1. This Report continues a conversation with the Government on whether the Prime Minister should continue to exercise near-absolute power to reorganise the Civil Service Departments. The Government's most recent Response, received on 25 April 2008, is published below as an Appendix.[1]

2. The Government's further response is thoughtful, and rightly points to a stumbling block to parliamentary control over the organisation of Government Departments under the existing system. This is that, constitutionally and legally, the "organisation and functions of a Government Department are fundamentally a reflection of the responsibilities of the minister in charge of the Department".[2] Thus, parliamentary control over the organisation of Government would effectively mean parliamentary control over the organisation of the Cabinet.

3. However, the current model is not the only possible model. Indeed, it has not always been in use in this country. Thus, the Ministry of Defence was established by Act of Parliament in 1946; further defence-related functions were transferred by Act in 1964.[3] In Canada, Government Departments are established and dissolved and significant functions transferred between them through primary legislation. This shows that it is possible, in a Westminster-style parliamentary system, to provide for parliamentary control of the Executive's power to reorganise the Civil Service.

4. Reorganising Government Departments in line with ministerial responsibilities may be long-standing practice, but it is putting the cart before the horse. We are not calling for primary legislation for every government reorganisation, but for major changes to the machinery of government, new secondary legislation should be subject to a debate and vote in Parliament to ensure proper scrutiny and analysis of the consequences.

5. This would require a fundamental change to the way that Government is structured. It would mean giving statutory functions to Government Departments, rather than just to interchangeable Secretaries of State. It would not limit the Prime Minister's ability to appoint ministers of his or her choice, but it might mean that those ministers would exercise functions across Departments, at least until changes to departmental functions had been set out in law and agreed by Parliament. Such a change would be an important practical demonstration of the Prime Minister's commitment to "entrust … more power to Parliament" and to "surrender or limit" his own powers.[4] We call on the Government to reconsider their position.

2   p 2 Back

3   Ministry of Defence Act 1946; Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act 1964 Back

4   HC Deb 3 July 2007, c 815 Back