CORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 120-iii

House of COMMONS

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE

TAKEN BEFORE THE

foreign affairs committee

developments in the european union

Wednesday 12 December 2007

DAVID MILIBAND, SHAN MORGAN, PAUL BERMAN and MARTIN SHEARMAN

Evidence heard in Public Questions 495 - 615

USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

Oral Evidence

Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee

on Wednesday 12 December 2007

Members present:

Mike Gapes (Chairman)

Mr. Fabian Hamilton

Rt. hon. Mr. David Heathcoat-Amory

Mr. John Horam

Mr. Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr. Malcolm Moss

Sandra Osborne

Mr. Ken Purchase

Rt. hon. Sir John Stanley

Ms Gisela Stuart

Richard Younger-Ross

________________

Examination of Witnesses

Witnesses: Rt. Hon. David Miliband, MP, Secretary of State, and Paul Berman, Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence. Shan Morgan, Director, Europe, and Martin Shearman, Head of CFSP, Europe Directorate, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, were in attendance.

Chairman: Will members of the public please switch off their mobile phones? I do not want any interruptions.

Foreign Secretary, I welcome you and your colleagues. Perhaps you would introduce them.

David Miliband: Good afternoon, Chairman. I am pleased to be here. Shan Morgan is director of our Europe team. Martin Shearman is head of the Common Foreign and Security Policy team-I know that you want to discuss that-and Paul Berman is our legal adviser.

Q495 Chairman: Thank you. Obviously, we shall focus largely on what will presumably be called the Lisbon treaty, but if there is time we hope to touch on some wider issues, including Kosovo. We are doing an inquiry into foreign policy aspects of the Lisbon treaty, and we will publish our report in January.

Do you think in retrospect that the Government's position during the original negotiations on the ill-fated constitutional treaty was correct? If so, why did the definition of foreign policy red lines change between the original negotiations before the constitutional treaty was agreed and the current position, in which those red lines seem to be much firmer than before?

David Miliband: Do you mean the position that was taken in 2001 and 2002, when the idea of a "constitution" was first mooted? There have been so many versions.

Q496 Chairman: Let me be more specific. In 2004, we signed up to a constitutional treaty, but in 2007 we seem to have a different position on the foreign policy aspects than in 2004.

David Miliband: That is an interesting way of looking at the matter. In foreign policy, the status quo is pretty strongly maintained in the current reform treaty. That was certainly the conclusion of the European Scrutiny Committee. I do not know whether you are highlighting particular changes from the constitutional treaty, but we have been clear all along that the most important red line-that term was not in common use at the time-or foundation is that foreign policy should retain an area of unanimity and that each country should be able to exercise a veto. That has been a consistent theme of the Government's policy since our 1997 election manifesto, and one could probably argue that it has been a theme of Governments of both parties since the idea of political co-operation, as it was then called, was first mooted in 1984 and then put into the Single European Act in 1986.

Q497 Chairman: But you would accept that there are differences from the position that the Government agreed in 2004. I thought their case was that the constitutional treaty and the reform treaty were very different.

David Miliband: One can go through the different elements. Some of them are structural, and a feature of the reform treaty is that the Common Foreign and Security Policy should remain a separate pillar, which is one important structural change from the constitutional treaty. Also, obviously, some declarations have been added, but the fundamental point is that the Common Foreign and Security Policy is an area of unanimity and has been a consistent theme of Government policy for much longer.

Q498 Chairman: We will come on to some of the specifics in later questions, but I am dealing with the general matter. Some critics have said that the Government have taken something of a negative approach to the red lines-you have taken a begrudging approach to the treaty-and that that has damaged relations with other European partners. How do you respond to that?

David Miliband: The Government have been clear and firm in setting out what we understand to be the national interest. I think that clarity is valued in the European Union, and people know where we stand on the treaty. That does not mean that people agree with us, but they understand our position: the fact that we have stuck to it is respected.

I do not think that we have been begrudging or even grudging in the way in which we have gone about the matter: I think that we have been clear and focused. There was a sense of exhaustion about institutional reform at the meeting in Lisbon in October that concluded the discussions on the treaty. Those who were most, and least, enthusiastic for an expansive version of the treaty agreed that we had spent the past six or seven years discussing ourselves and institutional reform, and that that could not be a feature of the next six or seven years. There was unity on that and a certain amount of mutual respect for different positions on that basis.

Q499 Chairman: The argument for the constitutional treaty was always that it would somehow simplify and reconnect the EU with the public. That exercise came to a disastrous end in France and the Netherlands. A witness who appeared before the Committee told us that the proposed structure is almost unintelligible even to a very intelligent person, and others have referred to its great complexity. How have we fulfilled in the Lisbon treaty the ideal or desire to reconnect with the public?

David Miliband: That is a really important and good point. I have never believed that institutional reform is the route to love and respect for the European Union among the peoples of Europe. It is a perfectly logical argument, but it says that the "democratic deficit" is the fundamental problem in the relationship between European institutions and the peoples of Europe, which I have never believed.

I believe that a delivery deficit is the fundamental barrier between the European Union and the peoples of Europe, which is why I am passionate about the following point: if the European Union is to show itself to be useful, it need not reform its institutions or become obsessed with institutional reform; rather, it needs to get on with tackling the big issues that people recognise cannot be addressed at national level. That is why the globalisation declaration that will be adopted in Brussels on Friday is important. The Prime Minister has led the way on that, and it is at the heart of the "Global Europe" pamphlet that he and I published. The critical point about the reform treaty is that it brings to an end six or seven years of institutional obsession and allows us to get on and tackle issues such as climate change and energy, international terrorism, migration and trade, which people in all strands of the spectrum recognise as international issues. The key for the European Union is that it shows clearly that it is able to address those issues.

People sometimes say, "You can't address those issues unless you reform the institutions," but to take the topical example of climate change-the Bali conference is meeting now-if you look at the conclusions of the March 2006 European Council, which offer a genuine leadership role for Europe on climate change issues and international negotiations, you will realise that they have done more to show the relevance of the European Union than any amount of institutional tinkering. The issue is important, but there is division. Both positions are perfectly logical and internally compatible, but people must judge which one they support.

Q500 Mr. Horam: I am interested to hear what you say. None the less, you presumably regard that particular bit of institutional tinkering in the treaty as necessary.

David Miliband: Yes. We think the treaty makes some important and good changes, and it is good for that reason, but it also brings to an end a period of-to use your phrase-institutional tinkering, which I think will be liberating for the European Union.

Q501 Mr. Horam: Yes, but it is not just the Government themselves. We can all collapse with exhaustion, as you say, at the end of this-

David Miliband: No, it is a twofold thing. There are good things in the treaty, and it says "enough is enough, let's get on with the real business."

Q502 Mr. Horam: In weighing these two things-what you might call political will to deliver things on the one hand, and institutional tinkering of this kind on the other-how important is institutional tinkering? Are we all wasting our time on it? Is it not very important at all? Could we have done all those things without institutional tinkering?

David Miliband: No. I think that the changes that have been proposed are sensible in many ways. The six-monthly rotating presidency is not a very efficient way of running a Union of 27. The reduction in the size of the Commission-

Q503 Mr. Horam: I am thinking of the foreign policy aspects of the treaty.

David Miliband: Well, on foreign policy, there are very few changes from the status quo. The European Scrutiny Committee says that "the largely intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and ESDP will be maintained, with no significant departures from the arrangements which currently apply under the EU Treaty."

Q504 Mr. Horam: You are comparing the constitutional treaty and the present treaty.

David Miliband: No, I am comparing the status quo and the current version.

Q505 Mr. Horam: Well, you have a major change. You have the double-hatting of the High Representative. You have the creation of an external service.

David Miliband: We can argue about whether those changes are major or not. All I am saying is that the ESC said that the fundaments of the status quo are preserved. The double-hatting, or the merger of the two posts into a single post, is a worthwhile reform. However, if you are saying, "Do we need to wait for that reform to address the issues in Kosovo today?", my answer is no, we do not.

Q506 Mr. Horam: In your view, what are the concrete ways in which, if we adopt the Lisbon treaty, the UK can realise its goals as regards the EU as an actor on the international stage?

David Miliband: Solely in respect of foreign policy?

Mr. Horam: Yes.

David Miliband: Well, let us take as item one in that question the creation of the new High Representative post. We do not have to quibble about whether you call it major: leave the adjective to one side. It is a worthwhile reform.

Q507 Mr. Horam: Why?

David Miliband: While it is true that the two people who have been responsible for external relations have, at various points in the last 10 or 15 years, found ways to get on, actually, two people doing one job is not a very sensible way of proceeding. I therefore think that is a sensible rationalisation, and is worthwhile in that respect, and-

Q508 Mr. Horam: And?

David Miliband: The External Action Service will bring some streamlining.

Q509 Mr. Horam: In effect, it is a question of efficiency, or effectiveness?

David Miliband: I think efficiency and effectiveness will be enhanced by the changes that are brought in. However, in the end, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is going to require a change of outlook on the part of the EU, first, because we are going to have to recognise that threats to our security and prosperity come increasingly from beyond our borders, rather than from within, and, secondly, because of political will, which you rightly referred to, when it comes to questions like Kosovo. It will be very instructive to see the extent to which Europe learns the lessons-and I would guess that there is a pretty unanimous view on this-of its weaknesses and failings in the 1990s, and whether it can learn from that history. I think that speaks to the political will that you referred to.

Q510 Ms Stuart: Following on from what Mr. Horam said, on the foreign affairs and defence side, most of what we want to do we could actually have been done without the treaty, and I just want to use one example: the European Defence Agency. That was an idea which came out of the original constitution, but we set it up anyway, whether the treaty was signed or not. Is there anything in the treaty that we want to achieve, which, because it is intergovernmental and requires unanimity, Heads of Government could have done anyway, without that document?

David Miliband: I think the example John Horam gave of the merger of the two roles obviously requires treaty change. That is something that would not otherwise have happened.

Q511 Ms Stuart: Could not Heads of Government have done that by unanimity anyway?

David Miliband: We can have a legal answer from Paul Berman.

Paul Berman: Double-hatting is excluded, because Commissioners cannot serve in other roles. In order for a Commissioner-in this case the Vice-President-to serve in a function in the Council one has to have treaty change.

Q512 Ms Stuart: Is that double-hatting of an occupation or a function?

Paul Berman: The prohibition on the Commission double-hatting is about not taking instructions from other institutions. If you work for another institution or take instructions from it you need to make provision for that exception. That is what the Treaty of Lisbon does: it explicitly allows the High Representative to take instructions from the Council.

David Miliband: But not the creation of a Tsar, merging the posts of President of the European Council and-[Laughter.]

Chairman: We will have questions on that later.

Q513 Ms Stuart: Can we move on to the overall point that the Chairman raised? I hate to do this to the Foreign Secretary, but may I remind him of a function he had before he became Foreign Secretary, when he was still in No. 10, and was one of the Sherpas to the original Laeken declaration that started all of this off? Do you think we have even begun to fulfil the aspirations of what was in the Laeken declaration regarding policy, institutions and delivery?

David Miliband: For the record, I was not a Sherpa for the Laeken declaration. However, a reflection group was established before the Laeken Council of which I was a member. That group produced no conclusions, I am pleased to say, or at least no written conclusions that may come back to haunt me. I remember having this argument during those discussions. The group involved Jacques Delors and Jean-Luc Dehaene, and their argument was that institutional reform is the route to relevance, and respect and admiration for the European Union. My argument was that it was about the delivery deficit, not the democratic deficit.

We have not achieved our goals. If I asked whether you could think of a way for an institution to make itself unpopular, high on that list would be spending six or seven years talking about its internal structures, which are at best opaque and difficult to understand. So you are right: it is a question of political recognition, and opportunities for political progress have been missed because of this great institutional hoo-ha.

Q514 Mr. Purchase: I want to move to the politics of this. You mentioned the big thing-delivery. I agree with you absolutely. I also know, however, that the machinery must be in place, regularly maintained and oiled, in order to provide the vehicle on which we do the big things. So I do not regard it as tinkering; I regard it as proper, sensible development of administrative policy in order to deliver what you quite rightly say are the important things. It does seem to me, however, that you have to explain to us how you reconcile support for these big things-the coherence and the concentration that we need in order to get them. How do we reconcile that with our oft-stated intention to maintain an independent foreign policy?

You may tell me that it is just because that is what the Daily Mail and The Sun says, that we are worried about electors and so on, but I puzzle in my own mind about how we can declare ourselves in favour of the big things-I will paraphrase-and yet at the same time say, "But, hang on, we have to be independent." I do not see how the politics work.

David Miliband: It is absolutely right to raise the point because it goes to the heart of the question of foreign policy in the modern world. How can one have an "independent" foreign policy in an interdependent world? That is the question you are asking, and it is absolutely right to do so. John Horam used the word "tinkering" and that is not a word I would want to associate myself with. We have ended up in difficulties in the past. The answer is that when one comes to efficiency and effectiveness, there are two aspects. One is the oiling, the efficiency of operation; the other is the legitimacy of the operation.

It seems to me that, notwithstanding all that we hear about globalisation and the interdependent world, the site of legitimacy for citizens is the nation. That does not mean that they do not have concerns beyond national borders. It does not mean that they do not want to apply their values beyond national borders. It is, however, to the nation state that people owe and commit a significant part of their sense of identity. I think that any attempt to produce foreign policy that negates that sense of identity would be quite dangerous because it would corrode the sense of legitimacy.

There is no question that you could increase the efficiency of the UN if you had less power for nations, but you would severely corrode the legitimacy of the decisions that were then taken. That is why it is right that the UN has nation states at its heart. It is right that Britain keeps the role it has in the UN at the moment. If you ask whether that involves compromises in the search for consensus, of course the answer is yes. Does that mean that we have to redouble our efforts to find consensus that works? Yes, but I would be wary of believing that there are administrative or "oiling"-to use your phrase-mechanical reforms that got us out of the fact that different countries and different people disagree about foreign policy ends and goals.

Keeping a national foreign policy is important in getting the right blend of legitimacy and efficiency. That is not to say that our foreign policy does not change, now or in the past. I have often said in the last six months that foreign policy used to be about foreigners and that home policy used to be about what we did at home. No more. In an interdependent world, foreign policy is about things that come back to haunt our security and prosperity at home.

Q515 Mr. Purchase: That is the whole point. The idea that any country in the world has an independent foreign policy at the present time, save perhaps for America, is a chimera. Why do we not recognise that the great role that we could perform in terms of world peace, prosperity and interdependence, is to come out straightforwardly and say that we are seeking a foreign policy that chimes with the needs of this society and this world that we live in?

David Miliband: I hope we can say that. Perhaps I misunderstood the question. By independent foreign policy, do you mean, should we be able to decide on our own foreign policy as a country? I think the answer is yes. If by independent foreign policy you mean, should we pretend that the outside world does not exist, then obviously the answer is no, we should not do that. We should frame our foreign policy in the context of the real world in which we live, which is a world of interdependence, and a shared planet where issues of resources, security and so on are shared issues, not issues where one can retreat behind a national or regional fortress. I am sorry if I misunderstood.

Q516 Mr. Purchase: I was looking for the vision, which, I think, as well as the delivery, will connect Europe to its community.

David Miliband: That is a very fair point. In the midst of discussion of delivery and democracy we have to remember what are the purposes of our interventions and how we are trying to promote stability in our terms-social justice and equal opportunity-around the world.

Chairman: Unfortunately we have to move away from the vision and into the minutiae now. Before we do, we will have a brief intervention from Sandra Osborne.

Q517 Sandra Osborne: I am very concerned about public credibility regarding the treaty in the UK. For the first time in 10 years as an MP I have had the subject raised on the doorstep-the only matter with regard to Europe that I have ever had raised in that way. It may well be people who read the The Sun and the Daily Mail, as Ken was saying. I think that people understand the difference as regards an inter-related foreign policy, but they are continually told that UK sovereignty over foreign policy is going to be taken away, and it is easy to promote that fear. If the Government cannot counter that fear in some way, is that not going to affect credibility further down the line on the big issues that you are talking about? What are the Government going to do about that?

David Miliband: The first thing that we can do is to be as open as possible in the way that we answer questions and engage in debate, both in Committees like this and in the House itself. We will have plenty of time to go through the details of the treaty.

You and I are in politics. You have got to believe that explanation is our biggest card. Explanation and persuasion is the business that we are in. We do not write headlines and we do not publish newspapers but we do have the power of our arguments.

There is a wider case, which is that the country faces a very big choice. Does it want to look at the world around it and think that it is so complex and fast-moving that we are better off trying to divorce ourselves from it? Or do we recognise that there is not a divorce from issues of economic instability, terrorism and climate change? The critical choice for this country is how we engage with those issues, both bilaterally with other countries and through multilateral institutions like the EU and the UN. I think that second course, of committing ourselves to engage through all the networks that we have is the right thing for the country, but it is a big choice and maybe it speaks to the sort of explanation that you point to. It could possibly be one of the unexpected virtues that could come out of our extended discussion over the next six months of the treaty.

Q518 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, a press article that I am sure you are intimately familiar with, one which I hope is your bedtime reading, is the former President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's article in The Independent on 13 October headed "The EU treaty is the same as the constitution". The question I want to put to you, since nobody disputes that, is why, Foreign Secretary, have the British Government not taken the honest path of saying, "We are going to change our policy on a referendum. Even though we had a commitment to it in the general election, we are going to go back on that commitment," and be honest with the British people about it and defend a decision not to have a referendum even though the treaty is effectively the same? Why, instead, are the Government continuing to perpetuate, frankly, this deceit on the British people by going through the pretence that the treaty now is radically different from the one that was before the Parliament and the British people before the last election? Why have the Government not been honest on this?

David Miliband: The Government do not agree with Giscard d'Estaing, that is the simple reason, for very good reasons, which I am happy to rehearse, but which all 27 Heads of Government accepted in June 2007 when they said that the constitutional treaty had been abandoned, and which the Chairman of this Committee referred to in his opening remarks when he talked about the failure of the constitutional process. The truth is, it is the constitution that was abandoned. The constitution sought, for the first time in European history, to re-found the European Union. That project is a perfectly legitimate project for people to believe in, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing believed in it, but the people of Europe, who voted in France and the Netherlands, did not believe in it. So the constitution that was promoted and to which he dedicated several years of his life has been abandoned. That is why we do not believe that we are in the same situation as we were in before those referendum defeats for the constitution.

While it is important, of course, to have respect for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, you only have to look at the comments of the Danish Prime Minister, not a former Danish Prime Minister, not a Danish Prime Minister who was in power until 1981, 26 years ago, but a Danish Prime Minister who is in power now, whose Council of State and Special Committee of Justice looked at the treaty. The Danish Prime Minister commented yesterday, not in Le Monde or anywhere else but in his own Parliament, that they had examined the reform treaty that has been put forward, and-this is the quotation from the Justice Ministry-"It is the Justice Ministry's conclusion that for Denmark"-a country which has a stronger version of the treaty than we do-"the Lisbon treaty does not transfer new powers." On this basis, the Justice Ministry concludes that Denmark can ratify the Lisbon treaty by normal procedure.

That is the existing Prime Minister of Denmark, so I hope, Sir John, this is not going to come to you saying that I am dishonest and you are honest. I hope that it can at least be taken forward on the basis that we have different views of the content of the reform treaty. We believe that the reform treaty, for the reasons set out at great length in my letter to the Chairman, is not the same as the constitution. It is perfectly legitimate for you to argue that it is, but I hope that you will accept that it is legitimate for me to argue that it is not.

Q519 Sir John Stanley: I simply say to you that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing says in the first sentence of his article: "The difference between the original constitution and the present Lisbon Treaty is one of approach, not of content." He continues for the whole of his article to indicate that the essential content is the same.

David Miliband: The fact that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing asserts it does not mean that it is right.

Q520 Sir John Stanley: Would you accept that, just because you assert the contrary, it is not necessarily right?

David Miliband: Exactly. Let me try to make the argument, not just the assertion. I rest my argument on three points. First, in structure, the reform treaty is different from the constitutional treaty. I defy anyone to say to me that collapsing all the pillars-which is what the constitutional treaty does-and maintaining a separate pillar for foreign policy is the same. It is not. So in structure, the reform treaty is different from the constitutional treaty because the reform treaty amends existing texts rather than re-founding the union.

Secondly, in terms of content, the reform treaty is different. It is different in part because of the red lines that have been achieved for this country, which make the treaty different in this country than in other countries. But it is also different for other reasons that we can go into.

Thirdly-and importantly-the reform treaty is different in consequence from the constitutional treaty, because the reform treaty ends the debate about whether Europe is going to have year after year after year of constitutional and institutional reform, or whether we are drawing a line under that period of reform and moving on-as Ken Purchase said-to the big issues. The proof of that third point will be in the declaration that comes out of the European Council on Friday. That will announce the establishment of the Reflection Group, while making it absolutely clear that, for the foreseeable future, institutional reform is off the European agenda rather than on it. So in terms of structure, content and consequence, the reform treaty is different from the constitutional treaty, and I hope you accept that there is not just an assertion of difference, but a founded argument based on three points as to why it is different.

Q521 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: The structure of the new treaty is different only in the sense that it retains the two existing treaties and amends them, rather than having a single, consolidated text. But in legal effect and in substance, the new treaty is pretty well identical to the constitutional treaty, as shown by the European Scrutiny Committee's comparative table. I would like to ask you about one matter of substance, which is identical but has simply been rolled over fully intact from the constitutional treaty, and that is the article that governs majority voting.

The Government claim that foreign and security policy will be inter-governmental, and we will have a veto over important matters. But the new treaty includes the important innovation that when the High Representative makes a proposal, that proposal is voted on by majority voting-so long as the European Council, at one of its four annual meetings, has agreed unanimously to accede to his request to make a proposal. Do you agree with that analysis of majority voting?

David Miliband: No, I do not, and I will return to that. But first, it is very significant that David Heathcoat-Amory, who has looked at this issue for some time, should say, I think for the first time, that the structure of the reform treaty is different from the structure of the constitutional treaty. That is what he said today, and we should recognise the importance of that. What he said was that the "legal effect" was, in his words, almost identical, but it was very welcome to hear him say that the structure of the constitutional treaty was different from that of the reform treaty. It is part of the purpose of these meetings to try to establish areas of fact, so I am glad that he picked up that point. So in terms of structure, we are amending existing treaties, not-to use your words-creating a consolidated text. It is not a new re-founding of the European Union. That is important.

Secondly, I do not accept that in legal effect, the reform treaty and the constitutional treaty are the same. You mentioned the ESC report, which is important and it does have a table of derivation at the back. Since you referred to it, I would like to refer to it. You say that it shows that the two treaties are the same. To show you why it does not show that, it relegates to one footnote the whole of the new arrangements on justice and home affairs, which are a significant part of the new treaty but were not in the constitutional treaty. I am just trying to find the footnote number so that you can follow it up. I think that that shows that your assertion about the listing at the back does not add up. You can take it from me-you can trust me, I am a politician-that they have relegated the justice and home affairs points to a footnote in the table at the back. I do not think that that gives due credit to the changes that have been achieved.

In respect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Council of Foreign Ministers acting in unanimity agrees a policy and asks the High Representative to come forward with the implementing policy. It remains the case that implementation of an agreed policy can be done by qualified majority voting, but the policy is set by unanimity.

Q522 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: First, you would have heard me say that the structure is different in the debate yesterday if you had not spoken and then left almost immediately. I repeat, and I think by implication that you agree, that in legal effect and substance-which is what people care about-the two treaties are almost identical. In the words of the European Scrutiny Committee, they are "substantially equivalent".

David Miliband: I do not accept that.

Q523 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Excuse me, I am asking a question. Your quarrel is not with me over this issue, but with a Labour-dominated European Scrutiny Committee.

I want to return to the point about qualified majority voting. I am referring to article 17 of the text itself. It is quite clear that when the High Representative asks to make a proposal to the European Council, this country, if it does not agree, will have to veto the request at that point. Otherwise, if it accedes to the request by the High Representative, from then on, majority voting will apply. There is no other way of interpreting article 17(b)(i). Therefore, that is a new and substantial erosion of the unanimity principle. In practice, it means that the UK would have to veto very early on, even a request to present a proposal by the High Representative. That is a very high bar indeed, and unless the Government vetoed it at that point, once the request has been made to the High Representative and once he has brought forward his proposal, according to that article, qualified majority voting applies.

David Miliband: Let me go through those two points. First, I do not accept that the reform treaty and the constitutional treaty are the same. Selective quotation from the ESC report is becoming a parliamentary sport. To be absolutely clear on what it says about the allegation of substantial equivalence, it says: "We consider that, for those countries which have not requested derogations or opt outs from the full range of agreements in the Treaty, it does"-and it refers readers to the table. Even the ESC says that for the UK, it is not substantially equivalent. Let us be clear about what the ESC says. I know that you are a distinguished member of that Committee.

Secondly, the unanimity basis for agreement on foreign affairs is for the policy. It has been the case since 1992-or possibly 1986-that the implementation of policy is a matter for qualified majority voting.

Paul Berman: Since Amsterdam.

David Miliband: Since Amsterdam, sorry. The distinction is between agreeing the policy and implementing it. That is unchanged by this.

Q524 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: No, you are being utterly obtuse.

We know that, in the existing treaty, implementing measures are passed by qualified majority voting. I am asking you a different question, on a new article, which concerns the role of the High Representative. When the High Representative asks the Council to present a proposal for action, the European Council can reject that request by unanimity. In other words, we have a veto.

David Miliband: Correct.

Q525 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: But, if the European Council agrees that the High Representative can present his proposal for action, from then on consideration of that proposal would be by majority voting. There is no other explanation. Please ask your advisers to confirm that.

My point is that the much-trumpeted veto of the United Kingdom must be asserted very early on, when the High Representative makes his request. He will make it in very reasonable terms. He will say, "I wish to present a proposal for action." For the British Government at that point to say, "No, we are not going to do that, because we are afraid of what you may bring forward," is a very demanding set of conditions. If we do not veto at that point, and he does bring forward his proposals to the European Council, from then on majority voting applies. I am asking you to agree what is in the text. It is clear, but the consequences of it are very serious.

David Miliband: In setting out the policy, there is unanimity. In implementing the policy, there is QMV. That applies in terms of both what we inherit from Amsterdam and of what you have described. Policy setting is a matter of unanimity. You and I agree about that.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: No.

David Miliband: You are saying that we have to decide it "early". I am saying that we have a veto. If you do not like it, you do not have to vote for it. Both in terms of the post-Amsterdam conditions and what you have quoted, QMV is triggered only once there has been unanimous agreement to do something. We are both saying that. You are saying that there is a veto, but you think that there has to be a high bar for it. I am not disagreeing with you. I am saying that in setting the policy there has to be unanimity, then when it comes to implementing it, there is QMV.

Q526 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I find it truly alarming that you are not familiar with article 17. It is not "implementing". It is "when adopting a decision defining a common action or position on a proposal from a High Representative". The word "implementation" does not occur in that phrase, so do not bring it into the text. Maybe it should have been there, but it is all too late, because it will be signed tomorrow.

David Miliband: No, I am sorry, as I have made clear, in both the inheritance from Amsterdam and the new pieces that you have described, whether the proposal comes from the Council or the High Representative, the initial decision is for a policy. We are agreed on that. There is a subsequent decision to put that policy into practice. Do not use the word "implementation" if you do not want to. That is a matter that will then be decided by QMV.

Q527 Andrew Mackinlay: Even if you are correct about the fact that the treaty is not the constitution, there is a political problem, because the perception of a substantial number of the electorate is that it is the same. That is a dilemma for legislators here, particularly but not exclusively Labour Members, who signed up to a manifesto saying that there would be a referendum. I believe it to be a majority, but even if it is not, a substantial proportion of the electorate believe that they are one and the same thing. That cannot be dismissed. It is a reality and a matter of honour. I was not the architect of the manifesto-I do not know if you were-but we signed up to this, and the perception is that it is one and the same thing. We cannot ignore that, can we?

David Miliband: You are right that nothing should be "dismissed". Some people may perceive that they are the same, but I am not sure. I think that Sandra was saying earlier that a lot of people do not have a strong view about it. Some people think it is similar, some people think it is different. In the end, all of us, whether Labour, Tory or Lib Dem, will have to take a view, firstly on the content of the treaty and whether it should trigger a referendum because of that content, and secondly on whether you feel the treaty is sufficiently different from the constitution that you stood on. Regarding the first issue, I think that we agree that something with far-reaching constitutional consequences should be subject to a referendum, joining the euro for example.

Q528 Andrew Mackinlay: There is one option, is there not, that would satisfy some legislators-not just Labour, but some Labour Members-which is a commitment to have a referendum between now and, say, 2012, reaffirming our membership of the European Union. Do you totally dismiss that?

David Miliband: I do not agree with it, but "dismiss" suggests tossing it aside. That is the Lib Dem-

Q529 Andrew Mackinlay: Some people were saying it in your own party before the Lib Dems, so it is a continuing church, albeit underground and persecuted from time to time. Some have been saying it. It does not matter who it came from; it is a sensible idea, is it not?

David Miliband: It is a position that has now been adopted by the Lib Dems.

We made our choice in 1974. If we were to have a significant constitutional change there would be a case for a referendum, but one of the things that we would all agree on, and which I have heard you talk about, is the importance of restoring respect for Parliament. Let us make Parliament the place where we decide things. That is what we are elected for. Let us then face the consequences of whether the electorate agree or disagree with us. I think it was Mrs. Thatcher who quoted Clement Attlee as saying that referendums are the refuge of those who are either demagogues or feel that they have lost the argument. We should take responsibility for the decisions we take in Parliament and then let the electorate decide.

Q530 Richard Younger-Ross: It would be very well and good for the politicians here to make that decision if they had any say in the treaty or any of its clauses. It was like getting hens' teeth from your predecessor to get her to admit that there had been any pre-discussions at all on the treaty, let alone what was in those pre-discussions and what the Sherpas were doing at the different meetings.

You asserted that the structures are different. My background is in architecture, and I can build you a nice new house out of bricks or I can go to your existing house and adapt it and build bits out of timber. The structures will be different but they are both still houses, and I assert that this is still a constitution, even though it has a different name and different structure.

David Miliband: But bungalows are different from tower blocks, are they not?

Richard Younger-Ross: I did not say anything about bungalows or tower blocks.

David Miliband: No, but they are both houses.

Richard Younger-Ross: Not by definition.

David Miliband: Maybe you are a theologian or a philosopher, not just an architect. To continue your metaphor, there is a big difference between doing up the paintwork and knocking the whole thing down and rebuilding it.

Q531 Richard Younger-Ross: Coming back to the point about the High Representative, the High Representative now has a Commission hat and can instigate policy. Is that not significant?

David Miliband: It is noteworthy. Obviously the Commission role of the High Representative is quite limited. His or her primary function is to carry out the wishes of the Council of Ministers, but where he or she is performing Commission duties then fair enough. There is a continuation of the right of initiative but you could say that the boot is on the other foot-formally, in this treaty, the Council is the policy originator.

Q532 Richard Younger-Ross: Do not Commissioners normally just wear Ministers down over a number of Council meetings?

David Miliband: I think that Minsters have shown themselves to outlive Commissioners more than Commissioners have outlived Ministers.

Q533 Richard Younger-Ross: With regard to whether this is the same as the constitution or whether it is a reform treaty, I seem to recall that during the early talks the Prime Minister was asked a question in the House about whether they were different, and he said that of course they were different because of the red lines. And he used the red lines as the mark of what the difference was. The red lines are all actually in the original constitution, so if you take the red lines away they are still the same thing.

David Miliband: I do not have the Prime Minister's quote in front of me, but obviously the red lines are a significant addition. As I said: structure; content; consequence. In terms of content, the red lines are a significant change from the constitution; they are not the same. The material on JHA, which we discussed at our last meeting, is a significant part of that.

Q534 Chairman: May I just take you to this point about parliamentary scrutiny? You made a point that there should be proper parliamentary scrutiny and presumably there ought to be better parliamentary involvement in future on European matters than there is currently. Are the Government considering giving a right of prior vote on any extension of QMV under the passerelle procedure for the Common Foreign and Security Policy?

David Miliband: Yes. The Prime Minister has said that we are.

Q535 Chairman: And when are we likely to know what that will involve?

David Miliband: When we publish the Bill, I think; when our preliminary conclusions are complete.

Q536 Chairman: You are not sure when you are going to publish the Bill yet?

David Miliband: You will not have to wait too long. Let us get the signature, or signatures, out of the way first, then let us move on to publication and then proper scrutiny. To anticipate a point that you might want to make, obviously these matters get discussed in the usual way, but I know that the Government know that you have a timetable for publishing your report and we want to make sure that there is proper time for that. We will not have the Second Reading of the Bill before we get your report.

Q537 Chairman: That is helpful. No doubt we will find out some more later on today, or tomorrow.

May I ask you about the implications of the new proposals for enhanced co-operation and what, if any, effect they will have on our policies and on how the Common Foreign and Security Policy works?

David Miliband: There is continuity and change in this.

Q538 Chairman: I am interested in the change.

David Miliband: The change is in respect of what we now all call permanent structured co-operation. Is that what you are talking about?

Q539 Chairman: Yes. There is that, but there is also a solidarity clause. I am interested in the co-operation.

David Miliband: Enhanced co-operation was brought in under previous treaties, for nations to come together to conduct foreign policy work together. Permanent structured co-operation is more on the defence side, on the European Security and Defence Policy side, and it is about capability improvement among EU member states. That is what the reference to permanent structured co-operation is.

Q540 Chairman: In practice, does that have implications for what we do, or is it just a drafting change?

David Miliband: No, I think that it is about the capabilities; that is one of the issues for European defence. This is about enhancing capabilities for European defence; EU-led operations in respect of security in the European neighbourhood. That is different from the solidarity clause, which is about terrorist incidents and whether or not we are committed to helping each other in the event of terrorist incidents. That seems perfectly helpful to us.

Q541 Chairman: Let us probe that a bit further. You have obligations to the EU under the solidarity clause, but you also have both your independent foreign policy and your national policies, and they may not be identical. How is that resolved in terms of the solidarity clause?

David Miliband: I think that it would be helpful if I just read out the content of the so-called solidarity clause, because I think that it makes clear the circumstances that we are talking about. It is title 7 article 188R of the treaty on the Future of the European Union. It says: "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity"-which is presumably why it is called the solidarity clause-"if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States". That circumscribes pretty clearly the circumstances in which this comes to pass. It is not a bit of foreign policy that emerges after negotiation and debate. This is about terrorist attacks and man-made disasters.

Q542 Chairman: And that is new? It was not in the constitutional treaty?

David Miliband: Correct.

Q543 Chairman: Part of the solidarity clause was in the constitutional treaty and what you have just quoted is new. Is that right?

David Miliband: Sorry, it is new in the sense that it does not exist in the current treaties. It was in the constitutional treaty.

Chairman: Okay. Gisela?

David Miliband: That is right, is it not?

Q544 Ms Stuart: Yes.

Would 9/11, which triggered article 5 of NATO, have triggered the solidarity clause?

David Miliband: If it had happened within Europe?

Ms Stuart: Yes.

David Miliband: It certainly meets my definition of a terrorist attack.

Q545 Mr. Purchase: Madrid?

David Miliband: Madrid, yes, and I suppose London 7/7.

Q546 Ms Stuart: So what is the argument that the solidarity clause undermines NATO?

David Miliband: Why does it undermine NATO?

Q547 Ms Stuart: This is not one of my frolics. Countries such as Finland were very concerned about this clause. They said that if you want a solidarity clause we can always join NATO. They asked why we were doing this within the EU. Also there is a slight difficulty in that it is not a true solidarity clause in the sense that countries like Ireland or Denmark have quite different positions. We need to be quite clear how we interpret the solidarity clause. The declaration makes the solidarity clause much weaker than it appears because it states that none of its provisions "is intended to affect the right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligations towards that Member State". In other words, a country has clear obligations but then it interprets them itself. Some people, although not in the UK, have been quite genuinely concerned that it undermines NATO.

David Miliband: I met the Finnish Foreign Minister and he certainly did not raise this as a threatening clause. Obviously it is open to member states to join NATO, but some of them are not members for historic reasons, which it is not worth going into. I do not see the argument-I do not say that you are making it-why a clause like this for the European Union undermines a similar clause that exists in the NATO treaty. I would have thought they were complementary and reflective of the values of the two institutions.

Ms Stuart: So our view is that there is no conflict. Okay.

Mr. Hamilton: May I briefly return to something-

David Miliband: I am terribly sorry Fabian, but it has been helpfully pointed out to me that there is a mutual defence clause which may be a source of confusion. Would it help if I read it out as it relates directly to this NATO order? Section 2, paragraph 7 states: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory the other Member State shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Art.51 of the UN Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation". Maybe that reflects the discussions that happened.

Q548 Ms Stuart: That is section 2 of what?

David Miliband: It is section 2 of article 28 A, paragraph 7. Sorry, Fabian?

Q549 Mr. Hamilton: May I come back to something that Andrew Mackinlay asked earlier? You quite rightly replied that it is for Parliament to make decisions about treaties. We always have done. On previous treaties such as Maastricht and Nice, those far-reaching decisions were made by Parliament rather than through referendums. The problem is that the previous Prime Minister committed this Government to a referendum and put that to the people in the manifesto.

David Miliband: On the constitution.

Q550 Mr. Hamilton: On the constitution. As you rightly say, the problem is that much of the Lisbon treaty is very different from the constitution that was proposed for which we guaranteed a referendum in the manifesto, but, as Andrew Mackinlay said, that is not the public perception. The difficulty that we have-and that we all have in our constituencies, whatever our party-is that it is perceived that the Labour party at the last general election made a commitment to a referendum on a constitution and that we are simply being disingenuous in saying that the Lisbon treaty is so different that we do not need the referendum.

I happen to agree with your point, but we are not getting that across. I wonder what you and the Government will do to make it clear to the electorate that this is different from the constitution on which we guaranteed the referendum.

David Miliband: Let us note first that we must deal with reality rather than perception.

Andrew Mackinlay: The reality is the perception.

David Miliband: No, the reality is not the perception-at least, as understood by Fabian and me. The reality is that this is not the constitution. It is very different-to use your phase. That was point one. It must be the reality.

Secondly, the Committee should not become a Labour party election-planning session in which we are trying to figure out how to explain our policies. I am happy to work with you to figure out the best way to explain matters to your constituents, but we should probably do that in our own bunkers rather than in quite such a public place.

Q551 Mr. Purchase: With great respect, that is a different point. We are talking about Parliament making the view clear to the public, and that is being distorted at the moment by parts of the popular press.

David Miliband: We have a responsibility to be clear as possible about the reality. Your investigation is into the reality. I think that Sir John Stanley and I agreed with each other on the matter during our last discussion. The bar for a referendum in a parliamentary democracy should be: does this law affect bringing into being a fundamental constitutional change? I think that that wording was used, although it can be checked. A fundamental constitutional change should be subject to a referendum, and Parliament must play its role. The real question that we face is whether the treaty constitutes a fundamental constitutional change, given all that we know about its contents and about the present? My case to you would be that no objective observer could look at the changes, however worth while in respect of double-hatting, and say that it is a fundamental constitutional change in our constitutional system. Given that, it is a slippery slope then to say that we should have a referendum anyway.

Mr. Hamilton: We need to get the message across.

Q552 Ms Stuart: But the previous Prime Minister did not give a reason for granting a referendum that had anything to do with the constitution. I want to know just for the record.

David Miliband: That is true. I think that I said that in this Committee. He said that it would clear the air.

Chairman: I am conscious that many of us have views about what the former Prime Minister said at that time, but let us not get into that.

Q553 Mr. Hamilton: Let me get back to the reality. One of the proposals in the treaty is for the establishment of a new European Council President. We took evidence last week from the former Foreign Secretary, Lord Owen. His view-shared by many, I think-is that a figure such as the European Council President might develop too great a degree of independence, thus undermining the prospect that he or she would be a creature of the member states as envisaged by the Government. How will we ensure that the European Council President does not become too independent of member states?

David Miliband: I read Lord Owen's evidence. It was very interesting, but I do not think that his view is widely shared. At least, I have not heard anyone else saying it. The President is appointed by 27 Heads of Government to chair meetings and have a role in setting the agenda. All of us here are politicians. We stay close to our electorates. Any Chairman of the European Council who gets too big for their boots and loses touch with the people who appointed them will end up in trouble. A pretty strong lasso is holding back any pretensions that that person may have. They have an important role. They are appointed for two and a half years and they are accountable pretty quickly to their 27-member appointing body.

Q554 Mr. Hamilton: Can we be sure that that 30-month term of office, which is pretty brief, will not be dominated by the quest to renew the contract or to find the right person in the first place? There is a danger that there is such a long lead-in time to the appointments that someone could be permanently on an appointments commission. You may or may not want to answer that.

Article 213 of the EU reform treaty states that the President of the European Council cannot also be the President of the European Commission. That is ruled out. Are you confident that that article holds water, and that we will not eventually find the same person doing both those jobs?

David Miliband: Yes.

Q555 Sir John Stanley: Why?

David Miliband: Because the article states clearly: "Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation." That is plain and simple-they cannot have two jobs.

Q556 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, do you think that the occupations of the Secretary of State for Defence and that of the Secretary of State for Scotland are the same?

David Miliband: No, the occupations are not the same.

Q557 Sir John Stanley: They are not?

David Miliband: They are two separate jobs.

Q558 Sir John Stanley: That is different from an occupation. They are the identical occupations; they are Cabinet posts.

David Miliband: This is a sort of canard, and I have had an amusing exchange with William Hague about the matter. He wrote to me asking why I had not ruled out the possibility that the two posts could be held by one person. I wrote back saying, "Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, engage in any other occupation." That seems plain and simple. Yesterday, he found the word "occupation", and thought there was a devilish plot to allow that possibility. He had not even read the whole article. Everyone has given me the article-I have got the point, I promise-so I shall read it out. Beyond saying that there is no holding of more than one occupation, the article says that members of the Commission shall "neither seek nor take instruction from any Government or any other body". In other words, not only is there a double occupational ban, there is a ban on any Commissioner taking instructions from any other body. The Chairman of the Council is there to take instructions from the 27 Heads of Government. That provision is lock, stock, barrel and bolted. All you have to do is read the whole article.

Q559 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, you said that you had studied Lord Owen's evidence to the Committee last week. He reported that the Dutch Parliament has received legal advice that is totally contrary to the interpretation that you have just given. Have you seen that advice?

David Miliband: No, I have not.

Q560 Sir John Stanley: He said: "Whatever the Dutch are or are not, their country is famed for its knowledge of international law. When they advise their Parliament that it still allows double-hatting and there are no substantive changes in the draft" -

David Miliband: Let us finish the earlier point. You seemed surprised that I said no. The Dutch evidence that you are quoting is apparently from seven years ago, and deals with the previous constitutional treaty.

Sir John Stanley: Well, from Lord Owen's evidence it was three years ago-

Paul Berman: It was from the time of the constitutional treaty, so it was three or four years ago.

David Miliband: It related to the constitutional treaty

Sir John Stanley: Yes, I know.

David Miliband: We do not have a constitutional treaty.

Q561 Sir John Stanley: That is your assertion-others take a different view. Finally, are you saying to the Committee that under no circumstances under the terms of the treaty will the roles of President of the Commission and the President of the Council ever be held by the same person?

David Miliband: That is prohibited by article 213. What could be clearer? It is prohibited because "Members of the Commission may not engage in any other occupation". If you are suspicious about the word "occupation", may I point out that the article says: "Members of the Commission shall neither seek nor take instructions from any Government or any other body"? That could not be clearer.

Q562 Mr. Moss: Foreign Secretary, several witnesses who have appeared before the Committee have expressed misgivings about the role of the new High Representative, including its practical "do-ability", given the huge range of responsibilities. How best do you think that the post can be made to work, given the remit of responsibilities and its double-hatted nature?

David Miliband: That is really important and completely fair, because two reasonably substantial jobs are coming together. The most important thing will be discipline on the part of the commissioning body-the Council of Foreign Ministers-about what it wants the High Representative to do, so that it is clear that he or she is there to enact agreed foreign policy. We must be disciplined in the priorities we have and the way in which we move forward.

Q563 Mr. Moss: Do you see any problems with this person being the Chair of the Foreign Policy Council, as well as the person who brings proposals to it? If you think of a company, the chairman and the chief executive coming up with the ideas; in this particular case, it is one and the same person.

David Miliband: That is a good point. It is certainly an innovation. From watching the way in which the current High Representative has played his role, I can see that, even though he does not chair the meetings, he is a pretty pivotal figure. It is a balance between commanding confidence and consensus, and initiative. The formalisation of his role as chair of the council enshrines his consensus-building role, given the unanimity requirements of foreign policy. I can see circumstances in which that will bring people together in a good way, although I totally accept your point that it is novel.

Q564 Mr. Moss: How do you envisage the appointment of the new High Representative, which we presume will take place on 1 January 2009, given the role of the European Parliament?

David Miliband: It is fair to say that the way in which those jobs are given out it is not exactly Northcote-Trevelyan. I envisage a lot of chatter, a lot of discussion, and a lot of feeling-out of positions. Whether there will be a job advert in The Economist, I am not sure.

Q565 Mr. Moss: The European Parliament has a role, as you are aware, in looking over the appointments of Commissioners. The new Commission will not be in place until 10 months after the European Parliament makes its decision.

David Miliband: It was late at night in the Lisbon summit when this was finally agreed. Just on a small point-I think you knew what you were saying but I could not remember-the European Parliament has a right to be consulted before the appointment, not afterwards.

Q566 Mr. Moss: There seems to be some discrepancy with what the Prime Minister has said. He said that the European Parliament will not be consulted, and yet declaration 39 in fact says that "appropriate contacts will be made with the European Parliament." Will you clarify the situation?

David Miliband: Yes, that was what was agreed late at night at the Lisbon summit, and it precisely refers to "appropriate contacts."

Q567 Mr. Moss: What does that mean?

David Miliband: I think that that will be in the eye of the beholder. It means that those contacts will not be inappropriate. There will be contacts and discussions.

Q568 Chairman: Mr. Solana is a remarkable man with enormous abilities and experience. He has come to this role, having been Secretary-General of NATO, and is widely respected in many quarters. How will we find someone who has a similar pedigree, wants the job and has the confidence of all these different players?

David Miliband: The first point is that we do not know whether Mr. Solana wants to carry on or not.

Chairman: He is not immortal.

David Miliband: No. Secondly, although he is a fine man in many ways, there are many people with experience. On the defence side, there are former defence Ministers, former NATO members and former Prime Ministers, but we should not go there. So yes, he has talents, but he is not unique.

Q569 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: The text that we now have is identical to that in the constitutional treaty-we can at least agree that that is the case for these clauses-and when it was negotiated in the Convention on the Future of Europe, the British representative, Peter Hain, tabled amendments to try to remove the double-hatting. He did not want the High Representative or Foreign Minister, as he was then called, to be a member of the Commission and a member of the Council, or to preside over the Council, so why did the Government accept the proposal?

David Miliband: I was not in this part of the Government at the time. I do not have an answer to that question, although I am happy to write to you with an answer.

Chairman: Perhaps one of your colleagues knows the answer.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: You have got very short memories; I can remember it very well.

David Miliband: You can give us the answer.

Q570 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I am asking you. The Government did not want the proposal, but they accepted it, and they are now saying that it is a good idea. However, by definition, the present Government do not want it, because it is exactly the same text; it has not been changed. We have got a text that the Government did not want. Why are we accepting it? You had another opportunity to amend what is now called the reform treaty-why did you not take it?

David Miliband: I will have to go back and find out what Peter Hain said and why he said it.

Chairman: Perhaps we can have a letter, which will help us when it comes to our reports.

Q571 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: May I ask another question? The High Representative will obviously try to secure the agreement of all member states for actions internationally. Where that is not possible-in the real world, countries disagree-what do you make of the additional clauses? They are not additional to the constitutional treaty-as I said, it is the same text-but they are additional to the present treaties which oblige member states to come together on foreign policy. I particularly ask you about the obligation in article 11, which says that there shall be "an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions." That has echoes of the "ever-closer union" provision in the present treaties.

Another article obliges member states to "ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity." There are therefore two articles that will apply when there is no agreement, but there will still be an obligation on member states to converge their actions. Will that not bind us, even when we have exercised our veto?

David Miliband: I do not think so, no. We touched on this when we talked last time about the mutual support clauses. We are bound by what we agree and once we have agreed something by unanimity we are going to pursue it in various spirits of co-operation. They are two sides of the same coin, really; one side is the unanimity side and the other side is the mutual support side.

Q572 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I am sorry, can you answer my question? I am postulating a situation whereby there has been disagreement in the European Council or we have exercised our veto over a proposal so there is no common action and no agreeing. However, there are these additional clauses-I emphasise that they are additional to what is in the present treaties-which mandate an ever-increasing degree of convergence in member states' actions. I read out another one that has the same effect of ensuring, through the convergence of our actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values. There is an obligation. Unless the treaty is completely meaningless, the words lay down an obligation for us to agree to converge our actions with other member states whom, I have just said, we disagree with; we have exercised our veto. Is there not a contradiction?

David Miliband: I do not think so, because the previous sentence to one of those you read out is about member states consulting with others, which seems to me perfectly sensible. As we discussed with Ken Purchase at the beginning of this sitting, precisely because other people's actions affect us, it makes sense to consult them and to understand where they are coming from and what they are trying to do in order to maximise our influence.

Q573 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I have got the consultation obligation, but I am asking about another obligation. It is no good referring me to another-

David Miliband: Sorry, you said it was new and in fact it is existing-article 16 is existing. If I have got the right sentence here, it says: "Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action. " I think that that was the phrase you used.

Chairman: If there is a confusion, perhaps we could have something in writing to clarify. I have to move on to some other areas.

Q574 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: We have three very highly paid officials plus the Foreign Secretary and they cannot answer a very simple question about a text that will be signed tomorrow by the Prime Minister. I think it is rather serious.

Paul Berman: To comment on the Foreign Secretary's point, the notion of convergent action is not new, it is there in article 16 of the current treaty. In relation to the new wording which also refers to convergent action-this is in article 11-that has to be applied within the framework of decision making of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It does not undermine the unanimity checks elsewhere. It is an overarching provision which describes how it will work in the preceding paragraph. It makes it clear that unanimity is the default option for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. So this is an overarching provision but then you have to look at the specific provisions that follow on how it is to be applied.

Q575 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: But the overarching provision is precisely my concern. If we put on one side our ability to veto, there is nevertheless this overarching obligation to converge our policy and our actions. Incidentally, the clause I have just read out is not in the existing treaty and I have just checked that myself.

David Miliband: We have just read out a clause that is.

Paul Berman: What I said was that the concept of convergent action is in the existing treaty in article 16. That notion is retained in article 11, which sets out the general overarching provisions. To make it clear, article 11 is an overall description of the Common Foreign and Security Policy but in order to implement it you have to look at the detailed provisions that follow thereafter.

Q576 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I am awfully sorry but, since we have a lawyer here, the clause in the existing treaty is different. It says that member states, "shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union". That is a negative requirement. This is a positive requirement, to converge our actions. That is a new obligation and I think it undermines the separate provisions, which allow us to veto in certain eventualities. It is, in your phrase, this "overarching obligation" that is precisely my concern.

Paul Berman: It does not override the detailed provisions. It is very standard practice in EU treaties. You have the introduction to a chapter and a general set of statements about how that policy is going to work. To see how it works in practice you have to look at the specific provisions. In article 11 you have a general description of how the Common Foreign and Security Policy is going to work. That includes a new paragraph that has been inserted in this treaty, spelling out the specific intergovernmental nature of the treaty, including the fact that unanimity is the default position. It then follows on to the language you identify, which talks about convergence.

What I am saying is that the concept of convergence is not new because that exists in article 16. This wording is new but it is part of the overall description of how the CFSP is going to work. In order to establish how it works in practice you must then look at the subsequent articles, which in particular include the provisions on conduct of decision making by unanimity, except in the exceptions that have already been discussed.

Q577 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Finally, can I get you to confirm that the phrase, "the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence for Member States' actions" is entirely new. Would you agree to that? Yes or no?

Paul Berman: I cannot agree that it is entirely new because, as I have said already, the concept of convergence is already in article 16.

Q578 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Where is it in this treaty?

Paul Berman: Article 16 talks about ensuring the Union's influence is asserted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action. What I am saying is that the notion of convergent action is not new. What I do agree is that this paragraph is new, as is the preceding paragraph, which underpins the intergovernmental nature of CFSP. In order to understand how these overarching provisions are to be applied, they cannot be taken as free-standing obligations, read in isolation. They must be read with regard to the more specific provisions that follow, including the provisions on voting by unanimity.

Q579 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Thank you for confirming that it is new. You are right. I have just checked article 16 and that phrase does not apply.

Secondly, is it not really very worrying-

David Miliband: Sorry, but it does apply.

Q580 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Well, I am sorry, but I have article 16 here and there is nothing about an ever-increasing degree of convergence.

David Miliband: No.

Chairman: We could be another hour on this.

Mr. Purchase: No, I do not think we could. I think it will take another minute, because it is there on the bottom line.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I must insist on reading out the article.

Mr. Illsley: Just read out article 16; it is there.

Chairman: We need to move on. I am conscious that, if we carry on talking about this section, we will not have time to ask questions about several other areas.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: I am sorry, but I must just read out the phrase: "in order to ensure that the Union's influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent actions". That is different from an obligation to the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence. That is so obviously the point that I wanted to put it on the record.

Q581 Chairman: We will no doubt come back to this at a later stage.

The High Representative has a specifically referred-to role, now, within the United Nations Security Council. I know that this was debated yesterday on the Floor of the House, but can you clarify whether you expect that to have any influence on the role of our Permanent Representative and our own role in the UN Security Council?

David Miliband: Our Permanent Representative is there to represent us, in the same way that I am there to represent us when I am at the Security Council.

Q582 Chairman: So there will be no change.

David Miliband: The European Union has the right to speak at the moment. I have the figures in my head from the German presidency: I think I am right that during the six months it spoke eight times. It can speak, but it obviously cannot vote, because votes are reserved for members of the Security Council.

Chairman: Okay.

Q583 Mr. Horam: Foreign Secretary, can I ask you about the External Action Service that is going to be set up? I think that you would agree that successive British Governments have done rather a good job in getting British officials into the Commission, particularly at the higher level. So now we have a major opportunity, because this new service will be set up and thousands of people will be involved, as I understand it. Yet at the same time I understand that the FCO is running down the European Fast Stream, which has been suspended and may be abandoned altogether. Does that not put us at a serious disadvantage? Why are we doing that now?

David Miliband: You are right to say that we have done better in the last 10 or 15 years at getting our people into the higher positions, which probably reflects earlier investment. In respect of the External Action Service, it is important to say that it will be taking on staff who are already working, because although the service is being created, people working in the Commission offices in 118 countries already have the first call for the new service. However, I agree with you that it is important that Britain gets proper representation.

First, I do not think that the run-down on the European Fast Stream negates our potential to have influence in the EAS, partly because there is much more scope now for people entering the Commission mid-career, which is a significant difference from the situation 20 or 30 years ago when you had to enter at the beginning and work your way to the top. Secondly, the EAS will be setting out to recruit people on secondment from the FCO and, as long as people are assured that they will be able to come back, that will be an attractive secondment.

The balance of FCO effort is moving away from Europe, which had up to 35% or even 40% of staff until relatively recently and is down to 30%

Q584 Mr. Horam: Why are we running down the Fast Stream? What is the reason?

David Miliband: The truth is that we were struggling to get people for it. I am happy to get some management data on that. We were struggling to get people on to the Fast Steam track and we have been trying to do more in respect of secondment and the mid-career entry point. I am happy to get you stuff on that.

Q585 Andrew Mackinlay: It is about their having confidence that they can return to the mainstream FCO.

David Miliband: But the point is that we need to exploit the opportunities for secondment that are created by the new EAS and we are determined to do that.

Q586 Chairman: You have just published a new, revised strategy. You have got rid of the 10 priorities and are moving towards a more focused approach. I have just had a letter about that. In that process there will perhaps be a reduction of commitment in certain parts of the world. If that is the case, will we be relying more and more on the European Union's delegations, or European Union representation? I will give you a particular example. Two weeks ago, I met a delegation of Members of Parliament from Gabon, where we do not even have an Honorary Consul. I wonder whether, as the EU's External Action Service is developed, the British Government might start using the EU's base in particular countries, rather than having our own, inadequate, representation-or no representation at all?

David Miliband: No. I see the two as complementary, not substitutive. I will look into the Gabon situation, because there will be provision for British visitors. We are bound to have some sort of representation in Gabon.

Chairman: We do not at the moment.

David Miliband: We will find out about Gabon. The point is that more and more business within Europe that used to be done bilaterally is now done through the European Union, and that is the importance of UKREP, so there is no suggestion of running down UKREP. Equally, we need to have representation in all European countries: that will continue. However, the focus of the FCO's staffing strategy is to put people into the priority areas, often areas of danger-it is why we are having a big upgrade in our Afghanistan effort, a big upgrade in our middle east and north Africa effort-which is part of a shift from the traditional focus of bilateral foreign policy in Europe to some of the new areas of threat that we face.

Q587 Chairman: Can we have a note on how you intend to tackle the staffing of the EAS from the UK point of view?

David Miliband: Of course. I am very happy to do that.

Chairman: Can we now move on? I have been told that it is about quarter past four. Gisela Stuart, please, on the Reflection Group.

Ms Stuart: Oh yes.

David Miliband: Fancy another role?

Ms Stuart: No.

Chairman: That is why we got her to ask the question.

Q588 Ms Stuart: I have already got redemption from one life sentence, I think. As we know, the Reflection Group is a group of wise men, suggested by President Sarkozy. While I think it is quite appropriate to have a forum to look at the way the European Union develops, I wonder what your view is on what the mandate of that group should be, particularly given that, in your opening statement, you said that one of the good things that ought to come out of the Lisbon treaty is that for the foreseeable future we put an end to institutional changes. Given that the Reflection Group will look at, particularly, Turkey's accession-this huge member state potentially coming in-will that come into it, or how do you envisage that mandate?

David Miliband: It is very important that the Reflection Group be about the long-term future of the Union. It should start with the global context that it will face in 2020 or 2030, the changing economic, demographic and possibly political context, Europe's place in the world, wholly consistent with the "global Europe" argument we have been making. It should not be trying to substitute itself for short-term policy making, and it certainly should be barred from getting into an institutional reorganisation. This is about the global context that Europe is going to face in 15 to 20 years' time. That is the mandate: to think far ahead, and not to substitute itself for the negotiations and discussion. I certainly do not see it adjudicating on Turkey. In fact, the basis for many countries agreeing to have this group at all is that it does not get into the question of commitments already made to Turkish accession.

Q589 Ms Stuart: So you would exclude discussions on Turkey?

David Miliband: I do not think there will be a sub-clause in its mandate saying, "You're not allowed to look at Turkey", but I think it will be absolutely clear that this is about the global context of 2020 to 2030, and not about institutional reform.

Q590 Ms Stuart: When would you expect them to report? What do you think would be a sense of the time frame?

David Miliband: Years, not months, I think. Two or three years.

Q591 Chairman: You referred earlier to the declaration on globalisation. Can you tell us what you expect to come out of that?

David Miliband: I think it is important to send a very clear signal about the new priorities of the European Union, and I think it is fair to say that over the last 40 or 50 years, the European Union has gained strength from its focus on issues within its borders: social standards, markets, currencies. However, in the modern world, that is only one wing of the aeroplane. The other wing of the aeroplane is what is going on beyond your borders. That is the new dimension that is very important. It is about climate, energy, migration, terrorism, crime-

Q592 Chairman: Peace?

David Miliband: Peace and stability, and conflict prevention. Those are issues beyond our borders that spill over into our borders if we are not careful. The globalisation declaration therefore needs to set out very clearly that that is the new focus of European action-the new balancing wing of the aeroplane.

Q593 Chairman: Have you seen the survey that the Bertelsmann Foundation has just published about public attitudes towards Europe and the rest of the world?

David Miliband: I have not seen it, no.

Q594 Chairman: It is quite interesting. It really gives a sense that the public want the European Union to deal with those kinds of issues and that they see the European Union as playing an important role in those areas. I would be interested to know whether this declaration has been driven by surveys-is it just coincidental?

David Miliband: It sounds like an extremely good survey-the sort of survey that we like. It makes sense. The former Foreign Secretary talked about the European Union not poking into every nook and cranny of local life. It should be focusing on things which are genuinely international.

Chairman: Can we move on to the EU budget?

Q595 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: Can I ask about prospects for the budget? Efforts were made in the Convention on the Future of Europe to reform the way that Europe finances itself and spends its money because great damage is done by continuing scandals over waste, mismanagement, fraud and so on. As it is called a reform treaty, does it surprise you that no real efforts were made to reform the treaty? Indeed, for the 13th year now, the auditors have failed to sign off the account. Given that there is to be a look at the budget next year, what are your ambitions regarding the EU budget and, crucially, how it is spent?

David Miliband: The treaty was not about the budget, it was about the institutions. The issue of the auditing arrangements is therefore not something for the treaty. But as you say, the budget is not being ignored and nor is its management being ignored.

The important starting point for us is to make sure first, that the budget focuses on things that Europe needs to do. Secondly, that it does them in as efficient a way as possible. Both of those things can be done from relatively close to a zero base. We should be starting from a simple proposition that the European Union should be spending on things that it should be doing; it should be doing it in an efficient and effective way. Thirdly, we need to ask whether public spending is the right way to achieve the policy goal described, presuming that we agree that it is a policy goal that Europe should be pursuing. Could that policy goal be achieved through regulatory or other means?

That is the right way to approach the European budget. It is a fundamental budget review. It is to be launched in the next year or so. Those are the right starting points: does it add value; is it efficiently done; and is public spending-as opposed to other action-the right way of achieving the goal? We will also be arguing strongly that the European budget should be contained.

Q596 Mr. Heathcoat-Amory: You say that the budget was not part of the treaty, but the budgetary process-the means by which Europe obtains money and spends it-is the subject of treaty articles. To that extent those articles could have been amended or strengthened. Some of us in the convention tabled amendments to strengthen the role of the European Court of Auditors and so on. I am not sure you are quite right in saying that nothing could have been done to reform that aspect of the treaty.

Can I ask you about a specific? When the Prime Minister was Chancellor of the Exchequer he raised the possibility of bringing back the structural funds so that the better-off members could spend their own money on industrial and social policy rather than having it filtered through the Brussels machine with all the inefficiency and incompetence that that would entail. Now he is Prime Minister, do you believe that is still his aim? Are there any other opportunities for bringing certain elements of the budget back under national control?

David Miliband: I would like perhaps to write to you or have an evidence session at greater length about the budget process. I am not going to use this occasion, especially only a couple of months after the Commission first issued its paper asking for views on that, to start setting out our negotiation stall in great detail. I do not think that that would be a wise thing to do. I would prefer to use the processes that are under way in Government to respond to that Commission publication and ensure that we do so in a way that maximises our negotiating potential. We should follow that through and I am sure that it will be for the Committee to examine it. There is a whole range of issues where there are fundamental debates going on about the purposes of the spending and how it is done, and it is better for us to do that in a way that responds coherently across the piece rather than just picking up individual items.

Chairman: Thank you. Richard Younger-Ross.

Q597 Richard Younger-Ross: Could you give us some idea of what the Government view or policy would be towards European common defence?

David Miliband: The European Security and Defence Policy is obviously standing. We have three priorities with regard to European security plans: first, capabilities; secondly, co-ordination with other players, notably NATO; and thirdly, conflict prevention and conflict response. We do not see institutional change as the prerequisite, but we see a focus on capabilities, co-ordination and conflict prevention as the priorities for discussion and that is our approach.

Q598 Richard Younger-Ross: There is an inconsistency in the document. The opening general provisions of the amended treaty's chapter on Common Foreign and Security Policy states: "The Union's competence in matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence." However, the text of the treaty's ESDP section itself provides the same wording but states that it "will lead to a common defence." There is a conflict between "might lead", which is what you seem to be saying, and the document, which says "will lead".

David Miliband: I am not sure that there is the distinction that you draw. If you look at the ESDP, you will see that it states that "the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common defence policy for the Union. This will lead to common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides." It shall, in that case, recommend it to the member states. That is in section 2, clause 2, article 28 A, so I am not sure that there is the contradiction that you described.

Q599 Richard Younger-Ross: It uses the word "might" in one place and not in the other, but if you go down, the ESDP provides for "permanent structured cooperation between certain nations." Could you describe what that would mean?

David Miliband: That is what we discussed earlier in the session with Mike Gapes when we went through permanent structured co-operation and it was about capabilities. We addressed that earlier when we were talking about solidarity, do you remember?

Q600 Richard Younger-Ross: Just coming back to the issue of "will" or "might", if there is permanent structured co-operation, that implies that there will be a common defence.

David Miliband: No, permanent structured co-operation is about groups of countries coming together to address capabilities issues.

Q601 Chairman: Perhaps we could have a note on that to clarify whether there is a difference of meaning, and we can then pursue a correspondence on that.

David Miliband: That is exactly the issue that we discussed at the beginning of the session.

Q602 Chairman: If there is a vote, is it possible for you to come back for a further 15 minutes, which would give us an opportunity to ask you about Kosovo?

David Miliband: I absolutely have to be gone at 4.45 pm, otherwise I will be late for my next meeting.

Q603 Mr. Purchase: At the moment, we have experience of joint control and operations in military matters through NATO and other co-operations, which have not always been desperately successfully because of problems of leadership and so on. In the future, do you think that matters would be made easier if we had moved more towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the leadership of any armed intervention or action that we may need to take?

David Miliband: I do not think so. The system that works is that on ESDP missions, there is a nation in the lead and it provides the infrastructure. When I was at the NATO meeting last week this issue came up in discussion. There has been no suggestion that that national leadership and national provision of an infrastructure, into which other nations can plug, is a problem.

The issue in Afghanistan is not an ESDP problem. There is a different issue in Afghanistan in that there are 38 countries there, some European and some not. They need better international co-ordination. Double or triple-hatting is being discussed for NATO, the EU and the UN. I do not think that a common European infrastructure is necessary for that. The European problem is not an institutional one, it is to do with capabilities and co-ordination-perhaps partnership would be a better word.

Mr. Purchase: In Europe-

Chairman: Ladies and Gentlemen, we will take 15 minutes for one Division-hopefully there will be only one.

Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

On resuming-

Q604 Chairman: Thank you for coming back, Foreign Secretary. I know that you are very pressed. We will ask mainly about Kosovo. Before we do so, there has been a story today about the situation with regard to the British Council in Russia, which we commented on when we published our report three weeks ago. It has not come as a great surprise to us, but I wondered if you had anything to say about what seems to be a concerted attempt by the Russian Federation Government to damage relations with this country and the British Council's work in Russia?

David Miliband: I know that the Committee takes the work of the Council very seriously and your report rightly highlighted the threats that seemed to be hanging over it. Today, a Foreign Ministry spokesman in Moscow announced that Russia has ordered the closure of British Council offices in St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg from 1 January 2008.

That is a very serious and illegal measure. The 1963 Vienna convention on consular relations and the 1994 UK-Russia agreement on culture confer legal status on the Council's activities throughout Russia. It is a sad fact, but I must point out that there are two countries in which the Council is not allowed to operate: Burma and Iran. I hope that the announcement today from the Russian Government does not signal that Russia is taking steps down that road, because that is deeply unwholesome company to be in. We are in touch with the British Council, and a meeting is taking place in 45 minutes between the Minister for Europe and the British Council about next steps. Our concern is, obviously, for British Council staff, but also for the Council's place as a key institution facilitating dialogue between Britain and Russia, which must be a good thing whatever one's view of different political issues. I have also been talking to European colleagues following the Litvinenko situation, and I shall be talking to them again tomorrow about a European statement on the situation, which I think is deplored throughout the House of Commons.

Q605 Chairman: Thank you very much. We will no doubt get an update from you and your officials in due course.

I turn to another area in which Russia plays a significant role-blocking a UN  Security Council resolution to succeed resolution 1244 regarding Kosovo. You and the Prime Minister have referred to supervised independence, in line with the Ahtisaari plan. Are you confident that there is an adequate legal basis for implementation of the Ahtisaari plan within Security Council resolution 1244 without a new successor resolution?

David Miliband: In short, yes, but as I said in my written ministerial statement yesterday, we want to go to the UN. The last four months of dialogue and mediation have taken place in good faith. We have urged all sides-I have done so personally when meeting them-to engage properly to try to bridge the gap between the sides, but as Ahtisaari found, the troika team have also found it impossible to bridge the gap. We think that it is right to go back to the UN, but we think that there is a full force in resolution 1244-NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that last Friday, so NATO forces will stay there-and I think that it provides a sound legal base for the future.

Q606 Chairman: Would that include the European Union civilian presence there with regard to assistance to the judicial and police authorities? Can that continue without a Security Council resolution?

David Miliband: There is a Security Council resolution-1244. It provides the foundation for the European Security and Defence Policy mission as well as the KFOR mission.

Q607 Chairman: Will that view be shared by all your fellow Foreign Ministers at the discussions tomorrow?

David Miliband: Strikingly large numbers of EU Foreign Ministers have looked carefully at the legal text, and it is much less of an issue between us than before. I do not want to say "all", but a vast majority now accept 1244 as a sound legal basis.

Q608 Chairman: But it is still possible, is it not, that several EU countries will decide for their own domestic or other reasons that they will not support the implementation of an Ahtisaari plan without the Security Council resolution?

David Miliband: There are two issues. One is going along with an Ahtisaari plan, and the second is recognising a newly independent country. Different European countries take different views on those two issues. I am not sure whether any European countries will hold out against the use of 1244 as the basis for European action.

Q609 Chairman: But there will be some that will not recognise an independent Kosovo?

David Miliband: I think that there will be some that do not recognise an independent Kosovo in the first wave; I do not know whether there are countries that will say that they will never do so.

Q610 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary, as we know, the writ of the Kosovo Government does not run in the Serbian northern area of the country. In effect, to recognise Kosovo as an independent state on its present boundaries is basically to endorse a Cyprus-type situation. Do you rule out the possibility of partition as a solution?

David Miliband: Yes. Partition has floated around in discussions during the past two years. It certainly does not have our support, and it has very few supporters elsewhere. People often ask whether an independent Kosovo can make a go of it as a viable country. If that question is asked of Kosovo, it applies in spades to the north of the country around Mitrovica. I do not think that partition offers a way forward. The truth is that the Ahtisaari plan has significant devolved authority for that northern part of Kosovo, rightly, and it is important that the minority rights there are respected, although, as I said in the House yesterday, there are Serb minorities elsewhere in Kosovo and not just in the north.

Q611 Sir John Stanley: What is your present assessment as to what the repercussions would be in Kosovo at the moment, and indeed in Serbia, if there is effectively a unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovan Government?

David Miliband: I think that the best answer is that it depends. If it was unilateral in the sense of being chaotic and unconnected to the international community's response, I think that there would be dangers. If it is carefully done, in a way that recognises and lives by the guarantees that have been made by the Kosovan Government and the Serbian Government to the international authorities with regard to preventing violence, and if it also respects the Ahtisaari plan with regard to minorities, there is a reasonable chance of moving forward, not in a way that everyone would like, but in a way that would preserve the basics of a respect for life and security on all sides.

Q612 Sir John Stanley: Can we take it as read that the British Government and other European Union members make it very clear in Belgrade that the main prize for Serbia is joining the EU and that it should be very careful about taking any steps that will send that process into reverse?

David Miliband: That is a really good point; I totally agree with that. I have met the Serbian Foreign Minister three times, and that is an absolutely key point. It is very good to hear it from you and the more that we can all keep making the point, within our different contexts, that this process is not about punishing Serbia but about finding a sustainable way for Serbia to live in the wider region, with its "European vocation", which the Serbian Foreign Minister often talks about, the better.

Q613 Mr. Purchase: The Serbians, however keen they may be not to mess the nest in regard to getting into Europe, are first and foremost Serbians. I do not believe that they will contemplate anything that takes the Kosovo province away from them. You have met the Serbian Foreign Minister; they believe that that could have been done at the time of the Balkan conflict. We could have imposed that if we had wanted to. They now believe that, legally and properly, Kosovo is part of Serbia. I think that there is absolutely no chance of the Russians ever agreeing to anything that the Serbians do not want. What I seek from you today, Foreign Secretary, is a commitment that Britain will not join again with America and invade, taking part in something that may have nothing to do with us at all, unless there is a clear, concise, agreed mandate from the UN.

David Miliband: We are there now, Ken; 16,000 NATO troops are there now.

Mr. Purchase: I understand that.

David Miliband: Including 155 British troops. And it is good that we are there now, or that the international community is there now, because it is a huge anchor of stability and a huge bulwark against violence. They are there under UN authority.

Q614 Mr. Purchase: But if it is used to enforce the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, that would be an entirely different matter altogether.

David Miliband: The "enforcement" is a separate issue. It is up to individual countries to recognise other countries. It will be for every country to make a decision about whether or not it wants to recognise a putative Kosovan state. I think that resolution 1244 set out a political process that did not circumscribe the outcome. It did not prescribe one outcome or another; it left the outcome open. But it did create a political process.

I do not know if you will agree, but I think that it is important that the UN Secretary-General came to a Contact Group meeting in New York that I chaired in September. He started off by saying that the status quo is unsustainable. That is a very, very important point. It is unsustainable politically, because you have a UN protectorate within a sovereign country; it is unsustainable economically, because no one is investing in Kosovo because they do not know the political status, and it is unsustainable socially, because you have this limbo. You may be right that it is a situation that none of us would have chosen to be in, and certainly no one wanted the tragedies of the 1990s to happen, but we have to deal with the situation as it now.

Q615 Mr. Purchase: I will just say finally, if I may, that I think that the use of forces to prevent the Serbians from controlling and ruling their country would be an absolute disaster.

David Miliband: Just so that we are clear, the mandate of the NATO forces is to prevent violence against people. That is what they are there for. They are there to protect human life.

Mr. Purchase: Yes.

Chairman: It is 4.45 and I am conscious, Foreign Secretary, that you said that you absolutely had to leave at quarter to 5. I know that two of my colleagues indicated that they would like to ask questions, but I am sorry. Thank you, and thank you Ms Morgan, Mr. Berman and Mr. Shearman. No doubt, you will write to us on some other areas if we pursue questions afterwards, but thank you for your time and for answering our questions.

David Miliband: Thank you.