Parliamentary Enquiry into East Asia

A Comment by the Council of the British Association for Korean Studies

4 March, 2008

Introductory Comments

In 2006, the British Association for Korean Studies was asked to comment on the emergence of China ('The Emergence of the People's Republic of China as a Regional Power and Its Impact on the International System', statement prepared 20 April, 2006).

Much of what we said then is relevant to your query regarding Korea and Japan.

Although the past is not a certain guide to the future, it is the only guide we have. In order to understand the 'global security' of Korea and Japan in contemporary times, we must clarify the nature of the historic cultural and political system of East Asia and look there to see what patterns there are. An examination of the East Asian past reveals the following general patterns:

1) East Asia (comprising China, Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Tibet, and Mongolia) is a coherent cultural and political sphere which has the area of 'China' as its cultural, political, and economic centre.

2) When 'China' is strong and stable, the region as a whole is stable.

3) When 'China' is weak and internally divided, the region as a whole is embroiled in war.

4) Contiguous areas to this core region such as Vietnam and Korea have long been self-aware of their socio-political context, and traditionally have developed schemes to accommodate Chinese power, while at the same time maintaining independence and sovereignty.

5) Japan has historically been in and out of the Sinitic (Chinese) sphere. That is, its history has not been patterned along the lines of a centralised state, because it has the advantage of being an island and therefore it did not need to create and maintain a Sinitic-style bureaucracy to mobilise defences against land-based military threats. Korea has had this necessity and that is why it did not descend into feudalism as did Japan.

The Cultural and Historical Background - China

Chinese culture is the oldest continuous culture on Earth, having a literary and canonical tradition (largely based upon Confucian thought) stretching back to the fifth century BC. Even today, the literary works which constitute this canonical tradition can be read easily. Such accessibility to classical thought and ideas has produced an extraordinary continuity in literature and historical writing in the region so that ancient aesthetic, philosophical, social, and historical views have been created and re-created over millennia. General social, economic, and political views, as well as views and observations about neighbouring peoples, became firmly established by the second or third century AD and have accompanied, if not motivated, the successive drives to unify politically the mainland under bureaucratic autocracies.

Confucianism, the predominant philosophical mode of East Asia, defined individuals as social entities, elaborated an extensive moral system which limited governmental power, and presented an economic system focussed on concepts of national co-operative activity to ensure general popular subsistence. As a consequence of Confucian ideology, politics have been dominated by political responsibility being vested in a regularised, bureaucratic institution recruitment into which has been determined by objective examinations, which in turn led to the creation of a non-feudal élite class (the so-called literati bureaucrats). Attempts to establish feudalistic aristocratic dominance over the 'Chinese' state have been quashed, dynastic rulers preferring intellectual attainment over birth, defining status almost solely in terms of performance in the civil service examinations. We may style this system of governance as a 'meritocratic' system.

Over the past two millennia, the key economic zones of the world have always included China. For most of the past two millennia, the Chinese economy was the most advanced in the world, triggering the onset of globalisation through the 'Silver-for-Silk Trade'. The scale of the Chinese economy has usually dwarfed all others, containing within its domestic sphere nearly every known agriculturally productive ecological niche, often possessing the world's most advanced technology, and using transport systems rivalled elsewhere only in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Although the standard of living in the Yangtze River valley seems to have been on a par with northwestern Europe until about 1800, from the mid- to late nineteenth century, Western views of China have been blinded by a European obsession with its own growth, and from the actual decline and collapse of one of the world's greatest political and economic powers, the Qing dynasty (1616-1911) of China. From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, China passed through another period of 'dynastic change'. However, by the end of the twentieth century, it had again embarked on a stable growth path which will probably take it through most of this century and beyond.

The Cultural and Historical Background - Korea and Japan

Naturally, the brilliance of 'Chinese' civilisation has had a profound impact on neighbouring nations, especially 'Korea' and 'Japan' which - not appearing as viable, coherent political entities until the fifth ('Korea') and the seventh ('Japan') centuries, benefited from nearly a millennia of advanced 'Chinese' civilization. The differences in socio-political organisation among these three countries can be placed on a spectrum from 'meritocratic' (China) to 'mixed meritocratic/aristocratic' (Korea) to 'aristocratic' (Japan). These differences deeply affected traditional politics and helped create centralised, bureaucratic states in China and Korea and feudal anarchy in Japan. Only from the late nineteenth century has Japan moved towards a more meritocratic recruitment model.

Although their heritages differed, the three countries are now in the midst of a historical convergence and can be expected to share and expand their mutual understanding of bureaucratic/technocratic management. This convergence along pragmatic lines also means that full-scale military conflict between them is unlikely. If they are now internally stable and prosperous, how might they be expected to interact?

East Asian Interactive Dynamics

Each of the nations of East Asia perceived that they had a particular place within the common East Asian cultural sphere, and were perceived in turn by the Chinese to have a certain place within it. Partly, this has been the result of geographic propinquity. Koreans have long shared a land border with China and have accommodated themselves over the centuries to this fact. Japan is an island, and thus could join the Chinese socio-political ambit when it suited their purposes. This does not mean that the Japanese have not adapted Chinese civilization, quite the reverse. But it does mean that Chinese culture has been made to fit Japanese circumstances much more than has been the case of Korea.

The Emperor of China was considered to be the Son of Heaven and the symbolic centre of the East Asian socio-political system, which was composed of a series of hierarchical relationships amongst the nations based upon a model of ideal family relations. This idea of a 'family' of nations derives from Confucian philosophy. The emperor's mandate to rule his nation ('China') was dependent on his ability to keep the peace and to satisfy the subsistence needs of his subjects - an idea deriving from the thought of the classical Confucian philosopher Mencius (372-289 BC).

The rulers of Korea in 'traditional times', however, never presumed to refer to themselves as 'emperor', but only as 'king'. This usage reflects the fact that although the Korean élite thought of themselves as 'equal' participants in East Asian civilisation, their socio-political position in the family hierarchy was perceived to be that of a younger brother to an elder brother. To do otherwise, would have implied that they were making a political claim that would have invited unnecessary Chinese interest and subsequent interference.

In terms of pure power, the Koreans have presented the Chinese over the centuries with both a loyal ally and a determined resistor to political assimilation. Korean policy towards China has always been a negotiated activity, either on the battlefield as is the case with the ancient kingdoms of Koguryŏ (4c. AD) and Silla (7c. AD), or by political accommodation sufficient to keep the Chinese out of Korean affairs as was the case with the kingdoms of Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn (1392-1910). From the late seventh century to the present, the Chinese have rarely sought to control Korean territory, because the Koreans always presented them with a very effective resistance. By the same token, the Chinese have viewed Korea as a buffer state. Massive Chinese assistance was provided in the 1590s to beat back a Japanese invasion of Korea, and again in the 1950s to drive back the forces of the United States and the United Nations.

When they have been able to do so, the Chinese have committed massive resources to defend Korea-in alliance with a Korean state-to drive military power away from their Korean frontier. Again, when it has had the resources, China has never allowed a hostile or potentially hostile power to dominate Korea. However, China has almost never sought to dominate Korea itself, being content that the peninsula is neutral or has a positive attitude towards Chinese interests.

The Koreans have long appreciated these circumstances and have profited from Chinese protection. When China has been strong and stable as in the early Song (960-1126), Ming (1368-1662), and Qing (1616-1911) periods, Korea has been at peace and has prospered as in the early Koryŏ and the Chosŏn periods. When China was strong (as in the Ming dynasty) and the Japanese mobilised to attack (as in the invasion of 1592), the Chinese-Korean alliance repelled them. When China was weak and divided as it was in the late nineteenth century, the Japanese sought to take advantage of the situation, seized Korea, and then attacked China. Traditionally, the aggressive state in Northeast Asia has been Japan, not China, never Korea, and the Koreans have always been allied with the Chinese. We should not expect that this pattern will change. Although the Americans have provided stability in the region since the end of the Second World War in 1945, they can now retreat, because the Chinese and the Koreans are strong enough to check the Japanese. This old equilibrium is re-emerging and not to be feared, unless we fail to understand the history and cultures of the East Asian cultural sphere and end up by being excluded from it because of our ignorance.

In short, when China is stable, Korea is stable. When Japan is also stable, then the region is completely at peace. These are the current circumstances, but they could change. The greatest current threats to regional stability arise from a North Korea that might descend into civil war, or an outside power - such as the United States or Russia - that might engage in a military adventure.

Implications for British policy:

The greatest problem for British policy in the East Asian region is the high level of ignorance about East Asia which pervades contemporary British society. Unlike the United States, Britain lacks a significant and successful East Asian minority that can provide cultural background knowledge at all levels. Consequently, it is imperative that we develop such high-level expertise in our institutions of higher education. However, the current record provides a dismal picture. Major higher education institutions, such as the Universities of Durham and Sterling, have eliminated almost entirely their offerings on East Asia, destroying long-held (Durham) or nascent (Sterling) expertise. Even a flagship institution such as the School of Oriental and African Studies in London recently threatened to destroy its research infrastructure by eliminating specialist librarians.

The problem is that the Government and our higher education institutions have been driven by 'managerialist' views which consider long-term investment in strategic 'knowledge industries' (universities) to be foolish, for fear that the current year's budget might show a deficit. To try and develop long-term expertise on East Asia with a workforce that can be sacked this year and re-hired the next is to play a fool's game bred from the twin delusions that any need for information can be provided by out-sourced consultants, and the belief that the important diplomatic and commercial people speak English anyway.

In his 1986 report 'Speaking for the Future: A Review of the Requirements of Diplomacy and Commerce for Asian and African Languages and Area Studies', Sir Peter Parker stressed the need to have a well developed cadre of people in this nation who had a good knowledge of Asian and African languages and cultures. It would appear that, more than twenty years on, his lesson has still not been learned. Not to have a significant financial investment in the creation of a cadre of British citizens with a competent knowledge of East Asia contradicts the commonsense approach usually taken towards developing scientific expertise. If in science, why not in diplomacy and business?

Because of our ignorance about the importance of building up long-term expertise, we may say that in world historical terms, East Asians are colonising us. How better to control a people than to learn their language (English) and their culture and hope that they remain ignorant of yours? One might think that the recent 'China craze' in Britain would have beeen good for Chinese Studies in general and East Asian Studies in particular. However, not only are the actual resources that are currently being committed to the development of the subject area still risible, but the focus of spending is almost entirely on the Chinese mainland. This latter issue ignores the key principle of understanding the context of any situation. One fears that the hype surrounding the 'China craze' may be as transient and vacuous as the wind.

Decision makers seem to be lost in a dream of a billion-plus Chinese consumers all buying a British widget. This is fantasy. The challenge is not to make a widget that all Chinese want to buy; it is the Chinese who are making the widgets that we are buying by the shipload. The challenge for us is to keep the East Asian nations - who now trade among themselves more than they do with the rest of the world - away from systems of autarky and closed trading spheres. This means that the United Kingdom must move upstream and develop expertise on East Asia so that the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese will look to Britons for sympathetic understanding, partnership, and the trust that is bestowed on honest brokers.

This goal can be fostered by:

1) the guaranteed and continued Government support for all branches of East Asian Studies in the nation's universities,

2) Government encouraging businesses and other commercial bodies to provide

bursaries for students studying East Asian subjects, and by making it financially

attractive for them to do so, and

3) encouraging businesses and other commercial bodies to provide in-course or immediate post-course internships for students who have studied a branch of East Asian Studies. It should be made financially attractive for businesses and commercial groups to provide these opportunities as this training is in the nation's long-term interest.

4) More specifically, in the cases of Korea and Japan, we want to call attention to the following:

a) The nearly complete lack of undergraduate and graduate bursaries-It is a sad truth that few undergraduate Britons choose to study East Asia, and is a dangerous trend that the best graduate students do not come to this country, because we have no money to support them. Universities in the US, Canada, and Australia catch and keep the best and brightest.

b) The nearly complete lack of post-doctoral research appointments that would snare the best young scholars.

We propose that:

For Korean Studies alone, the Government should capitalise a set of 12 full undergraduate and post-graduate bursaries for use at the four institutions which teach Korean subjects in the UK (SOAS, Sheffield, Oxford, and Cambridge).

The government should capitalise a set of 6 post-doctoral research fellowships for the same institutions.

The BAKS Council could administer these bursaries and fellowships, because it represents all four institutions, and for several years has administered bursaries and internships for undergraduate students to spend part of their course-time in Korea, and to experience the business world of Korea.

Any successful short-term policy prescriptions on East Asia will be dependent on the pursuit of a long-term policy for the development of expertise on the region, as Sir Peter Parker made quite plain over twenty years ago. Without the commitment to a long-term policy of development, this nation will not only be flying blind, but we will have nothing to offer East Asians in the coming decades, who will increasingly become the world's dominant force politically as well as commercially.

The Council of the British Association for Korean Studies

President: Professor James H. Grayson

Immediate Past President: Dr. James Hoare

Secretary: Professor Keith Pratt

Treasurer: Dr. John Swenson-Wright

Members of Council: Dr. Kirsteen Kim, Dr. Grace Koh, Ms. Fumiko Kobayashi, Dr. James B. Lewis, Ms. Jane Portal, Dr. David Prendergast.