Recalls and the prison population
161. The 2003 Act overhauled the system of release
and licence for prisoners on sentences over 12 months (and would
have changed systems for people on short-term custodial sentences,
but those provisions have not been brought into effect). Previously,
offenders on sentences of less than four years were released on
licence from prison half-way through their sentence and then released
from licence at the three-quarter point. The final quarter of
the sentence was spent 'at risk'if a further crime was
committed the time remaining could be added as an additional custodial
sentence to any further penalty. In the 2003 Act the licence period
was extended to last the full sentence. The 2003 Act also allowed
the Secretary of State to lay down standard conditions of licence
and set procedures for when licence conditions were alleged to
have been breached and the individual was recalled to prison.
The new procedures transferred the responsibility for deciding
whether a person should be recalled to prison from the Parole
Board to the Secretary of State-effectively the Probation Services.
The Parole Board, however, reviewed all recall decisions to determine
whether they are fair; the offender also has a right of appeal
to the Parole Board against the recall decision. When considering
the decision to recall, the Parole Board must also determine either
the date on which the prisoner will be re-released or the date
of the next review at not less than annual intervals.
162. Our attention was drawn to the number of
prisoners being recalled to prison for breach of licence because
it is an area where numbers are rising rapidly. The Prison Reform
Trust stated that in the five years to 2005 there had been a 350%
rise in the number of offenders recalled to prison for an alleged
breach of conditions.[246]
In 2006-7 11,231 offenders were recalled to prison compared to
8,678 the year beforea 29% increase in one year alone.[247]
This compares to 2,457 people recalled during 2000-1.[248]
Although the overall percentage of the prison population made-up
of recalled prisoners at any one time is relatively small, the
Prison Reform Trust pointed out that it was rising very quicklyboth
because of the increased number of persons recalled and because
the changes to licence arrangements in the 2003 Act meant that
individuals were liable to stay in prison longer if they are recalled.[249]
163. We heard two main criticisms of this system
for recall of prisoners: first, that people are not supervised
effectively in the community when on licence and that this contributes
to the level of breaches and, secondly, that the system was too
inflexible and focused on returning people to custody rather then
enabling them to comply with conditions.[250]
The Parole Board had particular concerns about how the increasing
numbers of recalls impact on their resourcesparticularly
in light of the other pressures on these in relation to Imprisonment
for Public Protection (see Chapter 3).
164. Witnesses presented a picture of a supervision
system that was not able to manage people effectively whilst they
were on licence. Lord Woolf was concerned that those on licence
were almost set up to fail because "the way we look after
those who are punished in the community has deteriorated".[251]
He raised concerns about overstretched probation resources which
made it difficult to provide effective community supervision.
The Council of HM Circuit Judges concurred, pointing out that
"breaches will continue to occur as long as underlying problems
remain".[252]
If the underlying issues are not dealt with either in the prison
sentence or during the licence period then the offender is much
more likely to breach the conditions. The Prison Governors' Association
raised as a particular problem the fact that offenders with substance
abuse problems may have chaotic lifestyles so that keeping to
a regular schedule of appointments would be a real challenge.
Unless we have a more "realistic" expectation of individuals
on licence then we are bound to see breaches of those conditions.[253]
165. We are concerned at evidence of the inflexible
system of response to breaches. The Prison Reform Trust told us
that using prison as a means to enforce breach of conditions:
"
is a non-sophisticated response in that it is a default
setting [
] if somebody does go back to prison, if it is
a relatively minor infraction, such as, for example, being late
for appointments, then if you send them back to prison and they
can, in practice, spend most of the rest of the face value of
the sentence in custody, that is disproportionate in relation
to the seriousness of what the person has done".[254]
In answer to a recent question, the Ministry of Justice was unable
to provide a breakdown of reasons why offenders were recalled,
although it was able to state that only about a quarter of those
recalled were called back for committing a further offence.[255]
The Prison Reform Trust noted that the most frequent reason
given for recall is that the individual is "out of touch".[256]
166. The Parole Board had particular concerns
about the current recall system due to the strain on its resources
and questioned whether looking at every single recall case added
value-only a small number of cases might concern those who were
considered dangerous or serious offenders. Its view was that the
current system was "wasteful of resources, does little to
protect the public or to prevent re-offending".[257]
The length of time taken by the Parole Board to hear recall
cases has been held in the courts to be in contravention of the
European Convention on Human Rights; the reason given by the Parole
Board for the length of time taken to get to a hearing was that
lack of resources meant that it was not possible to have the hearing
any sooner.[258]
167. The Government is aware of the concerns
raised and the 2008 Act contains provisions to change the recall
system. The 2008 Act provides for a revised recall system, including
a fixed period of recall whereby an eligible recalled prisoner
would be released automatically after 28 days provided the Secretary
of State is satisfied that he will not present a risk to the public.[259]
This means both that the Parole Board would not be required
to review every case and that offenders would not be waiting in
prison for long periods awaiting that review. Referral to the
Parole Board of recalled prisoners ineligible for automatic release
(extended sentence prisoners, those sentenced for a specified
offence and those not considered suitable for automatic release)
will take place after the 28-day period or before if the prisoner
makes representations to that effect.[260]
168. These new arrangements seem likely to ease
some of the resource pressures on the Parole Board and to tackle
concerns that individuals were receiving potentially very long
custodial periods for relatively minor acts that breached their
licence conditions. As such, the Parole Board told us that they
supported the principle of the 28-day fixed recall system.[261]
The Prison Reform Trust commented that, on practical grounds,
the proposed system could be an improvement: "so, for the
more minor infractions it would be sensible to have a limit. What
tends to happen at the moment is that people often stay in custody,
having been sent back for relatively minor failures to comply,
for very long periods, because there is no realistic hope of the
Parole Board reviewing the case within a very short period of
time".[262]
169. However, the 28-day fixed recall period
does not tackle the more fundamental issues expressed to us, such
as the fact that the recall system is too inflexible to assist
people to comply with their licence conditions rather than simply
returning them to custody. Simon Creighton expressed concern that
a 28-day recall period could worsen matters because it would face
recalled prisoners with all the problems of any short sentence-breaking
ties and systems that support an individual and help them not
to re-offend, without helping them in any other way to tackle
the problems. He suggested that the result might be simply a revolving
cycle of individuals coming back, and back again, for 28-day periods
because re-offending was not managed. The Committee stage within
the House of Lords of the 2008 Act involved significant debate
on these provisions, highlighting the inflexibility of the 28-day
fixed period.[263]
170. We welcome the Government's acknowledgement
that the recall system set out in the 2003 Act is not appropriate,
as evidenced by the changes to the system in the 2008 Act. The
28-day fixed recall system should deal with particular concerns
about the strain placed on Parole Board resources by the need
to review every recall decision.
171. We remain concerned, however, that the
system for recalling prisoners on breach of licence is unnecessarily
rigid. Changes to the recall system do not extend the flexibility
that people working with offenders need if they are to enable
the highest levels of compliance.
Breach of Community Sentences
172. Similar concerns about inflexibility were
raised with regard to breach of community sentences. The 2003
Act set out procedures for breach of the new community sentences.
The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies report that their research
suggested that where orders are breached, sentencers have less
discretion than previously to avoid imprisonment.[264]
In the past, sentencers could choose to take no action, issue
a warning or impose a fine. Probation officers had more discretion
about whether they took a breach case back to court. However,
when Community Orders are breached, courts can only amend them
the order by imposing more onerous requirements, or revoking the
order and re-sentencing, possibly with a custodial sentence, even
where the original offence was not punishable by imprisonment.
When Suspended Sentence Orders are breached, courts can activate
the custodial sentence, impose more onerous requirements or lengthen
the supervision period.
173. The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies,
therefore, argued that there was an urgent need to "address
the rise in the number of people who breach community sentences
or are recalled to custody for breaching their licence conditions".[265]
The Mayor of London's Office also agreed and warned that the increase
in custodial sentences for those who breach community penalties
"risks undermining the principles of sentencing". It
continued: "a better balance must be found between enforcement
and enabling offenders to be given every support and opportunity
to comply with a community sentence".[266]
The trade union and professional association for family court
and probation staff (NAPO), described breach as a "nightmare".[267]
The Criminal Bar Association warned that a "lack of resources,
insufficiently experienced personnel and insufficient facilities
will lead to the almost inevitable breakdown of such sentences
and the almost equally inevitable imposition of custody".[268]
174. As with breach of licence conditions, witnesses
sought a system for breach of community sentence conditions that
was flexible enough to support the offender in meeting the conditions.
David Faulkner believes that: "breaches of condition should
be dealt with firmly, although with more flexibility for those
which involve no more than a missed appointment, and it is just
as important for the supervisor or offender manager to try and
make sure that breaches do not occur in the first place".[269]
The Howard League's concerns were with the "inflexibility
and automatic nature" of the current system.[270]
The Centre for Crime and Justice Studies suggested that
a system to enable compliance, rather than counterproductive enforcement,
might be developed through a graduated system of positive rewards
and a graduated hierarchy of responses to a breach.[271]
Clinks suggested that probation staff be given greater discretion
to deal with failures to comply with conditions in the context
of an offender's individual circumstancesthey describe
drug rehabilitation scenarios where offenders' chaotic lifestyles
are taken into consideration and missing appointments treated
as a learning experience.[272]
175. We urge the Government to reconsider
the systems by which the Probation Service and the courts are
required to deal with breaches of conditions or breach of licence.
A more flexible system which enables these services to support
compliance, rather than automatically punish what may be minor
infringements, would contribute much more in the long run to public
protection by preventing re-offending than sending people to prison.
245 Uncorrected transcript of oral evidence on Sentencing
Guidelines, taken before the Justice Committee 22 January 2008,(HC
279-i), Q 4 Back
246
Prison Reform Trust, Bromley Briefings, Prison Fact file, December
2007 Back
247
Ministry of Justice, National Offender Management Caseload Statistics
2006, Table 10.8 Back
248
Ibid Back
249
Prison Reform Trust, Bromley Briefings, Prison Fact file, December
2007 Back
250
See for example Ev 19 Back
251
Q 12 Back
252
Ev 24 Back
253
Ev 107 Back
254
Q85-87 Back
255
HC Deb, 4 February 2008, col.941W Back
256
Prison Reform Trust, Bromley Briefings, Prison Fact file, December
2007 Back
257
Ev 97 Back
258
R Cooper v Parole Board [2007] EWHC 1292 (Admin) (18 May 2007),
www.bailii.orglew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/254.html Back
259
Clause 29, new subsection 255A Back
260
Clause 29, new subsection 255C(4) Back
261
Q 184 Back
262
Q 87 Back
263
HL debate, 27 February 2008, col. 664. Concern was particularly
significant regarding clause 31 which gives the Secretary of State
increased discretion to recall life-sentenced prisoners on licence.
In existing provisions, the Secretary of State has this power
but only when it is 'expedient in the public interest' to recall
the person before a recommendation by the Parole Board is practicable:
section 32, Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. It is unclear, however,
whether this change would significantly affect the number of people
recalled by the Secretary of State as the Government have said
that the existing power is used and anticipate the same test will
be applied by the Secretary of State-'expedient in the public
interest': HL debate, 27 February 2008, col. 670-671 Back
264
Ev 16 Back
265
Ev 19 Back
266
Ev 86 Back
267
Ev 17 Back
268
Ev 31 Back
269
Ev 43 Back
270
Ev 66 Back
271
Ev 19 Back
272
Ev 22 Back