Submission by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) to the Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry into Global Security: Iran

James M Acton, Michael Crowley and Andreas Persbo

8^th June 2007

About VERTIC

1. This submission has been prepared by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). Founded in 1986, VERTIC is an independent non-governmental organization that promotes effective and efficient verification as a means of ensuring confidence in the implementation of international agreements and intra-national agreements with international involvement.

2. This submission is based on the results of a yearlong research project under which VERTIC developed a range of legal and technical measures that could contribute towards the solution of the current impasse. The project was funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT).

Introduction

3. Iran is a prime example of a country that has a major confidence deficit with regard to its implementation of international agreements covering nuclear activities. We believe that fresh thinking is needed to resolve the current diplomatic dispute, before the situation deteriorates further. VERTIC welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

4. This submission will seek to examine options for the development of transparency and confidence building measures by which Iran could seek to reassure the rest of the world that its nuclear activities are entirely peaceful. In so doing, the submission will address two of the issues of concern to the FAC namely:

a. the extent of the progress Iran has made on nuclear development; and

b. the options open to the international community in addressing the possibility of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, and the implications of these options for regional and global security, nuclear proliferation and energy security.

Progress made by Iran on nuclear development

5. Over the years, Iran has developed an extensive domestic nuclear fuel cycle. The country's ambition seems to be to establish one of the largest nuclear infrastructures in the developing world. A list of a number of known facilities, and their respective status is reproduced in appendix 1 to this submission. Although activities at the majority of these facilities are under scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA or 'the Agency'), information on certain facilities such as the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) and the Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is incomplete. In addition, the Agency has been visiting two military sites at Parchin and Lavisan-Shian[1] and its investigations into activities conducted at those two facilities are still ongoing.

6. Iran has attempted to procure nuclear technology both overtly and covertly. The management and operation of a clandestine procurement network has by some been interpreted as one important indicator of Iran's intent to acquire nuclear weapons.[2] After all, what's the point of hiding the country's activities if there is no mala fides? The Iranians have responded to this argument by pointing to the fact that previous overt procurement efforts by Iran often have been thwarted by certain Western governments. For instance, under the terms of a 1995 nuclear agreement, Russia agreed to negotiate the construction of a uranium enrichment facility (presumably equipped with short sub-critical centrifuges). This contract was subsequently cancelled after US pressure.[3] According to Iran, the reluctance of Western suppliers to engage with the country forced it to rely on the often expensive supply of the so-called A.Q. Khan network.

7. Operated from Kahuta, Pakistan, and headed by metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, this network supplied sensitive nuclear technology to 'rogue' customer states, including Libya and North Korea.[4] This technology included, in the case of Libya, weapons designs complete with engineering drawings and handwritten notes related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.[5] Iran seems to have received documents of similar character, particularly on 'the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components'.[6] It is very troubling that this document remains in Iran's possession since its content has no civilian application. . Such concerns are exacerbated by the involvement of the Iranian military in the country's nuclear programme, especially as its role in this respect has never been adequately clarified.[7]

8. The A.Q. Khan network also supplied a number of centrifuge components and centrifuge designs to the Iranians. These designs are based on outdated European centrifuge technology. A table outlining the relative effectiveness of these centrifuges is reproduced in appendix 2. Compared to state of the art western technology, these centrifuges are very ineffective. At present, however, uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge nevertheless represents Iran's quickest route to acquiring enough fissile materials for nuclear explosives. After a period of suspension, Iran is presently installing centrifuges at a reasonably high rate at one of its underground centrifuge halls at Natanz, central Iran.

A note on Iran's progress in uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge

9. By early May 2007, Iran had installed approximately 1,600 centrifuges in its fuel enrichment plant (FEP)[8]. If it keeps current pace, it will have installed its first 'module' of 2,912 centrifuges by the Autumn of 2007.While ineffective by modern European standards, see appendix 2, a facility that size may theoretically produce enough material for one weapon in less than a year if the feedstock is natural uranium, less if the feedstock is low enriched uranium.[9]

10. It remains unknown how much raw material (such as aluminum and maraging steel) and other centrifuge components Iran has at its disposal to keep construction of the enrichment plant going. In March 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security reported that the country 'has enough components for up to 5,000 centrifuges' but that 'many components are not expected to pass quality control'.[10] Although centrifuge assembly workshops used to be under Agency verification during the suspension,[11] they are no longer monitored by the IAEA.

11. There are unconfirmed reports that Iran has overcome previous problems with feed materials and that they are well underway in managing larger cascades of gas centrifuges. This has prompted IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to call on the Security Council to reconsider its requirement that Iran suspend uranium enrichment and related activities[12].

Conclusion

12. Iranian officials seem to be confident of their own ability to construct and run the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, and reportedly have 3,000 personnel working in shifts to complete construction at the site.[13] As noted above a full 'module' of 2,912 centrifuges is likely to be completed in the latter half of this year. Although Iran has announced its intention to continue centrifuge development beyond the first module (towards the completion of a fuel enrichment plant with more than 50,000 units), it remains to be seen whether it has the resources to do so.

13. The presence of a functional uranium enrichment facility in Iran does not necessarily mean that Iran is developing a nuclear weapon. What it does mean, however, is that, proceeding at the current level of activity, Iran will have the capacity to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than a year. Depending on how much work, if any, Iran has done on so-called weaponization, they could have a device shortly thereafter. However, this worst case scenario, sometimes floated in the media, assumes that Iran is able to operate its facilities around the clock, and without major interruptions. This is unlikely to be the case for some time yet,

14. The need for effective verification and transparency measures going beyond Iran's legal obligations are the more pressing the more developed Iran's fuel cycle becomes. Not only is transparency and verification important to resolve outstanding issues, but it is also instrumental if a militarily significant diversion or other violation is to be detected in time for an appropriate action to be taken.[14] The next section will outline some options open to the international community which could facilitate trust in Iran's nuclear programme. It will also assess the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards in Iran.

Technical and political options open to the international community

The purpose of IAEA safeguards

15. There are three generic ways in which a civilian nuclear programme can be used in the development of nuclear weapons. First, declared nuclear material (uranium or plutonium) can be diverted for use in a nuclear weapons programme. Second, the knowledge gained from operating a civilian programme can be used to run a clandestine military programme-this is sometimes known as sneak-out. Third, having developed fuel cycle capability as part of a declared programme, a state can leave the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), end international inspections and use its facilities to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. This scenario is sometimes known as breakout.

16. Under the terms of the NPT, non-nuclear weapon state parties are obliged to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programmes. The purpose and scope of these safeguards is set out in the Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which is concluded between the Agency and the individual state. Model provisions are contained in INFCIRC/153. Derogation from these model provisions is generally not allowed. The focus of this agreement is to give the IAEA the tools it requires to be able to detect whether states have diverted nuclear material from declared facilities.[15]

17. The provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in regard to the detection of clandestine facilities are rather limited. It requires states to place all nuclear material on their territory under safeguards and gives the IAEA the right to inspect suspected clandestine nuclear facilities. However, to initiate such inspections, the IAEA must first detect suspicious activities. And, according to Jozef Goldblat, 'it may be unable to do this unless it obtains relevant information from national intelligence agencies'.[16] It is analogous to giving the police the authority to make arrests for a particular crime, without granting them sufficient investigatory powers to detect, monitor, and identify suspects. This problem was highlighted when Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme was discovered in 1991. In response, the Model Additional Protocol (contained in INFCIRC/540) was developed. Its primary purpose is to give the IAEA the tools it needs to detect clandestine nuclear facilities.[17]

18. Nuclear safeguards, by themselves, are not designed to prevent breakout. Pursuant to article X of the NPT, a state may withdraw from the treaty and end IAEA inspections by giving three months notices if 'it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.'

Analysis of the effectiveness of current IAEA safeguards in Iran

19. Iran is a signatory to the NPT and has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force.[18] It signed an additional protocol on 18 December 2003. Although it has not yet ratified the Additional Protocol, it did apply it provisionally before suspending it on 6 February 2006.

20. Safeguarding declared facilities: VERTIC has recently published a study which, inter alia, analyses the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in Iran.[19] Using information available in the public domain, VERTIC estimated the quantity of nuclear material that Iran could divert from its declared facilities without attracting the attention of the IAEA. The answer depends on the facility in question, but is much smaller than the amount of uranium required for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. The VERTIC study did, however, identify two principal, relevant weaknesses of current safeguards on declared material.

21. First, not all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) is subject to safeguards. UOC must be processed before it is suitable for enrichment and for this reason used to be completely exempt from safeguards. Although the IAEA has recently started to safeguard some UOC, it does not have the legal authority to safeguard all of it.[20] Iran could divert unsafeguarded UOC with little fear of detection and could use it as feedstock for a clandestine programme.

22. Second, although the IAEA would almost certainly detect a military significant diversion from an Iranian facility, there is a question over whether it could do so in a timely fashion. The IAEA aims to detect the diversion of so-called indirect use nuclear material, such as low enriched uranium (LEU). within about one year.[21] There is some doubt about whether the IAEA can meet this target in all circumstances. More importantly, however, there is a strong argument that this target ought to be shortened; if a military significant diversion is only discovered a year after it has taken place there may be insufficient time to take preventative action before Iran succeeds in developing a nuclear weapon.

23. Safeguarding Iranian enrichment: Iran's enrichment activities are of particular concern. Apart from a diversion of material (which could take place at any facility), there are two specific ways that a declared enrichment plant could be used to produce material for a nuclear weapons programme: excess production and direct production. Excess production involves using a declared enrichment facility to secretly enrich undeclared nuclear material. Direct production involves reconfiguring a centrifuge cascade to produce weapons-usable high enriched uranium (HEU).

24. If the appropriate monitoring technology is in place, both excess production and direct production can be detected rapidly.[22] Some safeguards to detect direct production are in place.[23] It is unclear whether Iran has allowed the IAEA to use surveillance cameras capable of sending signals off-site. The Agency and Iran have however agreed interim verification arrangements at the FEP.[24] Exact details are unknown, but an unconfirmed and single sourced press report claims that inspectors visit the facility every 10 days.[25] Such inspections - if they are occurring - though expensive can be reasonably effective. However, remote monitoring, which could detect direct production in real time, is much more preferable.

25. There is no information in the public domain about what measures, if any, are in place to detect excess production. There is, therefore, legitimate doubt about whether Iran's enrichment facilities are suitably safeguarded. This concern is particularly acute in the case of the larger of Iran's two facilities, the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP).

26. It is very important to emphasise that even if appropriate safeguards were placed on Iran's enrichment facilities, such facilities could still contribute to a nuclear weapons programme because, by operating them, Iran would gain knowledge useful for conducting a clandestine programme. In addition, (as discussed below) they could also be used to acquire nuclear weapons as part of a breakout strategy.

27. Detecting clandestine facilities: Given that Iran does not have an additional protocol in force, the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared facilities is limited. Indeed, the Director General has regularly stated that without an additional protocol in force the IAEA is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared facilities in Iran.[26]

28. Moreover, even if Iran ratified an additional protocol and implemented it in full, it might not be adequate to build sufficient confidence in Iran's intentions.[27] Even with an additional protocol in place, a well-designed clandestine programme would have a reasonable chance of avoiding detection-not least because additional protocols work best in societies where multiple independent sources on a state's nuclear programme are available.

29. Detecting clandestine centrifuge facilities is a particularly challenging task. Centrifuge enrichment plants are small and unobtrusive. They produce almost no emissions and have no distinguishing features that cannot easily be hidden.[28] Moreover, because the IAEA does not have the authority to oversee the production of centrifuges, machines nominally produced for a declared programme could easily be diverted for use in a clandestine one. The existence of a declared centrifuge programme therefore makes it easier for Iran to conceal a secret one.

30. Safeguarding Iran's heavy water programme: Although Iran's enrichment programme has been the focus of international concern, its heavy water reactor (HRW) programme should not be neglected.[29] When completed, the IR-40 reactor at Arak has the potential to produce plutonium that is particularly suitable for use in nuclear weapons. To extract plutonium from spent fuel, Iran would require reprocessing capability. Although Iran carried out small-scale reprocessing experiments in the past, the IAEA has been able to verify that declared reprocessing activities have been discontinued. However, if Iran were to reverse this decision, or if it develops a secret reprocessing facility, the HWR could be used in the development of a nuclear weapon-most likely following breakout.

Policy options to enhance trust in Iran's nuclear programme

31. Three UN Security Council Resolutions relevant to Iran's nuclear programme-1696, 1737 and 1747-are currently in place. To comply with them, Iran, at a minimum, needs to:

a. Immediately suspend all enrichment-related activities, as well as continue the suspension of reprocessing activities;

b. Immediately suspend its heavy water reactor programme;

c. Provide sufficient access to, and co-operation with, the IAEA to enable it to verify these suspensions and resolve any outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme.

d. Ratify promptly and implement in full an additional protocol, and in the meantime apply one provisionally.

32. The presence of these resolutions constrains diplomatic freedom of action by ruling out several options as legally unacceptable. This would include any proposed solutions involving the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation as these are likely to conflict with the resolutions. Such a situation will continue until the resolutions are amended, revoked or reinterpreted.

33. An additional Security Council resolution would be required for Iran to be permitted to restart its enrichment or HRW programmes. In the interests of facilitating a diplomatic settlement to the current dispute, one possibility would be for the Security Council to assure Iran that it would be permitted to restart some or all of its proliferation-sensitive activities under additional safeguards as soon as it has complied with the Security Council's demands and the IAEA has resolved all the outstanding questions about its nuclear programme.

34. Another solution would be for the Security Council to define what constitutes 'uranium enrichment' or 'uranium enrichment related' activities. This could allow for some freedom of action. Ideas concerning various forms of standbys (i.e. where Iran keeps its enrichment facilities operational but off-line) could also be discussed.

35. The following section of this submission seeks to analyse how the adoption of additional safeguards and/or the implementation of other confidence-building measures (such as a termination of sensitive nuclear activities) by Iran could be employed to build trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.[30] Such safeguards and confidence building measures would be 'voluntary' in the sense that Iran would have freely chosen to adopt them as part of a negotiated settlement. They could, however, form part of a formal agreement that would be binding once entered into.

Terminating sensitive fuel cycle activities

36. Terminating declared fuel cycle activities would obviously remove the possibility of a diversion. Moreover, although it would not prevent breakout, it would mitigate the consequences of Iran leaving the NPT. It could also slow the development of a clandestine nuclear programme by denying Iran useful knowledge.

37. If Iran choose, the following four programmes could all be utilised as part of a strategy to acquire nuclear weapons through breakout:

a. The heavy water reactor programme;

b. The Fuel Enrichment Plant;

c. The uranium metal production lines at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF);

d. Fuel fabrication facilities.

Operating them would give Iran knowledge that would-to varying degrees-be useful for running a clandestine programme. Their termination would, therefore, be an extremely important step in the confidence building process.

38. In addition, termination of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) would build confidence-but the benefits of terminating pilot-scale enrichment are less marked than the benefits of terminating industrial-scale enrichment at the FEP. There are two main reasons for this. First, because the PFEP is so much smaller than the FEP, its breakout potential is much smaller. Specifically, it seems very unlikely that after leaving the NPT, Iran could use the PFEP to produce sufficient high enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon before pre-emptive action could be taken. In contrast, the FEP could (when all 50,000 centrifuges are installed) produce enough high enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon within a small number of weeks.[31] Second, although Iran has not yet mastered centrifuge technology, its enrichment programme is continually maturing.[32] The more time passes before Iran suspends enrichment, the less effective such a suspension will be at denying Iran the knowledge it needs to operate a clandestine programme.

Improving safeguards on declared facilities

39. As identified above the two principal concerns with regard to safeguards on declared facilities are that (i) warning of a diversion would not be timely in all circumstances and (ii) not all uranium ore concentrate (UOC) in Iran is under safeguards. It would be straightforward to improve both these deficiencies. The IAEA already safeguards some UOC in Iran-expanding the scope of safeguards to cover all UOC would pose few technical difficulties. The IAEA could also detect a diversion more quickly by, for example, taking a physical inventory of Iran's nuclear material more frequently.

40. If Iran were not to abandon its pilot-scale enrichment programme, extra safeguards on the PFEP would also be appropriate. Given that the PFEP is so small, it can be effectively safeguarded against diversion, direct production and excess production (see paragraph 22 above) if Iran is willing to accept the appropriate (highly intrusive) verification arrangements.[33] To mitigate the consequences of breakout, it would also be important to ensure that a stockpile of LEU was not built up in Iran. To this end, Iran could agree to send all enriched uranium produced by the PFEP abroad for fuel fabrication.

Enhancing the means to detect clandestine facilities

41. Improving the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities is a more difficult task. Implementation and ratification of an additional protocol by Iran is a necessary first step. Furthermore, the risk of clandestine activities remaining undetected will be reduced when the IAEA is able to resolve all outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme.

42. The IAEA's prospects for finding a clandestine nuclear programme can be significantly improved if multiple opportunities for detection are made available. For example, at present Iran could obtain nuclear material for use in a clandestine programme by diverting UOC. If safeguards were placed on all UOC (as discussed in paragraph 38 above) Iran would be forced to build additional facilities to manufacture it secretly. This would give the IAEA an additional opportunity for detecting a clandestine programme and hence increase its chances of doing so.

43. It is also possible to increase the cost to Iran of equipping a clandestine enrichment plant. At present the IAEA has no authority to verify the manufacture of centrifuges-nor would have even where an additional protocol to be in force. If Iran does not terminate the production of centrifuges, it could divert some of them for use in a clandestine programme. This could be prevented by giving inspectors permission to oversee production and 'tag' completed machines. The IAEA could then keep track of them and ensure that none were diverted. Moreover, with this scheme in place, any untagged centrifuge that was discovered would be proof that Iran was engaged in a clandestine enrichment programme.

44. Further reassurance about the absence of undeclared facilities could be provided by permitting the IAEA to interview scientists and officials. Such interviews would be most effective from a confidence-building perspective if they were conducted in the absence of any Iranian officials. The IAEA could also be given permission to photocopy any documents it requested.

45. Technological means to detect clandestine nuclear facilities are also available. In particular, the IAEA could conduct wide area environmental monitoring in Iran.[34] This would involve installing a network of detectors (probably air samplers) capable of picking up the emissions from nuclear facilities. The discovery of enriched uranium, say, in an area far from any declared nuclear activity would constitute strong evidence of clandestine nuclear activities. Wide area environmental monitoring is effective at detecting secret reactors and reprocessing plants. Unfortunately, it is much less effective at detecting a clandestine gas centrifuge enrichment plant-unless intelligence to guide the search is available. Wide area environmental monitoring has been tested in pilot studies but never implemented in practice. A feasibility study would be required before implementing it in Iran.

Reciprocal confidence-building measures

46. To facilitate confidence building, there are various reciprocal steps that the E3+3 could take. Only steps directly related to Iran's nuclear programme are considered here. Other, more general confidence-building measures, though just as important, lie outside the scope of this submission.

47. Nuclear cooperation: The E3+3 has offered to support the development of a peaceful nuclear energy programme in Iran.[35] Iran has not yet responded positively to this offer. However, it should be noted that Iran's uranium resources are extremely limited and it will need to import uranium should it wish to implement a civilian nuclear reactor programme of any significant size.[36]

48. Fuel supply guarantee: The E3+3 has also offered to provide a guarantee that nuclear fuel will be made available to Iran at market price, should commercial supply mechanisms fail. The exact form of any guarantee would be have to be negotiated between Iran and the E3+3, and no specific proposal for Iran has yet been put forward. However, consideration should be given to establishing a physical 'fuel bank' for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, i.e. a stockpile of pre-fabricated reactor fuel owned by the IAEA which Iran is entitled to use if Russia (its primary supplier) refuses to supply it. Although such arrangements are not, in general, feasible (as reactors generally use different types of fuel and a guarantee should be capable of covering all reactors in a given country),[37] in the case of Iran it could be possible as Iran has only one reactor. Although there are many other models for a fuel guarantee, none are as credible in Iran's case as a physical fuel bank. In particular, there is only one facility outside of Russia licensed to fabricate fuel for Bushehr. There can be no certainty that this facility will have the spare capacity to produce fuel should Iran need to invoke the guarantee.

49. Open Skies Treaty: Iran could also be invited to join the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. This treaty gives state parties the right to conduct overflights over one another's territory. Its members include France, Germany, Russia, the UK and US. Overflights could be useful in searching for clandestine nuclear facilities in Iran and because it is reciprocal, the Open Skies Treaty could be a more palatable arrangement to Iran than one in which it is obliged to accept overflights but not allowed to conduct them.

Recommended priorities for confidence building

50. Should Iran suspend its enrichment programme in line with UN Security Council resolutions, negotiations on resolving the situation would follow. From the point of view of confidence building the optimum solution would be for Iran to agree to a complete termination of all sensitive nuclear activities as well as additional safeguards (both on any remaining declared activities and also those to detect undeclared activities). In any set of negotiations, however, it is likely that compromise will be needed. Agreement may not be possible unless the E3+3 agrees to the continuation of some sensitive nuclear activities-in particular, pilot-scale enrichment under additional safeguards once the IAEA has resolved any outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme. That said, VERTIC believes that the following steps are necessary, but not sufficient, for rebuilding trust in Iran's nuclear programme:

a. a suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities until the IAEA has been able to resolve all outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme,

b. a termination of the nuclear activities listed in paragraph 36 above;

c. the implementation and ratification of an additional protocol.

51. Permitting Iran to recommence pilot-scale enrichment is not without risks. Those risks can, however, be mitigated if the safeguards on enrichment are highly intrusive and robust. Moreover, the suspension should be lifted only after Iran has implemented an additional protocol and the IAEA has resolved any outstanding questions about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

52. Agreeing that Iran could recommence pilot-scale enrichment under the conditions outlined in the paragraph above could help to resolve the current impasse. Iran has frequently expressed its belief that the E3+3's aim is to make any suspension of its sensitive nuclear activities permanent. Assuring Iran that it will be permitted to restart its pilot-scale enrichment activities at an early date may help to persuade it to suspend them now. Moreover, as Iran's centrifuge programme matures, a complete termination of all enrichment activities will become increasingly ineffective at denying Iran the knowledge required to operate a clandestine programme. Based on information in the public domain, it is hard to estimate when it will become less effective than a continuation of pilot-scale enrichment under enhanced safeguards. However, if that point has not yet been reached, it is probably not far away.

53. It is also important to build confidence that Iran will not leave the NPT. There is very little that the 'technical' measures discussed in this submission can do in that regard. After all, concern about breakout is not primarily motivated by any particular feature of Iran's nuclear programme; fundamentally, it stems from a lack of trust in the government of Iran. For the technical confidence-building measures, such as those discussed in this submission, to be effective they must be part of a wider political process. The legal framework on which such a process could be built is discussed below.

Legal framework

Establishing an agreed framework

54. The previous sections of this submission outlined a range of practical transparency and confidence-building measures that Iran could introduce to build trust in its nuclear programme. Many of these measures could be developed and implemented unilaterally by Iran with the assistance, where appropriate, of the IAEA. However, although such a unilateralist approach is possible, it would have to overcome a large degree of scepticism from many in the international community.

55. VERTIC believes a fertile approach to building and maintaining international trust in Iran's actions and intentions could be to develop and subsequently introduce confidence-building and transparency measures (such as those outlined above) cooperatively with key partners in the international community and to implement them within a clearly defined and binding legal framework-or framework agreement.

56. In this part of its submission, VERTIC proposes key elements of such a framework agreement providing the mechanisms and processes by which Iran and the key partners can develop, implement and monitor a more detailed agreement establishing the specific package of transparency and confidence-building measures deemed appropriate and possible in this particular case. Although the framework is based on a cooperative solution between Iran and the key partners, in which all parties work towards establishing and implementing a range of confidence-building and transparency measures, the burden for its successful execution rests with Iran.

Scope of rights and obligations under a possible framework agreement

57. The legal framework proposed would need to be based on a delicate balance between Iran's inalienable right under article IV of the NPT 'to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination', and Iran's need and duty to assuage the concerns of the international community that its plans may not conform with articles II and III of the NPT. Without a change in Security Council practice, the framework would also need to take into consideration the obligations on Iran following from UNSCRs 1696, 1737 and 1747.

58. Iran's nuclear non-proliferation obligations are set out in article II of the NPT. According to the article, Iran has undertaken 'not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' and 'not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'.

59. The legal framework could establish that Iran shall not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon-usable material. Such wording would allow Iran to conduct enrichment up to the point where the product becomes usable in weapons (i.e. enriched to 20 per cent ²³⁵U). Other forms of enrichment and the reprocessing of irradiated fuel would constitute a breach of the agreement.

60. However, as is noted above, Iran is also bound by UN Security Council resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, which require it to 'suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development' as well as its work on heavy water-related projects. Whilst these UNSCRs remain in force, all forms of enrichment are disallowed irrespective of whether the product is usable in weapons.

61. The proposed framework agreement could also require Iran to not develop any subsystems or components that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons. Since the precise scope of such a requirement would be the subject of intense interpretation by the parties, the framework agreement could pre-empt potential divisions by asking a consultative committee (see below) to decide which activities or items should be proscribed, and for what period of time.

62. The framework agreement could also allow for the temporary suspension of any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities which are related to the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon-usable material, as well as their subsystems or components. Once again, a consultative committee could decide on the precise meaning of these terms.

63. Consultative committee - role and remit: While Iran is likely to view moves towards the establishment of an agreed set of cooperative confidence-building and transparency mechanisms as being in its interests, it is likely to reject any proposals that do not acknowledge its active involvement and allow it some measure of control in such a process. On the other hand, if the other parties to the agreement believe that Iran is in effective control of the confidence-building venture, their confidence in the outcome of the process will decrease or, in the worst case, vanish completely. A delicate balance must therefore be struck; the process should involve Iran to the greatest extent possible, yet contain checks, which ensure that the international community is convinced that its products accurately reflect conditions on the ground in Iran.

64. Such a balance can be realised through the mechanism of a consultative, or executive, group of state nominated actors. The role of the consultative committee is to give practical guidance on the operation, interpretation and development of the framework agreement. For instance, it could:

· consider questions concerning verification of compliance with the obligations assumed, which may be considered ambiguous;

· provide on a voluntary basis such information as any party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

· consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the legal framework;[38]

· consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the legal framework, including proposals for amendments;

· consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at restoring long-term confidence in Iran's intentions; and

· decide on whether long-term confidence in Iran's intentions has been restored.

65. Consultative committee - composition and decision making processes: The participation in the committee should be restricted to the parties of the framework agreement, with the chair rotating on a regular basis. Depending on how the decision-making process is set up, it may be necessary to allow more seats for the minority party (i.e. Iran). If procedural matters are decided by a majority vote, as suggested below, it could be prudent to level the playing field by allowing Iran as many representatives as the other parties combined.

66. The committee should agree upon and adopt rules of procedure for itself as well as financial rules governing its funding. It could decide procedural questions relative to the organization of its work, where possible by consensus, but otherwise by a majority of those present and voting. There should be no voting on matters of substance.[39] This point is of particular importance, since it would otherwise be possible for one party to claim unfair treatment, and use that claim as grounds for withdrawal. The disadvantage with no voting on substance is obvious; it allows one party to effectively deadlock the process. However, the temptation to deadlock the process could be dis-incentivized by the introduction of an independent observer.

67. The independent observer would be tasked with overseeing the process and, on the request of any one of the parties, deliver a public statement on a specific question relating to the implementation of the agreement. Public exposure of potential failures or disagreements will form an incentive to agree on a certain interpretation or course of action in order to avoid the issue being referred to the observer. The observer would play no other role-it would not have the right to speak at meetings of the consultative committee or be allowed to influence its work in any direction.

68. Verification measures: Any verification process established under the framework agreement should take care not to duplicate the procedures undertaken by the IAEA pursuant to its safeguards agreements with Iran.[40] However, while the IAEA will be best placed to verify compliance with many of the requirements of the framework agreement, it may not have the necessary authority, under its established safeguards system, to instigate and complete all forms of required inspections. For instance, certain verification measures may need to be conducted to gather more information on activities that have no apparent nexus to nuclear materials. Such activities may include visits to workshops and facilities run by the Iranian military or other groups closely connected to the national security apparatus of Iran.

69. In those cases where IAEA safeguards are not be able to cater for all specific concerns and needs arising from the framework agreement, an additional system could be developed to provide assurances within and between the parties, and, in so doing, complement the safeguards regime which the IAEA implements under the NPT.[41]

70. There is precedent in international arms control law for supplementary verification measures, not covered by Agency safeguards. An important example is the "Complaints Procedure" elaborated in Annex Four of the 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. This procedure forms an integral part of the treaty's control system, which aims to verify the parties' compliance with all treaty provisions.[42] These treaty provisions could serve as the prototypical architecture for a supplementary verification regime that would be applicable to Iran. This regime would essentially be entrusted with tasks that fall outside of "traditional" IAEA rights and obligations. The core elements of such a supplementary verification procedure are elaborated in VERTIC's recent publication on this issue[43].

Appendix 1: List of Iranian Fuel Cycle Facilities[44]

Appendix 2: Some centrifuge specifications

Source: Mark Hibbs, 'Pakistan developed more powerful centrifuges', Nuclear Fuel, 29 January 2007, <http://www.platts.com/Nuclear/highlights/2007/nucp_nf_012907.xml>; Marvin Miller, 'The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Proliferation', in Gilinsky, Miller, Hubbard, 'A fresh examination of the proliferation dangers of light water reactors', The Non-Proliferation Policy Education Centre (NPEC), 22 October 2004, p. 35

[1] Parchin is a very large military complex devoted to the research, development and production of ammunition, rockets and high explosives. The site has hundreds of buildings. Lavisan-Shian is home of the Physics Research Centre which purpose, according to Iran, has been 'preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defence) and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defence', see IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/83, 15 November 2004, p. 22

[2] For instance, former US Under-Secretary of State John R. Bolton has argued that 'one unmistakable indicator of military intent is the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding Iran's nuclear activities', see John R. Bolton, 'U.S. Efforts to Stop the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction', Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 4 June 2003, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/dos/dos060403.pdf>, accessed 5 June 2007.

[3] For some Iranian imports, see Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, 'Selected Iranian nuclear imports', Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, 1998, available at <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/irantbl.pdf>, accessed 4 June 2007

[4] For a in-depth description of A.Q. Kahn, his network, and his customers see Gordon Corera, 'Shopping for Bombs', Hurst & Company, London, 2006

[5] Ibid, p. 222

[6] Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran's Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities, Update Brief by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, 31 January 2006, p. 3.

[7] IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2006715, 27 February 2006, par. 54

[8] For a discussion of Iran's centrifuge and other nuclear activities see: The use of voluntary safeguards to build trust in states' nuclear programmes: the case of Iran, Verification Matters 8, VERTIC, James Acton with Joanna Little, May 2007, p 17-20.

[9] See for instance: Iran's Strategic Weapons Programmes: a net assessment, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Routledge, London, 2005, p. 54

[10] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, 'The Clock is Ticking, But How Fast?', The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 27 March 2006, < http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/clockticking.pdf>, accessed 5 June 2007

[11] According to the IAEA, Iran has 'a number' of privately owned centrifuge assembly workshops. Activities used to be centred at a site called Farayand Technique. According to Iranian officials, 'it is currently said to be the Quality Control Centre for all centrifuge components manufactured for the facilities at Natanz, but it also has capabilities suitable for the testing and assembly of centrifuges', IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran', GOV/2004/11, 24 February 2004, para 42

[12] Iranian Centrifuges Running Better Than Expected, Global Security Newswire, 15 May 2007, http://204.71.60.36/d_newswire/issues/2007_5_15.html

[13] See 'Natanz scales up', 26 May 2007, <http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2044629>, and 'Developments at Natanz', Nuclear Engineering International, 29 January 2007, <http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2041732> , both accessed 5 July 2007

[14] For a discussion on the concept of 'militarily significant diversions', see Allan Krass, 'Verification: how much is enough', published for SIPRI by Taylor and Francis Ltd, London, 1985, p. 201, available at <http://www.sipri.org/contents/publications/Krass85.html>

[15] Jozef Goldblat (ed) with David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, Taylor & Francis, London, 1985.

[16] Jozef Goldblat, 'Implementation of Article III of the NPT', undated paper, <http://www.opanal.org/Articles/cancun/can-Goldblat.htm>, accessed 4 June 2007

[17] Oliver Meier, 'Fulfilling the NPT: Strengthened nuclear safeguards', VERTIC Briefing Paper 00/2, Verification Research, Information and Training Centre (VERTIC), London, April 2000.

[18] Contained in International Atomic Energy Agency, 'The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferatio [sic] of Nuclear Weapons', INFCIRC/214, 13 December 1974, www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf.

[19] James Acton with Joanna Little, The use of safeguards to build trust in states' nuclear programme: The case of Iran, Verification Matters No. 8, Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, May 2007.

[20] International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Policy paper 18: Safeguards measures applicable in conversion plants processing natural uranium' in International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards Manual (SMR 2.18).

[21] International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, International Nuclear Verification Series no. 2, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 2002, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/nvs-3-cd/PDF/NVS3_prn.pdf, para 3.20.

[22] W. Bush, D. Langlands, N. Tuley and J. Cooley, 'Model safeguards approach for gas centrifuge enrichment plants', Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges, Vienna, IAEA-CN-148/98, 16-20 October 2006.

[23] In particular, the IAEA does take environmental samples in the cascade hall. Any direct production would certainly be detected-but given samples take weeks if not months to process, it would not be detected rapidly. International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran', GOV/2007/8, 22 February 2007, www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf, para 4.

[24] According to the 22 February 2007 report by the IAEA, 'the Agency agreed to interim verification arrangements at FEP, involving frequent inspector access but not remote monitoring, provided that these arrangements were in place before Iran started feeding UF6 into the cascades. Iran was informed that these arrangements (which are now in place) would be valid only for as long as the number of machines installed at FEP did not exceed 500, and that, once that number was exceeded, all required safeguards measures would need to be implemented'.

[25] 'IAEA inspectors in Iran', Press TV, 22 May 2007, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=10635&sectionid=351020104>, accessed 4 June 2007

[26] See for example, GOV/2007/8, para 27.

[27] Acton with Little.

[28] For a discussion of the difficulties associated with detecting clandestine gas centrifuge enrichment plants see Acton and Little and the references contained therein.

[29] Paul Brannan and David Albright, ISIS Imagery Brief: Update on Construction Activities at Arak 40 MW Heavy Water Reactor, Institute for Science and International Security, 21 April 2006, www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakupdate.pdf.

[30] Except where otherwise stated, a full analysis of all the proposals presented in this section can be found in Acton and Little.

[31] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Iran's strategic weapons programmes: a net assessment', Strategic Dossier, Routledge, London, 2005.

[32] For a detailed discussion of the current state of Iran's centrifuge programme see Acton and Little, page 25 and the references contained therein.

[33] In particular, remote monitoring of the cascade hall and feed and withdrawal stations would be required, as well as inline enrichment monitors. See Bush, Langlands, Tuley and Cooley for a more detailed discussion.

[34] Kenneth W. Nicholson, 'Practical application of wide area environmental sampling for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities', 22nd ESARDA Annual Meeting, Dresden, 8-12 May 2000, http://esarda2.jrc.it/db_proceeding/mfile/P_2000_Dresden_8-6.pdf; David W. Swindle, 'Wide area environmental sampling: Results from an international evaluation on potential applications in international safeguards', 22nd ESARDA Annual Meeting, Dresden, 8-12 May 2000, http://esarda2.jrc.it/db_proceeding/mfile/P_2000_Dresden_8-5.pdf; Garry Dillon, Wide Area Environmental Sampling in Iran, The Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, 2006, www.npec-web.org/Essays/WideAreaEnvironmentalSampling.pdf.

[35] See for example the June 2006 offer made to Iran by the British Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, on behalf of the E3+3, which is available at www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article-imprim.php3?id_article=5314.

[36] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand, Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development, Paris, p. 206.

[37] Fuel guarantees have been much discussed recently-for an overview of the debate see Oliver Meier, 'News analysis: The growing nuclear fuel-cycle debate', Arms Control Today, vol. 39, no. 9, 2006, www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NAFuel.asp; Pierre Goldschmidt, 'Mechanisms to increase nuclear fuel supply guarantees', Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, DC, 7-8 November 2005.

[38] A provision of this kind could be used to streamline the process, to strengthen or relax the verification regime, and to harmonize the confidence-building mechanism with a larger framework agreement covering other aspects of relations between the parties.

[39] While the absence of a vote-based decision making process significantly increases the risks of a deadlocked consultative committee, it could also, help to ensure the survivability of the committee, by reducing the danger that a vote against a party could prompt that party to withdraw from the agreement.

[40] Compare with 1986 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Annex 4, paragraph 5. This also conforms with Iran's suggestion that 'The NPT and the IAEA safeguards would form the essential basis of applicable law', Islamic Republic of Iran's Response to the Package Presented on 6 June 2006 (informal translation), p. 7

[41] See Hans Blix, 'The IAEA full scope Safeguards Agreements and compliance with them by Parties to the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones', undated document, <http://www.opanal.org/Articles/Aniv-30/blix.htm>, viewed 14 December 2006

[42] See in particular Article 8 (2) (d) of the treaty.

[43] Andreas Persbo, Thinking inside the box: exploring legal approaches to build confidence in Iran's nuclear programme, Verification Matters No. 7, Verification, Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), London, May 2007.

[44] Sources: IAEA Reports on Iran, GOV/2003/40, Annex, Page 1, GOV/2004/83, Annex 1; David Albright, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Status and Uncertainties', 15 March 2007, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/AlbrightTestimony15March2007.pdf>, accessed 7 June 2007