Memorandum from Elahe Mohtasham[1]

Senior Research Associate at the Foreign Policy Centre in London

Submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdom Parliament

Inquiry into 'Iran's Nuclear Programme'

11 June 2007

Executive Summary:

1. Much of the debate about the 'Iranian nuclear threat' is driven not so much by any hard evidence about a weapon driven programme but by fear that Iran's mastery of civilian technology would provide the means to rapidly develop a weapons capability should she wish to do so in future.

2. Unpalatable as some of Iran's policies and actions may be, it is far from an imminent threat to its nuclear and non-nuclear neighbours, or powers outside the Middle East region. Therefore, any attempt at 'pre-emptive' military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities is unlikely to be viewed sympathetically both within and outside Iran. Any military attack will galvanise the Iranian population and strengthen the hands of those religious hard-line fundamentalists who have argued against the benefits of joining international nuclear non-proliferation treaties and conventions. Short of a whole scale invasion and occupation of Iran, which will have catastrophic consequences, any aerial bombardment is unlikely to eliminate Iran's nuclear infrastructure and know-how but is likely to make it withdraw from the NPT and freely develop a weapons programme.

3. With most experts believing Iran to be between two to ten years away from becoming a nuclear weapon-capable state, there is still time to persuade Iran that benefits of remaining a non-nuclear state far outweigh any perceived security advantages that the possession of a handful of nuclear weapons may provide. The existing pre-conditions (mainly the suspension of all uranium enrichment related activities, including research and development by Iran) to the start of the negotiations between the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (the P5+1) should be removed to allow the diplomatic negotiations with Iran to begin as soon as possible.

4. Iran should be offered non-discriminatory access to nuclear materials and technology to pursue its legitimate civilian nuclear projects in return for enhanced confidence building and verification measures to ensure its activities remain confined to peaceful purposes.

5. Regional initiatives such as nuclear-free zones and multi-national ownership and control of nuclear fuel production facilities should be encouraged and supported to eliminate grounds for a regional arms race, and to discourage regional states to engage in a 'race' to acquire nuclear fuel cycle technology.

6. There is an urgent need for negotiations to find a formula to offer positive and negative security assurances to Iran.

7. Iran's legitimate security interests should be recognised by outside powers, and practical steps taken to allay its fears in return for Iran's cooperation in resolving some of the pressing issues confronting western countries.

8. Iran's integration back into the international economic and political system is the best guarantee of democracy within the country. Economic, cultural, and scientific ties may be linked to Iran's behaviour in both domestic and international arenas.

Introduction:

9. There are a number of key contextual variables, ranging from technological aspects of Iran's nuclear programme to less tangible issues related to Iran's intentions to acquire nuclear technology or the nature of diplomatic negotiations to resolve the conflict that would be crucial factors in any discussions about Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's human rights records as well as the military, economic and political threats, sanctions and pressures put on Iran through resolutions passed by the Security Council of the United Nations are factors, which also would have significant bearings in any discussions, analyses and list of recommendations put forward regarding Iran's nuclear programme and the UK's foreign policy towards Iran.

10. In this paper a series of questions have been identified to guide thinking about the United Kingdom's foreign policy towards Iran, especially in relation to Iran's nuclear programme. These questions are highlighted in the following paragraphs.

11. The factual information and analyses from which the Foreign Affairs Select Committee may draw conclusions is outlined in the main body of this paper, which is divided into three sections. The first section deals with a number of questions related to Iran's nuclear intentions and Iran's obligations under the NPT and the related safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The five questions addressed in this section are as follow.

i. What criteria could be used to determine whether Iran has the intention to acquire nuclear weapons?

ii. What have been the main areas of Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards?

iii. What have been the main remaining outstanding questions by the IAEA regarding Iran's nuclear programme by May 2007?

iv. What are the main components of the decision-making process in Iran regarding the nuclear programme?

v. What are the differences between the Security Council Resolution 687 adopted against Iraq in 1991 and the Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 adopted against Iran in 2006 and 2007?

12. The second part of this paper deals with the main technological developments in Iran's nuclear programme. There are three inter-related questions addressed in this section.

i. How far is Iran from the capability to construct a simple atomic device and to deploy an operational nuclear weapon?

ii. What is the relationship between civil and military aspects of Iran's nuclear programme?

iii. Could Iran's uranium enrichment programme be used only for producing fuel in civil nuclear reactors?

13. The third part of this paper provides an overview of Iran's nuclear programme within the global context of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The five main questions addressed in this section are as follow.

i. In which manner have the expectations put on the role and objective of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards evolved historically, and what impact have those changes had on the current dispute over Iran's nuclear programme?

ii. In what circumstances would Iran more likely to withdraw from the NPT?

iii. What has been the role of Iran in the NPT related export control measures, agreements and proposals between 1970 and 2007?

iv. Why have the United Kingdom and the United States been reluctant to provide a legally binding and unconditional security assurances to Iran and other non-nuclear weapon states?

v. What are the key obstacles as well as common interests in the diplomatic negotiations to reach an agreement between Iran and the P5+1?

14. The last section of this paper provides two appendices. Appendix I provides a chronology of the main events in the procurement of Iran's centrifuge and uranium enrichment technology between 1985-2007, and Appendix II provides a chronology of the main events in the negotiations between Iran and the three European Countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) including the high representative of the European Union (EU) between October 2003 and May 2006, and between Iran and the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) between 6 June 2006 and 31 May 2007.

Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Obligations under the NPT and IAEA Safeguards:

15. What criteria could be used to determine whether Iran has the intention to acquire nuclear weapons?

16. A state's potential motivations or incentives to acquire nuclear weapons and its behaviour have been the two central criteria that have long been used by analysts to determine the extent to which a country may wish to acquire nuclear weapons capability. In relation to Iran, the list of potential motivations could include the existence of nuclear weapons in the neighbouring countries of Iran (in Pakistan and Russia) and in the wider Middle East and South Asia (in Israel and India). The military presence of the two other nuclear weapon states (the UK and the US) in the Persian Gulf area could also provide added potential incentives for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons of its own. The possible use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons by Iran for defence or deterrence purposes, in case of a full-scale invasion of Iran, could be considered as a potential motivation for Iran to develop a simple design, emergency type, atomic device. Moreover, Iran's experience during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), a war which Iran believes started by Saddam Hossein with full knowledge, encouragement and support of the United States and the western European countries, and during which the ill-prepared Iranian troops were attacked by the Iraqi chemical weapons, and the Iranian civilians were bombarded with the Iraqi missiles, could be seen as a strong potential incentive for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons of its own. Other potential motives may also include the prestige factor which equates possession of nuclear weapons as being synonymous with having 'great power' status which appeals to both Iranian nationalists and islamists.

17. In the list of behaviours, Iran's failure to report to the IAEA in a timely manner its enrichment, processing and reprocessing activities using nuclear material, in the 1980s and 1990s, and the way Iran has acquired centrifuge technology through non-state procurement networks for almost twenty years, has added to the suspicions and provided circumstantial evidence to those states who have been accusing Iran of developing nuclear weapons. The technological options that would be available to Iran to use the civilian nuclear capability for use in a military programme are as follow. First, Iran could master the enrichment and other related nuclear technologies for the current overt civilian enrichment programme and build a parallel covert programme to enrich uranium for military use. Second, Iran would have the right under Article X.1of the NPT to withdraw from the treaty after providing three months notice for such a withdrawal, and then to convert its civilian enrichment facilities, which has been legitimately developed under Article IV of the NPT, to a military one. Arguably, such an option is currently available to a number of other non-nuclear weapon states such as Brazil, Germany, Japan and Netherlands.

18. However, the above suspicions and circumstantial evidence of the type argued by some states against Iran, do not fall under the international legal obligations that Iran has signed in the 1970 and 1974 in respects of the NPT and its associated IAEA safeguards measures. Under the terms of the NPT, like the other non-nuclear weapon states, Iran has to fulfil two fundamental obligations. The first obligation relates to Article II of the NPT, which requires from the non-nuclear weapon states not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. The second obligation relates to Article III of the NPT, which requires from the non-nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards, implemented by the IAEA, to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to weapons.

19. There has never been a specific enforcement mechanism in relation to implementation of Article II of the NPT obligations. Therefore, for example, if Iran were to decide to develop undeclared centrifuge nuclear facilities for the enrichment of uranium for military purposes, the IAEA would not have any type of monitoring system to detect such clandestine production of enriched uranium. In fact, such a wide area monitoring system would be considered as being unreasonably expensive by the IAEA and has never been before deployed anywhere else in the world. At the present time, only the centrifuges using UF6 as feed material based at Natanz are under the IAEA safeguards system. The construction of other centrifuges at other workshops in Iran not using any nuclear material would not fall under the standard IAEA safeguards measures, which Iran signed in 1974.

20. The enforcement of Article III of the NPT obligations is carried out through the IAEA's monitoring and verification that is designed to ensure that declared nuclear facilities are operated according to safeguard agreement with Iran, which Iran signed with the IAEA in 1974. In the past four years that Iran's nuclear programme has been under close investigation by the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, as early as November 2003 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that "to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ... were related to a nuclear weapons programme."[2] The same conclusion was confirmed by the IAEA Director General, in February 2006, which stated, "As indicated to the Board in November 2004, and again in September 2005, all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for."[3] In his latest report on Iran, the IAEA Director General confirmed again on 23 May 2007, that there has been "no-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran", and that Iran "has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities."[4]

21. Through several resolutions passed between 2003 and 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors made a ruling that Iran has failed, over a period of almost twenty years, to comply with some of its required reporting obligations. However, the IAEA has also emphasised that it "has not seen any diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devises."[5] Therefore, although Iran has been found in non-compliance with some aspects of its IAEA safeguards obligations, Iran has not been in breach of its obligations under the terms of the NPT.

22. Although the IAEA has stated that it is not yet in a position "to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear or activities in Iran", the Director General of the IAEA has acknowledged that "the process of drawing such a conclusion ...is a time consuming process,"[6] and that "the process of drawing such a conclusion, under normal circumstances, is a time consuming process even with an Additional Protocol in force."[7] It is important to note that there is an Addendum to the 2005 IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report, published in June 2006, which states that 45 other countries are in the same category as Iran, including 14 Europeans and several members of the Security Council.[8]

23. In terms of both potential motivations and actual behaviour, the Iranian officials have been adamant that it would not be in Iran's interest to acquire nuclear weapons on both ideological as well as on strategic grounds. Apparently, a Fatwa (religious decree) issued by Ayatollah Khamenei as the leader of the Islamic political system, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. [9] The discussion of any possible costs and benefits of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is also prohibited in official governmental institutions, even at the highest level of decision-making involving the Supreme National Security Council, at least since the issue of the religious decree in November 2004. President Ahmadinejad also rejected the utility of nuclear weapons in his statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 September 2005. The Iranian diplomats and officials maintain that as long as the Iranian political system remains Islamic, it is highly unlikely that the current religious decree could be changed.

24. In relation to Iran's military doctrine, the Iranian officials would also argue that Iran with its current state of technological development could not reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against its adversaries. They would acknowledge that nuclear weapons would increase Iran's global vulnerabilities without providing Iran any credible nuclear deterrence.[10] Iran also argues that its acceptance of over 2000 inspector-days IAEA inspections in the past three years, the signing of the Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003 and its implementation until 5 February 2006, the submission of more than 1000 pages declarations under the Additional Protocol, allowing over 53 instances of complementary access to different nuclear sites across the country, and providing repeated access to military sites which would amount to the most robust inspections, were clear indications of Iran's firm commitment to its obligations under the NPT and broader international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Iran has announced that it would be prepared to resolve any further outstanding issues with the IAEA, only if the nuclear dossier is removed from the Security Council and returned back for further investigation to the IAEA.[11]

25. There are different legal interpretations as to whether the mere delay in reporting of nuclear activities by Iran could have constituted a non-compliance legal case with Iran's IAEA's safeguards agreement. Iranian officials and diplomats would agree that they had conducted a number of nuclear activities that they probably should have reported to the IAEA at the time when those activities took place. However, they would argue that given Iran voluntarily disclosed substantial material related to its past nuclear activities, as a corrective measure, in October 2003 and throughout 2004, there should not have been a ruling of non-compliance by the IAEA over Iran's past nuclear activities. Under the IAEA's Statutes (Article XII:c) if states found in breach of their IAEA's safeguards agreements, they will be provided with an opportunity to return back to compliance within a reasonable time, before any punitive action taken against them or before their cases are referred to the United Nations Security Council. Section 19 of the IAEA's safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153), which deals with measures in relation to verification of non-diversion and any possible non-compliance makes it clear that the IAEA's Board of Governors "shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures" and "shall afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance."

26. In addition, Iran maintains that given that there has never been any evidence of conversion of nuclear material to weapon use, Iran has been in full compliance with its NPT obligations. Moreover, Iran maintains that other non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, such as Egypt and South Korea, had also found by the IAEA in 2004 and 2005 to have delayed in reporting some of their nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities. However, both Egyptian and South Korean files were closed by the IAEA Board of Governors without any punitive action against these two countries. Iran believes that there is a case of discrimination against Iran and that the IAEA Board of Governors made a ruling of non-compliance against Iran based on political pressures imposed by the United States and the European countries. Iran believes that further politicisation of the IAEA and the Security Council of the United Nations, which has imposed political and economic sanctions against Iran, following two resolutions (1737 and 1747) on 23 December 2006 and 24 March 2007 respectively, would have severe adverse effects on the credibility of these two important international institutions responsible for maintaining international peace and security.

27. What have been the main areas of Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards?

28. The IAEA's Board of Governors has found Iran to have been in a state of non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, which Iran had signed with the IAEA in 1974, in basically two areas. First, Iran had delayed in reporting the testing of a number of centrifuges with nuclear material for enriching uranium between 1991 and 2002 at the undeclared Kalaye Electric Company facility using undeclared nuclear material, which had been imported in 1991. Second, Iran had delayed in reporting of the undeclared import of natural uranium metal in 1994, and its subsequent transfer for use in laser enrichment experiment, including the production of enriched uranium.

29. What have been the main remaining outstanding questions by the IAEA regarding Iran's nuclear programme by May 2007?

30. All the main remaining issues that the IAEA wishes to clarify in relation to Iran's nuclear programme have been related to the possibility of the existence of a weaponised nuclear programme in Iran.

i. The IAEA would still need to clarify with Iran the sources of low and highly enriched uranium found at locations when Iran manufactured, used and stored P-1 type centrifuges. The IAEA has argued that it would need to have a better understanding of the history of Iran's centrifuge programme and to construct a full chronology of Iran's centrifuge enrichment programme in order to be able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations and its peaceful nature.

ii. There are also a number of points related to Iran's past reprocessing experiments;

iii. Iran's experimental work on polonium;

iv. Further clarification of why there had been contamination at the Physics Research Centre;

v. Iran should provide the IAEA access to documentation concerning uranium metal and its casting into hemispheres;

vi. Iran should provide clarification about Iran's alleged studies related to the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4,

vii. to high explosives testing,

viii. or the design of a missile re-entry vehicle,

31. Iran has declared its readiness to "negotiate on the modality for the resolution of the outstanding issues with the IAEA, subject to the assurances for dealing with the issues in the framework of the Agency, without the interference of the United Nations Security Council" [12]

32. What are the main components of the decision-making process in Iran regarding the nuclear programme?

33. The Iranian Constitution that developed following the 1979 Revolution, and the different kinds of interpretations that have been put on the Articles of the Constitution by various Iranian presidents and governments in the last 28 years have had significant bearings on Iran's foreign policy decision-making process. Many aspects of Iran's constitution and political system are modelled on western democratic institutions. Principle 57 of the constitution separates legislature, executive and judiciary from each other and states that these are independent powers (although in the case of Iran they operate under the supervision of the Vali-Faqih, the Leader). Principles of 6, 9, 56, 58, 59, 62 and 84 embody the principle of freedom, and emphasises the necessity of elections for the offices of the Presidency, the Majles (Parliament) and the Councils through a direct and secret ballot by the public. The 1979 Constitution was based on the Iranian Constitution of 1906, which had established a constitutional monarchy in Iran, together with the constitution of the Fifth Republic in France, with a strong Presidency. At the same time, there are a number of religious and almost mystical connotations in Iran's Islamic system of government. According to Principle 5 of the constitution, the state is to be led by an "honest, virtuous, well-informed, courageous, efficient administrator and religious jurist according to Principle 107" of the Constitution. However, the contradiction between the political role of the leader which according to Principle 107 is "equal with others before the law", with his religious role as the Vali-Faqih, with seemingly unlimited powers is evident in the same principle of the constitution. Principle 107 states that the leader assures "all the powers of the Velayate-Amr [a figure ruling by divine sanctions] and all the responsibilities arising thereof." Principle110 provides the leader with the most extensive duties and powers which include command of all the armed forces, declaring war and peace, and ordering mobilisation of forces, appointing, dismissing or accepting the resignation of the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the Commander-in-Chief of the armed and security forces, and resolving those problems confronting the system that cannot be solved by ordinary processes, through the Council for Determination of Exigencies. In relation to Iran's armed forces, the prominence of the Islamic ideology is underlined in the preamble to the constitution which states that "the Islamic Republican Army and the IRGC will be responsible not only for defending the borders, but also for the mission stated in the Book [Quran], of holy war in the way of God and fighting to expand the rule of God's law in the world." Principle 4 of the Constitution also stresses the importance of the Islamic rules and standards by stating that all military laws as well as civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, political, etc., should be based on Islamic criteria. It further emphasises, "this principle will absolutely or in general be dominant over all of the principles of the Constitution... and any determination in this connection will be made by the religious jurists of the Council of Guardians. However, it is important to note that despite the revolutionary tone of some aspects of Iran's constitution, Iran's foreign policy has remained pragmatic and remarkably non-ideological between 1980 and 2007. It appears that Islamic ideology as a normative set of beliefs has been present in Iran's domestic legal system. However, other non-religious identities, which are features of all societies, have also been influencing Iran's domestic and foreign policy behaviour. Familiar concepts such as realism and national interest based on a general cost and benefit analyses continue to play a significant role in the behaviour of Iran, particularly, in relation to its nuclear programme.

34. At a more practical level, foreign policy decisions involving national security, defence and nuclear issues are assigned to the Supreme National Security Council, which according to Article 176 of the Constitution operates within the framework of the general policies specified by the supreme leader. Although the head of the Supreme National Security Council is the Leader, the President of the country occupies a prominent role as the Chair of the council. Other members of the council are the speaker of the parliament, head of the judiciary, head of the armed forces' Supreme Command Council, the officer in charge of planning and budget, two representatives of the supreme leader, the heads of the Foreign Ministry, Intelligence and Security Ministry, and Interior Ministry, and the top officers from the regular armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In relation to Iran's nuclear programme, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council has come to play a leading role since October 2003 when Iran's nuclear programme became a controversial issue at international level. At the time of Presidency of Mohammad Khatami, Dr. Hassan Rohani was appointed between 2003 and 2005 to act as the Secretary of this council. Following the election of President Ahmadinejad, Dr. Ali Larijani who used to be the Leader's Representative at the Council has been appointed to act as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council.

35. As far as the decision-making process regarding Iran's nuclear programme is concerned, there are two main committees operating within the Supreme National Security Council, which deal with the nuclear issues depending on the level and importance of the subject. The most important and high-ranking committee consists of the President, Foreign Minister, and two representatives of the Leader. All important decisions are presented by this Committee to the Leader (currently Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i) in order to obtain his approval for the implementation of a particular policy. The second committee encompasses a wider group of people who are mainly from the Foreign Ministry dealing with detailed legal, technical and scientific issues and responding to questions asked by the IAEA.

36. Although there is no evidence of any formal decision taken to build nuclear weapons nor there exists any known official time-table for developing nuclear arsenals, the option of acquiring nuclear weapons capability or at least establishing a basic technological infrastructure and know-how to obtain such a capability in the face of an uncertain regional and international political situation, has been a hotly contested issue debated in the press, academic and non-governmental bodies at least since 1998 when India and Pakistan embarked on testing several nuclear devices to develop nuclear weapons. In my visits to Iran and private discussions with the Iranian officials, I have been struck by the degree of uneasiness and threat some felt towards the possibility of the Sunni supporters of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan, who regard Iranian Shi'as as heretics, to gain control of nuclear weapons in that country or to develop nuclear weapons of their own. It has been my impression that Iran is probably more concerned with the prospect of a Taleban or al-Qaeda type nuclear state than with the existence of nuclear weapons in the state of Israel.

37. Although Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, (the Leader of the Islamic regime), as well as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the head of the Expediency Council) have expressed their firm support for Iran's civil nuclear programme at critical times and important occasions, these two important figures have tried to remain neutral and relatively quiet in almost daily contested debates between the hard-line religious fundamentalists and reformists over Iran's nuclear programme and the country's various commitments under the international treaties not to acquire nuclear weapons.

38. In a meeting held in the presidential office in September 2006, situated in the crowded district of Tehran, Davood Ahmadinejad, the elder brother of President Mahmood Ahmadinejad, tried to reassure me that neither the President nor his close associates are in favour of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Davood Ahmadinejad who occupies one of the large adjacent white buildings next to the presidential palace, runs a separate inspection organisation called 'Special Inspectorate' [Bazresiye Vijeh]. He is believed to act as a close aid to his younger brother. In the course of discussing the nuclear issues with me, he emphasised that the President does not have the control of Iran's nuclear programme and any decision taken by the President on this issue would be a shared decision taken jointly with the other members of the Supreme National Security Council. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus amongst all the Iranian officials and key decision-makers that Iran should retain its rights under Article X.1 of the NPT and withdraw from its international obligations if extraordinary events jeopardize the interests of the country.

39. A month after the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696 adopted on 31 July 2006, and a couple of days following the publication of the IAEA Director General's report on Iran of 31 August 2006, I had a meeting with Dr. Hassan Rohani, who is currently Ayatollah Khamene'i's representative at the Supreme National Security Council. As the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council between 2003 and 2005, he was the head of the negotiating team dealing with Iran and the E3/EU nuclear discussions as well as responding to the IAEA's technical and legal questions. Our meeting took place at the Centre for Strategic Research attached to the Expediency Council, which is headed by the former President Rafsanjani. The Expediency Council acts as a mediator in disputes between the parliament (Majles) and the Council of Guardians. Since October 2006, Rafsanjani was given additional powers by the Leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i, to use the Expediency Council to oversee and possibly curb some of what it seemed as excessive policies of the newly elected President Ahmadinejad and his government. Hassan Rohani is currently the head of the Centre for Strategic Research, which provides advice to the Expediency Council on nuclear, defence and security issues. The centre also benefits from the membership of distinguished personalities, such as the former President Khatami and other moderates specialised in military and strategic studies.

40. I was welcomed warmly by Rouhani at his office at the top floor of the 9 storey modern glass-built building on the foot-hills of the majestic Alborz mountain in Niavaran situated in the affluent district north of Tehran. Rohani was very courteous and kindly offered me the top seat in the room and asked his assistant to bring us tea and sweets. Despite being a religious figure, wearing the traditional garb of the Iranian clergy, in nearly two hours meeting that I had with him, I found him as being friendly, liberal minded and at ease to talk to me privately. He came across as being confident, precise in his thought and choice of words, and it was clear that he had detailed knowledge of both technical and legal aspects of Iran's nuclear programme. It was easy to see why despite his initial reluctance to accept the post, the former President Khatami and Ayatollah Khamene'i had insisted that he should represent Iran on nuclear issues at international level in October 2003. I thanked Dr. Rohani for the opportunity to question him on sensitive and controversial issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme. More than any other politician in Iran, Dr. Rohani has made public and disclosed detailed information regarding the decision-making process in Iran's nuclear programme and the circumstances under which Iran and E3/EU negotiations had taken place. Therefore, I asked him the main reason for such transparency and openness. I suggested whether he felt that he was forced to disclose the information in order to defend his policies in the face of criticisms by some hard line factions in Iran. He said, "the analysts outside the country tend to exaggerate the factional differences inside Iran". He said "the main reason for the disclosure was that he felt obliged and accountable to the Iranian public and that although some analysts from outside would be reluctant to acknowledge, it is part of the normal process of the Islamic government in Iran that the officers in charge of the governmental affairs are constantly being questioned and the individuals in office are obliged to provide answers".

41. I asked Rouhani why Iran was against the installation of remote monitoring systems as part of the IAEA safeguards measures at the over-ground Pilot Enrichment Plant and underground Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz. The IAEA argues that the remote transmission of encrypted safeguards data to the Agency Headquarters in Vienna from Natanz would be necessary to compensate for the fact that measures normally used for verification at operational enrichment facilities, such as limited frequency unannounced access, are not feasible at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. Hassan Rouhani's reply was that the installation of such devices would have been justifiable only under the IAEA's enhanced safeguards measures called 'the Additional Protocol' which Iran had been voluntarily adhering to between 10 November 2003 and 5 February 2006. However, following the IAEA's Board of Governors' decision to refer Iran's case to the Security Council of the United Nations on 4 February 2006, Iran withdrew from its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol. As a result, Iran could only agree to the traditional, standard and less intrusive safeguards that Iran had agreed with the IAEA in May 1974. In these circumstances, Rohani maintained that any additional requests from the IAEA would be viewed by Iran as discriminatory with no technical or legally justifiable basis.

42. Although Iran installed a number of new cameras at Natanz on 2 February 2007,[13] in a meeting that I had with senior legal advisors of Iran's Foreign Ministry in Vienna on 2 May 2007, I was told that Iran would be very reluctant to agree with the installation of any remote monitoring cameras due to the security defects of such remote technologies, which are based on the use of the internet. Iran believes that such remote transmissions could provide unauthorised third parties with confidential information about Iran's nuclear programme. However, in a meeting that I had in Vienna, on 9 May 2007 with Ambassador Soltanieh, Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, he told me that as a confidence building measure, Iran had agreed to unannounced inspections of the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz. The latest IAEA report on Iran published on 23 May 2007 confirmed Ambassador Soltanieh's remarks to me. The IAEA report stated, "on 22 March 2007, Iran agreed to a modified safeguards approach for that facility which includes, in addition to a monthly interim inspection and design information verification visit, a combination of, inter alia, unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures (GOV/INF/2007/10)."[14] The first of such unannounced inspections took place on 13 May 2007.

43. In view of concerns surrounding the possibility of Iran developing a clandestine nuclear programme, I asked Dr. Rohani, in my meeting of September 2006, the question of whether and to what extent he would personally be confident that he and the Supreme National Security Council would have full knowledge of all the existing nuclear facilities, number of all the centrifuges available in Iran or the amount of nuclear material currently in existence within the country. He said that he was confident that no clandestine nuclear weapon programme could exist in Iran without his knowledge or that of the Supreme National Security Council. I asked Dr. Rohani about the number of centrifuges in Iran at that time. He did not provide me with any specific figures but he said that the IAEA had been informed of the number of centrifuges in Iran. This question was important because if Iran were to decide to develop undeclared centrifuge nuclear facilities for the enrichment of uranium for military purposes, the IAEA would not have any type of monitoring system to detect such clandestine production of enriched uranium. In fact, such a wide area monitoring system would be considered as being unreasonably expensive by the IAEA and has never been before deployed anywhere else in the world. Since 5 February 2006, when Iran withdrew from the Additional Protocol, only the centrifuges using UF6 as feed material based at Natanz have been under the IAEA safeguards system. The construction of other centrifuges at other workshops in Iran not using any nuclear material would not fall under the standard IAEA safeguards measures, which Iran signed with the Agency in 1974. It was quite significant that in his last report, as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, submitted to the former President Khatami on 31 July 2005, Dr. Rohani specifically mentioned, "if Iran's nuclear facilities are military attacked, we would still be able to continue our uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel process making without any threat of damage to them."[15]

44. Following the imposition of sanctions on Iran by the Security Council resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006, I had a meeting in January 2007 with the Vice-President of the Centre for Strategic Research of the Expediency Council, Hossein Mousavian. He was the head of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Supreme National Security Council between 2003 and 2005 and one of the key players in the E3/EU negotiations with Iran over the nuclear issue during the presidency of Khatami. I asked Mousavian what measures Iran would be taking to reduce the current mounting tension over Iran's nuclear programme and the possibility of military attack on Iran's nuclear facilities as well as civilian centres. Hossein Mousavian, including a number of other military analysts that I met at the Centre for Strategic Research were quite sceptical of any military action against Iran. Although Hossein Mousavian admitted that Iran was aware of the possibility of military attack on some of the specific nuclear facilities, he was quite dismissive of the possibility of military attack on civilians by Israel or the United States. He believed that any attack on the civilians would only have the opposite effect of rallying the people around the Islamic regime than weakening the regime or making it vulnerable to outside pressures. Hossain Mousavian suggested, "the only way out of the current crisis would be the adoption of a realist, flexible and face-saving approach by both side of the dispute. He said that whilst the Security Council of the United Nations should recognise the legitimate rights of Iran under the NPT to have access to nuclear fuel cycle technologies, Iran should also show flexibility and agree with a time-frame for implementation of confidence building measures."

45. There was also a general consensus amongst all the officials that I met at various centres of decision-making as well as at the Iranian Foreign Ministry that Iran's confidence building measures, transparency and openness that was becoming a characteristic of President Khatami's government has been replaced by feelings of tension and a general negative change in the political atmosphere following the presidency of Ahamadinejad, and especially due to the referral of Iran's nuclear file from the IAEA to the Security Council of the United Nations. However, in a number of meetings that I had with the people advising President Ahmadinejad's office, I found those individuals friendly and eager to engage in research, dialogue and academic work with research institutes in the western European countries and the United States. It has been my impression that the new generation of the people who have come to office following President Ahmadinejad's election, are eager to be acknowledged and respected by the recognised western academic and research institutes. They told me that the hard divisions usually made between the hard-line fundamentalists associated with President Ahmadinejad and the reformists associated with the followers of former President Rafsanjani or Khatami are misguided and probably the creation of the outsiders.

46. What are the differences between the Security Council Resolution 687 adopted against Iraq in 1991 and the Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 adopted against Iran in 2006 and 2007?

47. There is a generally held misconception that the Security Council Resolutions, (1696, 1737 and 1747 adopted on 31 July 2006, 23 December 2006 and 24 March 2007 respectively) asking Iran primarily to suspend its uranium enrichment programme were similar to the Security Council Resolution 687 adopted on 3 April 1991 which prohibited Iraq from retaining, acquiring or developing nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles. Such attempts to draw parallels between the Iraqi and the Iranian situations could cloud the issues, raise wrong expectations and lead to adoption of misguided policies. The differences between these resolutions were as follow. First, the Security Council Resolution 687 adopted on 3 April 1991 against Iraq was a disarmament resolution aimed at a country, which had invaded another one and was defeated in a war involving allied forces from countries around the world. Therefore, there was a genuine consensus around the world that Iraq's invasion of another country for territorial gain was wrong and had to be confronted and reversed back using military force under Chapter Seven of the United Nation's Charter.

48. Second, the main aim of the Security Council Resolution 687 against Iraq was to establish a formal ceasefire following the previous Resolution 686 of 2 March 1991 that had ended the war and had asked Iraq to cease hostilities and to rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait. Therefore, unlike the 2006 and 2007 Resolutions adopted in the case of Iran (which were over the interpretations of nature of the IAEA safeguards' rules and obligations), the Security Council Resolution 687 was the product of a war and the military defeat of Iraq in a conflict involving armed forces of the international community.

49. Third, it was only after the adoption of the Security Council Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991 that the IAEA, as one of the two organisations (along with the UN Special Commission - UNSCOM) was entrusted with implementing the United Nations' disarmament goals, which began to monitor, verify and destroy Iraq's nuclear facilities. Unlike the case of Iran between 2003 and 2006, the IAEA found substantial documents and evidence of the existence of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme between 1991 and 1998 (especially after August 1995 when Lt. Genearl Hussein Kamal, who was responsible for Iraq's weapon programme defected to Jordan and revealed additional information and released additional documents as evidence of Iraq's nuclear weapon programme prior to 1991). Therefore, in contrast to Iraq's situation in 1991, at the time of the adoption of Resolutions against Iran in 2006 and 2007, there was no consensus or an overwhelming agreement amongst the international community that Iran posed an eminent threat to its neighbours or to international security, or that Iran's nuclear programme should be confronted with military force. It was significant that in contrast to the Security Council Resolution 687 against Iraq, which was adopted under the general Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter in 1991, the Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 against Iran were adopted specifically under Articles 40 (in the case of Resolution 1696) and 41 (in the case of Resolutions 1737 and 1747) of Chapter Seven of the United Nations, which refer to political and economic sanctions and rule out the use of military force.

The Main Technological Developments in Iran's Nuclear Programme:

50. How far is Iran from the capability to construct a simple atomic device and to deploy an operational nuclear weapon?

51. To have fissile material production facility, such as the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz in Iran or a reactor to produce plutonium, and the knowledge of a weapon design, such as an implosion type atomic bomb, are only two of the necessary parts to enable a state to acquire nuclear weapons capability. There are other nuclear and non-nuclear parts that would need to be procured and assembled together. To put it in a comparative perspective, the first British atomic, implosion design, gravity bomb, called the Blue Danube (in use between 1953-1964) consisted of seven parts. These were the imploder system, plutonium core, initiator, casing of the explosive assembly, detonator firing mechanism, proximity fuse device and ballistic outer casing. The first atomic devices exploded by the former Soviet Union (1949), France (1960) and China (1964) were also based on the similar implosion design except that the Chinese used highly enriched uranium instead of plutonium in the core of the device. The United States tested its first implosion, plutonium based device at Trinity in July 1945 and used the same design to drop the atomic bomb on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945. In all these cases, the production of the fissile material (i.e. plutonium or highly enriched uranium) and making of the initiator were the most difficult parts of procuring and assembling a nuclear device. The role of the initiator was to release sufficient neutrons to initiate fission by a mixture of beryllium and polonium (polonium-210 (Po-210) being an intensely radioactive alpha emitting radioisotope that has a half-life of 138 days). However, the short life of the initiator (which was estimated to be about six months) provided additional problems of replacement of this material on a continuous basis. Although Iran has done some experimental work on polonium,[16] it would probably not be able to make this material in a reactor for military purposes as long as the current IAEA safeguards are in place.

52. However, for a viable nuclear weapon to be used militarily, it would be vital that it should have the reliability and capability of being stored safely for years without the threat of being misused or stolen by elements outside the control of the state. In addition, a successful nuclear device would need to be fitted on a delivery system, such as an aircraft or a missile. Therefore, to have a nuclear device dose not mean having the capability to employ a deliverable nuclear weapon. A comparative study of the history of nuclear weapons development in the existing nuclear weapon states would indicate that it would take at least two to five years between the capability to develop a nuclear device and the ability to transfer that capability into an operational nuclear weapon, fully integrated into the military structure. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, although the test of the first atomic device (Hurricane) took place on 3 October 1952, it was not until five years later in late 1957 and early 1958 that the United Kingdom attained a fully operational nuclear capability with Valiant B.1 bomber built to accommodate the Blue Danube atomic implosion gravity bombs. However, the tests on the ballistics, bomb casing, detonators, fusing systems and other related safety mechanisms on the Blue Danube continued until 1964. Similarly, in the case of France, whilst the testing of a series of atomic devices took place between 1960 and 1963, the full development and production of the first French atomic weapon called the W1-11 became possible only in 1963. However, it was not until 1964 that the first series of atomic weapons were delivered to the French Air Force for operational purposes.[17]

53. If Iran has any intentions to obtain nuclear weapons, Iran's gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme would provide the most technologically advanced route that Iran could employ to obtain the essential fissile material for use in a simple atomic device. Another technological route, would be to produce plutonium by completing its current heavy water reactor programme. Once the heavy-water reactor is fully constructed and operational, it could produce about 9 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium per year, which could be used for developing one or two nuclear weapons per year. However, Iran's heavy water reactor programme is still at the early stages of its development and is not expected to be complete at least until 2011.

54. As far as the technological developments in Iran's gas centrifuge uranium enrichment programme is concerned, Dr. Gholamreza Aghazadeh, Director of the Atomic Organisation of Iran, officially announced the industrial scale production of uranium enrichment at the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz (situated about 250 km (150 miles) south west of the capital Tehran) on 9 April 2007. President Ahmadinejad also announced the industrial scale production of nuclear fuel by Iran on the same day. However, according to the most recent reports by the IAEA published on 23 May 2007, Iran has been operating only 1312 centrifuges at the underground centrifuge facility in Natanz (known as the Fuel Enrichment Plant). The number of 1312 is much lower than the necessary 3000 centrifuges needed to produce enough low enriched uranium as a fuel for civil reactors or highly enriched uranium for use in a nuclear weapon. Therefore, it appears that the Iranian officials are currently highly exaggerating the degree of Iran's achievement in its uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel making programmes.

55. A more realistic assessment of Iran's current nuclear capabilities, based on the technical information provided in the latest IAEA report on Iran on 23 May 2007[18] as well as based on my own assessment of conversations with the Iranian scientists, diplomats and monitoring the published material in the Persian language (Farsi), would be to state that Iran has just started to successfully install and operate about a thousands cascade centrifuges. At this rate of progress and in comparison to the previous months, Iran would be able to install and make operational one cascade (164 centrifuges) every 10 days, and install and operate around 500 centrifuges a month and about 6000 a year. At the current rate of progress, Iran would probably be able to install and operate about 3000 centrifuges by the end of the summer. At this rate, it would take probably until 2015 that Iran would be able to produce 51000 centrifuges. This was the number of centrifuges that Iran had declared in 2003, it had the intention to install and operate at the underground Fuel Enrichment Plant for commercial production of nuclear fuel in civil nuclear reactors.

56. As far as the production of fissile material is concerned, even when Iran successfully operates 3000 centrifuges by the middle of summer 2007 (if Iran decides to withdraw from the NPT and produce high enriched uranium), a further year or two would be needed to produce 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for use in a simple implosion, emergency type device. The assembly of the device (i.e. putting together all the nuclear and non-nuclear explosive charges, detonators and casing in a safe and operative manner) would take probably about six months. However, for a fully weaponised and tested nuclear gravity bomb to be fitted into an aircraft or for a nuclear warhead designed as part of a missile system additional two to five years would probably be needed.

57. If Iran decides to stay within the NPT and withdraw only when it has enough stockpile of low-enriched uranium, Iran could convert a stock of low enriched uranium into 20 kilograms of highly enriched uranium for use in an atomic device, in only a few months following its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Therefore, a fully operational weaponised nuclear weapon in Iran would probably not be feasible until 2014. A simple design, emergency type atomic implosion device could be available probably by 2009.

58. What is the relationship between the civil and military aspects of Iran's nuclear programme?

59. Centrifuges are tall and thin cylinders, which in the case of the P-1 type operating in Iran, spin on their rotors 60,000 times per minute or 1000 times a second for the purpose of enriching a highly toxic gas substance called uranium hexafluoride or UF6. Therefore, because of its high speed, the cylinders are not attached in a fixed manner. The top of the cylinder is held in place by a magnet, and the bottom is held in place by a needle, which is spinning inside a lubricant. The gas is forced through the centrifuges when the heavier U-238 isotopes tend to move to the side of the machine at a faster rate than the lighter isotopes containing U-235, which tend to remain at the centre. In this process the gas, which has remained in the centre is removed and transferred to the next centrifuge, where the process is repeated. The UF6 gas progressively becomes richer in the U-235 isotope as it moves from one centrifuge to another. The end product of the enrichment process is uranium 235, which could be used, depending on level of its enrichment, to either fuel civil nuclear reactors or be used as a fissile material in nuclear bombs.

60. A review of Iran's actions to build its centrifuges and enrichment facilities at Natanz and at the other eight known workshops - such as Kalaye Electric company, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique sites near Tehran - appears to indicate that Iran is aiming at developing at least a basic technological base to obtain enriched uranium of about 3 to 5 percent U235 to use as nuclear fuel for generating 20,000 megawatts nuclear electricity in its light-water nuclear reactors planned for construction in the next twenty years. Iran currently has a civilian, 1,000 megawatt - electrical light water reactor under construction by Russians in Bushehr, which is due to start in September 2007. This type of reactor will use about 3.5 percent low enriched uranium 235 as fuel. Russia has a contract to provide the fuel for the life-time of the reactor which had been scheduled to be delivered to Iran in March 2007 but has been delayed for what appears to be political reasons to pressurise Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment programme and comply with the UN Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. Under the current contract, Russia would take back the spent fuel to Russia for its own use.

61. However, it could be possible that Iran, similar to the French nuclear programme between 1952 and 1958, would be aiming to put in place a dual-use infrastructure in order to have the option for a nuclear weapons development programme, if it decides to do so in the future. It is important to bear in mind that the same centrifuge technology could be reconfigured to enrich uranium to above 20% or 90% percent for use as fissile material in nuclear devices. The IAEA defines high enriched uranium (HEU) as uranium enriched to 20% or above in the isotope U-235; low enriched uranium (LEU) is defined as uranium enriched to between 0.72% and less than 20% U-235. Although an atomic device could be made theoretically with 20% enrichment in the isotope U-235, it is generally recognised that for a low weight and efficient atomic device it would be likely that a state would need to obtain 90% percent enrichment in the isotope U-235 in its centrifuges.

62. In terms of the existing reactors, plants and facilities, Iran has an American supplied 5 megawatt-thermal research reactor used for research and production of radioactive isotopes for medical and industrial uses located at the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran in Tehran. This reactor has been operating since 1967. In order to replace this 40 years old reactor, Iran is arguing that they are planning to build a new 40-megawatt (thermal) heavy water reactor called the IR-40 in Arak situated 250 kilometres (150 miles) west of the capital Tehran. The fuel elements for this type of reactor is natural uranium in the form of uranium dioxide which is planned to be produced in the Fuel Manufacturing Plant to be built at the Esfahan Nuclear Research Centre. Heavy water, which is the coolant and moderator for this type of reactor is also planned to be produced in Arak. According to Iran, about 85 tonnes of heavy water would be needed to start the IR-40 reactor with an additional 1 tone for every subsequent years. A heavy water reactor is known to produce plutonium of a grade suitable for use in nuclear bombs. The Dimona research reactor in Israel as well as the Cirus reactor in India are believed to have been producing plutonium for the nuclear weapons programmes of these two countries.

63. However, in order for Iran to be able to produce suitable fissile material from either the plutonium produced in the Arak heavy water reactor or the plutonium produced in the civil nuclear reactor in Bushehr or in any of the future planned light-water reactors, Iran would need to build a reprocessing plant to separate and treat the plutonium which is a highly toxic and radioactive substance. Although Iran started the construction of the heavy water reactor building in March 2005, the date for the actual commissioning of the heavy water reactor is declared by Iran as being 2011. However, there has not been any indication that Iran has been planning or designing a separate reprocessing facility either near Arak or Bushehr or at any other part of the country. Nevertheless, if Iran decides to construct such a reprocessing facility, it would not be a difficult task for Iran to master in a relatively short period of time.

64. Could Iran's uranium enrichment programme be used only for producing fuel used in civil nuclear reactors instead of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons?

65. It seems that at the present time, the capability to produce low-enriched uranium as fuel for use in the light-water reactors to be the main incentive behind current efforts by Iran to install 3000 and later on 50,000 gas centrifuges in Natanz's underground Uranium Enrichment Plant. The Iranian nuclear scientists have told me that they have already submitted several detailed feasibility studies to the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran explaining the advantages for Iran having its own nuclear fuel and the manner in which the production of Iran's own nuclear fuel could be competitive with the use of other sources of energy available in Iran, such as oil and gas. I was quite surprised to hear that the Iranian scientists felt that they had a hard time obtaining adequate financial support from the government to carry out their task.

66. The Iranian nuclear scientists as well as the Iranian diplomats have explained that it would be in Iran's long term economic and political interests to develop its own uranium enrichment plant in Natanz on the basis of the following cost and benefit analysis.

i. They would point to the fact that the price of uranium has already increased more than 800% since 2001, and that lack of world-wide supplies of uranium and enrichment facilities would probably lead to a shortage of uranium for fuel of power reactors by the year 2015.

ii. Iran believes that the existing enrichment facilities operating in the world would not be able to provide sufficient low enriched uranium for the future nuclear power reactors expected in the next decade world-wide.

iii. Iran would argue that the current non-Russian suppliers of enriched uranium have promised their enriched fuel to the current or future buyers.

iv. In addition, Iran believes that apart from economic benefits, the United States' opposition to the Islamic regime in Iran, and the extensive plans to widen the scope of political and economic sanctions against it would mean that Iran could not remain dependent and rely solely on the procurement of nuclear fuel from outside sources.

v. Therefore, given the future uncertainties and high demands and prices projected for nuclear fuel, Iran would argue that it would need to establish a contingency nuclear fuel programme simultaneously with the construction of its nuclear reactors.

vi. Moreover, Iran would hope to be able to construct the necessary nuclear infrastructure to satisfy the expected future nuclear fuel demands by establishing a viable commercial uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, which could supply nuclear fuel for nuclear reactors in the region or even at the global level.[19]

vii. Although some western analysts have suggested that Iran's own indigenous uranium ore would provide enough fuel only for the operation of eight years of Iran's own nuclear reactors, Iranian diplomats and decision-makers would argue that other uranium mines could be found and utilised within Iran in the future.

viii. Iran maintains that its current oil and gas resources are finite and will be depleted within two to five decades, following Iran's current economic and projected needs in future for development.

ix. Iran argues that with a territory of 1,648,000 km (five times the size of the United Kingdom and three times the size of France) and a population of about 70 million (70 percent of which is under the age of 30), projected to be more than 105 million by 2050, it could not rely exclusively on fossil fuel.

x. Iran is adamant that access to nuclear energy would be essential for its economic development because of the demands to provide electricity to 46,000 villages in 2007 in comparison with only 4400 before the revolution in 1979.

xi. In addition, Iran has estimated that reliance on nuclear energy could save the country190 million barrels of crude oil or $10 billion per year in today's prices.

xii. Iran relies on a study carried out in 1974 by the US-based Stanford Research Institute, which recommended the building of nuclear reactors in Iran for generating 20,000 megawatts of electricity before 1994. Iran is now aiming to reach that level by 2020.

67. The Iranian nuclear scientists have carefully been kept out of the political debate over the acquisition of nuclear weapons. I have heard the nuclear scientists speak with me in patriotic terms about their work but without any hint of determination to turn Iran into a nuclear armed country. I heard one of the scientists explaining to me enthusiastically that they had been preoccupied with advancing their own expertise and with enabling Iran to make up for scientific and technological grounds lost to other countries, such as Pakistan and India. The nuclear scientists talked warmly about the IAEA inspectors who visit Natanz and Esfahan's nuclear facilities at least once every three to four weeks. One of the scientists even showed me a friendly photograph that he had taken with one of the Canadian IAEA inspectors on his mobile phone. This would illustrate the existence of a culture of friendship, respect and understanding between the Iranian nuclear scientists and the international safeguards' inspectors who visit Iran's nuclear facilities as part of the IAEA team at least once every three or four weeks.

68. The start of the installation of 3000 centrifuges in Natanz, which began in January 2007 and officially announced on 9 April 2007, would be a boost to Iran's determination to produce its own nuclear fuel. Although some of the recent claims by the Iranian officials that Iran has reached the stage to produce nuclear fuel on an industrialised scale[20], or that Iran "currently is able to produce enough nuclear fuel for 20,000 MW(e) of electricity",[21] is clearly an exaggeration, it could be argued that Iran has already acquired the scientific know-how, engineering skills and technology to put into practice and produce enough nuclear fuel for some of its planned reactors in the next five years.

Iran's Nuclear Programme Within the Global Context of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime:

69. In which manner have the expectations put on the role and objective of the NPT and IAEA Safeguards evolved historically, and what impact have these changes had on the current dispute over Iran's nuclear programme?

70. In order to have an understanding of the current crisis surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, it would be essential to have an understanding of both Iran's behaviour as well as an understanding of the changing nature of expectations and interpretations put on the text of the NPT and its related IAEA safeguards. Historically, efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons and to establish a viable international safeguards system was taking place simultaneously and in parallel with the developments in the procurement of atomic weapons throughout 1950s and 1960s. In 1961 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, 1665 (XVI), put forward by Ireland on the "Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons".[22] Between 1960 and 1962 the United States and the Soviet Union put forward additional arms control and disarmament proposals including measures to prevent the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states. In the 1960s the main concern of the nuclear weapons states, the United States, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, was to prohibit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by industrialised states, such as Germany and Japan, rather than any of the current developing countries, such as Iran. In January 1964 and August 1965 the United States put forward proposals to halt nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. Two essential elements within these proposals were later incorporated into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. The first principle concerned an obligation by nuclear-weapon states not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of other states, and the second principle requested the non-nuclear weapon states to accept IAEA or similar safeguards on their civil nuclear activities.[23]

71. Between 1967 and 1968 seven drafts of a treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were submitted to the General Assembly and Disarmament Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union. The seventh revised draft of the Treaty was finally submitted to the General Assembly in May 1968, and the General Assembly approved a resolution, 2373 (XXII) endorsing the text on 12 June 1968.[24] The issue of international safeguard system was discussed in Articles I, II and III of the Treaty. Under Article III the non-nuclear weapon states undertook to accept IAEA safeguards and not to divert nuclear energy from peaceful uses into nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The distinctive feature of the NPT safeguards system was that the signatories to the NPT became obliged to accept a comprehensive system of safeguards on their whole territory, unlike the IAEA's safeguards in the case of non-NPT members of the IAEA, which applied only to those projects undertaken through the IAEA's assistance.

72. The objective of the Agency's safeguards system under the NPT was to verify that member states had not diverted nuclear materials from peaceful uses into nuclear explosive devices. The objective of the Agency's safeguards system under the IAEA Statute was to ensure that the member states did not use supplied material or equipment to further any military purposes. Therefore, whilst the NPT put the emphasis on verification of material (i.e. enriched uranium or plutonium), the Agency's Statute put the emphasis on verification of material and facilities provided by the IAEA and the manner in which they were being used (i.e. for peaceful or military uses). As a result, some states such as India (a non-NPT member state) argued that peaceful nuclear explosions were not explicitly prohibited under the IAEA's Statute. In addition, whilst the NPT did not prohibit non-explosive military use of nuclear material (for example for the propulsion of nuclear submarines), the IAEA's Statute prohibited such uses under the INFCIRC/66.[25]

73. In order to bridge the gap between the IAEA's safeguards system set up in 1957 and the NPT safeguards system set up in 1970 under the IAEA, a Safeguards Committee was formed at IAEA's headquarters in Vienna between June 1970 and March 1971. The Committee produced a comprehensive document, INFCIRC/153, which regulated the relationship between the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT and the IAEA. The result was that the objective of the NPT safeguards system emerged to be defined as one providing a timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful to military or unknown purposes. However, a significant limitation of the safeguards was that it could not prevent a member state from acquiring a nuclear explosive capability. It was assumed that the risk of early detection by the NPT safeguards system would deter any diversion from peaceful activities. The verification measures, designed under the NPT system, could only verify the current or past activities but it could not give a verdict on any future intentions of the member states.[26]

74. However, the whole structure, function and purpose of the NPT and its IAEA safeguards, as it was originally defined in the 1970s, came under question, following revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme after its defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf war and the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 687 that had called for the full disarmament of Iraq from all weapons of mass destruction. Once the IAEA, mandated by the Security Council, discovered the full extent of Iraq's attempts to produce fissile material for its nuclear weapon programme, despite being a signatory to the NPT, there was a general agreement that the IAEA had to change a number of its safeguards procedures in order to regain its credibility as a viable international nuclear safeguards system. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the loss of control over the export control policies in the former Soviet republics, intensified the pressures to change the principles and objectives of the NPT with the aim of strengthening its monitoring and safeguards mechanisms. In the 1990s the main question was whether it was worth having a nuclear non-proliferation treaty that could monitor only the overt nuclear activities but not any clandestine ones.

75. The development and implementation of the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) by May 1997 provided the necessary legal authority to enable the IAEA to ask non-nuclear weapon states information about all aspects of their nuclear activities, and empowered the IAEA to request non-nuclear weapon states to provide it with indirect as well as direct assurances that their nuclear material declarations were complete. The NPT was signed on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970 as a framework treaty, meaning that the details regarding its implementation had to be worked out and agreed by the signatory states at a later stage. However, each NPT member state had the right to decide on its own, as an independent sovereign state, whether it was in its own national interests to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol. Therefore, only for those NPT member states who had agreed to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, their declarations as well as other sources of information, ranging from the commercially acquired satellite images to environmental sampling of all the state's territory were added to the previously based standard IAEA safeguards mechanisms. Significantly, Iran was one of the few major countries in the Middle East that signed the Additional Protocol, following an agreement, initiated by the visit of the three Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to Tehran on 21 October 2003. On 10 November 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol and indicated that pending its ratification, Iran would voluntarily act in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol. However, Iran eventually decided to withdraw from its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol, following the IAEA Board of Governors' decision to send Iran's file to the UN Security Council on 4 February 2006.

76. The public revelations about Iran's uranium enrichment programme in 2002 and 2003, highlighted a number of issues which used to be controversial back in the 1970s, namely the proliferation implications of civil nuclear fuel cycles and the means of controlling civil usable nuclear material. Libya's decision to disclose its nuclear weapon activities in December 2003 brought into public attention the existence of a complex network of black market in radiological and nuclear procurement activities, operating across the globe.

77. As a reaction to the above developments, President Bush in his speech of 11 February 2004 expressed concern about the existing loopholes within the NPT and made proposals in relation to assisting nations to end the use of weapons grade uranium in research reactors and urged increased efforts in preventing further proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The Director General of the IAEA on 12 February 2004 also advocated the use of the United Nations Security Council to prevent any withdrawal from the NPT under Article X.1 of the NPT. Although the idea of universal criminalisation of the weapons of mass destruction activities was generally seen as a positive act, the use of the Security Council to force states to carry out specific policies came under increasing question by the developing countries and non-nuclear weapon states.

78. In 2004 and 2005, there was a growing concern that the Security Council might be turned into a legislative body of its own, undermining and replacing traditional multilateral treaty forums, such as the existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. There was a general agreement that any discussion to reform the NPT and the IAEA's safeguards procedures should be pursued and promoted in such a manner that a particular country or a group of countries do not feel alienated or threatened. However, by sending Iran's nuclear file from the IAEA to the Security Council of the United Nations on 4 February 2006, it became clear that the IAEA Board of Governors were determined to pursue policies, put forward initially in 2004, aimed at increasing the power of the UN Security Council to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation globally. In a confidential letter, dated 10 March 2004, to the French, German and the United States' negotiators, John Sawers, the British diplomat in charge of Iran and the E3-EU negotiations also outlined the British strategy of using the Security Council to remove one of the Iranian arguments that the suspension in relation to Iran's uranium enrichment programme was voluntary. As he put it, "we could do both by making the voluntary suspension a mandatory requirement to the Security Council, in a Resolution we would aim to adopt I, say, early May."[27]

79. However, under Article VIII of the NPT any amendment to the NPT would come into force only in relation to a particular state, which would agree to ratify it (probably with a similar compliance process which has been taking place in the context of the IAEA's Additional Protocol). Therefore, it is clear that if undue political pressure is put on a state, through the Security Council of the United Nations, to ratify or comply with the proposed changes in the NPT, such actions might force a state or many states to withdraw from the treaty.

80. In relation to Iran's nuclear crisis, looking at the conflict through a historical perspective and taking into account how the NPT and its related IAEA safeguards have evolved historically, one could see that the current conflict between Iran, the IAEA and the Security Council of the United Nations is basically based on the different interpretations put on Iran's obligations under the IAEA safeguards agreement that Iran signed in 1974. All the current main remaining issues that the IAEA wishes to clarify have been related to the possibility of the existence of a weaponised nuclear programme in Iran. Therefore, the IAEA's insistence to obtain more information about P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, or to have a better understanding of the history of centrifuge programme in Iran has been for the purpose of verifying the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations and the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. As the last report of the IAEA Director General dated 23 May 2007 put it, these are related to the issue of IAEA being able to "provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme."[28] However, it is important to bear in mind that all the above assurances that the IAEA has been requesting from Iran does not strictly fall under the type of the IAEA safeguards agreement that Iran signed in 1974. The Iranian officials would argue that had Iran ratified the Additional Protocol, it would have been under a legally binding obligation to provide such assurances. However, under the 1974 safeguards agreement that Iran singed with the IAEA, Iran would be obliged to provide the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and facilities, and to provide the IAEA access to those declared nuclear material. In fact, the last report of the Director General of the IAEA dated 23 May 2007 confirmed that Iran had complied with those obligations by stating that there has been "no diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran."[29]

81. In what circumstances would Iran more likely to withdraw from the NPT?

82. Under the Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, Iran has been put under pressure to suspend mainly its uranium enrichment activities, including research and development. However, the right of access to civil nuclear technology has been granted to Iran under Article IV of the NPT. It is important to remember that the right of access to civil nuclear technology has always been crucial to all the NPT non-nuclear weapon states. For example, although Germany and Italy singed the NPT in 1969 and Japan in 1970, despite pressures from the United States and the former Soviet Union on these three countries to ratify the NPT as soon as possible, they refused to do so until 2 May1975 in the cases of Germany and Italy, and 8 June 1976 in the case of Japan. In each of these three countries, which had been defeated in the Second World War, substantial parliamentary debates took place between 1970 and 1975 over whether their freedom of action would be limited in the area of civil nuclear power activities and how far the ratification of the NPT would prevent them from competing in civil nuclear industry with the victorious Allied powers of the Second World War, who had remained free from all restrictions under the NPT.[30] By contrast, Iran during the Shah ratified the NPT as early as 2 February 1970, and the Islamic regime did not even contemplate withdrawing or questioning its obligations under this treaty following the 1979 Revolution in Iran.

83. It would also be crucial to point out, in the light of pressures put on Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to enrich uranium, that historically on the very same day that the NPT came into force on 5 March 1970, the Federal Republic of Germany signed a tripartite international agreement with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for the production of enriched uranium by the ultra-centrifuge method. Moreover, in the same year (1970), Germany started a pilot plant for the plutonium production. All these historical facts demonstrate the manner in which Germany interpreted its rights under the NPT. None of the signatories to the NPT objected to this German interpretation of its rights under the NPT in 1970.[31]

84. Such a practice, has already set a precedent for any future interpretations put on the NPT as far as the member states' rights to have access to nuclear fuel cycle technologies is concerned. This is an important point because some people have attempted to argue that the reference in Article IV.1 of the NPT which states, "Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," does not encompass the right to develop nuclear fuel cycle technologies or enrichment plants. However, under the generally accepted rules of international law set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, any interpretations put on the treaty should be based on the uses of the language of the treaty on its face together with subsequent practice of the parties to the treaty. Recourse can be made to the negotiating record, known as 'preparatory work', only as a secondary means to assist clarifying those issues, which remain ambiguous and the treaty text and subsequent practice do not resolve.

85. In relation to the right of withdrawal, when the NPT was signed by the member states on 1 July 1968, it was agreed that like the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, every signatory state would have the undeniable right to withdraw from the Treaty after three months notice, if that state decides that special circumstance related to the treaty's objectives have endangered its supreme national interests. The right of withdrawal is outlined in Article X.1 of the NPT, according to which the notice of the withdrawal should be given "to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council" and "include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests". Therefore, under the generally accepted rules of international law set forth in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, there would be nothing to stop Iran, as an independent sovereign country to withdraw from the NPT and all its related IAEA safeguards once the Iranian government decides to do so.

86. In fact, following my recent discussions in May 2007 with the Iranian diplomats, key legal advisors and decision-makers, it became clear that as far as the decision-making process involving Iran's withdrawal from the NPT is concerned, the Iranian parliament (Majles) and the Council of Guardians have already provided the government with the permission to take such a course of action, if the government decides it would be in Iran's interest to do so.[32] Iranian diplomats and legal advisors have also expressed their own personal opinions to me that any further Security Council resolutions and increased military threats against Iran which would amount to humiliation of Iran in international forums and conferences would most likely lead to Iran's withdrawal from the NPT sooner than some analysts have already suggested.

87. What has been the role of Iran in the NPT related export control measure, agreements and proposals between 1970 and 2007?

88. As an additional measure and separate from the IAEA safeguards, following the NPT's entry into force in 1970, export controls to regulate and control the export of nuclear related material were organised in a more systematic manner. Although the NPT does not explicitly recognise the authority of the current export control measures (i.e. the Nuclear Supplier Group), a number of organisations or conventions have been developed to deal with the export control provisions specifically mentioned in the Articles of the NPT. Two similar but structurally different organisations, the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Supplier Group (London Club) were developed in the 1970s. Missile Control Regime (MCR) was also established, as a third organisation in the 1980s to deal with export of technologies related to missiles. The Zangger Committee, which was formed in 1971, was an attempt to define, in more detail, some of the provisions mentioned in the NPT Article III.2, which states that "Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article."

89. Consequently, a series of meetings were held in Vienna, chaired by Professor Claude Zangger from Switzerland, between 1971 and 1974, in order to provide a set of guidelines and a list of items subject to export control, known as the 'trigger list'.[33] Items in the first trigger list included nuclear reactors and specified equipment such as pressure vessels, fuel-charging and discharging machines, control rods, pressure tubes, zirconium tubes and primary coolant pumps, deuterium and heavy water exceeding specified amounts, nuclear-grade graphite, reprocessing plants and equipment designed or prepared for them, fuel fabrication plants and equipment (not including analytical instruments) designed or prepared for uranium isotope separation.[34] Although the guidelines and the trigger list which was drawn out and presented to the IAEA (document INFCIRC/209) in September 1974 had no legal binding on states, the individual member states tried to give effect to them through their own countries' internal export control laws and regulations. Further clarifications and updates to the list have been made since 1974. The Zangger Committee's trigger list would apply to those states not in full IAEA's safeguards. In 1992, following the revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon development, other items such as plants for the production of heavy water, deuterium and deuterium compounds and equipment were added to the list.[35]

90. The Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) also known as London Club was formed in 1975 as a response to India's import of nuclear technology, and the subsequent development and explosion of an atomic device by that country in 1974 under the pretext of a 'peaceful nuclear explosion'. The main concern of the NSG was to restrict the export of nuclear technology to prevent the development of similar atomic devices by other non-nuclear weapon states. The aim was to develop stricter guidelines than the trigger list provided by the Zangger Committee and to persuade France, which was neither a member of the NPT nor a member of the Zangger Committee, to monitor its export policies. Initially only seven major supplier states (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR) were members of the London Club. By 1977 the suppliers of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, expressed their common policies in a document and presented it to the IAEA for circulation to all its member states. Although the document known, as INFCIRC/254 did not have a legally binding obligation, it contained a set of guidelines to prevent the export of material and equipment (mentioned in a trigger list annexed to it) related to nuclear weapons. A number of nuclear sensitive materials such as heavy water and technologies related for its production, enrichment and reprocessing facilities were included in the NSG guidelines. By 1990s the number of states joining the NSG had increased to more than 30 with the main states being Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech, Slovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, UK, USA.[36]

91. By the end of 1977 another major effort was initiated by the United States for a comprehensive technical evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle, the reprocessing and enrichment facilities, the fast breeder reactor and a study for evaluating the prospects for developing fuel cycles with less potential to be diverted to military uses. The project leaders of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation programme (INFCE) met mainly in Vienna for more than two years but failed to reach a consensus or find any absolute technical means for the establishment of safe 'proliferation proof' cycles. Nevertheless, the efforts of INFCE culminated in the establishment of a Committee on Assurances of Supply within the IAEA Board of Governors in June 1980. This Committee has been a main source of advise on the question of supply of nuclear material, equipment and technology, and fuel cycle to the IAEA' Board of Governors since that time.[37]

92. However, it would be important to point out that the export control measures between 1970-1978 were not targeted against Iran under the Shah. In fact, the historical records illustrate that Iran, as a main strategic ally of the western industrialised countries until the 1979 Revolution, was given a special status to have access to full nuclear cycle technology without any restrictions. Consequently, Iran purchased in 1975 a ten percent share in the EURODIF gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment plant, which was originally founded in 1973 with France 45% share, Belgium 11% share, Italy 23 % , Spain 11% share and Sweden 10% share, in the nuclear site of Tricastin in France. Sweden withdrew from the project in 1974, and subsequently Sweden's ten per cent share was transferred to Iran that had provided the consortium with 1 billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) towards its construction. Italy reduced its share of EURODIF to 16% in 1980 when the French Partner Cogema purchased Italy's share. As a result, France's share in the EURODIF increased to 52%. Iran has continued to hold its share of this uranium enrichment plant after the 1979 Revolution, and it has taken part in its annual meetings of the Board of Directors between 1979 and 2007.[38] In addition, in 1975 President Ford even provided the permission for the United States' nuclear material to be fabricated into fuel in Iran for Iran's own reactors, and for export to those countries that the United States had bilateral agreements. A decision was also considered by the United State's government for approving reprocessing of the United States' nuclear material in a multinational plant to be established inside Iran.[39] In 1976 South Africa also agreed to supply Iran with $700 million of yellow cake.[40] Therefore, it was not surprising that an export control international conference was organised at Perspolis (near Shiraz in the Fars province) in Iran in 1977 to discuss the problems of exporting nuclear technology from industrialised countries to developing countries, especially those sensitive nuclear facilities related to enrichment or reprocessing plants. It was at that conference that a proposal for the establishment of an international fuel cycle centre was first put forward.[41]

93. There is a generally held misconception, especially on the part of Iran, that nuclear non-proliferation policies that have been adopted by the United States since the 1980s are specific policies directed against the Islamic regime, and that if the Shah were still in power in Iran, the United States would have provided it with all the necessary uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities. However, a detailed study of the changes taking place in the United States following the election of President Carter into office in January 1977 indicate that the United States adopted radical new nuclear non-proliferation policies as early as 1977 (two years before the 1979 Revolution in Iran). President Carter had made a specific point during his presidential campaign in 1976 to take radical new initiatives once in office. President Carter's increasing concerns over dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation arising from the anticipated global expansion of nuclear reactors, created a number of major crises even in the United States' relationships with its close Western allies, such as the UK, France, Japan and Belgium between 1977 and 1979. These European countries, had historically invested substantially in their fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycling as part of their nuclear fuel cycle programmes for their civil nuclear reactors. However, the United States, which had been highly critical of the European civil nuclear power programmes wished to halt these programmes at global level, as a measure to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the United States introduced domestic legislations to ban the development of fast-breeder reactors (FBRs) and their related reprocessing facilities that would have been necessary to produce the fuel for civil nuclear reactors in the United States. More specifically, in order to make bilateral agreements with other states, including EURATOM, compatible with the United States' overall policy on nuclear non-proliferation, the United States introduced the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978, which asked the administration of President Carter to renegotiate all the existing bi-lateral agreements with other states. Therefore, even if the Shah were still in power in the 1980s, he would have most probably faced major criticisms and significant obstacles in acquiring uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities from the United States. The Shah would have probably been more successful to pursue his interests in acquiring uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies through the European countries.

94. In order to prevent diversion of nuclear material from civil nuclear fuel-reprocessing plants into nuclear weapons, effective international control and safeguards over the production, storage and use of separated plutonium was proposed in 1980.[42] The nuclear export control agreements, which had been incorporated in the IAEA safeguards since 1970s were further discussed at the time of the NPT Review Conferences in 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990. However, it was not until the advent of the 1991 Persian Gulf Conflict and the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapon programme as well as the dissolution of the USSR and the loss of control over its export control arrangements that the IAEA's safeguards system, together with other international safeguards systems such as arms transfer control regime, shifted their emphasis and efforts towards more inspection, accountability and transparency. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference a number of non-nuclear weapon states, notably Iran, asked for active participation in the Zangger Committee and NSG as well as for greater transparency of these two group's nuclear-export activities.[43] Between 1995 and 2000, the NSG held two international meetings in Vienna in 1997 and in New York in 1999 to pursue the Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation as it was stated in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. By the time of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, attempts were made by the member states of the Zangger Committee and NSG to include references to their export control activities in the Final Document of the Review Conference. Such proposed references included statements such as adopting "understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states not parties to the Treaty." However, any such references, which could have legitimised and officially acknowledged these two export control groups as part of the NPT, were opposed by a number of non-nuclear weapon states, especially Egypt, Iran and Malaysia, who feared that such wordings would legitimise the existing restrictions put by the industrialised countries to transfer nuclear technology to civil programmes of the developing countries.

95. As part of the E3/EU negotiations with Iran, which began in October 2003 and continued through out 2004, 2005 and 2006, Iran put forward a proposal on 17 January 2005, and in paragraphs 25 and 32 of that proposal, Iran specifically asked for the acknowledgement of Iran's inherent right to acquire legitimate means for self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Iran asked for removal of restrictions against the transfer of conventional armament and their relevant sensitive dual use goods and technologies to Iran, and demanded the E3/EU to cooperate actively with Iran in the area of export control and to exchange expertise and knowledge to assist Iran to put in place an effective national export control related to sensitive material, equipment and technology, and containing enforcement procedures with appropriate penalties which could contribute to the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As part of the specific proposals related to the elements of 'Objective Guarantees', the same export control policies were suggested by Iran in their proposal of 23 March 2005 presented to the E3/EU member states in Paris. In September-October 2006 Iran proposed an international consortium, based on the IAEA's main proposals on multinational fuel activities, including enrichment, published on 22 February 2005 that would have dealt with all the export control issues related to Iran's nuclear programme. However, Iran has never received any response to these proposals because of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (P5+1) insistence that Iran would need to suspend all its uranium enrichment activities indefinitely before the start of any negotiations.

96. Why have the United States and the United Kingdom been reluctant to provide a legally binding and unconditional security assurances to Iran and other non-nuclear weapon states?

97. Like most other non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, Iran has sought to obtain legally binding and unconditional negative security assurance (that the nuclear weapon states would not attack them with nuclear weapons), and positive security assurance (that the nuclear weapon states would assist them if attacked by nuclear weapons). By a legally binding security assurances, it is meant an independent agreement or treaty, or a protocol attached to the NPT, instead of the present general statements of intent embodied, for example, in the 1978 and 1982 unilateral statements by the nuclear weapon states at the first and second United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD), or a series of separate statements by the nuclear weapon states reflected on the 11 April 1995 Security Council resolution 984. However, some would argue that a Security Council resolution would be legally binding.[44]

98. Although the Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 provided both negative and positive security assurances, the type of assurances were seen as being similar to the positive security assurances that the three NPT depository nuclear weapon states had provided in 1968. The conditional terms of the Security Council Resolution 984 have been criticised on the grounds that the NATO states and the Russian Federation continue to keep their option of the first use of nuclear weapons; and that in case of a nuclear attack, the agreement of the Security Council had to be obtained before any action in support of the victim or against a nuclear aggressor could be taken. Following the 984 Resolution, China restated its long-time position regarding no-first use of nuclear weapons and called for an international convention on no-first use.

99. The three nuclear weapon states (France, The United Kingdom and the United States) have particularly been reluctant to provide a legally binding and unconditional negative security assurance to the non-nuclear weapon states, such as Iran, on three basic military grounds. First, there is the assumption on the part of these nuclear weapon states that an unconditional negative security assurance would undermine the basic element of uncertainty, which is often defined as the key in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrence against an adversary. Second, France, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as the Russian Federation continue to regard as legitimate the right to retaliate with nuclear weapons in the case of an attack with chemical or biological weapons. Furthermore, these nuclear weapon states believe that an unconditional negative security assurance might encourage the use of chemical and biological weapons by countries such as Iran at the time of war and crises.

100. As part of the E3/EU negotiations with Iran that had began in October 2003 and continued through out 2004, 2005 and 2006, Iran put forward a proposal on 17 January 2005 dealing with security assurances. In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the proposal Iran had asked for both negative and positive security assurances (i.e. rejection of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Iran and adoption of appropriate measures, through the United Nations Security Council to prevent it). However, Iran has never received any reply to that proposal or any other proposal put forward to the E3/EU in subsequent months on 29 April, 17 September, 30 March, 22 August, 12 and 21 September and October 2006 because of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (P5+1) insistence that Iran would need to suspend all its uranium enrichment activities indefinitely before the start of any negotiations.

101. Although the E3/EU put forward its own package of proposals to deal with Iran's nuclear programme on 5 August 2005, one of the major weaknesses of that proposal was the absence of the United States in providing Iran with any specific security guarantees. In the second package of incentives offered to Iran on 6 June 2006, on behalf of the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany (the P5+1), the United States was again reluctant to provide specific security assurances to Iran.

102. The negative and positive security assurances embodied in the 1995 Security Council Resolution 984 are conditional, and as far as the three nuclear weapon states (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) are concerned, such assurances would not be applicable to those non-nuclear weapon states, which have not been in full compliance with their NPT safeguards agreements. These nuclear weapon states may interpret the 984 Security Council Resolution in a way to exclude Iran from benefiting the terms of that Resolution. Therefore, some believe that in the whole of the Middle East and South Asia as well as Central Asia and Caucasus, Iran is the only major country with inadequate security protection. India, Israel and Pakistan would rely on their own nuclear weapons for deterrence and defence. Turkey is a member of the NATO and all the Arab states of the Persian Gulf would be protected by their close military and political relationship with the United States and its allies. It is within this overall regional and international context that Iran's civil nuclear programme, similar to the full nuclear fuel cycle facilities in Japan, has been viewed by some forming a viable latent nuclear deterrence for Iran. Therefore, it would be vital that in any discussions of Iran's nuclear programme, Iran's legitimate security concerns to be fully taken into account by the members of the Security Council and other states involved in negotiations with Iran.

103. What are the obstacles as well as common interests in the diplomatic negotiations to reach an agreement between Iran and the P5+1?

104. As far as the diplomatic negotiations in resolving the nuclear issue is concerned, both Iran and E3/EU (including the United States) should bear the responsibility for the failure of diplomatic talks between 2003 and 2007. Iran should have been more transparent and active in responding to issues of concern put to it by the IAEA. At the same time, the E3/EU and the United States should have been more responsive to several reasonable proposals put forward by Iran between 2004 and 2007 to reach an overall agreement on the nuclear, security, economic and other issues.

105. More specifically, in relation to curtailing Iran's enrichment programme, there were a number of important missed opportunities between January 2005 and April 2006, during which Iran had put forward proposals which could have limited the number of centrifuges operating in Iran. If these proposals were received positively by the E3/EU, an agreement with Iran could have been reached to limit substantially the scope and extent of Iran's uranium enrichment programme. Such an agreement could have prevented Iran from launching into a full-scale industrialised production of uranium enrichment by now. However, the United States and the European countries' unrealistic and unreasonable insistence that Iran should suspend all its uranium enrichment activities, even at the level of research and development, prior to the start of any negotiations, and Iran's refusal to do so has led to the current diplomatic dead-lock.

106. Iran has been reluctant to suspend all of its uranium enrichment programme indefinitely on both technical and psychological grounds. Technologically, a lesson has already been learnt from the North Korean experience when in 1994 as a result of the US/North Korea Framework Agreement, North Korea suspended the construction of a 200 megawatt-electric reactor at Taechon and a 50 megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. However, once North Korea decided to restart the construction of these two reactors, following the collapse of negotiations between the parties in 2002, it faced considerable technological difficulties to such an extent that it had to abandon the construction of the 200 megawatt-electric reactor, because of the substantial damage done to it. North Korea had also found the progress on the construction of the 50 Megawatt-electric reactor as very slow due to its long period of suspension.[45] Iran has also the bitter experience of facing the consequences of a long-term suspension of the Bushehr civil nuclear power reactor between 1979 to the present day. In addition, I have personally witnessed and reported the negative psychological effects, which an indefinite or long-term suspension of a scientific project could have on the moral, pace of work and future career development of the Iranian nuclear scientists.[46] Significantly, on12 September 2006, Iran offered to suspend its uranium enrichment for a two months period. However, this offer was rejected. Iran also offered to suspend some aspects of its uranium enrichment programme on 26 April 2007. However, this offer was also rejected by the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1), who continue to insist that all uranium enrichment related activities, including research and development, would have to be suspended as a precondition to the start of any negotiations.

107. Given the technological advances that Iran has already made in its uranium enrichment programme, especially between October 2006 and May 2007, it would be highly unlikely for Iran to agree to any limitations to its industrial scale uranium enrichment programme. Internal political developments in Iran, and significant changes in the perceived balance of power in the Middle East region, following the war in Lebanon in July 2006, and the deteriorating situation in Iraq, would be additional reasons as to why it would be much more difficult today, in comparison to 2005 or early 2006, to ask Iran to halt its industrial production of nuclear enrichment programme. In today's technological and political circumstances, only the Iranian proposal put forward between January 2005 and October 2006, and again on 31 May 2007, for the establishment of a multinational consortium (based on the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) main proposals on multinational fuel and enrichment activities published on 22 February 2005)[47] to allow uranium enrichment on the Iranian soil under a comprehensive and enhanced IAEA monitoring and safeguards system, could form the basis for negotiations leading to an agreement.

108. The 6 June 2006 proposal submitted to Iran by the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) has also positive points and could form a basis for the start of the negotiations. The state of the human rights in Iran and the release of the US-Iranian citizens held in Iran as well as the state of the Revolutionary Guards arrested by the United States' forces in Iraq could also be discussed within this framework. I was told by a number of Iranian diplomats that Iran might even be prepared to resume its cooperation and respond to the remaining outstanding questions by the IAEA, if the P5+1 refrain from taking any further sanctions or resolutions at the UN Security Council against Iran. Any further economic and political sanctions through resolutions by the UN Security Council or any military attacks or even further threats of military attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities would most probably lead to Iran's withdrawal from the NPT and a considerable weakening of the already fragile nuclear non-proliferation regime at global level.

109. Despite the obvious changes in personnel and policies under the new government of President Ahmadinejad, one could still detect continuities in Iran's nuclear decision-making process, which has been left over from the Khatami's reformist government. There are moderate and liberal minded people amongst the people advising President Ahmadinejad. I have met and talked with them. The main key legal and technical advisors and top decision-makers based at the United Nations in New York and Vienna have been able to keep their posts at the Foreign Ministry since 1980s. Ambassador Soltanieh, currently representing Iran at IAEA has been Iran's foremost legal and technical advisor in nuclear and arms control fields since 1980s with various posts as Iran's Ambassador in Geneva and Vienna. Ambassador Soltanieh is a US/European educated diplomat promoting arms control and nuclear non-proliferation policies representing Iran at various international organisations. Ambassador Javad Zarif is also a prominent arms control, disarmament and human rights specialist who was educated in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s. He is familiar with both the western as well as the Iranian sensitivities and concerns. Such reformist individuals based at Iran's Foreign Ministry have been able to retain their key positions in various capacities and continue to remain a main source of advice to the Supreme National Security Council and the Leader, Ayatollah Khamene'i, who would ultimately have the responsibility under the Iranian constitution to make decisions on nuclear issues. Therefore, it was not surprising that following the Security Council Resolution 1737 on 23 December 2006, which imposed sanctions on Iran's trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology, the Iranian parliament (Majles) voted on 27 December 2006 for a general policy of obliging the government of President Ahmadinejad to revise its cooperation with the IAEA. However, the parliament refrained from making any specific legal or technical demands, leaving the decision on such specific responses to the specialist officials at the Foreign Ministry who deal with Iran's legal and technical commitments under international laws and treaties. In fact, it would be quite difficult and risky for any kind of government, whether religious reformist or hard-line fundamentalist, to dispense with the advice and experience of these career diplomats who have been involved in Iran's nuclear decision-making process since the 1980s.

110. The common link between Iran, the United States, the European countries and the rest of international community is their shared interest to combat the greatest single terrorist threat, which is al-Qaeda. This point is highlighted by a close study done by Ruhi Ramezani who is a Professor Emeritus of Government and Foreign affairs at the University of Virginia and has published extensively on the U.S. and Iran relations. He argues that al-Qaeda is in an ideological war with both Iran and the west. Professor Ramezani points to the fact that on 5 May 2007, al-Zawahiri, who is al-Qaeda's No. 2 leader and Osama bin Laden's chief strategist intensified his verbal attacks on the Shia and in anticipation of U.S.-Iran talks and chided Iran for having given up its slogan of "America, the Greatest Satan", [for] slogan "America, the closest partner". In response, Iran's President Mahmood Ahmadinejad blasted at him and said, "Why do you, who want to kill Americans, kill innocent people and place bombs in the [Iraqi] market place? On behalf of all the women and children in Asia, Europe and America, who have been victims of al-Qaeda terrorists, I wish for you and your terrorist group hell fire, and would gladly sacrifice my life to annihilate you." President Bush also spoke in similar terms on 23 May 2007 when he said, "If al-Qaeda succeeds in Iraq, they would pursue their stated goals of turning that nation into a base from which to overthrow moderate governments in the region, impose their hateful ideology on millions, and launch new attacks on America and other nations. In short, al-Qaeda is public enemy number one for Iraq's young democracy, and al-Qaeda is public enemy number one for America, as well." A former Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi also emphasised in May 2003 that Iran was "the pioneer in fighting al-Qaeda terrorists", and "Iran was the al-Qaeda enemy before the U.S."[48]

111. It is important to acknowledge that issues involved in Iran's nuclear programme are invariably linked to much wider issues of management of nuclear energy/power at global level and to the changing role, rules and regulations of the NPT, IAEA and Security Council of the United Nations. These issues are extremely time-consuming subjects, which would need to be discussed and resolved in a multilateral and peaceful manner, free from threats of economic, political and military sanctions or the use of force. In their various proposals (please see Appendix II) Iran has proved to be ready to discuss these issues.

Appendix I: Chronology of the Main Events in the Procurement of Iran's Centrifuge and Uranium Enrichment Programme:

1985 = The decision was made by Iran to launch a centrifuge enrichment programme.

1987 = Iran received drawings of the centrifuge P-1 type along with samples of centrifuge components through a foreign intermediary.

1988-1995 = The start of the first phase of the centrifuge programme, during which basic research and initial development work was located mainly at the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran premises in Tehran, with laboratory work conducted at the Plasma Physics Laboratories of Tehran Nuclear Research Centre. There were also tests of centrifuge rotors at the Amir Kabir University in Tehran and on the premises of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran in Tehran without insertion of any nuclear material. Some 2000 components and some subassemblies were obtained from abroad through foreign intermediaries or by Iranian entities between 1993 and 1995.

1994-1996 = Iran received a duplicate set of the P-1 drawings along with components for 500 P-1 type centrifuges as well as design drawings for a P-2 type centrifuge from foreign sources in 1994.

1995-2002 = Prototype testing and development work of the P-1 type centrifuges was relocated to the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. Some mechanically testing of P-