UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 147-ii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

foreign affairs committee

Overseas Territories

wednesday 23 january 2008

MR LOUIS OLIVIER BANCOULT and MR RICHARD GIFFORD

Evidence heard in Public Questions 112 - 175

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Wednesday 23 January 2008

Members present:

Mike Gapes (Chairman)

Rt hon. Sir Menzies Campbell

Mr. Eric Illsley

Mr. Paul Keetch

Andrew Mackinlay

Sandra Osborne

Rt hon. Sir John Stanley

________________

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Mr. Louis Olivier Bancoult, Leader, Chagos Refugee Group, and Mr. Richard Gifford, Clifford Chance LLP, Solicitors, gave evidence.

Chairman: Good afternoon. We are conducting a general inquiry on the Overseas Territories. In that context, it was thought useful to have an input relating to the situation from your perspective in the Chagos Islands, even though they are not at the moment occupied by people who were born there. I invite you to introduce yourselves before we begin questions.

Mr. Bancoult: I am Louis Olivier Bancoult, leader of the Chagos Refugee Group, and elected representative of the Chagossian community in Mauritius.

Mr. Gifford: I am Richard Gifford. I am the solicitor for the Chagossian community in Mauritius, and have been conducting the law cases over the past 10 years.

Q112 Chairman: Mr. Bancoult, would you explain how the community was removed from the archipelago, and why?

Mr. Bancoult: It is a pleasure to be here. Thank you for this opportunity to speak on behalf of my people about our struggle. There are 3,700 Chagossians in Mauritius, about 1,000 in the UK, and 500 in the Seychelles. The removal of my people started in the 1960s, mainly in Diego Garcia, followed by Peros Banhos and the Salomon Islands. We were all removed and forced to leave everything behind. Arriving in Mauritius was a nightmare for us. No planning had been made. No house, no job: cast aside without any provision.

We suffered terrible hardship and dreadful living conditions. Dumped into the slums of Port Louis, the capital of Mauritius, we face many problems, such as drugs, prostitution, joblessness, illness and early death. Over the years, we have not been able to integrate into Mauritius: we have the worst jobs, the worst housing and have barely managed to survive. Our community is held together by our memory of our beautiful islands, which we believe are our birthright. We have suffered enough and we want to go back home. We ask for your help to make this possible. We hope that this Committee will recommend that all Government Departments respect the human rights of the Chagossians, who have been denied them; that the Government consult the Chagossians on how best to meet their wish to return to Chagos; and that, finally, the FCO and the Department for International Development jointly develop a proposal for the European Union or another fund to support a resettlement programme for our people.

Q113 Chairman: We will come in a moment to questions about the way forward and the future, but for now I would like to focus on what actually happened. You referred to the 1960s. Was the removal all at one point or was it phased?

Mr. Bancoult: It was phased. It started in Diego Garcia, where people were asked to leave to make way for the US military base.

Q114 Chairman: Which year was that?

Mr. Bancoult: It was in 1971. At that time, those people were asked to choose either to go to Peros Banhos or Salomon, or to return to Mauritius, but they were all forced to leave Diego Garcia. What was said at the time was that there would be no programme in Peros Banhos. One year after Diego Garcia, those on Peros Banhos or Salomon were asked the same thing-even though they are about 130 km from Diego Garcia, everyone had to leave because it would become dangerous for a civilian population to live there.

Q115 Chairman: Mr. Gifford, do you wish to add anything?

Mr. Gifford: The effective removal started immediately Mauritius became independent in 1968, because the shipping link from Mauritius to Chagos was suspended. Olivier's family, who returned to Mauritius just before then for medical treatment for his sister, were prevented from returning to Chagos, because there was no shipping any more. There was a gradual depopulation. They were not warned when they went to Mauritius that they would not be able to get back. The islands dwindled somewhat in population. What then happened was that the Americans got their funds authorised in December 1970. In January 1971, the British Indian Ocean Territory administrator addressed the islanders and said that they had to go. By September they had all left Diego Garcia.

Q116 Chairman: You referred to the impact on your family and what conditions were like when people were moved to Mauritius. Have those conditions improved in the more than 30 years in which people have been living in Mauritius or elsewhere?

Mr. Bancoult: I do not think that the situation has improved. The reason is that when we were forced to leave Chagos to come to Mauritius there was no planning. Compare that with the situation on Chagos: all the Chagossians had their own house and job-all the people worked on the coconut plantations-whereas arriving in Mauritius was a nightmare. It is a very different life from Chagos. In Mauritius, we have textile industries and sugar cane plantations. No training was given to Chagossians to integrate them into Mauritian society.

Q117 Mr. Keetch: May I confirm, gentlemen, that you are talking about 3,000 to 4,000 people? Is that your approximation of the numbers?

Mr. Bancoult: A little more than that.

Q118 Mr. Keetch: Are you saying 4,000 people?

Mr. Bancoult: Yes, 4,000 or 5,000.

Q119 Mr. Keetch: Do your people tend to live together in one main community in Mauritius?

Mr. Bancoult: We have been living in the slums in various places in the poorest regions of Port Louis. In those places, we faced many problems, just like the lowest category of people in Mauritius which, as you know, has an ethnic problem, and we were forced to leave the region.

Q120 Mr. Illsley: Before I come to the question of legal proceedings, may I ask if the people of Mauritius resent the Chagossians for coming on to their island or are you living quite happily with the Mauritian population?

Mr. Bancoult: Even the Mauritian people were not aware of what happened, because an exchange had been made for Mauritian independence. When we arrived, many people said that we had just come: it was very difficult because there was a lack of jobs for Mauritians. There were many problems then, and many people chose to leave Mauritius and go abroad. It has become more difficult for Chagossians, because most of our people do not have a level of education, as education came very late to Chagos. It has become more and more difficult to do the work that we expect to do because it does not exist in Mauritius.

Q121 Mr. Illsley: My next question is on the legal proceedings. As you are aware, the Government have decided to petition the House of Lords for a further appeal, using the grounds that the implications of this case apply to other Overseas Territories, particularly in the use of the royal prerogative. What is your opinion? Do you feel that that is a legitimate reason for petitioning the House of Lords, or is it simply a delaying tactic to try to prolong things even further?

Mr. Gifford: Perhaps I can answer that question. There is a limit to what I can say, bearing in mind that the issues in the appeal are, of course, for their lordships. However, in so far as they are basing the appeal on the constitutional right of the Crown to legislate for the Overseas Territories without review by the judges or by Parliament either, that is a constitutional matter that barely concerns the Chagossians. They have now had three courts in 10 years; seven senior judges have said unanimously, "You simply can't do this. You cannot remove a population from their homeland." The pity is that all seven judges have adopted different judicial reasoning to get to the same conclusion and, of course, seven judgments like that bristle with issues, as the Court of Appeal, in refusing leave to appeal, expressly acknowledged.

These poor people, who have been sorely treated for 40 years, have been caught up in the wheels of constitutional nicety. We are not even sure that the Government actively resist the right to return; we cannot get any sense out of them, because they will not say what their policy is.

Q122 Mr. Illsley: The fact that the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal tends to imply that it decided that this was an end to it, and suggested to the Government that by refusing leave to appeal that they should accept the decision.

Mr. Gifford: Yes, that is absolutely so. One reason why they might have come to that conclusion was that after the first judgment, Robin Cook, as Foreign Secretary, expressly endorsed the judgment and said, "We accept the judgment. We will not appeal." He said that the feasibility studies then took on a new importance, and he was held to that promise by the Court of Appeal.

Q123 Mr. Illsley: Given that the House of Lords must, by definition, be the final leg of any legal proceedings, if it grants an appeal, what sort of time scale are you looking at before getting to the end of the legal stages?

Mr. Gifford: You mean if the House of Lords dismisses the Government's appeal?

Q124 Mr. Illsley: As I understand it, the Government are petitioning to appeal to the Lords. Is that right?

Mr. Gifford: They have been granted permission to appeal, but on an unusual condition. In granting leave, their Lordships' House directed that the Government must bear the legal costs of both parties, whatever the outcome of the case.

Q125 Mr. Illsley: What is the time scale now?

Mr. Gifford: That case has been set for 30 June.

Q126 Sir Menzies Campbell: I have a number of legal points to make, although they are not necessarily related. What is the legal status of the Chagossians in Mauritius? Do they enjoy the same rights and privileges as citizens? Do they have access to health and education? Are they disqualified from voting in elections and things of that kind? Have you ever had sight of the lease due to expire in 2016 to determine whether the possibility of an extension would require the agreement of both parties, or whether the United States could unilaterally ask for it?

Mr. Gifford: May I answer the second question first? It is a popular misconception that there is a lease. There is not, Sir Menzies. There is simply an exchange of notes, dated 1966, which declare jointly that the islands shall be made available for the joint defence purposes of the UK and US for an indefinite period. It is then said that there will be a review of that in 2016. It is unclear whether one party can optionally extend, or whether it needs the consent of both parties. It think that it is the former, because it provides for an indefinite use of the base-and no rent is paid, by the way.

Q127 Sir Menzies Campbell: It may not be a formal lease, but the exchange of those letters, and actions in reliance of them, might well be thought to have created a legal relationship equivalent to a lease. Is it your view that the way in which those letters are framed would allow the United States to say, "We want to go on indefinitely," and that the United Kingdom would not be in a position to resist that?

Mr. Gifford: In the narrow terms of the 1966 treaty, I believe that that is the case. However, of course, the UK is still the sovereign. If it might be breaching the lowest form of treaty-the exchange of notes-by saying no, one could point out that they were in breach of a whole raft of multilateral treaties in getting rid of the population in the first place.

Q128 Sir Menzies Campbell: Are you aware of any other circumstances under which the British Government have acted in such an apparently favourable way towards another country in relation to territory for which the British Government are responsible?

Mr. Gifford: I am not aware of any other case where the entire territory has been given away for nothing.

Q129 Andrew Mackinlay: Quite apart from the outrage, in my view, at the removal of the islanders, surely the legal title of the real estate remains with the islanders. If not, by what instrument was that taken from them?

Mr. Gifford: Very interesting. It was carefully planned in Whitehall from the outset. After the exchange of notes in 1966, legislation on the territory was passed by the commissioner alone, by means of an ordinance, to provide for the compulsory purchase of the freehold interest of the plantation company, which then transferred the freeholds to the Government. To make matters clear, another ordinance was passed declaring the entire archipelago to be Crown land.

Q130 Andrew Mackinlay: For expedition purposes, could you give us a note on the extent to which there has been parliamentary oversight or authority? From what I make of what you have just said, there has been none or very little. We are interested in the extent of parliamentary oversight. The other thing that I just wanted to touch base with you on in this. To the extent that they are near neighbours, is there not a common sea boundary with the Republic of Maldives and is there not some sea territorial issue with it?

Mr. Gifford: The Maldives are 1,000 miles away.

Andrew Mackinlay: I know.

Mr. Gifford: So there are international waters in between. There is a 200-mile economic exclusion zone all the way around Chagos. However, as their lordships pointed out in the divisional court, any vessel exercising the right of innocent passage can pass within three miles of Diego Garcia itself.

Andrew Mackinlay: May I ask a question about Mauritius, or should I come back to it later?

Chairman: I would rather stay with this US issue, as I have John Stanley to come in next.

Q131 Sir Menzies Campbell: Would you indulge me for just one moment? Compulsory purchase is usually followed by compensation, to compensate the person whose land has been compulsorily acquired for the loss of that land, and specifically for that. Sums of money were disbursed eventually, but was that money provided in reliance of the principle that, where there is compulsory purchase, there should be compensation, or was it provided on some kind of ex gratia, unspecified basis?

Mr. Gifford: After compulsory purchase powers were passed, they negotiated with the plantation company and agreed a figure of £670,000 for the freehold, which was paid to the company. There was a provision that if anyone else claimed any interest in the land, they had to lodge a claim with the Governor in the Seychelles within a certain period-about six months or so. Unurprisingly, the Governor did not receive any claims from the Chagossians, even though their customary title had stretched back for five generations over large swathes of the islands, but of course they were unable to access that kind of mechanism and their rights were simply swept away.

Chairman: We will come later to some other questions about compensation. Can we just focus for the moment on this US base issue?

Q132 Sir John Stanley: Mr. Bancoult and Mr. Gifford, I went to Diego Garcia some years ago. When I was there, it was a military installation that was in very substantial use. The whole of that main island had been taken over for military purposes. So, leaving aside the merits of the case just for a moment, I imagine that you would agree that, in terms of sheer practicality, there is no possibility of a conjunction of continuing US air operations and all the other facilities on the main island of Diego Garcia alongside a return of the Chagossian community, with their agricultural requirements and so on. You would accept that there is no way that they can live cheek by jowl on the same island. I think that that is self-evident, but perhaps you could confirm that. I will come to the outer islands in a moment.

Mr. Gifford: For practical purposes, the resettlement plan of the Chagossians, which will be launched in the House of Lords next month, will be confined to the outer islands of Salomon and Peros Banhos. The Chagossians accept that, for present purposes, it is not politically practicable to press for a return to where they mostly originate from, which is Diego Garcia, and where, we have to say, their heart lies.

However, as to whether it is practically feasible, we say, "Well, why on earth not?" Although you say that Diego Garcia is entirely occupied by the military, it is clear from this particular map published by the Chagos Conservation Trust, which is in turn funded by the British Indian Ocean Territory, that approximately one half of the island is set aside for nature conservancy, or a nature reserve. There are only small parts of the island-well, substantial parts, but probably amounting to no more than a third in total-that are occupied by the military airfield and what they call the downtown area, and that sort of thing. Diego Garcia is 40 miles around, and it is mostly forest. So, in due course, it should not be impossible to re-establish settlements there, but we accept that it is too politically sensitive for the Americans at the present time to push for that.

Q133 Sir John Stanley: We do not have a copy of your conservation leaflet. Perhaps you would like to give us a copy.

Mr. Gifford: I would be happy to leave the leaflet with you. I have other copies.

Q134 Sir John Stanley: Can we come on to the second part of my question? The only practical option it would appear at the moment is a resettlement based on the outer islands. Certainly when I was there flying over them, they all appeared to be absolutely uninhabited, and I believe that is the case. Under your resettlement plan, which I am sure the Committee will be interested to see when you make it available, is it possible to produce an economically viable solution for the returning Chagossian islanders? I understand entirely that that does not bring them back to where their heart may lie and the island they came from, but does it produce an economically viable and acceptable solution in that sense?

Richard Gifford: Indeed. We have had an extremely distinguished land economist, well known to Department for International Development and the FCO, working on this proposal in close conjunction with the exiled community. I have a very brief synopsis here. He says that there are no physical, economic or environmental reasons why resettlement on two islands should not take place. I have seen the draft but will not go into detail. He has a fairly well-constructed plan for regenerating the economy, which is not surprising because the Government's own consultants established that you could double or treble the fisheries catch even in a sensitive marine environment like Chagos, without causing damage to fish stocks. You could establish eco-tourism, for which there is a very high demand. The coconut plantations could be rehabilitated. These days you could make biofuel out of coconuts. There is a paper by the man who runs the Marshall islands who says that you can run your Mercedes and the boats on biodiesel made from local coconuts. There are many things that could be done economically.

Q135 Sir John Stanley: The issue of the moderately close conjunction of the civilian population and a full-scale operational airfield is one with which we are very familiar in the UK. Many members of the Committee have visited USAF bases, particularly when the USAF was here in larger numbers than it is now. They are under the RAF flag but are basically run by the USAF. They are in extremely close proximity to the civilian population. Could you explain why the British Government at the time felt it necessary to comply, presumably on security grounds, with the American view that there had to be a complete clearance of all the Chagossians from the outer islands and why they were not allowed, and are still not allowed, to return to the outer islands, when in virtually all cases they would be substantially further removed from the US air base than they would be on some of the remaining operational facilities which the USAF have here?

Richard Gifford: I share your view of military bases run by the US. I do not know of any other military base in the world that does not have an adjacent civilian population. Indeed, there are 2,500 civilians living on Diego Garcia at the moment. All but three are imported from the Philippines and Sri Lanka, which is where they prefer to recruit their civilian workers. Three are Chagossians. As a result of a mass application by Chagossians, who had been refused employment on the base for 30 years, three managed to get employed there. The conditions are harsh. They are not allowed home for two years. It is a two years without leave contract. It would be marvellous if they could just potter across the archipelago and go and see their families in the northern islands.

Q136 Sir John Stanley: I have one final question. As you may know, the Committee has visited Guantanamo Bay and we have produced a report to the House of Commons on extraordinary rendition. There has been a great deal of speculation and reports in the media that Diego Garcia might be being used for extraordinary rendition. Ministers have rested on unequivocal American assurances that this has not been the case as far as Diego Garcia is concerned. For example, a written answer given by the Foreign Office Minister Kim Howells on 26 October 2006 said: "The US authorities have repeatedly given us assurances that no detainees, prisoners of war or any other persons in this category are being held on Diego Garcia, or have at any time passed in transit through Diego Garcia or its territorial waters or airspace. This was most recently confirmed during the 2006 US/UK Political Military Talks held in London on 17 and 18 October."-[Official Report, 26 October 2006; Vol. 450, c. 2076W.]

Have you any evidence to put to the Committee that those assurances given by the US authorities to the British Government are incorrect?

Mr. Gifford: I have two pieces of information. I am aware that a retired US general whose name is Barry-I am afraid that I have forgotten his surname-made two broadcasts on national public radio in which he suggested that it was known in the US military that Diego Garcia was used for these purposes. If you have had a paper from Reprieve, I believe that they have summarised the speeches in full.

I myself am aware, because I read it in The Sunday Times about a year ago, that The Sunday Times tracked the flight records of a particular aircraft that is known to be engaged in extraordinary rendition and, when the suspected terrorist Ramzi bin al-Shibh was arrested in Pakistan, that particular flight took him first to Diego Garcia and then on to Guantanamo Bay. Of course, I cannot personally verify that in any way. That is the extent of my information.

Q137 Sandra Osborne: Does the Foreign Office have any sort of mechanism, either formal or informal, for finding out what is actually happening on the islands, or is there completely no discussion or relationship with the formal inhabitants of the islands?

Mr. Gifford: There is no attempt to consult the population or their representatives about what goes on on the islands. All that I can say is that after about four years of delay, the Foreign Office did arrange and pay for a boat trip for 100 Chagossians, who visited the islands in April and May of 2006. One hundred of the old folk were taken back there for a visit and tended some of the graves. They tried to exclude Diego Garcia from the trip, but Olivier's people said, "No, we will not go if it is excluded, as we are only visitors after all." It was then allowed. As far as I know, that is the extent of it. They do what they like and it is an unsupervised paradise. I think that they like the idea of no oversight, no consultation and nobody looking over their shoulder. The last thing that they want under present policy is to have to consult.

Q138 Mr. Keetch: Going back to the base and the exchange of notes, as you described it, back in the 1960s, are you aware of any provision in those notes or have you come across any declarations in Parliament that suggest that the UK might have some control over US activities on the base? In other words, I am trying to follow up on what Sir. John was asking about rendition. If it was being used for rendition, or if the US were using the base for bombing operations, do you know of any agreement by the US that they would require them to seek the UK Government's approval to use that base, for example, in the same way that the UK had to approve operations coming out of US air force bases in England?

Mr. Gifford: I believe that there is a liaison committee to deal with military and administration matters. I asked the commissioner some time ago how often it met and was told that it was very sporadic-once or twice a year. There is nothing that I am aware of in the exchange of notes or any subsequent agreement which requires the UK to consent or even to be informed. With regard to building on the island, for example, they recently sought the permission of the British Government to build some shelters for the stealth bombers because they are very sensitive. The British Government gave consent and there was a note published in which they agreed to that. As to operational and military dispositions, I am not aware of any requirement to consult.

Q139 Mr. Keetch: As far as you know, has there been any suggestion that there are any British liaison people working at the base?

Mr. Gifford: Yes, there is what they call a "Brit rep," who is the senior naval officer. There is a small retinue of naval personnel and there are usually three or four British policemen, know as the BIOT-British Indian Ocean Territory-police, who are seconded from over here. With regard to quite how effective that oversight is, I can tell you that when I visited I was told by a policeman that they were really only concerned with confiscating pornographic videos and drugs and that was the extent of their remit.

Q140 Mr. Keetch: Finally, could you answer Sir Menzies's other question about the civil rights of people in Mauritius? He asked if they had the vote, access to health care and so on.

Mr. Gifford: Yes, they are Mauritian citizens and dual nationals. The British Government specifically enacted when they detached Chagos that these chaps should become Mauritian at independence. They kept rather quieter about the fact that they also retained their British subject status. They have full civil rights. I would point out that they occupy the lowest rung in a very hierarchical society and suffer various forms of discrimination, but that is not official or governmental.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming-

Q141 Chairman: Can I ask all members of the public to switch off your mobile phones, please, if you are coming in? I do not want any interruptions. Thank you.

Gentlemen, thank you for staying and waiting for us to come back. Can I ask you about the issue of a sustainable return? As you are aware, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office produced a feasibility study in 2002 and there is some controversy about the conclusions of that document, as to whether it was modified in the process, between 2000 and 2002. It has been alleged that the conclusions were interfered with, and one of the submissions that we have had says that. If that is the case, why do you think that the document was interfered with?

Mr. Gifford: One would be rather naive if one was not aware of the tendency for official, supposedly scientific, Government-sponsored reports, which are supposed to be totally objective, to have an element of wishing to please those commissioning the reports, and indeed sometimes they are rather too generous with the ability to tailor the conclusions to fit the master's purposes.

However, in this particular case, we have direct evidence of the actual redrafting process. It came in very late, because we asked for drafts of the two studies-the preliminary one in 2000 and the so-called "phase 2B" that came in the middle of 2002-because we were not very happy that the negative bits were being trumpeted by the Government all over the place and nobody ever mentioned the positive bits, at least not in administration circles.

So we were told that, yes, you can have the draft of the preliminary study, but no, you cannot have the draft of the phase 2B study. Now, that was enough, because the draft of the preliminary study showed very clearly that an unqualified conclusion that there was no problem with up to 1,000 islanders resettling immediately had been amended by a handwritten note, following a meeting with the administration, to make it a qualified conclusion. It actually said, in quotes, "qualify" and "if"-

Q142 Chairman: You said "the administration." Just for the record, who do you mean by "the administration"?

Mr. Gifford: The British Indian Ocean Territory administration office.

Lo and behold, the published version, which we already had, showed that settlement is physically possible, but only if a number of qualifications were met, and there were half a dozen qualifications, which in practice did not amount to very much, but they made the conclusion look much more qualified.

That was the preliminary study. When it came to the phase 2B study, the only bit that you ever see quoted by Ministers or officials is the so-called "general conclusion." It is about three or four lines and it amounts to a supposed conclusion that resettlement is precarious and costly. Now, it sticks out like a sore thumb, because it does not follow from what goes before, nor from the body of the research, and nor does it fit in with what follows. What follows is that, in order to proceed with this study, we have to do all sorts of things: we have to consult the islanders, as any resettlement plan must do; we have to look at the costs of resettlement, which they were prohibited from doing by their terms of reference; and we must look at the benefits of resettlement. You would think that those elements were pretty fundamental-costs, benefits and consultation-but they were excluded from considering any of them by their supposed terms of reference. Instead, you got this conclusion that sticks out like a sore thumb and says that it is too costly and too precarious to send the islanders back, none of which was based on any of the research outlined in the rest of the report.

So, being very unsatisfied with the fact that this bit was always quoted in law proceedings, public statements or wherever, we asked for the draft, and lo and behold we were told that all copies of the drafts had been destroyed following a meeting between officials and consultants. We asked why that was and they said, "It is standard practice. We do not keep drafts after six months." We said, "There was litigation pending at the time, in 2002. You might have been required to produce all drafts of the report. Surely you would not have destroyed them without consultation with the legal department, at least." There was no answer to that, so we asked for the electronic copies-this is all under the Freedom of Information Act, and the questions were suggested by the UK-Chagos Support Association, so I can refer to it.

The terms of reference in clause 17 say that the consultants will supply electronic and hard-copy versions of their draft report, and following comments from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the BIOT, consultants will then finalise their report. That was the structure built in to the terms of reference. We asked for the electronic copies and all we got was the reply, "There aren't any."

Q143 Chairman: That was the basis for the ministerial answers. I have one from the then Minister, Bill Rammell, in 2004, who said it would be "highly precarious"-a phrase you used-and would involve expensive underwriting by the UK Government for an open-ended period, probably permanently. The line we are getting from the Government is that there would be contingent liabilities indefinitely and it would not be a sustainable return, therefore there would be an unquantifiable cost to the taxpayer, which means that it is not justifiable. Are you saying that that is not the case, according to some of the earlier drafting? Can you put a figure on the costs of resettlement-both the immediate costs and the long-term costs of contingent liabilities?

Mr. Gifford: The Government's stab at producing figures is very worrying. When Bill Rammell announced to me the cessation of the feasibility studies in June 2004 following the passing of the Orders in Council, he told me that the cost was estimated at £5 million. I was a bit staggered by that and said, "That is not very much. It is the cost of an embassy building. It is not much by the side of expenditure on other Overseas Territories. To right an historical injustice it is very modest." However, that figure then got altered. By the time we got to court somebody in the Department had re-calculated and come up with £22 million. Worryingly, I have just been given a copy of the National Audit Office report and the only reference to the BIOT-

Q144 Chairman: Is that the report, "Managing Risk", which was published recently?

Mr. Gifford: Yes. I was staggered to see the description of risk in respect of resettling. Under "potential cost" it says that the 2002 study estimated resettlement costs would be in the order of £40 million over 10 years. The resettlement study in 2002 was expressly prohibited by its terms of reference from dealing with costs, and it did not come up with a single figure. I hardly think that Sir John has cooked up that figure.

Q145 Chairman: Sir John Bourn, not Sir John Stanley.

Mr. Gifford: Yes.

We must not shrink from the fact that there will be a cost, possibly a substantial cost, for rehabilitating the islands. We think it would be right to share the cost; we think there are funds in Europe. We went to the chairman of the European Development Fund to deal with the Government's argument, since we were told we could not go to the EDF because we are talking about an unpopulated territory. We got a sympathetic Member of the European Parliament to ask the chairman of the fund, "What if the islanders went back? Would funds then be available?" He gave a formal reply saying that a resettled population would be able to apply for the next round of funding from the EDF. So the answer was yes.

I want to come finally to the conclusion of our consultant, which is that clear income opportunities for settlers and general revenues to their local councils have been identified and Chagos would have much less need for annual subventions than most other Overseas Territories.

Q146 Chairman: But there would be some need for the Department for International Development or another Government Department to give ongoing support to the community there.

Mr. Gifford: Yes, but diminishing support. There are better economic prospects for Chagos than there are in many other Overseas Territories.

Q147 Chairman: We are talking a maximum of 1,000 people to be resettled, as we discussed earlier.

Mr. Gifford: Yes, the initial phase is identified as 150 families, which equates to about 750 people of different ages.

Q148 Mr. Keetch: You mentioned earlier that Salomon island and Peros Banhos had been identified as the two islands to which you would initially want to go back. The map that we have is not wonderful. How far from Diego Garcia are those islands?

Mr. Gifford: One hundred and thirty-five nautical miles.

Q149 Mr. Keetch: So they are not literally across the bay? They are a long way away.

Mr. Gifford: They are a long way away-they are right across the Great Chagos bank, which is rather hazardous to cross.

Q150 Mr. Keetch: So people there would pose no clear security threat to what is happening on Diego Garcia?

Mr. Gifford: That is our view.

Q151 Mr. Keetch: Okay. May I ask what happens on those islands at the moment? If I were to come along in my little yacht and decided to land on Salomon Island, would the US military stop me?

Mr. Gifford: No. If that were, by chance, to happen, you would get a visit from the fisheries protection vessel, which would issue you with a ticket for $30, and that would count as a permit to be on the islands. But you would have to stay on your boat overnight; you are allowed to walk around the islands in the daytime, but you have to stay on your boat at night, which would be moored in the lagoon, along with the 20 or 30 other ocean-going yachts that bowl up.

Q152 Mr. Keetch: Who gets that $30?

Mr. Gifford: It goes to the BIOT administration.

Q153 Mr. Keetch: So the UK Treasury is getting the funds from moorings and such things over there?

Mr. Gifford: Yes, but its principal revenue is from fishing licences, which bring in between £1 million and £2 million a year.

Q154 Mr. Keetch: What would you estimate is the revenue that the UK taxpayer gains from fishing and boating-£1.5 million a year?

Mr. Gifford: Yes. It has been as high as £2 million in a year, and there are answers to parliamentary questions on all this.

Q155 Mr. Keetch: To be clear, we are actually gaining revenue from these islands?

Mr. Gifford: Well, it is said that it costs as much as it brings in to run the fisheries protection vessel and the BIOT presence on the island.

Q156 Sandra Osborne: Can I ask you about compensation? I believe that there have been some settlements in the past, including a full and final settlement in 1982. It has been established in the UK courts that the UK Government are under no legal obligation to pay further compensation. Why do you believe that there is an entitlement to further compensation?

Mr. Gifford: We think that the settlement in 1982 was conducted largely without consultation. In its terms of settlement, it was unfair. In its implementation, the very detailed legal acknowledgement and surrender that the islanders were required to sign was neither explained nor translated. In accepting the last tranche of compensation of about 600 rupees, which was only worth about £20 or £30 in those days-the whole amount was only about £2,500-they were required to thumbprint a very legalistic form that the British Government required the Mauritians to obtain. That, sadly, is held up to be the basis of the finality of the settlement.

Nothing was done to find out from the community what its needs were or whether it wanted training, jobs, housing or repatriation-none of those things was gone into at the time. A lump sum was simply negotiated between the British Government and the Mauritian Government, who were going to disburse it. The question was what they would have to pay to get rid of the problem, but they did not get rid of the problem. The islanders have never integrated: they have maintained their own separate identity and they have suffered more than most in their communities and in their personal lives. There is an illness that the Chagossians recognise; it is called sagrin, which we might know as chagrin-they die of sadness because they want to go home. It is thought that compensation is appropriate in those circumstances.

Q157 Sandra Osborne: Given what you have just said, is there a level of compensation at which the islanders would give up their right to return?

Mr. Gifford: Even if you asked the Government these days, I do not think that they would say it was possible to surrender your birthright in that way. I do not think that you could conceptually construct a settlement that would enable that to happen. There might be islanders who do not want to go back, and many certainly would wish to receive compensation for what they have suffered. However, I do not think that these days you could bargain away such a fundamental right, as the Court of Appeal said.

Q158 Sandra Osborne: Do you have a view on whether the habitual residence test for Chagossian benefits claimants in the UK should be removed?

Mr. Bancoult: What happened to the Chagossians has been described as a violation of human rights. As a result of a decision taken by the British Government, we were uprooted and are now living in huge poverty in Mauritius. We are now able to have British passports. I am aware that the Foreign Affairs Committee has just presented a White Paper on citizenship, but it did not mention us, because the island has no population and is used for US purposes. The judgment in 2000 did not give us anything on a plate. It is a shame that we have to go to court to be recognised as British subjects. A special case should be made for Chagossians to settle in the UK, where many facilities can be offered to them. I would also like to raise a very important point about gender discrimination. Some people make a division in families, so that some are entitled to British passports and some are not I simply request that that be discussed and an explanation found.

Q159 Chairman: You said at the very beginning that there are about 1,000 Chagossian people in the UK. How old are they? Are they very elderly or is there a spectrum of ages?

Mr. Bancoult: Most of those who have settled in the UK are the second generation: I mean children whose mother or father are Chagossian. Most of the native Chagossians are still suffering in Mauritius. It is very difficult for them, because they have always lived on a tropical island, to come here. I must add that it is very expensive to have a British passport. To get one in Mauritius costs 7,100 rupees, which is more than £110 and is difficult for Chagossians to find. We would like to, but it is very difficult.

Q160 Chairman: Because you have to pay for a passport?

Mr. Bancoult: Yes. We think that there should be a special desk for Chagossians to assist them in all their needs. For example, we should have detailed guidance.

Q161 Chairman: Are you taking about a special desk in the UK or in Mauritius?

Mr. Bancoult: In Mauritius. Most Chagossian natives there are facing health problems, because most of them are more than 60 years old. They should be treated as a special case. There are arrangements for a crisis in other Overseas Territories. The same applies to training, which is not available for young Chagossians. We are alone; we have been orphaned. No one cares for us. We should receive the same treatment as other British subjects and UK citizens.

Q162 Chairman: Taking up Sandra's question about habitual residence tests and benefits, are there still people coming from your community in Mauritius to settle in the UK? Roughly how many?

Mr. Bancoult: About 1,000 people.

Q163 Chairman: At what rate are people still coming to the UK?

Mr. Bancoult: Most of the Chagossians are still in Mauritius. There are about 1,000 to 1,100 of them.

Q164 Chairman: In an average week, are three, four or five people wanting to move from Mauritius to the UK?

Mr. Bancoult: That depends. If we had the ambition, the national test could be removed. Our case is very different. If we have to wait six months or more, our position will become very dangerous and difficult.

Q165 Chairman: When there was, for example, the volcanic eruption in Montserrat, the British Government took special steps to allow people from Montserrat to come to the UK without having to go through those difficulties with benefits at the start. I had constituents who were in those circumstances. Initially, there were obstacles, but then some MPs took up the case and it was sorted out very quickly. Those people did not have those difficulties. Can we quantify numbers to determine how we should pursue the issue and try to assist people in a particular way in this country?

Mr. Bancoult: If that can be done, that would help, because many people who choose to come here face that problem. They must be treated in a humanitarian way. They are ready to go back home.

Q166 Chairman: So they do not want to live here or in Mauritius. They want to live in their home.

Mr. Bancoult: Yes. We are waiting for our rights to be restored, and we will return home.

Q167 Mr. Keetch: May I ask a few questions about the sovereignty dispute with Mauritius? We are told that the UK has given an undertaking that we would cede the Chagos Islands to Mauritius if at any point they ceased to be of military importance. Is that right? Has such an undertaking been given?

Mr. Gifford: Yes. It was an undertaking given at the time by the Wilson Government and repeated subsequently by the Thatcher Government to retrocede the Chagos Islands when they are no longer required for defence purposes.

Q168 Mr. Keetch: The President of Mauritius has said that he would be prepared to leave the Commonwealth to pursue his claim to the islands. How far do you think the Mauritian Government would go to try to rest their claim? Do you believe that they might take it to the International Court?

Mr. Gifford: Yes. The Mauritian Government are very much wedded to the idea of sovereignty. They take the view that "We was robbed". They believe that Mauritius was regarded as an inferior, non-independent country. It was worried about negotiating the terms of its independence at the time, and it had its arm twisted, so it was in a lower bargaining position and it was not true consent when it agreed, in return for £3 million, to cede the islands to Britain. There is no doubt that successive Mauritian Governments have tried very hard in a number of ways to persuade the Government to return the islands, and they would love to get a case off the ground in the International Court of Justice, if only they could find the jurisdiction to do it. They believe they have a strong legal case. Unfortunately, jurisdiction is lacking in the absence of consent, and the manoeuvre that you mentioned-seceding from the Commonwealth-was plugged the same day by the Foreign Office when it filed an amended consent to jurisdiction that excluded former members of the Commonwealth. It quickly cut that out on the same day that it arose.

Q169 Mr. Keetch: Presumably the Mauritian Government would support the resettlement of the Chagos people too?

Mr. Gifford: It is very interesting. Past Governments have been hostile to the Chagossians' claims. I was told by a Foreign Minister in a previous Government that they could not in any way support the islanders' claims against the British Government, because that would be asserting their rights under the British constitution and would somehow compromise Mauritius's claim to sovereignty of the islands. However, I am very happy to say that they have a much more enlightened Prime Minister at the moment and he has made supportive public statements. After the recent victory in the Court of Appeal, he went on record as saying that the interests of the Mauritian people, the Chagossian people and the Mauritian Government were now complementary and they could march forward together. So I think that, as soon as Mauritius realises the commercial benefits that will come to it from re-establishing the economy of the islands, Mauritius will be quite helpful and positive.

Q170 Mr. Keetch: Presumably, it is about time that we started asking the people of Chagos themselves what they want. What is the general view of your people? Would you rather return to the islands and they were, say, a British overseas territory, or would you like to see them become part of Mauritius?

Mr. Bancoult: The most important thing for us as a people is to give preference to our fundamental rights, because, as far as sovereignty is concerned, that is an issue between two Governments. We do not want to just be concerned by sovereignty. It is a political motor, but the most important thing is our fundamental rights, to be able to return to our homeland and to have everything done so as to let the island develop.

Q171 Mr. Keetch: With respect, a British Government might well say, "Well, look, we would quite like to know what is going to happen? If we fund your return to the islands and we start helping you to do that, are you going to turn round in six months and say, right, we want to leave the British Overseas Territories and join Mauritius?" Surely, that is a legitimate question for us to ask? What is your view?

Mr. Bancoult: In the past, all decisions were taken without consultation of the Chagossians. The wish of our people is that we would not like any decision to be taken without consultation.

Q172 Mr. Keetch: If the people were consulted, what is your gut feeling about what their answer would be? Would they want to become Mauritian, or would they want to stay as part of a British Overseas Territory?

Mr. Bancoult: Frankly, most of us want to stay British.

Q173 Andrew Mackinlay: Assuming that this wrong could be remedied, as it were, has there been adequate work about these islands and atolls-to the extent that one can do such work-as to what will happen in the next 100 years? What are the problems with sea levels rising, and that sort of thing? I hesitate to ask the question, but unfortunately the world is as it is, is it not? We have just heard from people in Tuvalu, and other places that have been hit by rising sea waters, so I ask the question.

Mr. Gifford: If you read the Government's feasibility studies, they do not say anything specific about that issue; they just talk about a general lack of evidence. However, I believe that the general understanding is that nothing serious is going to happen for about 100 years and an awful lot depends on what measures can be adopted in the meantime. Coral islands are not fixed like granite; they have the capacity to breathe and move. These are the finest corals in the world so the prospects are not bad. My consultant tells me that these islands are better placed than most coral atolls to resist global warming and rising sea levels. I cannot be very specific as it is so complex, but we know that the Americans are investing millions of dollars in shelters, so they are not planning to evacuate at any time soon.

Q174 Andrew Mackinlay: Have you investigated the territories' status vis-à-vis the European Union? Gibraltar, for instance, is in the European Union; the islands that are closest, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, are not, and neither are the Overseas Territories in the Caribbean, but they have a special relationship. Does the European Union have any legal jurisdiction over these lands or is there a void in that respect?

Mr. Gifford:: They are one of the Overseas Territories recognised by the European Union. The people are all British citizens, who have the right of movement throughout Europe. They do not have any right to assert their own identity in the European Union because everything has to go through the Government. They are a kind of NGO without a voice. We have attended EU-ACP meetings and been tolerated outsiders. A certain amount of interest has been expressed, but the Chagossians have no official status.

Q175 Chairman: May I take you back to the environmental question? We have taken evidence in which people have told us that one of the perverse advantages of the situation that has developed is that there is an area where the natural environment has developed because there is no human habitation. Consequently, there are rare species and damage could be caused to the area if people were to move back there. What is your reaction to that evidence? Mr. Bancoult, what do you feel about that?

Mr. Bancoult: We were the guardians of the environment. We always protect our environment; we do not want to destroy anything. We do not see how people can say that we will damage it. Of course we will look after it.

Mr. Gifford:: Consultation is beginning between our resettlement team and the Chagos Conservation Trust. A joint plan is evolving to pursue the Chagos Management Plan that has been adopted and to train Chagossians as conservation guardians. I think it is accepted on all sides that that could be a benefit.

Chairman: Thank you. As there are no more questions we have come to the end of our session. I thank both of you for coming along this afternoon. It has been very useful for us as it has given us a completely different perspective on Overseas Territories. As you know, some of the Overseas Territories have lots of sheep and few people, some have larger numbers of people, and your islands have a particular history. We hope at some point they will also have people resident there who can act as guardians of the environment.

Mr. Bancoult: May I thank you for allowing me to speak on behalf of my community? It has been a pleasure to explain our wish to return to our homeland.

Chairman: Thank you.