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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 543-ii House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE TRANSPORT COMMITTEE
THE OPENING OF HEATHROW TERMINAL 5
MR STEVE TURNER, MR IGGY VAID, MR RIZWAN AZIZ, MS JACKIE REED and MR STANLEY PETERS
MR COLIN MATTHEWS and MR TERRY MORGAN Evidence heard in Public Questions 190 - 323
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Transport Committee on Members present Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair Mr Philip Hollobone Mr John Leech Mr Eric Martlew Mr Lee Scott Graham Stringer Mr David Wilshire ________________ Witnesses: Mr
Steve Turner, National Secretary for Civil Air Transport, Mr Iggy Vaid, Senior Shop Steward, Mr Rizwan Aziz, Branch Chair, BAA
Heathrow, Ms Jackie Reed, Trade
Union Side Secretary, BAA Heathrow, and Mr
Stanley Peters, BAA Shop Steward, Unite - the Chairman: First, I should like to ask Members whether they have any interests to declare. Mr Martlew: I am a member of Unite and the GMB unions. Graham Stringer: I am a member of Unite. Q190 Chairman: I am also a member of Unite. I welcome our witnesses this afternoon. I ask you all to introduce yourselves, starting on the left. Mr Peters: I am Ms Reed: I am Jackie Reed, a trade union side secretary which co‑ordinates the four trade unions with the company at Heathrow. Mr Vaid: I am Iggy Vaid, British Airways employee and senior shop steward in BA Mr Turner: I am Steve Turner, national secretary of Unite, civil aviation. Mr Aziz: I am Rizwan Aziz, chairman of the Unite branch at Heathrow. Q191 Chairman: BAA has told us that one of the two reasons why there was such a calamitous opening of Terminal 5 was lack of staff familiarisation and training. Do you agree with that? Mr Aziz: There was training. I do not think that training was adequate. Do you mean the training specifically on the security side? Q192 Chairman: I am relating to you the verdict of BAA as given to this Committee. It gave two reasons one of which was lack of staff familiarisation and training. I am asking all of you as union representatives whether you agree with that statement. Mr Aziz, do you agree with that statement? Mr Aziz: I do not agree with that statement. There was not a lack of familiarisation and training as far as BAA was concerned. We are there for the security aspect as well as other areas. The training was there and time was scheduled for it. We had no real input into the type of training given, so it would be unfair for me to make a comment on whether or not it was adequate, but training was scheduled for the period. I do not think I would have enough knowledge or insight into the training itself to say whether or not it was adequate. Q193 Chairman: Would anybody else like to comment on that? Mr Vaid: As far as British Airways was concerned we had a similar problem
with familiarisation and training for most or all the staff. The training was
called "Fit for 5". People were taken to a hotel and shown some sort of film or
slides and told this was what it looked like. They were then given familiarisation
training for three days to cover an area as big as Q194 Chairman: Did any of you raise problems about training with the management? Mr Vaid: Yes, we did raise it. Obviously, it was a big concern to us that our people were telling us they had not picked up what they were trying to tell them. It was not only a matter of familiarisation with the building but the IT system had also changed. We have a different system for baggage reconciliation and so on. Then the IBM system was introduced and people were not familiarised with that. Q195 Chairman: With whom did you raise those concerns? Mr Vaid: We raised them with our senior management team especially in British Airways. I cannot speak for the airports authority. Q196 Chairman: When did you raise it with the senior management team at British Airways? Mr Vaid: I would say that we raised it a good six months to even a year before. Q197 Chairman: What was the response? Mr Vaid: As far as concerns the trade union side, I believe they made the decision to involve what we call process engineers who came in and decided what type of process needed to be installed. They only wanted the union to implement that process and it was decided by somebody else, not the people who really worked it. The fact is that they paid lip service to, ignored or did not implement any suggestion we made. I have a piece of paper in my hand to show that even as early as January there was a meeting with the senior management team at which we highlighted our concerns about how the baggage system and everything else would fail, that the process introduced would not work and so on. We highlighted all these concerns, but there was no time to change the whole plan. Their plan for which way they would go was set up more or less in 2005. Q198 Chairman: Mr Vaid, you have referred specifically to problems about the baggage system. Were there any other areas of work where concerns were raised and no response was received? Would anybody like to add to what we have already heard on any other aspects of work? Mr Turner, at the end of May you are quoted in the Morning Star as saying that "workers had raised concerns about problems with the terminal 'over a long period of time' and that 'these concerns have unfortunately fallen on deaf ears up to this point.'" What were those concerns about, and with whom did you raise them? Mr Turner: Our members and shop stewards locally had been raising concerns
both within BAA and BA for a considerable period in relation to the opening of
T5. I was personally not involved in those discussions. I was appointed
national secretary of the aviation division only in March and was not around at
the time of these deliberations, hence I have brought with me today a number of
colleagues who can give first-hand evidence of what was going on at the time. But
a number of concerns were raised about the process engineering issues that BA
was introducing at the time of the transfer to T5. They have been working in
conjunction with BAA but there has been a total failure to consult with the
trade unions. We have a document which was produced by a senior member of BA's
HR management, Veronica Kumar. That was published in Human Resources magazine in February 2008. It talks about Terminal
5 as being the Q199 Chairman: Are you saying there was no response at all to the points you raised? Mr Turner: No consideration was given to the response from the trade union side. Q200 Chairman: Was this BA, BAA or a joint body? Mr Turner: I think it is fair to say that it was BA and BAA. Iggy Vaid can speak for BA in respect of this; he already has. Our colleagues involved in these deliberations in respect of BAA, particularly Stanley Peters at the end of the table, may very well want to make a comment on this. Q201 Chairman: Would you like to tell us anything about BAA? Mr Peters: We had several meetings with the company prior to T5; they started in 2006. We said to the company that the way it was going would not work. Based on our own experience having worked there for years no technology can take that away. Based on our experience we said that they must listen to what we said and do it this way, but we were told that, no, it was a state-of-the-art building and everything would work and be all right. Q202 Chairman: Did you raise any particular things? Mr Peters: Yes. Obviously, we were talking about upping the staffing level as well. Rosters are very important to everybody to suit working mums and so on and to get the right staffing level. We were not getting that; we were told that this was the roster we would have. People who wanted to join them would join; if people did not want to join, tough. There were no negotiations on that so as to enable the operation to run smoothly. There is no doubt that we had a lot of teething problems to start with, but those and the queues could have been avoided had we been listened to but we were not. Q203 Chairman: Were you surprised or not surprised when the problems arose on the day? Ms Reed: Not surprised. Some discussions did start from the end of October 2006 but they were more presentations about how it would work, the size of the building and that sort of thing. Once we started to get into deeper discussions obviously they were about this was how it would work, it was an opportunity to bring in state-of-the-art equipment and this was how it would be. To go back to your original question on training, what threw us a bit was that there was some pretty powerful generic training for security officers. They would all have been trained up to a certain standard so they were not security risks and so on, but as to familiarisation they started to introduce staff to the terminal from January but it depended on the particular area. It was zoned off into different areas. Some familiarisation was just for the particular area in which they were working and because of the size of the building obviously there was a bit of confusion if you moved out your area. The terminal is a vast building and obviously a lot of familiarisation is required. As to training, I think the issue might not necessarily be on the security side but some of the new slightly different roles brought in to run the terminal. For example, the customer host role replaced the old information desk system. These people were mobile around the areas and they would be performing a lot of roles not covered by other positions. It was almost a trouble-shooting role within the area and because it was a brand new role I think those people struggled. They did not get the training up to speed. Q204 Chairman: We have been told that there was a big problem in staff logging into the baggage system and 48 accounts were incorrectly set up with barcode passwords being generated incorrectly which led to a shutdown of some of the systems. Is that a fault of training? Was it due to staff who had not been shown how to do it, or was it the equipment? Mr Vaid: There was also the difficulty that somebody somewhere removed one line of the name and then everyone else's name went up on the computer screen and so nobody could sign in because it was not accepted. Q205 Chairman: Was this system tried out before the day? Was there any rehearsal of this? Mr Vaid: The systems were
tried individually. The problem was that the proving trials carried out did not
involve the trade union side. I cannot speak for the British Airports
Authority, only British Airways. They said to those who volunteered to do the proving
trial that they were not involved in changing the process; they were there to
make sure that the system worked. They introduced the RMS system which was
totally alien. People sitting somewhere else were allocating jobs to you. Each
individual was given a small hand-held device called an RMS and with that
device he would sign in. The device tells you to turn left. You turn left and
then you go to the aircraft and deal with that. When you finish you press a button.
They tell you to turn right and you do that. That was the system they used.
People were not prepared for who was to work with them and who were the next
people to come in. They were all individuals and people tried to turn them into
machines. In the past people would allocate a job to me and I would go and do
it. If the allocation was wrong I would come back and tell the person face to
face that it was wrong and he should not do it. He would then learn from that.
But now the people who allocate the task are somewhere else and you do not see
them and communicate with them. They are probably somewhere in Q206 Graham Stringer: At any time was the safety and security of either employees or passengers put at risk? Mr Aziz: No; security was never compromised. Q207 Graham Stringer: What about the safety of staff? Equipment was not working; there was baggage all about; two escalators were not working; and some of the lifts were not working. Were there any health and safety implications? Mr Turner: I think there were huge health and safety implications for our people. I take the opportunity to pay tribute to the many hundreds of our people who worked professionally and diligently to provide the best possible service they could on a difficult day in very difficult circumstances which included assaults, both verbal and physical in some cases. Some of our members at Terminal 5 were spat upon because of the chaos created as a result of the opening day and subsequent days. You cannot have 27,000 bags lying around a baggage hall without serious safety implications. How are you going to deal with that number of bags? Where do you put them? This had huge implications for our people who tried to do what they could within the realms of their ability as workers to address the problems. This was a real issue for us. This was a world-class facility that should have opened with the eyes of the world on it. The reality is that it was a farce. Our people are very proud to be employed by BA and BAA, rightly so, and they do not jump to criticise their employers, but on this occasion or people were embarrassed and humiliated by the way in which Terminal 5 was opened. Many of the problems identified were clearly teething problems. There are examples of major pieces of infrastructure like Terminal 5 being opened at other airports. Of course you have teething problems. Lifts do not work et cetera, et cetera, but so many issues at the opening of T5 were not teething problems but structural ones. They tried to introduce a different operating method based on process engineers who designed a new system without consulting our people who collectively have many thousands of years' experience on the ground. Q208 Graham Stringer: I will come to that point but I want to stick to health and safety issues. Obviously, there are problems if thousands of bags have been put in the wrong place. In terms of the record of accidents, were more accidents recorded on that day than you would have expected? Mr Vaid: I do not know of any accidents reported on the day, but as far as
concerns security of aircraft or passengers there were thousands and thousands
of bags left over. You try to deal with them and scan them. Then you try to
send them somewhere in Q209 Graham Stringer: You talked about the changeover. When Willie Walsh was here from BA he said that more than 80% of the staff involved in baggage handling had been on courses to familiarise themselves with the new machinery. Do you accept that figure? Mr Vaid: I know that in particular in British Airways on the first day there were about 15 or 16 people who had never been there before. Q210 Graham Stringer: What would that be as a percentage of the total number? Mr Vaid: Out of about 700 people 15 is very low. They had been taken round in a van for two days and shown it as previously described. They had two days of familiarisation in a van or were shown slides; they were shown where their lockers were and so on, but there was no training for hands-on work. That was very new. Q211 Mr Martlew: Would it have been possible to do it before the airport opened? Mr Vaid: I did have a concern that so far it was just a building site and there was some hindrance to that as well. For instance, even now we have a second switch and I am sure that for that British Airways has learned from that. Previously, it was three days of familiarisation; now we have seven days. We now have three days of familiarisation and four days of hands on training before moving in. Q212 Mr Martlew: Was there any difference in wage rates and income for the people moving into T5? Was there a financial incentive or disincentive for the people to move to T5? Mr Vaid: There was no wage difference whatsoever; it is the same rate of pay for everyone. If you ask whether there was enough overtime over there and so on I think there was plenty of it, so it was not a problem. Q213 Mr Martlew: I am pleased to see you here today. You have said that it was more important to get things right than to come to our evidence session on 7 May. Was there any pressure from management at all not to appear before the Committee in May? Mr Turner: No. First, perhaps I can say that I was not available to attend the Committee on 7 May. Q214 Chairman: We did receive a communication from you. Mr Turner: I was not available to attend and sent my apologies, but I did make some points about the necessity to put things right and they stand. There has been no pressure put on our people from BA or BAA in respect of our attendance. Q215 Mr Scott: You told us that the training was not adequate or that at least your opinions on what was going wrong were not taken on board by the management. Do you think the reason for this was that no matter what happened Terminal 5 would open on a prescribed date and that was not going to change even if there were problems? The second part to that is that in the test runs where volunteers went in it was reported at that stage that they identified the very same problems which occurred when Terminal 5 eventually opened. Is that correct? If so, are you saying that no notice was taken of what they said? Mr Vaid: I think there was a lot of things. There was also a timing difficulty. In 2005 they set up the allocation system and probably spent millions of pounds on it. In no way were they going to change that. It did not matter what we suggested or did; that system was in and had to be used. For that reason there was no way that any other electronic system could be introduced even in the last three or four months, so we had to make do with whatever the system was even if we tried to tell them that it did not work and extra resources were needed. You turn human beings into zombies with these types of things, but it was too late and it could not be changed at that stage. They made the decision much earlier to go with that system and spent a lot of money on it. Q216 Mr Scott: That was not the question I asked. Was it pointed out to the management that there were major problems in the trial period which then occurred when Terminal 5 proceeded to open? Mr Vaid: They tried the RMS allocation system in other terminals first. The concern was that any time there was a problem they stopped it. They said we should go back to the normal system and this should not be used. It really did not work in those terminals either. We told them that but they took no notice of it because the terminal was designed to operate in that way. Q217 Mr
Wilshire: I start by apologising for being a
few moments late. I also place on record what I always put on records on these
occasions. I do not know whether it is a proper declarable interest, but I
represent parts of Mr Vaid: Lots of dummy runs were conducted. There were a number of what we
call champions picked out from the staff. They were not from the trade union
side; they were picked out from the people. Those staff were there to see
whether it worked or did not work. There were hundreds and hundreds of people.
It was one of the few things that they did not do and mistakes were made. They
highlighted them and it was followed through all the way. They may have tried,
say, the Q218 Mr Wilshire: You have answered part of the question: yes, there was baggage and there were baggage handlers. My understanding that one of the many things that went wrong - I do not suggest that it is the cause of everything - was the hand-held machines used to check the details on the bag before it is put into a container. Mr Vaid: No. That is called a reconciliation gun; the bag has to be reconciled with that gun. There was difficulty with them at the beginning, but today at 10 or 12 stands in the sunshine the laser is not powerful enough to read it. We have to make it dark to try to read the label. That is a totally different gun. The RMS system was an allocation system. Q219 Mr Wilshire: That is helpful because it has cleared up in my mind a misunderstanding. The hand-held equipment used to check the bags was used in the trials and did work in the trials? Mr Vaid: Yes. Q220 Mr Wilshire: But there were some problems on the day the terminal opened? Mr Vaid: Yes. There were two totally different things. One was that each individual loader, the logistic driver and so on, was not given that gun; only the baggage people used it. But the drivers who go from one place to another to load and offload planes and everything else got the hand-held computers which gave them the ob. Q221 Mr Wilshire: That clears up one query I have. Referring to the little machines that gave people instructions, at any time during the trials and proving activities were they in evidence and being used by somebody? It does not matter who used them but were they used in the trials? Mr Vaid: Yes, they were used. Q222 Mr Wilshire: Were any problems encountered during the trials? Mr Vaid: Yes, problems were highlighted. It did not really correct itself. Q223 Mr Wilshire: Were the problems you found during the trials as bad, worse or not as bad as those that happened on the opening day? Mr Vaid: It was more or less the same, but the problem was that being in a new area people did not know exactly where they were supposed to be directed to by the system. If you are looking for one particular spur or island you do not know where it is; you ask 10 people before you can even go there, whereas previously when we did these trials in another terminal we knew exactly what we were doing. For that reason we still have those problems in those terminals. Q224 Mr Wilshire: One of you said that during the day in question these machines did not work and one problem led to another, if I understood it correctly. Had that problem happened before, or was it unique to the day it opened? Mr Vaid: One problem was the automatic baggage sorting system, which was called BRS or whatever. That system did not read it properly on the day and it was sending the bags to the wrong destination. Q225 Chairman: Had that been tested before? Mr Vaid: It was tested individually on a flight to say that at a particular island all the bags were coming in rather than opening up the whole of that system. That was not done. Q226 Mr Wilshire: But was the performance of the machines that told you where to go on opening day worse than the experience during the trials? Mr Vaid: I just do not want to confuse you. There are two or three items in there. One is the allocation system which is a little hand-held computer. That is totally separate. It tells me where to go and what to do. The other one is a gun which the baggage handler uses to reconcile the bags with the passenger to see that the passenger is on and the bag can be loaded, or the passenger is not on and the bag is not loaded. That was the gun which caused some difficulty on the day, and even before. The third thing was the introduction of the Vanderlande baggage sortation system. That system sorted the bags and sent them to the right place. That system was not reading it properly on the day and also previously. Q227 Mr Wilshire: I ask a general question which I preface by asking you not to assume I am guessing at an answer. I believe that somebody has to confront the rumours and accept the fact - how do I put it gently? - that there have been ongoing difficulties between the trade unions and management at Heathrow. That is a fact and I do not wish to take sides in it. There were rumours running around the airport - I never believe rumours - about the opening of T5 being a further extension of the difficulties. I just need to ask this question so we have it on record. Were any of the problems that occurred on opening day anything to do with union/management difficulties or problems? Please do not think I think it; I ask it so we have it on record. Mr Vaid: I can assure you that that was not the case. One hundred per cent of the members wanted to make sure it worked because it was an honour. It was a new building and we had pride in it. In no way whatsoever would anybody not let that work or have a go slow or anything of that nature. One hundred per cent wanted to make it work on the day. Q228 Mr Wilshire: I just hope I do not get too many members writing me nasty letters as a result of asking that question. Ms Reed: I can reiterate that from the BAA side as well. Q229 Mr Martlew: I have listened very carefully. I presume that in the other terminals there was a traditional method of working that probably had remained unchanged for many years though there had been some developments. Then you saw Terminal 5 being built. You have just mentioned pride in that, but was there also some apprehension about the change? How did management motivate you to take pride in this building and get involved in it? Did that happen, or were you just told what you had to do? Mr Vaid: When you ask how the staff was motivated, it is a shame I have to say - I tell the truth - that if you asked staff whether they would remain in Terminal 4 or Terminal 1 rather than go to Terminal 5 a majority would rather be in T4 or T1. Q230 Mr Martlew: That is now. What was it like before it opened? Mr Vaid: Before there was enthusiasm about having a new terminal and everything else. When they learned the way that they were to work and what the process was to be they were not as enthusiastic to go there. That is not to say that for those who did go there was some sort of difficulty because they did not want to go; they did the best they could. Q231 Mr Martlew: So, did the management underestimate the change in work practices that people would have to undertake? Mr Vaid: I would say that they did not take the staff into their confidence and say that this is the new way of working; that is how it is done and we introduce it but if they think they cannot pick up everything in one day it will be introduced slowly. That was not done. Q232 Mr Martlew: Do you think management has learned the lessons of what went wrong? Mr Vaid: They are still more or less on the same path, but since the chief executive of British Airways has taken charge of it and wants to know exactly what is going on every day and so on they are more focused on training and everything else, so they have accepted some accountability. Q233 Chairman: Would any other witness like to add to that or disagree with that? Mr Peters: I think that BA management has also learned. You can see from the restructuring that they would want to work with the trade union and want to do things better, so some good has come out of it. One hopes that if they have another project like this they will involve the trade union and maybe we can work together. Nobody knows the workforce better than the trade union; it knows it much better than the management. I am afraid that is how it is. Therefore, we would have told them that we should be doing this or that. Obviously, it is a public company and we all recognise that it wants to make a profit, but I think that on the whole they are listening to us and trying to work with us rather than telling us. Before they told us rather than consulted us. Q234 Mr Martlew: Since the opening the Select Committee has made a visit. We were shown round and everything seemed to be running smoothly. Is that the case? Was it a hiccup and has it been put right, or are there still major problems to be overcome? Mr Vaid: I still do not believe that we have got the basics right. As proof of that, just before I came in I worked out that every day in Terminal 5 932 bags do not connect with transfer passengers. That is the average for the whole month. Q235 Chairman: Can you clarify what you are saying? Mr Vaid: What I am saying is that of the total number of bags of transfer passengers flying from Terminal 5 at Heathrow, an average of 932 are not connected with the passenger; they may go the next day or the day after that. Q236 Mr Martlew: You are saying that a passenger has a one in 12 chance of losing his bag if he transfers across, so there are still problems there? Mr Vaid: Yes. Q237 Mr Martlew: To come back to some of your comments, when they were building the new terminal they were going to install the new technology; they were not going to build it as a big replica of Terminal 4. Mr Vaid: Yes. Q238 Mr Martlew: The fault seems to be that they did not really consult about putting it in and did not train the people properly when they did so. Is that correct? Mr Vaid: They never asked the trade union side what the best system should be. We could have explained it. Nevertheless, we understand that we must have new technology; times are changing and everything else. If they had taken people into their confidence we would have told them exactly which way we thought it would work. Obviously, we have to make savings and do everything else, but we were not consulted. It was the process engineers who thought up exactly how that system needed to work and we were there to implement that process. Mr Turner: A couple of points emerge from the question. What has occurred here is that BA has used an opportunity in conjunction with BAA and Terminal 5 to change the method of operating completely. There has not really been any consultation with the trade unions in the run-up to that; certainly there has been no meaningful consultation and none of the views expressed by the trade union has been taken seriously by the company. The manner in which those changes have been introduced despite the failings at the opening of Terminal 5 means that the system of work is in place and still results in significant numbers of bags not accompanying passengers. It will happen today and tomorrow, just as it happened last week and last month. Q239 Mr Martlew: But is it getting better? Mr Vaid: Yes, it has got better. Q240 Mr Martlew: It is getting better week by week? Mr Vaid: It is getting better, but obviously if they discuss with us a change of process I think it would get much better. We have to do it; there is no other alternative. Mr Turner: A second point is the day when Terminal 5 opened and the days immediately following that. Irrespective of all the teething problems that we experienced with the RDS systems and all the genuine difficulties that we continue to have with RDS and that manner of work, I genuinely believe that we would still have managed the opening of Terminal 5 had it not been for the software problems in the system itself. The patches introduced previously for the trials were not removed and by the time they were identified and removed we had huge backlogs of bags and it was impossible to address the problem on day one. Q241 Chairman: It is the software that you are identifying as a key point? Mr Turner: Yes. While the trials were going on software patches were introduced to prevent bags being transferred to other terminals and the transfer of sensitive information to other sources because it was not required; it was a trial and the bags were going round in an enclosed system; they did not need to divert to Terminal 1 or Terminal 4 for transfer and information did not need to be relayed to third parties. With the opening of Terminal 5 all of those patches needed to be removed because bags then needed to be transferred. Q242 Chairman: Are you saying that in the trials in relation to the software what happened did not reflect the real live situation? Mr Turner: Yes, and they could not. They were running bags round a system and testing the validity of the system itself. There was no necessity to transfer bags from that system to Terminal 1; there were no passengers; it was purely a trial. Therefore, patches were put onto the system to prevent the electronics in the system transferring the bags. Q243 Mr Martlew: And they forgot to take them off? Mr Turner: Whether or not they forgot to take them off is a different question because BA were assured that they were removed. Q244 Mr Leech: Most of the questions that I intended to raise have already been asked or answered, but since the opening have you made any formal written representation to either BA or BAA about recommendations you would like to make, first, about changes that could improve the system and, second, about things that need to be done differently in future terminal openings? Mr Turner: As a union we certainly have; we have been making representations to BA at various levels. We had a scheduled meeting with Willie Walsh, the CEO. Unfortunately, he could not make the meeting and it never took place, but the shop stewards have had numerous meetings with the appropriate level of management and those concerns have again been relayed. Certain changes have been made in terms of the structure of BA and some individuals in post in the run-up to the opening of T5 are no longer there, and not just at director level. BA has a managerial style, as Iggy expressed it earlier. If you surround yourself with yes men you do not get many noes, and that pretty much sums up BA's managerial style. It has fiefdoms. Q245 Chairman: Has that changed? Are there new arrangements? Mr Turner: There has been no noticeable change from our point of view. Q246 Mr Leech: What sort of response have you received to those recommendations? Mr Vaid: The shop stewards committee has told BA that this is the best way to operate. The company has accepted that it needs a change, but it is saying that it will not make any major change until switch 2, switch 2.3 and all the rest of it take place. Then they will consider making the change if that is possible. Q247 Mr Leech: Do you think that BA and BAA have learnt the lessons? Mr Aziz: Moving forward from March 27 I think there has been learning on the management side of BAA. We now have an opportunity to become involved in decision-making on T5 to assist the management team moving forward. Under the new structure I think it is now a lot better because more accountability and responsibility is placed on individuals at certain levels so they take ownership. From the trade union perspective, I think that BAA is moving progressively further forward than before. Q248 Mr Leech: Do you believe that in future the unions will play a greater role in the decision-making process? Mr Aziz: I hope so. Mr Turner: The trade unions have always played a positive and constructive role. Q249 Mr Leech: I was not suggesting that they had not, but you suggested at the beginning that perhaps the management had not really taken notice of the input you wanted to make. Do you think that this process will allow a change of heart by BAA and BA? Mr Turner: There are two different entities here. I see really positive change in BAA. I see the building of a new relationship with BAA in terms of its relations with the trade union side locally and nationally. I just refer back to the comments made earlier in terms of the article released by a senior HR manager of BAA about a trade union-free Terminal 5. That was their position in the run-up to the opening of Terminal 5. The changes that have been made in the managerial structure of BAA will facilitate a much better working relationship with the trade unions in future. BA is a different animal; BA will always be BA. We will continue to represent the interests of our members in BA. Whether or not that brings us into conflict with BA's management team is a different story, but BA has a particular style; it is led and managed with a particular style and I do not see any significant changes to it. Ms Reed: I reiterate what Steve has just said. Up until a couple of years ago the trade unions and BAA management had a good, strong relationship. I think we have just spent a couple of years in the wilderness with a bit of change in the system, but over the past few months it seems to have reverted back to the strong relationship we used to have. With the change in the system it is definitely moving forward; it is much more positive. Q250 Mr Hollobone: I think that passengers will be surprised and disappointed to learn that there is still a one in 12 chance of losing their bags if they transfer at Terminal 5. How does that one in 12 ratio compare with the previous loss rate for transfer passengers? Mr Vaid: Today it is about 80 bags per thousand; it was about 120 bags per thousand, sometimes even 200 bags per thousand. Those are only transfer bags. As to direct bags - those checked in at Heathrow or at Terminal 5 and going out - the performance is much, much better; it is about 8.3 bags per thousand passengers. Q251 Mr Hollobone: Are the previous figures that you quote from Terminal 5 when it started or the previous terminals? Mr Vaid: Terminal 5. Q252 Mr Hollobone: What would be the comparative rates for the terminal before Terminal 5 opened? Mr Vaid: It was about 60 to 70 bags per thousand. Q253 Mr Hollobone: So, it is not far off but it is higher than it needs to be? Mr Vaid: Yes. Q254 Mr Hollobone: I still remain unclear as to the basic reason for one in 12 people losing their bags at Terminal 5. Mr Vaid: Lots of transfer bags land up in Terminal 4 even today and they have to be manually transferred to Terminal 5 or from Terminal 5 to go back to Terminal 4, because there is no mechanical or automatic system to move the bags; they have to be loaded in vans and brought back. As more flights move to Terminal 5 and fewer transfer bags have to go from various places obviously it will improve. Q255 Mr Hollobone: We have spoken a lot about the baggage system, transfer bags and so on, but other issues were highlighted by the media at the time of the launch of Terminal 5 which included difficulties in accessing car parks, the delays in staff security searches and the lifts. In its evidence to this Committee BAA has told us that it does not believe car parking problems for staff on the day or the delays to staff security searches were major factors in the disruption caused to passengers. Is that something with which the unions agree? Mr Vaid: I can assure you that I was there by Q256 Mr Hollobone: What BAA is telling the Committee is that problems with car parking caused minor delays to staff. Car parking problems should not have delayed any staff member by more than 10 minutes. Do you agree with that? Mr Vaid: I would agree it was 10 to 15 minutes, but on that day people were delayed in going in for half an hour or even longer. Q257 Mr Hollobone: There were problems at apron search facility south. Mr Vaid: Yes. Q258 Mr Hollobone: BAA tells us that the longest queue for staff search on 27 March was 20 minutes and it does not believe that staff search was a major factor in the disruption. Do you agree with that? Mr Vaid: That was a major concern particularly early in the morning when the aircraft arrived. If I am to start at five and there is a 20-minute delay in a car park and for another 20 minutes I am queuing up I shall be half an hour late meeting that aircraft. We do not accept that that was not a major concern on the day. Q259 Mr Hollobone: BAA tells us that 28 of the 192 lifts at T5 were not in service on opening day; half of the lifts out of service were in the short stay car park. The primary reason BAA gives for the lifts not being completed on time is the difficulty in finding sufficient lift engineers due to the current high demand in the construction industry. Is that an explanation that the unions accept? Mr Vaid: I attended the AOC meeting. They told us that these were difficulties and they could not get engineers and parts. Previously, those lifts were used by the builders and they were not fit for use by passengers and so they had to be closed down. That was not something that we noted as a major concern. Obviously, stairs could have been used. Some lifts are still not working today. Q260 Mr Wilshire: As to delays in the car park and in security, is not one of the realities that a very large number of management and union members who were not on duty were interested to see what would happen and a far greater number of people, mainly spectators, turned up than were anticipated? I understood that to be the main problem. It does not excuse the delays but that seems to be what happened. My colleague Mr Hollobone drew the conclusion that things were now worse in T5 with missing bags. The figures I thought I heard suggested the opposite. To clear my mind, of the bags originally checked in at T5 how many per thousand are lost? Mr Vaid: Currently, the average for the whole month is 8.3 bags per thousand passengers. Q261 Mr Wilshire: At the beginning of T5 what was the number? Mr Vaid: It was about 18 to 20. Q262 Mr Wilshire: What was the number for the other terminals before T5 opened? Mr Vaid: They achieve about six bags per thousand. Q263 Mr Wilshire: What was it before? Mr Vaid: In other terminals the figure was about five to six bags per thousand. Q264 Mr Wilshire: Did that include T4? Mr Vaid: Yes. Chairman: Thank you for coming to answer our questions. It has been very helpful to our inquiry. Witnesses: Mr Colin Matthews, Chief Executive, and Mr Terry Morgan, Acting Managing Director, Q265 Chairman: Gentlemen, perhaps you would identify yourselves for our records. Mr Matthews: I am Colin Matthews, chief executive of British Airports Authority (BAA). Mr Morgan: I am Terry Morgan, acting managing director of Q266 Chairman: Mr Matthews, the opening of Terminal 5 was a national calamity. In the first 11 days 636 flights were cancelled and nearly 3,000 bags went missing, yet when you came before this Committee on the previous occasion you appeared to know very little about the problems that led up to those events. Do you feel that you were let down by your own management team on that occasion? Mr Matthews: No, I do not. In order to understand what happened in those first days we needed to dig very deeply into the baggage system software. To do so we needed exactly the same skills and people who were also required to fix the issues in the short term. Therefore, when I appeared before the Committee on the previous occasion I did not have the facts. We could not have the facts because the resources needed to obtain them were being used to resolve the issues for passengers. Q267 Chairman: But it was not just knowing more facts about what went wrong. You have submitted an additional piece of evidence. When you came last time you said that you were not aware of the detail of any discussions prior to the opening and yet it appeared there had been a lot of discussions before the opening. You did not know that concerns had been raised and yet it appeared that they had been. Did you not feel that your management team had let you down for an appearance before the House of Commons Select Committee? Mr Matthews: No, I did not. Q268 Chairman: Even now you do not think you should have known a bit more when you came before us? Mr Matthews: Chairman, no, I do not believe so. I am chief executive and I am accountable for those things. I seek no means to deflect that accountability to anyone else. Q269 Chairman: You do not believe that you are accountable to the public in any way or for the questions that this Committee wants to ask you? Mr Matthews: I am glad to come today in order to provide fuller answers to your questions based on the facts which I now have in my possession. Q270 Chairman: I am most surprised that following the previous encounter with this Committee you do not feel that your own management let you down in not equipping you in a proper manner to be able to answer the questions. Before you took your seat we heard from the trade unions. They reported that their comments had been ignored; there was lack of meaningful consultation; and even now significant numbers of bags go missing. Great concerns were expressed. Have you changed any of that situation? What will you do about it? Mr Matthews: Baggage performance in Terminal 5 today is broadly better than that of the other terminals. One of your colleague's questioning was heading towards that point. It is not perfect. It is perfectly true that if an aircraft arrives late the transferring bags under certain circumstances do not have any chance of making their connecting flight. Therefore, the data that you heard a moment ago explaining the proportion of bags which did not make their transfer flight includes in many cases delayed flight arrivals. If you look very narrowly at system performance then it is good; if you look broadly at terminal performance T5 is at least as good as or slightly better than other terminals. Terminal 5 is working well today. I am proud and delighted to say thank you to all of the British Airways and BAA staff who made June 5 a terrific success. That was the day on which a sizeable number of long haul flights were transferred from Terminal 4 to Terminal 5. That transfer happened successfully. All the BAA people and British Airways staff collaborated effectively and successfully. Terminal 5 is today working well. I am proud of its performance today and how everyone in our organisations jointly is making it work. Q271 Chairman: Are you quite confident that the situation which arose on the opening of Terminal 5 could not happen again? Mr Matthews: I am quite confident, yes. Q272 Chairman: You are absolutely sure? Mr Matthews: Yes. If there had been fundamental problems on the opening day we would not have been operating as well as we are today. Q273 Chairman: The trade unions tell us that there was no meaningful consultation with them; that they raised issues about the operations of the new terminal but they were ignored because decisions had already been taken and they were simply asked to do things, not to comment on what they thought was wrong. Do you accept that? Mr Matthews: I might share my answer with Mr Morgan who has been closer to these issues for longer than I have. I completely agree that for success we need to take into consideration the views of people who do the job. It is the people who do the job who know it best. There is an absolute need to build that into our design in putting in places new projects on which we are working. I completely agree with that objective. I am not sure we will ever get to the stage when we say we do it well enough. I think we should always seek to do it better. I certainly hope to have a constructive relationship with the trade unions. For the details of the months just prior to opening perhaps I will ask Mr Morgan to assist. Q274 Chairman: Mr Morgan, I should like you to answer that question and also indicate what changes have been made to improve the situation. Mr Morgan: As I think you heard earlier from our union colleagues, there are two entities at work here, BA and BAA, and I think it is important to differentiate between the two. BA obviously has its baggage and logistics operation and their other staff and I do not think it is proper for me to comment on the way it has interacted with its unions. I can speak for BAA. Certainly, the working relationship between ourselves and the unions over the past three to four months has been excellent. We have learnt an awful lot from the opening of T5 and we are using that learning to work with the unions now to make it even better. It is important to realise that the vast majority of our staff in Terminal 5 are employed in passenger security and the regulations laid down by government give us some leeway in terms of our processes but not very much. The processes and outcomes which we are directed to achieve are highly prescribed. Primarily the area that we did discuss with the unions was rosters and how we could get more roster efficiency in Terminal 5. I believe that those discussions started towards the back end of 2007. I believe that we have a roster system in T5 that is not just good for the company but also very much welcomed by staff. The key element of it is that there is a limited number of rosters instead of a whole plethora of them and the security officers work together in teams, so they come to work as a team rather than come to work and meet people they have not met before. Those are the sorts of issues we have been discussing with the unions, and I am pleased to say that the relationship is going from strength to strength. Q275 Chairman: You now have a joint team with BA at terminal level. Is that assisting the situation? Mr Morgan: Yes. That was put together principally on day one to fix the issues at T5 but mostly to prepare ourselves for the new switches of aircraft out of T4, that is, the June move and the move coming up in September and October. That team meets on a daily basis to monitor the operational performance of the previous day and to learn if anything has happened which requires improvement or must be put right. There is also a BA/BAA team meeting once a week primarily to prepare ourselves for the new switches of aircraft coming in from T4. Again, that relationship is working very well indeed. Q276 Mr Hollobone: Do you accept that the opening of Terminal 5 was not only an embarrassment for BAA and British Airways but also turned what should have been an occasion of national pride into one of national humiliation? Mr Matthews: Yes. We deeply regret the disappointment felt by many people. Our own staff, ourselves and the public expected better. We should have had a better outcome, and we deeply regret that. Q277 Mr Hollobone: Do you accept that the way in which the opening of the terminal was handled let down not only your shareholders but your staff and customers? Mr Matthews: That was what I have just said. I regret it not just on behalf of our staff but also the public. Everyone was hoping and expecting a great performance and was deeply disappointed by our failure to do so. Q278 Mr Hollobone: If we were to ask you to list the top five reasons for what went wrong with the opening of Terminal 5 in order of priority what would they be? Mr Matthews: I would start with two which I believe are particularly important and, if you like, we can go further. The first is that however well the airport operator and the airline operator, BA, are working it is also vital that the two are absolutely integrated and together. I think that during the construction of Terminal 5 that appeared to be the case. Around about or just prior to the opening of T5 it seems that that togetherness deteriorated. It is that togetherness that allows you to cope with the issues that arise on the day. Speaking personally, I think that was the biggest thing. I also believe that it is the biggest contribution to the success we had on June 5 with the movement of flights from T4 and T5 with, happily, very little attention externally. It worked smoothly and correctly. The second matter is to do with staff familiarity. The work that we have done since I last came before the Committee has narrowed down that to a specific area where familiarity on the opening day was not good enough. That does not concern the process of British Airways baggage loaders taking the bags off the baggage system; it concerns the people who take the bags to the aircraft once they are in aluminium containers. When we looked in detail at our system performance on the first and second days it was clear that the system was performing correctly, though not absolutely perfectly. There were one or two issues, but the system performed correctly. As a matter of fact, BA baggage loaders took off the bags correctly and put them in the aluminium containers, but those containers were not transported into the aircraft. The group of people within British Airways responsible for that are called British Airways Logistics. It is clear to me that we failed to make that particular group of people adequately familiar with it prior to opening. Q279 Mr Hollobone: In the previous evidence session it was made clear by British Airways and subsequently by yourselves in written evidence that there were discussions about the possibility of scaling down or postponing the opening. Was an estimate ever made of the cost to the British Airports Authority of scaling down or postponing the opening? Mr Matthews: I am not aware whether it was viewed from a cost point of view. I have no doubt that the overwhelming consideration would have been a successful opening. I believe that after the decision to open was taken jointly between BAA and British Airways in September 2007 had there been a huge issue which clearly threatened the opening it would have been given consideration. The fact was that although a number of issues were raised they were addressed. Nothing was considered big enough to say that we should delay the opening. With hindsight clearly that was an incorrect judgment, but it seems to me that that was what happened in that period. Q280 Mr Hollobone: Your projections about the number of staff who reported for duty that day proved wildly inaccurate; some 40% to 50% more members of staff turned up than was anticipated. The trials that you undertook did not factor in repeat entries by individuals and non‑British Airways observers and retail staff who were instructed to report to work early. Is that not simply a question of management failure? Mr Matthews: I think those were issues that arose on the day and they had an impact early in the morning. The other point we have made in our submissions is that they were fixed relatively quickly. Within a couple of hours in the case of the security queuing issues we were on track. That does not excuse the fact that early in the morning it was not on track, but I think it is fair to categorise those as teething problems. They were problems that impacted and were awkward and difficult for staff first thing in the morning, but they did not have an impact throughout the day and cause the real turmoil that came about later in the day. Q281 Mr Hollobone: If you had your time again what one thing would you do differently? Mr Matthews: I would focus resolutely and determinedly on keeping British Airways and BAA in the same room tightly together. That has been my focus since joining on April 1 and it will continue to be my focus under any set of circumstances. I repeat that however good each one is on its own it needs to be really tightly co‑ordinated and built together into a single team for success. That would be the single thing that personally I have invested in and will continue to invest in. Q282 Mr Hollobone: Obviously, the public sees the two big companies British Airways and British Airports Authority involved in this. What is the split of responsibility for the catastrophe that happened on the opening of T5? Mr Matthews: I think we have been clear from day one as to the things which went wrong on the BAA side. Frankly, I think that British Airways has been very bold and direct from its side, too. I have resolutely tried to avoid allocating blame; it is very unhelpful to anyone. I will certainly speak to the failings which happened within BAA. I do not believe that the issues within BAA were more than teething problems. I think we could have coped with them, but I think it is appropriate to speak to the BAA issues. Q283 Mr Leech: The unions who appeared before you said they had made some recommendations for the future. What recommendations have they made? What have you taken on board and what do you not accept? Mr Matthews: I think the heart of what they were saying was involvement. They also made reference to the fact that in the case of BAA they felt there was good involvement. Therefore, I believe that we are responding to their fundamental issue. I am not sure we will ever be satisfied that we are good enough when it comes to involving everyone in the way we want to. We should continually try to get better, but I was glad to hear my colleagues acknowledge that we are moving in the right direction on that issue. Q284 Mr Leech: The reason I ask the question is that when you came before the Committee on the previous occasion you said you had not been made aware of certain things. Are you aware of exactly what recommendations about changes the unions have made? Mr Morgan: At the risk of repeating myself, there are a number of recommendations that the BA unions may have made to BA. We do not have full visibility of those. As far as concern the BAA unions we talked to them about rosters and in particular about various terms and working conditions within Terminal 5. Those are part of ongoing discussions and negotiations with the unions and we shall take on board their views in future. Q285 Mr Leech: Are there any specific recommendations they have made that you do not accept? Mr Morgan: I am not aware of any from BAA's point of view. Q286 Mr Leech: As to the future, one of the concerns raised by the unions was that they were not involved in the process leading up to the opening of Terminal 5. Do you say that your relations with the unions have now improved? Do you accept that perhaps it was a mistake not to have them on board and be involved in the discussion and decision-making process prior to opening? Mr Morgan: As far as concern BAA staff the relationship has improved immensely and I think the unions and ourselves acknowledge that. There is certainly more we can do going forward. As far as concern the security processes we are always looking for better ways to do things. As the staff are often the best people to tell us when things can be improved and how we shall listen to what they say. Q287 Mr Wilshire: Mr Matthews, I am not sure that it is an advantage or disadvantage from your point of view that you were not in post for most of the period but perhaps it gives you the opportunity to have an overview which you would not otherwise have had if you were close to it. Referring to lack of togetherness and staff familiarity, when in your judgment did it start to go wrong before the day of opening? Mr Matthews: I honestly have not been able to pinpoint that. I just remember that when I arrived on the day - I spent my time in Terminal 5 - the clear sense from how people were working was that we were in our separate corners but working really hard and passionately to fix things. Everybody I came across really wanted it to work but they were not as together as I would have wanted it. It needs to run up and down the whole organisation, so I have invested time with British Airways people since that time. Mr Morgan has already referred to working level collaboration elsewhere. I am not sure that I can pinpoint when it happened. What I can observe is that under the stress of the opening difficulties as I arrived and saw how people behaved it was not a single team and it should have been. Q288 Mr Wilshire: I do not want to ask you to name names and try to blame people, but why do you think those two things began to happen and develop? Mr Matthews: I am sure that it was a stressful time. People really wanted it to work and do a great job and they stretched to reach the goal. I suspect that perhaps they ran out of time to be as close as they should have been. I was not there to see it. I can understand why those things happen, but I know that the key to making these things work is to have a single objective, team and set of data and, in a way, to be blind to whether the people are working for British Airways or BAA but just to focus on making it work. It was not quite like that on opening at day one as I arrived and saw it. Q289 Mr Wilshire: If you were doing this again how would you implement the things you have just said to prevent it happening? Mr Matthews: I think the best thing is that it is not so much what you say but what you do, so it would be about me personally spending the time with the right people within British Airways and insisting that the same thing happens throughout the organisation. Mr Morgan: We have a very complicated baggage system which relies on people putting in bags, the system working and people taking out bags. The front bit and the bit in the middle were tested incredibly thoroughly in the lead up to opening. What was not tested as well as it should have been was the last bit, that is, getting the bags from the baggage hall to the aircraft. We now know that we have to look at the system end to end and be absolutely clear that we have all the right people in the right place at the right time to make it work. Q290 Chairman: Who took the decision on testing in that way without having second thoughts about the process of testing? Mr Morgan: It was a joint programme of testing. We took the decision to test from check in with British Airways staff down to the point of offload. I think it was then a question of trying to work out how the resource could be made available to test the last bit. If we had our time again, as we will do with the next switch, it will be pretty clear that the last bit of the process must be tested and we have to assure both ourselves and British Airways that we have got that bit right. Q291 Chairman: But at the time did anybody raise that issue? Did anybody identify that as a problem? Mr Morgan: It was discussed as an area where ideally we would like to test. I do not think, looking back through the joint workings, it ever got to the point where there was an agreement to test it from end to end; we simply ran out of time. Q292 Mr Wilshire: To try to clear up one or two things which have been cited as major catastrophes but which perhaps were not, is it right to say that if the car park, search, lift and escalator problems had been the only problems the shambles that we ended up with would not have arisen? Mr Matthews: Categorically; that is what I believe. Q293 Mr Wilshire: In effect they were embarrassments that should not have happened? Mr Matthews: That is correct. Q294 Mr Wilshire: They were not really the cause of this problem? Mr Matthews: That is correct. Q295 Mr Wilshire: Referring to the baggage system, putting aside your two main points would the filters on the software and the reconciliation problems have of themselves caused major problems? Mr Matthews: Categorically not. Q296 Mr Wilshire: Not even the filter problems? Mr Matthews: The filter problem affected a small number of bags between one specific terminal and another. It certainly had an impact but it was absolutely not catastrophic and overwhelming. Q297 Mr Wilshire: So, even if you added together the four little ones plus the baggage problem, which is somewhat more major, they would not of itself have been the problem? Mr Matthews: I believe not. Obviously, if you have enough small things ultimately it becomes a big issue, but in my opinion none of the things you have mentioned on their own or even in combination would have resulted in the turmoil we had on the first day. Q298 Mr Wilshire: Others have asked why consideration was not given to delaying the opening as a solution. Would it have been possible to halt the process towards the end with all the other airlines in the queue? Mr Matthews: It would have been possible but it would have caused huge damage and turmoil and therefore it would have been a difficult decision to take. But I believe that the people in place at the time would have taken that decision if they had seen absolutely clear that something fundamental was wrong. I repeat that Terminal 5 is working well today. If there was a fundamental problem with the processes, even where those processes had been changed, or the system it would not today be working correctly. The system and to my knowledge the processes have not been fundamentally changed. Q299 Mr Wilshire: Having plucked up the courage to ask the unions the odd awkward question perhaps I can put a couple to you. It has been reported in the newspapers that BAA or Ferrovia has financial difficulties. I do not want to go into that because that is not what we are inquiring into, but is there anything about what happened with the opening of T5 that owes anything to what we read in the newspapers about financial difficulties? Mr Matthews: Nothing whatsoever. Q300 Mr Wilshire: The other awkward question is that one of the things you did early on after your arrival was to go in for a major management restructuring. Did that have anything to do with what went wrong at T5? Mr Matthews: It was nothing to do with what went wrong at T5. Nonetheless, I think it was a pragmatic way in which I and my team could devote more time directly to Heathrow, so it is a reflection of just how important it is to BAA that Heathrow functions properly and well and the priority that I personally put on it. Q301 Mr Wilshire: Does that mean that when you arrived you judged that Heathrow was not getting the attention and working as well as it might have done? Mr Matthews: I did note that there were several layers of management between me and, say, the operations director running Terminal 5. In the new structure I am much closer to that. Q302 Mr Martlew: Obviously, the opening was a major PR disaster. I think you made reference to June 5 when there were no problems at all. Surprise, surprise, there was no media coverage about it, was there? Do you feel aggrieved about that? Mr Matthews: No, absolutely not. The airport's job is to do fantastically well but we do not need to be visible. I think that for us success is that a passenger buys a ticket from Virgin or British Airways, has a great experience and is conscious only that he or she has had a good flight. I do not see why the passenger should be specifically conscious of BAA's performance, so I will settle for not being visible. Q303 Mr Martlew: You got off to a bad start. How do you convince the general public that Terminal 5 is where they should fly to? Mr Matthews: I think we need to be modest. To suggest we are perfect is a mistake because we are not. Therefore, I think the answer to your question is that so far more than four million passengers have passed through T5, the vast majority of whom I believe have had a good experience. Therefore, the reputation of T5 substantially will return because we have millions of people passing through it and saying to themselves and colleagues and friends that it was a good experience. Perhaps that is too "engineering". I am an engineer, not a marketing person, but I think that what will recover reputation is millions of people who are pleased with their experience. Q304 Mr Martlew: You mean it is a bit like the National Health Service. Those who use it find it is good; those who do not need it have a different view of it? Mr Matthews: I believe that people whose memories of Terminal 5 are coloured by the opening days should come back and try it and see that it is working well. Q305 Graham Stringer: Last time you were here we discussed how many warnings you had had from trade unions and middle management about the problems that might happen. You said that you had not had the opportunity to check emails and so on. Have you taken the opportunity over the past couple of months to see how many warnings were given by management and trade unions? Mr Matthews: I did and I could find nothing in my system or that of my predecessors. I asked my senior colleagues to do so. We have not found an email or letter with those warnings. I quite accept that there were verbal discussions. I do not suggest that means that the trade unions did not express their views; I am sure they did, and we heard some of that half an hour ago, but, in response to your formal question, I have looked and have not found any such specific warning. Q306 Graham Stringer: The trade unions told us that they had forebodings and told management there would be problems and you are saying that you have no record of that whatsoever? Mr Matthews: In my personal system I have no such record. I can perhaps turn to my colleague. Mr Morgan: At the risk of repeating myself, we do not have visibility of correspondence or discussions between BA and their unions, so it is possible that there were discussions going on between the unions and BA. Q307 Graham Stringer: I accept that here there are two managements, BA and BAA. I am asking whether the trade unions or your own management emailed or warned you in any way whatsoever about the problems that arose? Mr Matthews: That is a slightly different question. I am sure there were discussions because there was a process going on over months, but the strict answer to the question whether I have found any letter or email is that I have not. Q308 Graham Stringer: That is surprising but it is a very clear answer. On your previous appearance we talked about the relationship with BA which you said was good. When BA came to give evidence it told us basically that it was instructing counsel and taking legal advice as to what to do about the situation. Has there been any legal redress for costs following the problems that arose at the opening of T5? Mr Matthews: I am very reluctant to talk about commercially sensitive issues. I am sure there will be discussions. Q309 Graham Stringer: I am being very specific about legal action. Mr Matthews: There is no legal action. Q310 Graham Stringer: By BA? Is Lufthansa taking legal action? Mr Matthews: I am not aware of any legal action by Lufthansa or British Airways. Q311 Graham Stringer: Or any other airline at all? Mr Matthews: I think it is in the public domain that a judicial review is being pursued by one airline against the recent price settlement but that is not against us; it is against the CAA. Q312 Chairman: What will you do differently when Heathrow East opens in time for the Olympics? Mr Matthews: I hope I have given you my personal credo which is that there is no such thing as a good airport unless you have good airlines operating from it, so it is a matter of making sure that the projects we do have single objectives, measures and teams and that we are blind to whether it is a United Airlines, British Airways, Virgin or BAA employee; it is one team that is absolutely determined to make that project work. That is the clearest single lesson and conviction that I will take, not just to HET. Before HET we are refurbishing T4, T3 and T1. We are rebuilding practically every single terminal at Heathrow. It is a massive programme. Happily, none of the moves is quite as huge as the first opening of T5. Nonetheless, we need to make every one of them work well. Q313 Chairman: Are you absolutely confident that there will not be any repeat of the fiasco at Terminal 5? Mr Matthews: I am absolutely confident that we are not perfect today or in the future. I know we can get better and that we have learned the lessons we need to from Terminal 5. Q314 Chairman: What would you regard as an acceptable rate of baggage loss? Mr Matthews: One can look across at different airports. It is always the case that if one checks in a direct bag one does not have the risk of a late arriving aircraft in the same way. Therefore, direct bags are always more reliable than transfer bags, but I believe that our performance in Terminal 5 is the same or slightly better than the other terminals and today's level is comparable with other airports. Q315 Chairman: But is it good enough? There have been criticisms in the past about baggage loss at Heathrow. Mr Matthews: No, it is not good enough. How can I possibly say that it is good enough until there is not a single bag lost? Q316 Chairman: You do not give the impression that you attach any urgency to dealing with that? Mr Matthews: I absolutely attach urgency to it. Sadly, there is no airport on earth yet that has the technology to measure lost bags in parts per million, but that is where we need to get to and that is what customers expect. Q317 Chairman: We have been told that the loss is 8.3 bags per thousand. That is a lot, is it not? Mr Matthews: That is less than 1%. Some people would say that is great; I say it is not good enough, but the technology available today in airports around the world is just not perfect. Mr Morgan: One point made earlier was the fact that a lot of the baggage systems at Heathrow, particularly into terminal, were manual and relied very much on people putting bags on trucks and driving them around or whatever. One of the projects in the transformation of Heathrow is to put much more automation into that, so particularly in the area of transfer bags that should help to get the ratio down as far and as quickly as possible. Q318 Chairman: But you will not put a figure on it? Mr Morgan: The answer to your question as to what would be acceptable is zero if it was my bag. Q319 Mr Wilshire: Mr Matthews, you have rightly said that perfection is impossible but clearly you would like to reach near perfection. Are you aware there are those who say that Heathrow ought to be better, not bigger? Am I right in believing that you will never reach near perfection until you have another runway? Mr Matthews: I think there are lots of things we can improve without another runway, but some things we cannot improve without having more resilience. Two days ago there was a major rain storm, which I am sure Members of the Committee will have noted. Even a rain storm causes delay at Heathrow because we have no margin for events like that. It causes a slow down in the landing and take off rate. I think that capacity at our hub and the nation's connection to the rest of the world is a critical issue. Q320 Chairman: That is perhaps a topic for another day, but we do not accept that capacity issues are an excuse for poor management of the sort we saw at Terminal 5. Mr Matthews: Quite right. Q321 Mr Wilshire: I was not suggesting that, Chairman. You said that you liked to be invisible and hoped people would try T5. In my travels round the world it is not just a British problem that we have now. I hear elsewhere people saying that after what has happened they would rather travel anywhere than through Heathrow. That must be deeply serious for the local community and the country. Can you on your own or with BA somehow come up with a programme to get the message across to the travelling public across the world that it is now safe to come to T5 again? Mr Matthews: I am sure that modestly, calmly and prudently we should do exactly that. Q322 Mr Wilshire: Do you have plans to do it? Mr Matthews: We have some embryonic plans to do that, but personally I will be cautious. I want to make sure that the facts precede the proclamation of them. Q323 Mr Wilshire: When will the embryo be born? Mr Matthews: I do not have specific timing, but I think that right now
Heathrow's competition is Chairman: Thank you for coming and answering our questions. That is very helpful. |
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