Uncorrected Evidence 449

Witness: Dr. John Swenson-Wright, Lecturer in Japanese Politics and International Relations, East Asia Institute, University of Cambridge, and Associate Fellow, Chatham House, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. Thank you, Dr. Swenson-Wright, for being our first witness in this new inquiry on global security, Japan and Korea. Members of the public, will you please switch off your mobile phones, or put them on silent? Thank you.

This inquiry is a follow-up to other inquiries that we have done on global security, including one on South Asia and one on East Asia. The East Asia one focused mainly on the People's Republic of China and its neighbours, so we thought that there was an opportunity to have an inquiry that looked at Japan and Korea in greater detail. They were touched on in our previous report, and this gives us an opportunity to go further into the issues.

I begin by asking for your assessment of the Japanese domestic debate on Japan's role in the world and how it is changing.

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Probably the most important thing to say, in looking at Japanese security policy as it is perceived domestically, is that there has been a gradual evolution in Japanese foreign and security policy dating from the mid-1990s. Part of that has been prompted by the perceived threat from North Korea-in particular, the launch of the Taepodong medium-range ballistic missile in 1998. In the words of one former bureaucrat, in a sense, it pulled Japan out of its post-war cocoon. It made the Japanese public in particular aware of their vulnerabilities.

We have seen a steady, incremental shift to a more proactive foreign and security policy. Gradually, some of the normative constraints, such as the post-war pacifism that has been reflected perhaps most powerfully by article 9-the so-called peace clause-of the Japanese constitution, have begun to be questioned and challenged. It is also partly an attempt to provide a corrective to the legacy of the first Gulf war, when Japan's bureaucrats and politicians felt that Japan was caught in a difficult position, having provided substantial financial assistance, but perceived not to be a major player in its commitment to security interests. There has been a strong effort to avoid repeating those mistakes.

Fundamental new legislation was introduced in 2001 and 2003, providing the opportunity for Japan's ground self-defence forces to be deployed to Iraq. That was an unprecedented development, as it was the first time that ground self-defence forces had been deployed to a conflict zone. Also, importantly in terms of domestic political debate in the Japanese Diet, maritime self-defence forces were deployed to assist in Operation Enduring Freedom, providing logistical support and refuelling capabilities to the allied effort in Afghanistan.

That all represents an important shift in how security is defined and pursued at a policy level. Some if it also reflects the importance of personalities. Former Prime Minister Koizumi took a number of important political risks in identifying himself so closely with the American allied effort in Iraq. More fundamentally, with regard to the long-term development of Japan's security policy, it is also a reflection of important institutional change in Japan.

As you may know, the Japan Defence Agency has been transformed into a fully fledged Ministry, reflecting the greater emphasis placed on defence matters in Japan's decision-making context. There was a major overhaul of Japan's national security doctrine in 2004 with the publication of the national defence programme guidelines. The emphasis in those has been to shift Japan's approach to security from a rather narrowly regionally-defined role to a much more self-consciously global role, harmonising its capabilities with America's global force posture review.

The key watchwords are flexibility and mobility, ensuring that Japan's defence forces can be deployed in a range of scenarios and circumstances to assist the United States-not only regionally, but globally. In that context, there has been much more active collaboration between Japanese and American forces since May 2006, with the articulation of a new road map. I can go into that in more detail if you like, explaining the background to some of those changes.

Q2 Chairman: Thank you. You mentioned article 9 of the constitution, and you also mentioned former Prime Minister Koizumi. Of course, since then, there has been Mr. Abe and now Mr. Fukuda. Do you think that the Fukuda Government will pursue prospects to amend that article?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is quite unlikely at this stage. Mr. Abe put in train a constitutional process to allow provision for constitutional reform in a range of different areas, but it must be emphasised that that is a long-term proposition. We are talking about four or five years.

It is also fair to say that Mr. Fukuda's current concerns are much more domestically orientated, because of the difficult domestic political balance with the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan, controlling the upper House. Mr. Fukuda's priorities have to be domestic. Also, in terms of his own foreign policy priorities, he is a man who seems much less willing-much less eager-than his predecessor to force the constitutional change argument. In a sense, he does not need to do so immediately.

There are practical measures that can be taken to allow Japan to continue to demonstrate its commitment to its relationship with the United States without necessitating constitutional change. Some of the hallmark issues associated with Prime Minister Abe, such as the plan to introduce a national security council, have fallen by the wayside. I think that most observers see that as a reflection of the cautiousness of Mr. Fukuda, who is much less inclined to pursue that particular area.

Q3 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: On the question of the UN Security Council, Japan wants to become a member, and it is supported by the United Kingdom, but membership requires a forward policy on world security. Is that compatible with article 9? I understand that, in 1945, the world thought that it had seen quite enough of the Japanese army, but that is more than 60 years ago. If Japan wants to play a world role in the Security Council, do you think that that is possible given the existence of article 9?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Yes. I do not see any contradiction between article 9 and Japan enhancing its role in the UN. We have seen that already, for example, in the very deliberate efforts that the Japanese Government made in ensuring the passage of two key UN Security Council resolutions-resolutions 1695 and 1718-in response to the July 2006 launch of ballistic missiles from North Korea and of course, most importantly, most symbolically and, from Japan's point of view, most worryingly, the detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea in October 2006.

Japan's behind-the-scenes efforts to put together a diplomatic coalition to deal with that security threat is precisely the sort of activism that I think reinforces its argument-it is not a new argument, of course-for why it ought to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. That argument is driven not only by Japan's perception and argument that it is doing more in the security context, but, very importantly, by the fact that Japan is one of the most significant financial contributors to the UN. Some would say that Japan is the most reliable contributor, given that it routinely presents about 20 per cent. of the UN budget.

Given that commitment, Japan feels-quite legitimately, I think-that it ought to have more say in the running of the organisation.

Q4 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: You mentioned examples, but they are regional. If Japan was on the Security Council, would it take a global perspective or would it use its membership as a foil to China and others, and pursue a Pacific-oriented set of concerns?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: There has been a very important shift, with the change in leadership from Abe to Fukuda, to a much more constructive approach to Sino-Japanese relations. As I am sure you know, the initial bid for a seat on the Security Council, which emerged under Koizumi's leadership, included a four-state proposition, involving Germany, Brazil, India and Japan. Although Washington paid general lip service to the idea of a Japanese position, there was a real feeling that Washington's commitment was somewhat half-hearted-principally because Washington felt reluctant to open the Pandora's box of UN Security Council reform on such a grand scale. Of course, the other opposition came from China.

There are some indications at the moment that, with Sino-Japanese relations having improved and with China talking about possibly entertaining an Indian bid for Security Council membership, the Japanese might go back to the Chinese and solicit their support. It is too early to say, but I think that we will see further efforts by Japan to enhance its position, at least in the diplomatic context.

As I said, there are many areas where the nature of US-Japan security co-operation is already much more global in focus. There is much more flexible deployment of Japanese forces in combination with the United States, and I would see that global approach continuing.

Q5 Sir John Stanley: As you know, the Committee, in an earlier stage of its global security inquiry, has visited both China and Taiwan. If there should be American military deployments or military operational action at any time in the future to safeguard the independence of Taiwan, what would be Japan's role in facilitating the use of American bases in Japan for that purpose? Have you any reason to believe that the Japanese, in addition to making it easy for the Americans to use their bases in Japan in that context, might wish to give active military support to conventional activities by the Americans to ensure the independence of Taiwan?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Probably the easiest thing that one can say at this stage is that the Japanese defence establishment and the political establishment would dearly wish to avoid that scenario developing. They would see it as drawing them into a conflict that could potentially extend far beyond their borders. Their preference has been to emphasise the importance of reaching a political solution. In February 2005, unusually for Japan, the Japanese Government, together with the United States, signalled the importance of reaching a diplomatic, peaceful resolution to the China-Taiwan conflict. As part of that redefinition of the US-Japan security relationship, there have been early stages of joint training between Japanese and American forces, with the potential contingency of a crisis in the Taiwan straits. But that is a long way from arguing in support of active military co-operation. That would be seen as provocative, for obvious reasons, and would undermine the efforts of the Fukuda Government to enhance their relationship with China-a relationship that is important for a range of reasons.

It is fair to say that the Japanese political establishment is also split about how best to manage its relationships with Taiwan and China, so it is far easier, from its point of view, to try to offset the possibility of such a security crisis emerging. Some have speculated that Japan's efforts to develop missile defence in closer collaboration with the United States, particularly the deployment of more mobile Aegis destroyers, which form a critical part of the new missile defence structure, might, at some point, be directed towards dealing with a conflict in the Taiwan straits. I think that that argument is overstated, but, in terms of perceptions, it fuels some of the dynamic between China and its regional neighbours. From Japan's perspective, China represents a real and present danger in terms of its ballistic missile capabilities. The Japanese establishment would wish to avoid intervening directly in support of the United States, but whether it could avoid doing so is debateable, because American forces would clearly have to be deployed from Japan, principally from Okinawa. It is almost inconceivable that the Japanese Government could veto such an action on the part of the United States.

Q6 Mr. Horam: What effect, if any, will Japan's presence in the G8 have on its international role?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: The G8 offers an interesting set of opportunities for Japan, particularly in the context of climate change. Prime Minister Fukuda clearly wants the Hokkaido summit in July to be a success. In part, that reflects the logic of domestic politics in Japan-there is talk of a possible lower House election in the autumn, and success in managing the G8 summit, however one chooses to define that in policy terms, is important for Japan. It also reflects the personal preferences of Fukuda, who, as a young man in the 1970s, was secretary to his father, the then Prime Minister, Takeo Fukuda. He had anticipated managing the 1979 G8 summit, but was unable to participate because of political change within Japan. The sense of frustration on the part of Fukuda Jr. partly explains his commitment.

What would Prime Minister Fukuda do? We have already seen some important indicators. He gave a significant talk at the Davos forum in late January, when he set out the potential environmental policy proposals that Japan would like to be taken up at the G8 summit. My analysis suggests that Japan is trying to present itself as a mediating force between the European Union-with its preference for some sort of top-down, unified set of standards to deal with climate change, as well as a system of emissions trading-and the United States, which we know is very sceptical about the merits of binding national targets.

The Japanese have proposed some sort of bottom-up system in which industry-based targets would be set as a means of moving towards the Kyoto and post-Kyoto targets, which are being debated at the moment. Unfortunately, the difficulty for the Prime Minister is that because of tensions within his Government and divisions within his Cabinet between the Environment Minister and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, he has been reluctant to set formal targets or to establish a clear time frame.

The Japanese establishment is questioning the merits of the 1990 baseline for discussions on climate change. By doing so, opposition is potentially being generated in European circles. There are even doubts about Japan's ability to meet its 6% reduction target under the existing Kyoto framework. However, despite those problems there are very real areas where Japan can demonstrate its willingness and ability to lead and to make a difference.

Under the proposal made by Prime Minister Fukuda at Davos, Japan will provide some $10 billion-worth of economic assistance over the next five years, targeted at developing countries, in an effort to reduce their emissions. There has been a great deal of stress on the importance of harnessing Japan's technical expertise in this field, particularly in conjunction with countries such as China. Again, that reinforces the effort by the Fukuda Government to enhance their bilateral relationship with Beijing.

There is much talk of alternative uses of energy, solar power, measures to mitigate the effects of natural disasters associated with global warming and better control of water resources. In typical Japanese fashion, those initiatives are being realised through a combination of grants and loans and a set of different incentives. It is quite striking when one contrasts the level of commitment on the part of Japan, with its $10 billion, with what the United Kingdom is proposing. Japan is prepared to take a lead and clearly feels that this is an important opportunity.

When we think about the G8, it is worth emphasising that there are non-environmental opportunities where Japan can afford to lead. In a sense, that relates to the earlier question about its security role and its ability to make the case for a prominent position in the United Nations. The initiative that is most relevant to that is the global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, which was first introduced in 2002 at the Canadian G8 summit. Japan has played an important role in encouraging denuclearisation, often behind the scenes and in a low-profile context. Again, that is emblematic of Japan's diplomatic style. It has been at the forefront of efforts to dismantle Russian submarines through the Star of Hope programme.

Japan has also been an active player in broadening the range and number of participant countries beyond the G8 framework and bringing in non-G8 states as part of that initiative. That sort of technical experience is invaluable not only in the context of the former Soviet states, but in the context of North Korea-a very live issue for Japan. If the Six-Party Talks were to continue along the route that we see at the moment and if Japan was able to realise and manage its domestic opposition to closer relations with North Korea, one could see a very valuable role for Japan in providing technical assistance, perhaps in conjunction with the United Kingdom.

There is a range of areas where Japan's past efforts could be applied in a future context-even in the context of China-for example, regarding non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. Japan has played an important role in decommissioning stockpiles of chemical weapons left over from world war two. It has important technical expertise that could be applied in a variety of different contexts.

Q7 Mr. Horam: Briefly, how far do you feel that Japan's stand on climate change and environmental matters is driven by its energy requirements?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: That is a very important part of its agenda, although its energy requirements cross a range of policy issues. The immediate context in which one would expect to see a more developed set of initiatives is enhancing and using nuclear power to deal with energy needs. Japan has been less proactive and less willing to embrace such initiatives. Its approach to its own energy demands involves closer relations with China, because of the need to develop access to oil and natural gas resources in the East China Sea. It also affects its relationship with Russia and, importantly in the context of non-proliferation measures, its relationship with Iran. Japan has been trying to develop access to the very substantial resources of the Iranian oil fields, and some of that has been qualified and constrained by diplomatic realities and pressure from the United States. Given the importance of maintaining access to diverse energy supplies, Japan is perhaps taking a more flexible approach in its relations with Iran than it otherwise might, and the Iranians have certainly been lobbying the Japanese Government to reconsider their position on that issue.

Q8 Mr. Hamilton: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has said that the success of Japan, and also South Korea, in ensuring stability in East Asia "will depend on their close relations with the US". It also notes that Prime Minister Fukuda has said that Japan's alliance with the US "should be used to leverage an enhanced Japanese role in Asia to boost relations with China and the Republic of Korea." Could you give us an outline of the current state of security relations between the US and Japan?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: The security relationship is broadly very positive. In fact, some former members of the Bush Administration who were closely involved with relations between the two countries would argue that it is the best that it has ever been. Certainly, if one takes most of the conventional indicators, it is easy to see why that argument would be made. The US remains the linchpin of Japan's security strategy, both in the region and in its evolving more global role. There are some 53,000 American troops in Japan, which is a very real and substantial presence.

There has been a substantial enhancement of security co-operation between Washington and Tokyo through the road map that I mentioned, and we have also seen at the diplomatic level a real effort by Prime Minister Fukuda to build on the success achieved by Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe. I think that the November summit of last year was a success. The Bush Administration and the President himself provide rhetorical support on the critical issue of the fate of Japanese abductees, which again is a very important political concern for the current Japanese Government. A new host nations accord agreement has been signed.

With regard to ballistic missile defence, there have been substantial developments in testing key technologies. Thanks to some agile footwork within the Diet, we have also seen the ability of the Liberal Democratic Party Administration to re-extend the deployment of maritime self-defence forces to the Indian Ocean and to reassure Washington, which had looked at that political issue as something that would potentially destabilise the relationship. We have also seen much more enhanced collaboration between Japanese military forces and their American counterparts in a series of exercises in the Pacific. Importantly, that is not limited to the US and Japan, but is now bringing in other nations such as Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand and Singapore.

Having said that, I think that there are some very important potential irritants in the relationship that could complicate how it develops in the future. With regard to North Korea, I certainly think that there is a private worry on the part of the Japanese Foreign Ministry-it might be reluctant to say this publicly-that Washington's commitment to solving the North Korean nuclear problem is perhaps not as strong as it would like. It worries, for example, that as part of the necessary arrangements to provide incentives to North Korea, the US is about to de-list the country as a state sponsor of international terror, in effect undercutting Japan's negotiating position with North Korea and potentially creating very significant problems domestically. While Washington worries about the very evident proliferation risk posed by North Korea, from the vantage point of Tokyo, the principal security concern is about ballistic missiles. That is not to say that that the nuclear issue is not important, but the ballistic missile threat from North Korea is equally important and, in certain quarters, there is a feeling that that concern has been insufficiently emphasised.

It is also important to recognise that making those very ambitious security changes in the defence relationship between the US and Japan will cost a lot of money. The simple redeployment of 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam, which is due to take place over a four-year period, is due to cost some $26 billion. When you consider that the Japanese annual defence budget is about $45 billion, you can see why that will impose a huge constraint on Japan at a time when its economy is suffering. Past American Defence Secretaries have been assiduous in pushing Japan to show a willingness to dig into its pockets to support such initiatives. Defence planners worry that their abilities to meet the broader roles and missions that are part of the new road map might be constrained by very real fiscal pressures. The defence establishment is legitimately concerned about that.

In terms of building an effective defence relationship, one area on which the two countries have been moving closer together since the 1980s is sharing critical defence technology. During the past 20 or 30 years, there have been periodic flash points of tension where there has been a debate over the merits of sharing technology, partly because American defence contractors worry about the possible leakage of such technology into the civilian sector. A similar controversy arose recently over the American decision to prevent the export of F-22 Raptor fighter planes to Japan, again suggesting a certain degree of caution from Washington in its willingness to work actively with its Japanese partners.

Politically speaking, in an echo of the mid-1990s, when a very damaging rape case on Okinawa threatened to derail the relationship, we have, alas, seen a similar event in the last month or so. Having said that, the political communities on both sides have learned how to manage such tensions and, for now at least, they have been able to contain the problem.

There are other issues that are less germane to security per se, and more to do with domestic politics, both in Tokyo and in Washington. The US Congress has been keen to single out Japan for criticism because of its failure to address the interests of former comfort women. In the process, that raised difficult historical issues that bedevil Japan's relationships with not only the United States, but, most importantly, China and South Korea. Those are areas that will need to be addressed in the future and although there is a will on both sides to manage the relationship, important areas of uncertainty remain.

From Tokyo's perspective, the other area of uncertainly is the likely outcome of the next presidential election. Rightly or wrongly, policy makers in Tokyo tend to assume that Republican Administrations are more sympathetic to Japan. Democrat Administrations have, in the past, been willing to play the trade card, and there is a nervousness due to uncertainty about what might happen in November.

Q9 Mr. Hamilton: Thank you for that comprehensive reply. Do you think that the close relationship between Japan and the United States is helpful to Japan in pursuing its regional relations? Despite all that you said, it is still a very close relationship-there are 53,000 US troops stationed in Japan, so it has to be close. How helpful is that to Japan in its regional ambitions?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is obviously critically important in providing Japan's immediate security guarantee. The nuclear umbrella that the United States offers Japan is essential as a deterrent strategy, and one can imagine the consequences of removing or qualifying that. Fortunately, there is no move on either side to question that relationship.

Japan does not have many choices in terms of where else it could go. We have seen a willingness to explore the possible development of a more flexible defence posture regarding not only enhancing its relationship with the United States, but thinking about new partnerships. In March last year, Japan entered into a new security partnership for the first time-in this case with Australia-which signified its desire for more flexibility. Under the Abe Administration, there was talk of a new quadrilateral relationship to bring together the United States, Australia, Japan and India. That signified a new political assertiveness and ambition on the part of certain members of the LDP, in particular the then Foreign Minister, Taro Aso. That idea is now well and truly dead, partly because of political change in Australia and the emergence of the Rudd Administration, who worry that moving to a more flexible defence posture of the type that I have described will be perceived by the Chinese as confrontational and as signalling a new containment strategy. As a result, there has been a movement away from this more ambitious agenda. The fact that the Japanese political establishment and certain politicians are willing to explore those new structures demonstrates, I think, a desire to enhance Japan's security options.

Q10 Sandra Osborne: With this recent rape case, to what extent are the views of the Japanese public reflected in the attitudes of the Government towards the US? I understand that there is anti-US sentiment. Is there a view that the US military should get out of Japan, or is the attitude consensual?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is a local issue for the residents of Okinawa, who represent 1% of the total land mass of Japan and accommodate 65% of all American forces. It is easy to see why this is a very difficult issue, but even in Okinawa there is a trade-off between those constituents who are opposed to the American presence and local businesses that benefit significantly from the economic stimulus that comes from that presence. On the whole, Japanese public opinion remains consistent towards the United States. If you look at it over the post-war period, you see very little fluctuation in general attitudes towards the United States, which for the most part remain very favourable.

Of course, these sorts of incidents are disruptive. What is important in the Japanese context is that the guilty party-or in this case the guilty Government, by association at least-is seen to respond sympathetically and quickly, and to offer apologies. Secretary of State Rice and Thomas Schieffer, the American ambassador in Tokyo, moved very quickly-within, I think, three days-to travel to Okinawa in the case of the American ambassador to meet, the family of the victim and to offer apologies. That has helped to diffuse a lot of those tensions. Where public opinion is much more volatile is in relations with China, and also with South Korea.

Q11 Chairman: May I ask you about China? There was clearly strong hostility and opposition in China when the previous Prime Minister Koizumi went to the Yasukuni shrine. There were demonstrations-almost riots at some point. What is Japanese public opinion, and also Japanese political opinion, with regard to internal Chinese issues? It might be too early, but could you perhaps comment on Tibet, and also on the Taiwan question in Japanese politics?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: In terms of Japanese public opinion and attitudes towards China, there is no doubt that the demonstrations in the mid-1990s and the significance of the history issue have been a source of tension. The Japanese public's attitude towards China is not that dissimilar to the American public's attitude towards Japan in the 1980s. That attitude is based on a fear of China's economic potential, and on the perception that it is growing ineluctably and will eventually take over Japan's dominant economic position. That is the principal fear on the part of the Japanese public. The media in Japan do not help, particularly popular media, whether it is manga cartoons or some of the more sensationalist press that is keen to demonise and stereotype the Chinese. That feeds into this almost symbiotic relationship between nationalist communities in China and Japan.

There are certainly outspoken politicians who are quick to point out the political shortcomings and democratic deficiencies of the Chinese Government. They are a vocal force, but not necessarily a representative one. In fact, if you look at the efforts-and not only those of the LDP and Prime Minister Fukuda-to rebuild the political relationship with China, you can see that they continue the important progress made by Mr. Abe. If you combine that with the efforts of the Democratic party of Japan- Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the Democratic party, has travelled with other members of his party to Beijing for important meetings with the Chinese leadership-there is a healthy pragmatism and recognition that this is a relationship that needs to work. It is often characterised as a hot economic relationship and a cool political relationship. The economic relationship continues to work in a constructive way, and business interests remain committed to developing their presence. China is now Japan's most important trading partner, and the rate of increase in Japanese inward foreign direct investment to China is striking. That does not minimise the importance of other tensions, particularly in the defence context. The defence agency, as it was before it became a ministry, has, over time, emphasised the potential security risk posed by China. There is concern about submarine and naval incursions into Japanese territorial waters, and, as I said, about China's real ballistic missile capabilities.

All of that has been an issue, but we have seen substantial improvement in the relationship in the past three or four months. That partly reflects person-to-person diplomacy. There was the visit of the Chinese Premier who, for the first time, addressed the Japanese Diet last spring. Importantly, in terms of addressing some of the historical issues that feed the domestic debate, Prime Minister Fukuda's visit to China was welcomed by the Chinese authorities, and he was given the opportunity to give a live public address on television-he was only the second leader to do so, President Bush being the first in 2005. Prime Minister Fukuda addressed the students of Beijing University, and spoke explicitly about having "the courage and wisdom to repent what we must repent." It was an important and deliberate effort to address the history issue head-on. As you know, Mr. Fukuda made a clear commitment not to visit Yasukuni shrine, taking some of the difficult political tensions out of the equation.

Prime Minister Fukuda's counterpart, Hu Jintao, is due to visit Japan in April or, more likely, May. That will be the first time since 1998 that a Chinese leader has visited Japan and, again, there is a perception that that will provide a useful opportunity to cement the relationship at a practical level. One thing I would emphasise in this new dynamic, which perhaps exposes a strategic weakness in Japan's approach to foreign policy, is that the Prime Minister has been quick to emphasise the commonality between China and Japan at a cultural level. During his visit, he went to Confucius's home town, and there was talk of emphasising Asian values, minimising what in the past was a clearer highlighting of democratic, political issues. Foreign Minister Aso sought to articulate a much more ambitious security and political agenda when he talked about constructing a new arc of freedom and prosperity in the region. That idea has now been put very much on the back burner, and Mr. Fukuda has attempted to reorient Japan's posture towards Asia, particularly China.

There are many other important elements in the new partnership. The Chinese ambassador to Japan, Cui Tiankai, talked about the importance of building a new strategic, reciprocal relationship, and we have seen unprecedented port visits by Chinese warships to Japan. We have heard talk of possible trilateral co-operation between China, the United States and Japan, looking for new security structures, particularly to address Japan's concerns about North Korea. There is increasing recognition in Tokyo of the fact that China is an important mediator in dealing with North Korea and thus a valuable partner. The economic relationship remains important to both sides.

As for problematic issues, we have mentioned Taiwan, which remains a concern. Both contenders in the Taiwan election have travelled to Japan on a number of occasions and are looking to shore up their support among a diverse political environment in which there are constituencies in both parties that align with either China or Taiwan. The oil and energy issue surrounding the debate about access to the Senkaku islands seems to be moving towards a successful resolution, but it is important to emphasise that this is a resolution only in terms of energy security, and joint access and development of those oil and natural gas reserves. The Chinese sound positive, but they have not compromised on the critical issue of sovereignty, which remains a flashpoint not only between China and Japan, but between Taiwan and Japan.

Lastly, and perhaps most strikingly in terms of the ability of unexpected events to derail bilateral relationships, there is the controversy surrounding food poisoning. Chinese dumplings have been identified as responsible for a number of high-profile food poisoning cases. This is not a trivial matter when one considers that China, after the United States, is perhaps the most important supplier of imported food to Japan, supplying about 60 % of its frozen food imports. The fallout is verging on mass hysteria and is not inconsequential, both economically and politically, with accusations of bad faith on the part of both Governments. The Japanese Government are accusing the Chinese Government of covering up information relating to the origins of the problem, and the Chinese Government are suggesting that the problem might have originated in Japan or was possibly an act of sabotage deliberately intended to derail the bilateral relationship.

Q12 Mr. Moss: May I return to relations with North Korea, which you touched on when answering the question on US-Japan relations? In your opinion, would Japan be prepared to normalise relations with Pyongyang if there were an international settlement on the North Korean nuclear issue, even if there was not some kind of movement regarding the issue of the abductees?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: If they can find a formula for dealing with the abductee issue, I think that there is a very real possibility that Japan would be prepared to entertain normalisation. After all, it was Prime Minister Koizumi who on two occasions took what at the time were very real political risks in visiting Pyongyang in 2002 and 2004. Mr. Fukuda, who in his time as Chief Cabinet Secretary was often referred to as a shadow Foreign Minister, took a great deal of interest in the relationship with North Korea, and his public remarks to date suggest that he is adopting a much more pragmatic approach than did his predecessor. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Abe was very much constrained because he had legitimised himself in terms of popular support by taking a very hawkish position on North Korea, and we see in Prime Minister Fukuda a desire to develop, in his words, a comprehensive approach to dealing with North Korea, so I think that the simple answer is yes.

Even public opinion in Japan is much more flexible, or at least ambivalent, on the importance of emphasising the abductee question. The key issue, of course, is how best to effect that change. In this context, relations with South Korea offer a new opportunity, not only with regard to co-operation between Seoul and Tokyo in developing a more co-ordinated approach towards North Korea, but in bringing in the United States to address security interests through the reactivation of bodies such as TCOG, the trilateral co-ordination oversight group and thinking politically of possible solutions.

Of course, Japan will need to be an important part of any long-term solution, principally because it offers, through normalisation, very real incentives for the North Koreans. In the 2002 meeting, the talk was of a package of aid of anything between $5 billion and $10 billion. When you consider that the North Korean economy, if one can measure such a thing, tends to record figures of about $17 billion for its GDP, you realise that this is potentially a very substantial incentive. If the political will is there, Japan could be a very instrumental player in effecting positive change, along with these important initiatives in the field of technology and the proliferation risks associated with North Korea.

Q13 Mr. Moss: Turning next to South Korea, how has Japan responded to the election of President Lee, and to what extent do you believe that the Japanese-South Korean relationship is still influenced by Japan's treatment of regional states in its colonial and wartime past?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Generally, the response has been very positive. As you know, President Roh was seen from Tokyo's perspective as being over-willing to play the history card over territorial differences and to use the vexed question of history text books as a means of securing domestic support on the home front. I think that that might be an overstated argument, and one has to understand that there are very real cultural differences between Japan and South Korea that feed this perception on both sides. Similarly, on the Japanese side, local politics has often intruded to complicate the bilateral relationship without necessarily reflecting a hostile approach on the part of the Government.

Lee himself, the new incoming president, is seen in Tokyo as a pragmatist. It does not hurt that he was born in Osaka, and so there is immediately a Japanese connection. It is striking that Prime Minister Fukuda chose to attend the inaugural ceremonies on 25 February and was one of the first foreign leaders to have a meeting with President Lee. There is talk of a visit by President Lee to Japan in April. The new Foreign Minister, Yu Myung Hwan, was the former ambassador to Japan, so what the Japanese like to refer to as pipes-the personal ties that bring these two constituencies together-have been potentially enhanced in a very important way.

The previous Administration was dominated by members of the so-called 386 generation-individuals in their 30s who were born in the 1960s and attended universities in the 1980s-who were seen as not having those very important personal ties. The fact that we see a new generation or an older generation of individuals shaping policy towards Japan and Korea offers important opportunities. Just as we have seen in the case of Sino-Japan relations a willingness on the part of politicians on both sides of the political aisle to travel to China to rebuild relations, so, too, we have seen a similar pattern on the part of Japan-Korea relations. There is even talk-ambitious talk, it has to be said-of building a new tunnel between Japan and South Korea, which at 200 km would be a major engineering undertaking, dwarfing by far our own 50 km link with France.

While all that is a positive change, there are possible areas where one might see points of tension alongside the co-operation. Lee is perceived as a business man and a tough negotiator. He has set his own agenda on economic growth very ambitiously: the so-called 747 strategy of ensuring 7 per cent. growth in the economy, doubling per capita income to the level of $40,000 per person, and establishing South Korea as the world's seventh largest economy. That means that there will inevitably be tensions in the economic relationship between the two countries. It was in 2004 that the two countries last talked meaningfully about the possibility of building a free trade agreement or an economic partnership agreement between them. Those negotiations have since stalled. They may be reopened, but there will be difficulties, particularly in the agricultural sector, in rebuilding the relationship in a constructive way.

Finally, one area which sometimes gets neglected in the bilateral relationship is the importance of cultural exchange-soft power-on the part of both countries. Just as there has been in the past five or 10 years a Korean wave of cultural products-films, books and music-that has ensured the growing popularity of Korea among ordinary Japanese, so, too, quite interestingly, there is now a Japanese wave. There is a similar level of interest on the part of ordinary Koreans in Japanese culture. That has to be a good thing, albeit a force that will have at best only a gradual, but hopefully sustained, impact on the bilateral relationship.

Q14 Sir John Stanley: During the recent presidential election in South Korea, President Lee gave a firm impression that he would be taking an altogether tougher line with Chairman Kim Jong Il if he was elected President. Indeed, I understand that President Lee's Korean nickname is the bulldozer. Do you anticipate that there is going to be significant change in policy towards the DPRK under President Lee, or is he as determined as his predecessor to try to achieve a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: I am hesitant to express a view on this issue because there are two much better qualified colleagues behind me who I am sure will address that question much more persuasively than I can. My sense is that Lee's approach is one of pragmatism and conditionality. There is the potential for a much more enhanced relationship with North Korea, provided progress is secured on the nuclear issue, and there is talk of expanding economic co-operation zones and of sending more economic assistance, in effect tightening the relationship between the North and the South. The distinction is between that approach and the approach of his predecessor, who saw engagement, in and of itself, as in turn producing success in terms of proliferation and nuclear discussions. We have a reversal of the sequencing. On the commitment to reaching a positive outcome, the two men are not that far apart.

Q15 Sir John Stanley: You referred earlier to the dispute between Japan and China and Taiwan in relation to certain islands. As you know, there is also significant dispute between the Republic of Korea and Japan on islands. Would you like to give us your assessment of whether there is any chance of resolving the sovereignty issues in relation to those islands? Could it produce actual hostilities between the Republic of Korea and Japan?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: The sticking point is on the mechanism proposed by the two sides for resolving the matter. Neither side accepts the proposal of the other-in the case of Japan, the willingness to go to international arbitration. There is complete reluctance on the part of the South Korean Government, who see the territory as legitimately Korean, so it is hard to see how diplomatic accommodation can be reached.

It is also important to emphasise that, in popular sentiment, this is much more of a live issue in Korea than in Japan. Your average Japanese member of the public, I am tempted to say, is little exercised by the fate of Takeshima, or Dokdo as it is known to the Koreans. It was striking that when the issue flared up-I think that it was in the spring of 2004, when the Shimane Prefecture decided to announce that henceforth 19 February would be Takeshima day-there was a very muted response on the part of the Japanese media and Japanese public opinion. By contrast, we have seen demonstrations, the burning of Japanese flags and attacks on the Japanese embassy in South Korea. It is hard to see how any politician in South Korea, however pragmatic he might be, would be willing to court public discontent by suggesting any sort of compromise on the territorial issue. I am afraid that it will continue to bedevil the relationship, but we may see the leaders being willing to find some formula for avoiding such unexpected flare-ups. The problem is that they often occur at local, not national, level.

Chairman: Can we ask questions about the regional security position and the Six-Party Talks?

Q16 Sir John Stanley: Could you tell us whether the Japanese Government, in your view, are quite content for the US to take the lead in the Six-Party Talks, or whether it has particular requirements that it sees as fundamental to the outcome?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: The bottom line from Tokyo's perspective is progress on the abductions on the one hand and, as I suggested earlier, the question of the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. Japan is willing to support what the February agreement represents and the mechanisms for ensuring closer engagement with North Korea. We now have different working groups that can address a range of issues, such as the possibility of a peace treaty and the possibility of some sort of regional security architecture, but Japan has made it very clear that it will maintain its existing sanctions and that it will not provide economic material assistance directly to North Korea unless and until the abduction issue and full normalisation are realised.

There is very little that Japan can be seen to be doing directly to enhance the Six-Party Talks process, and that is a danger for Japan. The danger is that it will be seen to be isolated. Pyongyang has been quite effective in the past in attempting to divide Japan from the other members of the Six-Party Talks, insisting that Japan's interests should not be represented and, in some cases, insisting that Japan should not participate in those negotiations.

One thing that the Bush Administration, particularly Christopher Hill, have insisted on is ensuring that there is continuing discussion on a regular basis with counterparts in Japan. There has been clear and persistent refusal to accept pressure from the North Koreans. There has to be a multilateral solution that involves all the key parties.

Chairman: Finally, can we ask some questions about the UK and Japan?

Q17 Sandra Osborne: How would you characterise the image of, and attitudes to, the UK in Japan?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Very positive. It is often said by Japanese diplomats that, in a sense, the problem with the UK-Japan relationship is that there is no problem. It is a very harmonious relationship. There are no tensions or difficulties. Culturally, there are clearly very close ties between the two countries. We have seen a regular flow of tourists, language students and young Japanese people attracted by the culture of London and the wider UK. It is probably fair to say that, on the part of young people in the UK, interest in Japan seesaws alongside interest in China. We see that in an educational context. There has inevitably been a dip in the number of students enrolling in Japanese studies programmes, but broadly I think that there has been a great deal of interest in, and sympathy for, Japan at many different levels.

Similarly, in Japan, there is a great deal of interest in, and enthusiasm for, British culture. Some of that has, of course, been the product of close political ties, particularly between former Prime Ministers Blair and Koizumi, who, to the best of my knowledge, had a very good working relationship. Prime Minister Blair was seen as an important-perhaps it is going too far to say inspirational-figure in Japanese political circles, and he was certainly very popular. Political culture in Japan has changed, particularly under Koizumi. Personality politics matters much more, as does the ability to command the media-the bully pulpit of television has been very important. One of the problems that I think that Mr. Fukuda might have in the long term is that he is not a natural performer like Koizumi. The Japanese public are probably looking for more of that dynamic style of leadership.

Q18 Sandra Osborne: In spite of that, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office cites a couple of issues about Japan's whaling activities and use of the death penalty. What leverage do you think that the UK has in trying to make the case against those to the Japanese Government?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: It is quite difficult to see how the British Government can persuade Japan to undertake what would be a major cultural shift. The commitment to whaling remains quite strong. As you know, it is presented as driven by scientific research interest, but the reality is that it is still an important part of domestic political culture. The consumption of whale meat continues in Japan. As I understand it, there has been some willingness on the part of the Japanese Government, in the face of international pressure, particularly from Australia and its new Foreign Minister, to reassess some of its whaling activities. For example, originally there were plans to include in this year's catch-if I can put it in those terms-some 50 humpback whales, but the Japanese Government have decided to roll back from that owing to concerns raised by the international community, including national Governments and non-governmental organisations in particular. I suspect that raising the issue in public forums and highlighting the concerns of a wide range of Governments provides the best opportunity for the British Government to at least try and contain the problem, but it would be over-ambitious to assume that we can really change the culture.

As for the death penalty, again I think that there are deep cultural reasons why it remains very much an active part of Japan's legal culture. There have been a number of high-profile cases of very sensational murders involving young children. Japan is a culture that believes in retributive punishment to meet the needs of the victims. Once again, I think that the most useful vehicles for effecting constructive change in Japan on such issues-and I think that there is a case for effecting constructive change, particularly in the way that prisoners on death row are treated-are organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The British Government's commitment to such activities could be quite constructive and helpful.

Q19 Sir John Stanley: If you were the British Foreign Secretary's personal foreign policy adviser on Japan, what would you tell Mr. Miliband should be his top British Government foreign policy priorities towards Japan?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: Climate change is probably the area in which there is the most opportunity to enhance and develop the bilateral relationship with Japan, taking advantage of the fact that Prime Minister Fukuda has clearly given a very important rhetorical commitment, as well as a financial one, to enhancing Japan's role in effecting positive climate change. It is an area where a lot more could be done. A secondary priority, perhaps, would be supporting Japan's wider security role. Under Prime Minister Abe, there was talk of an out-of-area support role for Japan with NATO, and those areas could be further explored.

Q20 Sir Menzies Campbell: Please forgive my absence for the whole of your evidence. I had another engagement, but I shall read the transcript carefully.

Both whaling and the death penalty are issues on which United Nations conventions exist. Japan has a long-term aspiration of permanent membership of the Security Council. Is there any sense among the Japanese, particularly in the Japanese Government, that a reluctance to adhere to those conventions might stand in the way of realising that aspiration?

Dr. Swenson-Wright: I have not seen it actively discussed in public discussions or the media. Presumably, it is an area where professional diplomats are aware of the potential weaknesses of Japan's position, but as a public issue, I would say that it is not something on which there has been much informed discussion or debate.

Chairman: Dr. Swenson-Wright, thank you very much. This has been extremely useful and we thank you for your time. We will pause for two minutes while we move the table around for the next witnesses.

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr. Aidan Foster-Carter, Honorary Senior Research Fellow in Sociology and Modern Korea, University of Leeds, and freelance writer and consultant on Korean Affairs, and Professor Hazel Smith, Professor of International Relations, University of Warwick, gave evidence.

Q21 Chairman: Good afternoon, Professor Smith and Mr. Foster-Carter. Thank you for taking part in our first day of taking evidence in our inquiry, "Global Security: Japan and Korea". I think that you listened to the earlier part of our session. In this session, we will focus on the Korean peninsula, but there are clearly questions that go much wider than that. May I begin by asking you about the position with regard to North Korea's nuclear programme? Professor Smith, how do you assess the current state of the nuclear programme and capability, and why do you think North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons programme?

Professor Smith: Thank you for inviting me to this meeting. In answer to the first question on the current state of North Korea's nuclear programme, I shall base my answer on discussions that I had with the State Department a few weeks ago in Washington DC and on information from the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, with whose staff working on North Korea I have worked for a while. My view is that in terms of the relationships between the major protagonists, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-North Korea-the technical issues are under way regarding the negotiations on denuclearisation. I think that the Americans have had their experts in North Korea on it. In fact, I know that they have had their experts in North Korea. The North Koreans have been talking to the United States and, from my own information, people in the United States and in the DPRK think that at the technical level denuclearisation is proceeding as expected under the recent agreement at the last round of the Six-Party Talks.

On the political level, there is still a lack of trust between the two major protagonists. Whatever one party says, the other party does not believe, or there are sections within the Governments and polities of both parties that put pressure on other sections. That is not the only issue, but it makes negotiations difficult. The United States is unhappy that North Korea has not given a complete rendering of its nuclear facilities, and that is still under negotiation. Negotiations have not broken off, which is very important. Chris Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, who is responsible for the negotiations, is still fairly pragmatic and even optimistic. I am putting words into Chris Hill's mouth as I have not met him, at least not recently.

The North Koreans are upset because they consider that the terms of the agreement from their perspective that there would be moves to take them off the list of states sponsoring terrorism and movements towards normalisation in relation to the United States-have not been fulfilled. It is those political aspects on both sides of the agreement that, in terms of the denuclearisation programme that has come out of the Six-Party Talks, are the key pertinent issues. Given that there was confidence on both sides, I think that the technical issues will be resolved.

Mr. Foster-Carter: I do not disagree with any of that, I shall just add one or two points to perhaps render it concrete. May I start by saying thank you very much for having me back? It was about two years ago that I was last here and I was looking over the comments that I made at the time, which looked extraordinarily inarticulate when written down. We were all exercised by two things: did the North Koreans have the bomb, and did the Americans have a policy towards North Korea? Things have moved on both those fronts; we know that the North Koreans have the bomb and the Bush Administration, rather belatedly, has acquired a policy. Statements about horses and stable doors may spring to mind.

I agree entirely with Professor Smith-am I allowed to say Hazel in the informal 21st century?-about the difference between technical and political issues. On the technical issues, we both agree that they apply only to the nuclear programme that the North Koreans admit is based on plutonium, about which they have sometimes boasted. That is underway; it is canned. The political issues, which are a little depressing, are twofold: the first is the American suspicion that the North Koreans have in the past done things that appear to suggest that they were pursuing a separate programme based on enriched uranium. That has been on the go for a long time. The second issue is an entirely new one, as of last September, when the Israelis bombed a mystery facility in Syria, where there was a strong suspicion, strengthened by the tight-lippedness of almost everybody in Jerusalem, Washington and elsewhere, that there may have been nuclear proliferation.

The political difficulty, as I understand it, although I, too, am making inferences, is probably a very great disappointment to Chris Hill. He has worked incredibly hard, and has been given a great deal of rope to produce an agreement. The problem seems to be that North Korea was supposed to produce a declaration on the UEP-uranium enrichment programme-by the end of December and it missed that deadline. That is the formal position, but I understand the practical position is that the North Koreans are not moving on from a formal denial: "We never did either of these things. We've never had highly enriched uranium, we've never done anything with the Syrians." I call that their Bart Simpson moment-you know the famous line: "Didn't do it, nobody saw me, can't prove a thing." Hill has explained the situation very carefully, and heavyweight people like Dr. Kissinger have been wheeled out in meetings with North Koreans in New York to explain that when we come to it, a comprehensive declaration must be just that; you really have to, forgive me, fess up. You really have to say everything, it is not enough to say "We're not doing it any more-honest, guv." To build the trust, which Hazel rightly mentions is lacking, there has to be a full confession. There are curious parallels with the abductions from Japan, but I will not go in to that. When the North Koreans manage a confession, it is a rare thing. Those are the political difficulties, as I understand them. I worry about how they will be transcended, and I worry for Mr. Hill's position, but perhaps that takes us further.

Q22 Chairman: What would make the North Koreans explicitly come to a point of abandoning the programme and admitting that they have had such a programme? Would that depend on the US going beyond the process of engagement to a more formal recognition and more formal diplomatic relations? Is that the sticking point?

Professor Smith: There are two issues. One is the broader issue that the North Koreans have been saying, at least since the first nuclear crisis of 1993-94, that they want normalisation of relations with the United States. In their terms, that means much more than being able to trade with each other. There is not much that they could get from the United States, because it is a bit too far away, apart from a bit of food. Most of their trade would still come from the region. Mainly, they see it as a security guarantee. If there was some form of normalisation, in their view it would mean that they were not going to be invaded or bombed.

In the past, there has been a lot of discussion about whether the North Koreans are paranoiac. They probably are, but from their perspective, they have seen the Iraq war and the rather belligerent approach to Iran, which is one of the two countries on the axis of evil list. They considered that they were at risk of two things: military action being taken against them in some way, and regime change through different ways of trying to undermine the regime-something which they still consider a risk. I do not know whether it is possible to achieve what the North Koreans want, given that many people do not want to give that sort of guarantee. Until they are sure that the regime will be safe-that is the Government with Kim Jong Il in charge and the structure around them-they are not likely to do anything about the wholesale abandonment of what they consider to be their trump card, which they call their nuclear deterrent. They want normalisation, but in the broadest sense: they want a security guarantee.

Mr. Foster-Carter: Again-I am not disagreeing, but I hope just amplifying the point-in so far as the North Koreans see things that way, and I agree that they probably do, I fear that they have a very unrealistic grasp of the way in which politics works in Washington and elsewhere. I am amazed and pleased at how far the Bush Administration have moved from where they were in their disastrous first few years on the Korean issue and probably on other issues.

The North Koreans may think that they can get a better deal or get things faster than through this process. Yet again, the years tick by. Last time, they were waiting for Kerry and they did not get him. Now they are probably waiting for-I should not name a name-a new Democrat US President. Again, I think that they probably delude themselves. Unless Chris Hill, who is very clever, can come up with some way of getting the Syria issue and the enriched uranium issue off balance sheet, as you might say, or shove them away into a separate track of talks, the Bush Administration will run out of time. Again, an interesting parallel is with those in Japan who have tried to push the abduction issue to where it will not get in the way of everything else, but not because they do not care about that issue. If the Bush Administration run out of time, I fear that the views of those like John Bolton, the former US representative to the UN, who argue that the North Koreans were never going to make a deal and that Kim Jong Il will never give up nuclear weapons and is just stringing us along, will become more persuasive.

Professor Smith: May I add to that? One of the issues is that the structure within the North Korean state is not a monolithic entity, contrary to outside conventional knowledge. There are real divisions-I would not say between hard-liners and soft-liners-but there are different interests at stake.

The Committee will have met people from the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for Foreign Trade who travel abroad, and they are fully aware that they need to do some sort of deal with the international community, howsoever that is organised. That could be done through the United States, the Six-Party Talks, the European Union-through the negotiations that they have with the IMF and the World Bank-or through any of the other people to whom they talk, officially and unofficially. Those people are sophisticated, and some of them-not all of them-go to a number of meetings, and I have mentioned in my evidence that there is track 2 as well as track 1.

In North Korea, the structure is such that everything that goes in-UK Government negotiations with the North Korean Foreign Ministry, for example-must then go through another layer, which is the security or the military apparatus. Those people are not in direct touch with foreigners and they still benefit from the way in which the system used to work. They benefit not only because of their position in the apparatus, but also because of the economic opportunities that come up from below through the new processes of marketisation. In other words, they have good contacts, although no access to foreigners they have access to hard currency, and that gives them another way to benefit from the system. That powerful layer in the North Korean political structure is capable of keeping a block on, or at least entering into negotiations that have the effect of paralysing progress. In any negotiations that North Korea undertakes with the rest of the world, it gives the impression of one step forward, two steps back. It is not the only reason for paralysis, but it is a major one.

North Korean bureaucracy does not work very well and there is not much communication between different Ministries and organisations. That is partly because there is no bureaucratic system in the modern sense of the word-filing systems and regular systems of procedure-but it is also because, for historic reasons, they do not trust one another. There are all sorts of blocks on internal, institutional change taking place. Lots of learning takes place at the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Trade, even at the top, and that can be effective when the very big issues are at stake. If, for example, the whole state has to mobilise itself to respond to the United States on the nuclear test issue, it is able to do so. Anything less than that, requiring some sort of effective bureaucratic functioning, leads to all sorts of problems.

Q23 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Reading the history of the nuclear negotiations seems drearily familiar. Where authoritarian Governments are concerned, there are endless retreats, advances, trade-offs, linkages, disappointments, disclosures, cheating, disclosures of the cheating and then more cheating. Does North Korea have a nuclear programme simply as a bargaining chip, or does it have genuine security concerns? Surely, North Korea's neighbours dread a collapse there-a demilitarised North Korea would be left alone, or would be helped in some way. Who would invade North Korea? Is its concern real, authentic and valid, or is the whole thing about bargaining?

Mr. Foster-Carter: I think that it is a bit of both. This is a state that was flattened by the US air force, with a bit of help from ourselves, half a century ago. It was not out of a clear blue sky-they had invaded South Korea-but it is a very powerful memory. It also reminds me-and here I show my age-of Konfrontasi in Indonesia under Sukarno. Throughout its history, the North Korean regime has consistently traded on those genuine fears and, for older North Koreans, on memories of attack from the outside, to create a permanent impression of a country at war on the verge of being attacked. I have no doubt-Hazel will know better than I do, as she has spent more time there recently-that many North Koreans genuinely fear that, as they have read and heard nothing else from their Government all their lives. At the same time, it is also a bargaining tool.

My rather pessimistic fear is this. I take seriously the Songun policy, the "military first" policy that has been an avowed doctrine since Kim Jong Il came to power, although not under his father . The military is put first, and I have described North Korea before, as others have, as a sort of Sparta of the East. I fear that, in the rather ghastly jargon of today, this is now hard-wired into North Korea. I cannot imagine a North Korea that is not trying to arm itself with everything under the sun, partly for bargaining, but mainly because it cannot conceive of security in any other way, such as collective security. I very much hope to be wrong about that. In my view, one must continue to try to engage, but that is my fear. That is the kind of state it is.

Professor Smith: I think that it is about deterrence. It is quite a classical use of the nuclear possession as a negotiating card. It is a fairly normal, whatever normal is, use of nuclear deterrence. Do the North Koreans think that they would be attacked? I think that they thought that there might be a surgical strike on their nuclear facilities, and my view is that that was a realistic possibility at some points over the past 10 or 15 years in terms of the relationship between the United States and the DPRK. Certainly, it was in 1994. They were very, very near war-two days away from war-before President Carter went to visit Pyongyang and negotiated a deal with Kim Il Sung, who was then alive. However, two issues to do with nuclear deterrence and the military capability of the DPRK are different from the first nuclear crisis, which took place in 1993-94, so although of course there is this endless repetition, as you rightly mention, two broad parameters are different. One is external; one is internal.

Externally, the international relations of north-east Asia are very different now from what they were in 1993-94. China is a valued partner of both South Korea and Japan, to a certain extent, because of the economic relationships that now bind them together. In my view, the nuclear test was the red line for China in terms of negotiations with North Korea. A number of other things took place that China was very unhappy about over the past several years-unilateral decisions that North Korea took that would have had an effect on China and that China stamped down on. One of them was the declaration of a free trade zone along China's border when it had been trying to stamp out corruption in the Liaoning area, which is north-west of North Korea. The North Koreans unilaterally declared a free trade zone with hardly any regulations and the Chinese stopped it, but I think that the nuclear test was a red line for China.

China is a major supporter of North Korea in terms of keeping the economy, such as it is, going with coal, fuel and food. The overall position of China, which is economically much more important now than it was in 1993-94-the time of the first nuclear crisis-and also the economic relations, the economic position of China in north-east Asia and even in relation to the United States, is different now, so that North Korea is much more isolated. This is a contributory factor, I would argue, in the relative success recently of the Six-Party Talks. It is not just about the approach of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush, who have argued since 2006, "We think we can get to an agreement on this, different from before." The external relations are different in North-east Asia.

Also internally, there is, in my view, a crisis of legitimacy inside the DPRK. If you were a child born in North Korea in 1989 or 1990 and have now reached adulthood, you have been brought up in extreme poverty and have also seen inequality growing quite rapidly. There is a nouveau riche class that has made some money out of the market opportunities that are available, but there is a vast swathe of poverty. Social services at least used to be provided, more or less nationwide, in the DPRK. I am talking about health and education. You did not have to buy medicines; they were more or less available. In terms of schooling, there was a literate, numerate population; there still is, although that will be disappearing now because the resources have gone.

People do not believe that this is a socialist paradise. Everywhere, people are trying to make money from the market. The state is no longer able to engage in the socialisation processes that it was able to do until 15 or 20 years ago, especially outside the capital, so the "military first" policy, which we have heard about in relation to North Korea, is, in my view, partly an insurance policy to keep the regime in place in the capital, in the DPRK. The pursuit of being a nuclear power is partly to promote a sense of national pride, as if to say, "We are doing it, and only big powers like America can do it." Also, it helps the North Korean Government, because it makes them seem more powerful than they are. In my view, the Government in DPRK is very fragile.

Q24 Sir John Stanley: As you both know, one of the key factors that produced the quite surprising progress on an agreement on nuclear weapons and declarations via the DPRK was the successful operation carried out by the US Treasury and other agencies to block the foreign exchange outlet of Kim Jong Il and his regime through Macau. Do you think that that key pressure point has become not so effective and usable? If so, can you identify any other significant sources of pressure that might persuade the Kim Jong Il regime that it has more to gain than to lose by complying with its enriched uranium declaration requirements and by making progress under the present agreement?

Mr. Foster-Carter: Gosh. On the former, the Macau business was actually rather odd. I am not quite certain, as you implied, that is has been established that that pressure brought North Korea to the conference table. Even if it did, things then turned very peculiar, because, as I understand it, once the Bush Administration decided that they wanted a nuclear deal above all else, the Macao business suddenly vanished from sight, with some embarrassment within different arms of the US Government. The North Koreans, as ever seizing any opportunity for further delay, saw the wonderful spectacle of the US having to return all the money, whether it was dirty or not.

I do not want to spend too much time on the detail, but some quite interesting independent journalistic accounts have cast some doubt on whether the matter was quite as we had thought. I confess that I have become old and cynical over the years, and I have tended to assume that the North Koreans are probably guilty until proven innocent, which is not our system in this country. However, there are some holes in the evidence; the US Treasury Department never published its evidence, for example.

The second part of your question was the more forward-looking, and I should like to pick up on something that my colleague said. China is key now. I am sure that she is right that it was a fateful day when the North Koreans exploded their little bomb. I think that it really annoyed the Chinese, not yet to the point that they would decide that they did not want the regime in place anymore, but at least to the point of endorsing the famous lines of Arthur Hugh Clough:

"Thou shalt not kill; but needst not strive

Officiously to keep alive".

Chinese grain aid to North Korea is down, as I understand it. The Chinese do not want unrest on their borders or the regime to collapse; but, to be brief, China is already applying more pressure than it used to, and it is in a position to apply more. Kim Jong Il may yet rue that day.

Professor Smith: This is not a direct answer to your question-which is not always very popular. I am not sure that now is the time for extra pressure. At the moment, the negotiations between the United States and the DPRK are more in the persuasive mould; at least, they seem to be, relatively, but we never know what will happen. We know what can happen with the North Koreans-you could say that they could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. However, at the moment, the transactions that have been agreed via the Six-Party Talks agreement would work for both sides. North Korea needs the energy aid from the agreements, and the agreements on shutting down the nuclear reactors, which is well under way, have been successful-there have been major advances in the past 18 months. That is the significance of the past 18 months and the Six-Party Talks. For once in the past 15 years, we are seeing fairly successful negotiations and things changing on the ground. Given that it is working, why change it? Why fix it if it is working?

There may come a stage in negotiations where, for all sorts of reasons, the idea of more pressure, as opposed to more engagement, is brought back to the fore. What sort of things put pressure on the North Korean Government? Certainly, you are right that they were very upset about the freezing of Macau bank accounts. Not a lot of money was involved-a maximum of $50 million, I believe-but, as well as the licit freezing of transactions, transactions may have been frozen illicitly. That was one of the problems for the US Treasury. We still do not quite know, because we never saw the evidence, but we do know that the personal bank accounts of senior people in the North Korean regime were frozen, and that caused a lot of upset. It caused the North Korean Government to want to do something. Clearly, whether it was strictly legal or illegal under international law, it was something that exercised the North Koreans.

However, several things can be done in respect of the trade that takes place between North Korea and its neighbours that are not illegal. For example, there are the various shipping networks. We already have port controls in almost every port to which North Korea sends its shipping, and North Korean ships are inspected. Those are perfectly legal ways of, for instance, checking the cargoes that go between various countries. If the international community wishes to reassure itself that there are no contraband cargoes, that would be a perfectly admissible way of ensuring that there are not.

Of course, at the same time, the economic situation in North Korea is so bad that even though a few people are making some money, most are not. A lot of the trade that goes into North Korea involves basic grains and things that actually help the population-food. It is hard to see a situation in which one would want to expand the sort of sanctions that would make things worse for the majority of the population, when they already suffer major food shortages.

Given the low level of the economy-this is always the problem with economic sanctions, if that is what we are talking about-there are not really many opportunities to make the economy squeak, if that is the question. It is already squeaking a great deal, and it does not show many signs of being reinvigorated in the short, medium or long-term future without a deal with the United States that would enable World Bank and Japanese funding to go into the country.

Q25 Chairman: Is there a particular role for the UK? We are not part of the Six-Party Talks. Is there any role that the UK Government specifically can play in these issues, or are we just there as a kind of supporting cast for the people who are doing the work?

Professor Smith: My view is that there is a role that the UK Government could play, but it would require funding. Also, it may not be a realistic objective to have the UK play such a role, because, after all, Korea has not been and, as far as I know, is not of major national interest to the UK directly. Of course, as an ally of the United States and as a partner in the European Union, the UK has supported denuclearisation and humanitarian issues, but, in essence, it has taken a supportive role in respect of what has come out of the United States and the European Union, rather than a proactive role.

As I said in my evidence, my view is that the UK is at the stage, given its privileged relationship with the United States and given the fact that it has diplomatic relations with the DPRK, which has an embassy in London and has had high-level ambassadors here since the opening of those diplomatic relationships, where it could play a major role in confidence-building between the two major protagonists, the United States and the DPRK.

I have said in my evidence-I admit to having a bias-that I think the Foreign Office was wrong to cut the money for CSCAP, the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific, in which the United States, North Korea and South Korea, operate, as well as the countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations. It has provided a forum in which Asia-Pacific security can be discussed. The European Union and China are also part of it.

Irrespective of that, there is a focus, for instance, for track 2-type forums to be made available, where North Koreans and United States policy makers and academics who are involved in the process can get together. This happens in the United States; it does not happen in Japan, but it does happen in China and parts of South-east Asia, and that has provided a forum for officials who are involved in the negotiating process to get together.

The UK is certainly in a very privileged position, in terms of its relationships with the key players, to provide forums for that sort of trust-building exercise. North Koreans and United States policy makers are used to this sort of operation; they are used to taking part in track 2 activities. The North Koreans, of course, are a bit more unsteady in them, but they have been to Wilton Park in the past for these sorts of activities.

There is a big role for the UK, if it wants to play it, but of course, it would cost money. It would cost money to set these things up; it would cost money to bring people in; and it would take time away from Foreign Office officials, who may see their primary role as being vis-�-vis Japan or China, because of the economic relationships there. In the end, however, that could provide an important stage for UK diplomacy because, as I said, international relations in east Asia-relations between China, Japan and South Korea-are changing a lot.

The United States had found its position being sidelined and its status and authority being undermined, because of its previous inability to play a major part in the Six-Party Talks-another reason for it to come back are alliance relationships-and there is a place for the UK, if it wants, to become a little more important in playing a facilitating role in the region.

Q26 Chairman: Do you want to add anything?

Mr. Foster-Carter: Briefly, and in parallel to that. Again, this may be unrealistic, but I would hope that we would try-subject to priorities and resource constraints-to get as many North Koreans over here as possible. They may not always be the top people-I take Hazel's point that we have had very senior DPRK ambassadors here-but the coming people, the students and so forth. There often is not funding, and of course, after the second nuclear crisis exploded a little over five years ago, a lot of these initiatives were nipped in the bud because you have to try to punish the state somehow. However, the more younger North Koreans we can get out here and expose to the West, the better. But you know better than I what the constraints are.

Q27 Mr. Moss: May I turn to something that you have referred to already, if somewhat obliquely? How stable do you think the North Korean regime is?

Mr. Foster-Carter: I am glad that you asked that, because we fixate so often on the nuclear issue, and quite rightly, because it is important, but North Korea is a package or a-the UN has a terminology-complex emergency. There are so many issues, and the internal stability issues are coming to the fore. I speak tentatively here, because I was foolish enough 17 years ago to go into print saying North Korea was about to collapse and would definitely go when Kim Il Sung died, so nowadays one is circumspect. However, at the very least, the tensions are growing. The pressures on the regime and its long-suffering people are acute, and they grow worse. The fact that the regime has been able to keep things under control so far does not mean that it can do it for ever.

Briefly, there are three issues. One is economic reform, and as I understand it, a toe has been put in the water since 2002, but that has not been radical enough to be effective-the economy has certainly not taken off in any sense. You now have a very odd mixed system where, as Hazel implied, the state no longer gives you a living-you have to really scrabble for it as best you can.

Then, there is the whole question of succession. Kim Jong Il is now 66. When his father was that age, his dauphinhood, if there is such a word, was already being arranged. It is complicated for Kim Jong Il, whose marital history we will not go into, but he is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. By rumour, he has banned even private discussion of the issue. There is certainly none in public. We all just speculate. If he were to have the heart attack tomorrow-we think he had heart surgery last year-I would say that all bets for North Korea are off. I do not know what system they have, although it is a very tight one-perhaps the military would take over in a smooth manner. There are real questions, particularly linking the two issues-going back to the failure of economic reform.

With people's hardship and a growing knowledge of the outside world-still not much, but a partial breakdown of the information quarantine-one is beginning to hear reports of people going to Government offices and protesting, and not immediately being carted away and so forth. There are huge tensions, and it is far from clear how the regime plans to manage them.

Mr. Moss: I think you said that there were three issues. I took down two: economic reform and succession.

Mr. Foster-Carter: They interlink, so forgive me for being unclear. Number one is the debates at the elite level: whether to reform or not and, although not quite the same thing, whether to give up the nuclear weapons or not. One imagines people who are on one side on that issue or the other. Secondly, there is the grass roots and the risk of unrest from below, the risk that the people will eventually become unmanageable-that is obviously linked to the first. Thirdly, there is the question of succession. I am sorry for my ambiguity.

Professor Smith: There are a number of different levels to that question. The first question, I think, was whether there was instability such that the Government could be overturned, in basic terms. One of the key variables is still the fact that there are major food shortages. Those food shortages affect the middle classes in particular, in the urban areas, because they do not have access to growing their own food, or they may not have relatives in the countryside.

Let us look historically. I am a political scientist, and political science does not have a good record in prediction, but one of the things it finds is that revolutions are not really made by hungry people. Revolutions are made by people who have a little bit of a stake in the system and who do not have to worry about literally getting enough food to feed themselves and their families at the end of the week. Now, in North Korea, with a population of about 23 million people, probably about half the country is still worried enough about food, particularly when the harvest has run out, in terms of its distribution. The urban areas do not have access to their own stores, so this is the top priority. Those people, including the people that might in another system be thinking about political change, such as white collar workers, teachers, doctors and local government officers working throughout the country, are spending their time thinking about food and survival-literally, survival. There is a modern infrastructure in the sense of universities, schools and technical and literate classes, but they are living in a primitive way because of lack of access to food. While there are continuing food shortages, there is a lack of legitimacy for the Government, but there are also bigger priorities than overturning the Government-that is, making sure people are alive. That is, literally, alive-it is not an exaggeration-throughout the period.

That also applies to the army, the famous 1 million-strong military. Although at the top of the tree people are of course privileged, most of the foot soldiers at the bottom are given basic rations, but they do not have enough food for their families. A million in the army and an average family of four people, that is 5 million people. So they are worrying about their families as well. The food issue, again, is so major that it does not lend itself to a position where there is room for political organisation and the ability to take over the state.

Q28 Mr. Moss: Would it be possible for North Korea under a different political regime, and another agrarian set-up, to produce most of the food it needs? Or is that quite impossible, given the geography of the state?

Professor Smith: It is not an agrarian country. Something like 20% of the land is arable, but most of it is mountainous and forested. Under Japanese colonialism, in the first 50 years of the 20th century, it was developed by the Japanese as an industrial area. In fact, the north-eastern strip was mainly chemical factories and steel factories, providing fertilisers. All those people are now unemployed, because there have been no resources since the fall of the Soviet Union to pump into those major industrial plants. So it is not a natural-whatever natural is-agricultural country, and when it was able to produce enough food for its people it relied heavily on agro-industrial inputs: electricity for irrigation; fertiliser, chemicals and pesticides. Those things are not available. Even the North Korean Government plans, and all the UN plans, are based upon: "If North Korea wants to feed its people, it needs to do something about developing and manufacturing export capacity so that it can buy food." I do not think that that situation is likely to change.

Q29 Mr. Moss: Has there been any improvement in the humanitarian or human rights situation in the past few years?

Professor Smith: Those are two different issues, the humanitarian and human rights situations. On the humanitarian situation vis-�-vis food and malnutrition, the three major nutrition surveys of 1998, 2002 and 2004 showed that the nutrition statistics had improved for children under seven. Those statistics are probably reasonably reliable. The malnutrition statistics for North Korea are now pretty much the same as those for south-east Asian nations. In fact, the statistics are better than those for India and Indonesia, for instance. Nevertheless compared with North-east Asia-Japan and China-the statistics are pretty poor, and the people are still living under threat of dying because they do not have medicines, and if they have enough basic food they do not have minerals and vitamins, or variety in their diet. There is such severe malnutrition that people die of hunger. All that still exists in the DPRK. So the humanitarian situation is kept afloat by aid from South Korea and China; that is why it is not worse than it is.

On the human rights situation, you can break it down into various aspects. Regarding the penal system, we still have no knowledge of what goes on in that system because there is no independent assessment. We must assume the worst case scenario, as we have information only from defectors. On the rule of law and electoral systems, we still have the same systems as before, where the party is not independent from the judiciary. In my view, there is room for manoeuvre in splitting out human rights issues, and discussing with North Korea different aspects of those, in terms of technical assistance on some of them. Overall, people have much more access to individual decision making-they are making their own decisions about their day-to-day economic transactions because the state does not provide them-and there is more ability to move around in the country, if you can walk that is, because you will not usually have access to petrol or cars. However, in terms of political freedoms, human rights are still non-existent.

Mr. Foster-Carter: May I add a couple of things on the human rights side? I do not know what counts as independent evidence. I know what Hazel means, but if anybody here is an enthusiast for Google Earth you can now look at the North Korean prison camps, just as you can look at Kim Jong Il's palaces and many other things. That adds an interesting dimension.

To link to what we have been saying about how the power of the state has to some extent weakened, when I read accounts of people who go back and forth between North Korea and China-because of the level of bribery that is possible-I do not sense a trend, but there seems to be a growing arbitrariness. People go back and forth between North Korea and China to earn money. If they get treated badly when they get caught, they might turn against the regime and do the very long journey-usually via another country in South-east Asia-and eventually find sanctuary in Seoul. People are moving around in spite of the regime. When they are caught, the degree of punishment can vary greatly, as far as I can see. I think that the capacity of the state to brutalise all its people is decreasing, and we may be thankful for that. Perhaps its will to do so is as well, but I am not so sure about that.

Q30 Mr. Moss: A final question, if I may? What is your take on the recent overtures from Pyongyang to western musicians? What is the point of that? Did it come as a surprise?

Professor Smith: No. The North Koreans have had, at least since the '80s, an active cultural-academic even-diplomacy of some sort. They held a big student festival where they brought in people from around the world to show what they considered to be the artistic and cultural side of Pyongyang. They have sent sporting groups to the Olympics and various festivals in South Korea, and they are very proud of their circus people who have won medals throughout the world, including Switzerland and various places in the west. So, they have engaged in large amounts of cultural diplomacy. What is interesting is that it is with the United States as opposed to with Europe, with which they are more familiar. All talking is good, but the North Koreans are pretty hard-headed about the significance of cultural diplomacy and on what are core issues to them. Yes, the world is shown a cultivated side to North Korea, but at the same time that does not infringe too much on what they see as their interests in the six-part talks, for instance.

Mr. Foster-Carter: Briefly, I am particularly interested in what might be called the replay, of which we are the beneficiaries. I believe this is an entirely independent matter, but a British businessman, David Heather, is negotiating to bring the leading North Korean symphony orchestra to these very shores later this year. That cannot be bad. Although I suspect it will not solve the nuclear issue overnight, surely it is to be welcomed.

Chairman: May we switch focus and ask some questions about South Korea?

Q31 Sir John Stanley: I would like to ask about DPRK and the South. May I ask you both what you consider should be the top British foreign policy priorities towards the DPRK?

Mr. Foster-Carter: Gosh. In spite of what I said earlier, I think it is right to push on the nuclear issue. I would have hoped that if we have a voice, we could try to work some way-although I do not know how it would be done-towards a package approach, and that the North Korean issue could be seen as how to make what I sometimes call a rather fierce little dinosaur become a more peaceable mammal and live at peace with its neighbours. We need to ensure that we do not lose that focus. However, perhaps I have not been specific enough.

On specifics, if I can return to what I said before about trying to encourage them to send people over here. Maybe that is entirely unrealistic. In a way, I would almost want to delink that from the behaviour of the regime because one wants to get at the hearts and minds of the younger North Koreans. You may tell me that is unrealistic, but that is the way that I think we and other European countries could make a big difference, if the resources permitted it.

Professor Smith: The question is about the role of the UK and-

Sir John Stanley: Foreign policy priorities.

Professor Smith: It is not realistic to think that the UK will take a major and leading role in the relationship with the DPRK. It could make more of three of its alliance structures: the first is with the United States, the second is with the European Union, and the third is with South Korea itself.

To reiterate what I said earlier, in relations with the United States the UK could provide a number of forums where confidence building could take place around the issues identified for further discussion in terms of the working groups that are coming out of the Six-Party Talks, one of which is economic development. That is something with which the UK could play a role. Although there would have to be some money spent-not a lot of money, but some.

Secondly, in terms of its alliance structure in the European Union, the European Union has a presence in North Korea and is likely to continue to have a presence. It has not spent massive amounts of money, but it has been very active, and has not only spent money on humanitarian and development aid, but has engaged in some form of political negotiations where it can-for example, with matters such as human rights. There is room for the UK to play more of a leadership role within the European Union in its relationships with North Korea. At the moment, the leadership role within the European Commission and the European Union is played by Commission officials, who in my view are very good. Nevertheless, there is room for a political leadership role to be played, and the UK has a comparative advantage because of its relationship to the United States and to the DPRK. That political role could be played in the European Union and could help to lead the resources that are already there in terms of providing some overall support for the Six-Party Talks.

Thirdly, on its relationship with South Korea, there is of course a new President in South Korea, who it seems will continue to promote the engagement policy, but will probably put more emphasis on what he has called efficiency and a development type approach, as opposed to a humanitarian approach. The UK could develop partnerships through the various UK-Korea parliamentary groups, and could seek ways to give support, although not subservient support. We could have an engaged dialogue with South Korea about the UK's views on what could and should be done, and we could work with the South Koreans to promote engagement with North Korea. Perhaps the UK could make more use of its alliances with the US, the European Union and South Korea.

I should like to talk about students coming here. Again, I declare an interest, as I work at the University of Warwick. In the early 1990s, when I worked at the University of Kent, I was the director of a British Council-funded project that brought Chinese students here. It was just after the Tiananmen square incident, so it was quite controversial. They came to the University of Kent and other universities in the country for periods of six months or more, and then they went back. It was not a cheap project, but it provided a fantastic foundation not only for my project, but for others that were going on at the same time and for future development. Canada was also involved. The project meant that Chinese officials, policy makers and people who were to work in business were very well grounded in the various norms and standard operating procedures relating not only to my subject, international relations, but to the economy, insurance and banking.

There is a role to be played by the UK, at this moment, in funding North Korean students to come here. Last year, the University of Warwick had two North Korean students who had worked at University Kim Il Sung and who wanted to come here to do masters degrees in English language education. They were qualified, they took the English language test, and a charity had agreed to fund them. The English language testing and interviews were done by the British embassy in Pyongyang, and the students went through the whole process that any of our overseas students would go through, but then the funder pulled the plug at the last minute. It is not cheap to bring students over: you have to pay overseas students fees, which cost �10,000 a year, and maintenance, so it costs about �20,000 a year per person, plus a bit of travel but my view is that such a project would pay substantial dividends in the short, medium and long-term in terms of North Korea's integration into the international community, as happened with all the experiences we had with China.

This is the right moment for such a project because it is also North Korea's top policy priority to get its people out and educated in degree courses, not just short-term courses, outside the country. The North Koreans know that that is expensive, but it is their top priority, and it should be a political and educational priority for anyone who can facilitate it. That runs counter to the myth that the North Koreans will never let anyone out. They will now, if we can find the funding to do it, so I make a plea: if anyone who is listening to or reading this wants to provide some funding for North Korean students to come here, let's go ahead and do it.

Q32 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. I shall now use the same words to ask you both a very different question. What do you consider should be the top British Government foreign policy priorities towards the Republic of Korea?

Mr. Foster-Carter: Sure. I have a particular view on that, although it takes us into entirely different territory, perhaps outside the remit of this inquiry.

Sir John Stanley: It is absolutely within the remit of this inquiry.

Mr. Foster-Carter: Okay. In my view it is not central-not a security issue. I hope that we will continue to do something that we were doing under the previous Roh Moo Hyun Administration, which is to encourage the South Korean Government to open their service sectors. I shall not go on at great length about why I think that is important. To give credit to Roh Moo Hyun, which is not always done, I think that he grasped that. Quite apart from any general views that one has on free trade and so on, South Koreans, right here and right now, are less well served than they could be in the spheres of education, health and legal services, which I know this country has taken a lead on, as well as in other areas. Curiously, although we are told that the new President has a business background, is business-friendly and so on, the business to which it is clearest he is friendly is Korean business, and large Korean business at that-the chaebol. He makes noises about free trade agreements, but I have not heard the sort of speech that we got from Roh Moo Hyun-they were widely ignored-about why opening the service sector, just as manufacturing is open and the financial end of the service sector is largely open, would be a good thing.

I am afraid that it is straight-down-the-line national interest. I am sure that there are British universities and others that, if they were allowed to, would set up camp. It is bizarre that in what is nominally still communist China, Nottingham can go and set up a campus, but one cannot yet do that-well, not straightforwardly-in South Korea. That sort of thing could only benefit. South Korea has a huge national debate and hang-up about its education; again, I will not get into that. It has highly educated people, but everybody is dissatisfied, for many reasons, and it is not a lot of fun being a student there. It is great fun being a university student-it is a doss-but the four years before that are absolute hell on earth. One hardly sleeps in order to get in. That sort of issue is what I hope we would do.

Professor Smith: I cannot really speak to the domestic issues, because it is not my direct area of research, but on security issues, I think that South Korea will continue its policy of engagement, both bilaterally and in the context of the Six-Party Talks. My view is that it is nothing really new, actually. I think that the UK can continue to provide what it has from 1990 onwards, when Kim Dae-jung met Kim Jong Il and the South Korean Government asked for support from the UK in their engagement policy, which was then called the sunshine policy. I think that it is still a policy that has borne more fruit than other policies, even if it is problematic. It is something that the UK Government should still see as the centre of their priorities in the security realm in their relations with South Korea, supporting it, though not blindly, in its attempts to deal with its difficult partner North Korea.

Q33 Sandra Osborne: What do you think has been achieved by South Korea's engagement with North Korea and its economic support?

Mr. Foster-Carter: As it happens, I read this very day that a plane load of 159 small and medium entrepreneurs from South Korea have flown to Pyongyang. It is the first such occurrence-I presume that it was arranged under the previous Government, but such continuities happen. Apart from anything else, South Korea has celebrated 20 years of democracy and had 10 years of the sunshine policy. One aspect of that, over and above what the Government may or may not do, is that the South Korean Government do not control what their own people do. South Koreans can go to North Korea now, and I am not sure that they even have to report back. The normal exercise of democracy, which doubtless we applaud, includes letting business people do that if they want to, subject, of course, to UN sanctions. That is all going to go on anyway, I think, if-it is a very big "if"-South Korean business thinks that there is any money to be made there.

A fact that is not often commented on is that the famous South Korean chaebol-the big businesses, some of them global household names such as Samsung, Hyundai and so on-have not, except for Hyundai, gone into North Korea. The position is very different from that of Taiwanese firms, most of which now make their living in China, whatever the political risk. That is because, quite apart from security issues, North Korea has been a pretty dire place to do business. Again, there is no time for the detail, but Hyundai has arguably been fleeced quite a lot. The former Hyundai is now at least three separate entities, as you might know. One lot has put up with all of that, but it has put off the others. However, if there is business to be done, they will probably go in anyway.

I shall add one thing on the Government level. Again, while we are focusing on the nuclear issue, sanctions, where to apply pressure and so on, we should not forget the sheer geopolitics of this. If North Korea is-I feel a bad metaphor coming on-a rather rotten plum that will at some point fall into somebody's lap, there is a question of whose. We can talk about multilateralism and try to mean it as best we can, but, at the bottom, China and South Korea are rivals for influence in Pyongyang. They might co-operate in many ways, but there is great concern in South Korea, for instance, including in the conservative circles that are now in power, that the Chinese have been buying up all the minerals in North Korea, which is rather well endowed with a wide range of minerals, as Hazel mentioned earlier. Those were developed during the Japanese colonial period, which is one reason why most of the factories then were in the north. Much of that has been sold to the Chinese, so the South Koreans are worried that they are losing out.

On the other hand, there is the cynical view of, "Let the Chinese have the difficult first stage of turning North Korea into a more normal country"-that is terrible talk that implicitly denies the sovereignty of the North Korean Government. However, even as the new South Korean leader, Lee Myung Bak, says-and he means it, I am sure-that he will try to move closer to the US and link his dealings with North Korea to the nuclear issue, I believe that there is powerful geopolitical and geoeconomic pressure to get in there and stop the Chinese, regardless of the nuclear issue. That will be a real dilemma for his Government, I believe.

Professor Smith: It is a very interesting question and I was just writing down what has been achieved in this period. Let us consider the big picture and compare the situation pre-2000, when there was hardly any contact between North and South Korea, with the situation today, when there are massive numbers of North and South Koreans talking to each other. That is something-they are opening up.

To be even more specific, from the humanitarian and food perspective, there is absolutely no doubt that many more North Koreans would be dead if it was not for South Korean assistance. It has been the main supplier of food and fertilizer to help North Koreans grow food over the past six or seven years. Certainly, it has kept people alive, which is something. As we saw from the famine in the mid-1990s, at the beginning of which there was no external assistance to help keep people alive, such assistance could not be taken for granted. China was not on such good terms with North Korea. Although China also supplies food, South Korean is the major supporter in terms of bilateral food aid.

Also on the humanitarian side, we cannot dismiss-although they get forgotten about these days-the family reunions. Of course the war divided Korea in 1953 and those divided, with relations on both sides, are all elderly and dying now. Divided families have managed to see each other owing to South Korea's engagement policy, not because of anything else, including the multilateral talks. That could not have been expected, but it has not been good enough. My view is that, for instance, the video family reunions are nothing short of torture. Nowadays, some of the family reunions have been replaced by video contacts between relatives in North and South Korea. I do not know why South Korea agreed to that. That must be as disturbing as not seeing people, perhaps. However, where people can get together, it is a huge achievement on a very personal and individual level. Of course, those opportunities get lost as people get old and die off.

Little economic development assistance has gone to North Korea from South Korea. Most of it has gone into humanitarian assistance. The small and medium enterprises working in Kaesong in the south and in the Kumgang tourist zone, when there is a comparison with South Korea's real wealth, have not invested massive amounts. Owing to profitability concerns, it does not look like there will be massive amounts of investment from the business sector in South Korea, unless the political situation improves.

On the political side, I think that it is certainly beneficial to be talking, rather than being in a cold war confrontation. There has been progress in some areas. The militaries have talked to each other on some matters. A road has been built through part of the demilitarised zone. There has been increased understanding at some levels, even if it has not permeated through in every aspect of the societies. However, under the cold war situation, you could have counted the number of North and South Koreans meeting in their dozens, but since 2000 that number has been in its thousands. Obviously, they are all speaking the same language, so that is important.

Finally, on the security side, the fact that the North and South Koreans are talking on every level, and that they have done throughout every single nuclear and missile crisis when everybody else has been very fraught-even in the nuclear test times, North and South Korea have kept on talking at different levels-leads to security predictability, or at least more predictability than there was when people did not talk. An element of predictability improves security relationships overall. The situation is not perfect, but it is better than when there was no talking.

There have always been back channels between North and South Korea, even in the worst times, but the amount of back and front channels between the countries now means that the complete unpredictability of North Korea is long gone. On the humanitarian and security levels, there have been major paybacks from the talks but, of course, not as much as the South Korean public would like. There have not been enough paybacks on a political level, and economic investment has mainly been for support in political, security and humanitarian matters than economic development per se. I do not think that much on the economic level will happen until a big deal is done to make people more secure about their investment.

Chairman: I am conscious of the time, so I shall take one more question from Sir John Stanley.

Q34 Sir John Stanley: Do you think that Kaesong has the potential to expand significantly and to become a major source of thaw between North and South? Specifically, have you any information on whether the now joined-up rail system through the DMZ, which I believe takes goods only as far a Kaesong, will be used to its full potential to create a freight link right through the DPRK? Is there any prospect whatever of the rail link becoming a passenger as well as a freight link?

Mr. Foster-Carter: It will eventually but, of course, the key question is when. One passenger journey has already been agreed. It is purely symbolic but, under the old South regime, the two Koreas agreed to send a joint cheering squad to the Beijing Olympics-they will start from Seoul and go all the way to Beijing by train. That is set to happen later this year. I do not think the arrangement will change, but we shall see.

Progress has been terribly slow. The South Koreans paid $500 million all told for relinking two railways-I believe that the one on the eastern side, which is of less economic importance, is not fully done. So far, the North Koreans have been so reluctant that, for a couple of years, reputedly, the Northern military would not allow it to be used at all. The roads, however, were open. What is it in the North Korean military mindset that finds trains a problem? As of very recently, you can drive on the roads into North Korea. In the Kumgang zone on the other side of the peninsula, you can drive your car in. I believe that even foreigners can do that. Perhaps you could find out when you are next there.

The train situation is worse: it does not go even as far as the Kaesong zone; it goes to the border station. The South Korean firms are numerous and the numbers are growing. It is for real-it might be too late, but it might be a mini Shenzhen in the making. The firms truck stuff because it is not economical to use the railway.

On the broader infrastructure, there is a big question about the spate of agreements that were reached in the last days of the Roh Moo Hyun regime after his summit, many of which seemed to me to be broadly practical. The agreements include joint work on both the road up to Pyongyang and the railway all the way to Sinuiju on the Chinese border. All sorts of working groups were created, but the process has slowed down as the North waits to see what it thinks of Lee Myung Bak. North Koreans cannot decide what to make of South Korea's new President, and I do not think that he can quite decide what he is going to do with the North Koreans. Al