,[269] concluding that "the introduction of a national Saving Gateway would be the most important single step towards achieving the aim of increasing the level of saving among low-income individuals and households".[270] In the 2008 Budget statement, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that the Saving Gateway would be launched nationally, with the first accounts available from 2010.[271] He told us that "the idea of the Saving Gateway is a very important one where we help people who historically have not saved get into the savings habit".[272] When we asked him why the scheme would not be ready for national implementation prior to 2010, he identified issues both of practical implementation—stressing the potential difficulties arising from quick implementation—and affordability—"I have to make sure I have the money to pay for it".[273]

74. The overall costs of the scheme will depend crucially upon the final decision on the level of matching. The Government's consultation document accompanying the Budget indicated that the Government had yet to come to a view on this matter.[274] The first Saving Gateway pilot project was based on the simple proposition that, for each pound invested by an individual up to £25 per month over the 18-month period of the account, the Government would itself pay a pound into that account. However, the final evaluation of the second pilot project suggested that "the ideal match rate was thought to be around 50p for each £1 of matchable contribution, although the majority of participants accepted that a lower rate would be more appropriate for reasons of affordability".[275] Last year, we accepted that, on grounds of affordability as well as other grounds, a national Saving Gateway could be based on a level of matching lower than pound-for-pound, and that a lower level of matching might be effective in encouraging saving among low-income individuals and households. However, we noted that certain forms of saving by the highest income groups obtain subsidy through tax relief at an effective rate of 40%, and we consider that the level of subsidy in percentage terms for those on the lowest incomes ought to be higher. On grounds of simplicity, we suggested that this argued for a rate of matching of 50 pence for every pound invested by the individual, although we also saw merit in the proposal that a pound-for-pound match rate might be set for saving in the initial two months of an account to encourage participation.[276] We continue to believe that there is a strong case for matching under the Saving Gateway at the level of 50 pence for every pound invested by the individual, possibly with support for the opening months at the pound-for-pound level. We recommend that, in advance of a final decision on matching rates, the Government publish estimates of the cost of implementation based on different levels of matching and associated estimates of take-up rates.

75. The cost estimates that we have just recommended be prepared could be based in the first instance on the Government's proposals for eligibility. The Government envisages that eligibility for the national Saving Gateway scheme "will be 'passported' from qualifying benefits and tax credits".[277] With the exception of Incapacity Benefit, all the relevant benefits are means-tested.[278] One of the lessons that the Government drew from the evaluation of the second pilot project was that a concentration on "people on lower incomes—up to around £15,000 household income as used in the first pilot—is about the right level". If eligibility were extended up the income scale, savings would start to be reallocated from existing savings schemes into the Saving Gateway, creating significant "deadweight" in terms of the Government subsidy.[279] The Government confirmed that the Saving Gateway was targeted on the working population:

People who are retired will not be eligible as other forms of support are in place for those who are retired and on low incomes, such as the Pension Credit and the winter fuel allowance. Students are able to access financial support through student loans and maintenance grants.[280]

76. However, even with regard to the working population, the use of "passporting", while administratively convenient,[281] excludes from eligibility significant numbers of individuals on low incomes.[282] The Treasury enumerated such individuals, as follows:

  • 0.5 million in the category of "those on low incomes, in work, aged 18-25 who do not qualify for [Working Tax Credit]";
  • 0.7 million in the category of those working 16 to 30 hours a week not eligible for Working Tax Credit; and
  • 2.7 million in the category of those "eligible for a qualifying benefit but [who] do not take it up".[283]

The Government stated that:

to bring these groups into eligibility for the scheme it would be necessary to set a separate income and asset test for those who do not qualify through 'passporting' but think they have income and assets low enough to qualify … A separate income and asset test would detract from the simplicity of 'passporting' and may act as a further barrier to helping individuals on low incomes to save. It would also not be possible to put the necessary computer systems in place to do this in time for the introduction of the scheme in 2010.[284]

The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not rule out the possible extension of the Saving Gateway.[285] We believe that, should the Saving Gateway be extended in future, the first priority should be to extend eligibility to those who would qualify initially in terms of income, but are not in receipt of a qualifying benefit or tax credit. The initial availability of the Saving Gateway only to those claiming qualifying benefits and tax credits reinforces the importance of Government efforts to increase take-up of tax credits to which we referred earlier. We recommend accordingly that the Government consider measures to link promotion of the Saving Gateway with the wider promotion of the availability of tax credits.

77. Mr Chote raised the concern that the Saving Gateway might not attract net new saving among the target group if financial providers offered to lend people money to invest in a Saving Gateway account:

There is obviously this issue that they have to deal with in terms of rolling this out in that how do they stop people effectively borrowing, they go along to a financial provider who says, 'Fine, we will lend you the money and you can then go and get the match for this and you can pay us back, you are better off and we are better off', but that is not achieving what the Government wants to.[286]

We recommend that the Government set out, in its response to our Report, its proposed methods for ensuring that Saving Gateway does not operate so as to provide incentives for financial providers, particularly unregulated financial providers, to lend money at high interest rates to encourage those eligible simply to borrow in order to save in Saving Gateway accounts.

78. The Government proposes that providers of Saving Gateway accounts should pay a return on balances held by savers. This return will generally be in the form of interest, although credit unions offering Saving Gateway accounts may pay a dividend unless our recommendation that credit unions be able to pay interest has been implemented by 2010.[287] Treasury officials confirmed that it was currently envisaged that interest payments would be taxable, while pointing out that many of those eligible would be below the tax threshold.[288] The Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that he would keep the taxation of interest on Saving Gateway accounts under review, while pointing out that the Government would be supporting those accounts through matching.[289] Although we accept that many of those with Saving Gateway accounts will not required to pay tax on the interest earned, we believe that both the simplicity of operation and the appeal of the Saving Gateway would be assisted if it were offered on a tax-free basis. To assist the public debate on this matter, we recommend that, alongside the cost estimates that we have previously called for, the Government set out its forecasts of the total tax receipts from interest on Saving Gateway accounts.


230   Budget 2007, p 154, para 6.59-6.60 Back

231   Budget 2008, p 202, para C.103; Q 289 Back

232   Q 290 Back

233   Ev 66; HC (2007-08) 397-i, Qq 26, 38 Back

234   HC (2007-08) 397-i, Q 23 Back

235   Ibid., Q 4 Back

236   Ibid., Qq 10, 30 Back

237   Ibid., Q 14 Back

238   Ev 68 Back

239   HC (2007-08) 397-i, Q 7 Back

240   Q 291 Back

241   Ev 68 Back

242   Ev 66-68 Back

243   HC (2007-08) 397-i, Q 19 Back

244   Ibid., Qq 20-21 Back

245   See Treasury Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2006-07, The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review: prospects and processes, HC 279, paras 60-65 and references given there. Back

246   Budget 2008, p 78, paras 5.8-5.9 Back

247   HC (2007-08) 428, p 2 Back

248   HM Treasury, 2004 Spending Review: efficiency progress to December 2007, March 2008, p 6, para 2.3 Back

249   Q 294 Back

250   Ev 62 Back

251   Q 293 Back

252   Treasury Committee, Seventh Report of Session 2007-08, Administration and expenditure of the Chancellor's departments, 2006-07, HC 57, para 51 Back

253   Ev 72 Back

254   Ev 71 Back

255   HC (2007-08) 55, paras 18-25 Back

256   Ibid., paras 17, 21 Back

257   HC (2007-08) 428, p 1 Back

258   HM Treasury, Value for Money Delivery Agreement, December 2007, para 2.5 Back

259   Department for Work and Pensions, 2007 CSR Value for Money Delivery Agreement, p 8, para 3.1.1 Back

260   Ministry of Defence, Value for Money Delivery Agreement, p 7 Back

261   Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Defra Value for Money Delivery Agreement, February 2008, p 4 Back

262   Qq 387, 390 Back

263   Qq 392, 394 Back

264   Q 396 Back

265   Ev 72 Back

266   Treasury Committee, First Report of Session 2004-05, The 2004 Pre-Budget Report, HC 138, paras 69-70 Back

267   HM Treasury, The Saving Gateway: operating a national scheme, March 2008, p 3; Treasury Committee, Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07, Financial inclusion follow-up: saving for all and shorter term saving products, HC 504, para 98 Back

268   HC (2004-05) 138, para 77 Back

269   Treasury Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2005-06, Financial inclusion: credit, savings, advice and insurance, HC 848-I, paras 103-111; HC (2006-07) 504, paras 98-112 Back

270   HC (2006-07) 504, para 112 Back

271   HC Deb, 12 March 2008, col 291 Back

272   Q 357 Back

273   Q 358 Back

274   The Saving Gateway: operating a national scheme, p 21, para 5.3 Back

275   HM Treasury and Department for Education and Skills, Final Evaluation of the Saving Gateway 2 Pilot: Main Report, May 2007, p 5 Back

276   HC (2006-07) 504, para 106 Back

277   The Saving Gateway: operating a national scheme, Executive Summary, p 3. The qualifying benefits and tax credits are Working Tax Credits, Child Tax Credits paid at the maximum rate, Income Support, Incapacity Benefit or Employment Support Allowance, Severe Disablement Allowance and Jobseeker's Allowance. Back

278   Q 75 Back

279   HC (2006-07) 504, para 102 Back

280   Ev 62 Back

281   IbidBack

282   Qq 75-76, 194 Back

283   Ev 62 Back

284   IbidBack

285   Q 357 Back

286   Q 74 Back

287   The Saving Gateway: operating a national scheme, p 20, paras 4.7-4.8; Q 201; HC (2006-07) 504, para 120 Back

288   Qq 198-200 Back

289   Qq 359-360 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2008
Prepared 7 April 2008