Responsible Russian analysts understand that Britain had to take some kind of action to underline the seriousness of the Litvinenko affair, given that Moscow has refused requests to extradite Lugovoi to stand trial in the UK. However, they were surprised and bewildered by what are seen as hasty actions by the new Labour administration in using what Sir Rodric Braithwaite, a former ambassador to Moscow, called "one of the bluntest instruments of diplomacy" by ordering the expulsion of four Russian diplomats. In their opinion (shared by the present writer) it would have been better for Gordon Brown to consult experts in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and instigate a post-Blair review of relations with Russia, which have steadily deteriorated in the recent period (UK diplomats and organisations in Russia have been subject to pressure recently by "youth groups" such as Nashi, which have reportedly only received a "mild rebuke" from Russian officials), and attempt to open a constructive dialogue with the Putin administration. The Brown team may have judged it better to take action and then, after the initial fuss died down, to initiate a more sober dialogue; Miliband was in fact careful to accentuate common interests between the UK and Russia across a range of issues. With relations currently much worse at the moment than in 1996, the last time Russian diplomats were ordered out of the UK, the expulsion is easily interpreted by Russia's political class as implying that their country is beyond the pale of respectable international society. This impression is reinforced by what Russian analysts (again, with some justification in the view of the present writer) perceive as irresponsible and often poorly informed criticism in large sections of the British media about both Russia's domestic politics and its behaviour on the international stage. Indeed, the media in both countries are tending to link diverse issues—energy disputes, arms control agreements, Moscow's concerns over US plans for missile defences in Europe, Russia's increased budget allocations on defence and relations with neighbouring countries—as evidence of a long-term downturn in Russian-Western relations and even a new "cold war".

  The decision to expel the Russian diplomats was, arguably, flawed in two other important respects. First, there is no clear consensus among Europe's leaders over how to deal with a more assertive Russia and it is not certain that Brown's action has received unequivocal support; the UK is seen by the Putin administration (this was clearly stated in the Foreign Policy Review published in March this year) as one of its most difficult partners in Europe. Second, there is some speculation in Moscow that the expulsion was motivated by the difficulties being experienced by British energy companies in Russia; this is not the case, and major disruption to trade relations is unlikely to happen, but both sides have a lot at stake and it is in nobody's interest to give the impression of politicising trade relations.

  In fact the indications are that Moscow's expected reciprocal response was restrained insofar as key British diplomats were not among those expelled. This is very much in line with the Putin administration's pragmatism in its foreign policy dealings; despite occasionally unfortunate rhetoric, Moscow has hitherto sought to play a responsible international role and strengthen its international standing after the Yeltsin years, and has no interest in spoiling relations over the Litvinenko affair. Responsible Russian commentators agree that the governing elite does need to think hard about controlling the activities of the FSB and some of the rather dubious elements linked with it (assuming from the available evidence that Litvinenko's death was a settling of scores among people linked with the security services), but this is something that the UK has little or no influence over.

  The legal aspects of bringing Lugovoi to trial are complex and are not debated here. However, the mainstream Russian view is that the authorities are justified in refusing to compromise the Russian Constitution by allowing his extradition; and of course the charge that the Russian courts have come under political pressure are being met with accusations of "double standards" and the suspicion of political interference (naturally strongly repudiated by the UK) due to the refusal of British courts to comply with Russian demands to extradite Boris Berezovsky. Berezovsky's extravagant criticism of the current Russian regime, the apparent plot to assassinate him and his subsequent accusations that President Putin was behind it, have complicated this situation even further and may well have a lasting influence on political relations (the suspension of security cooperation between the UK and Russia is already unfortunate). The alternative put forward put forward by Moscow, to stage a trial in Russia, would at least mean that the Lugovoi case would be subject to the judicial process and that some of the evidence would be presented in the public domain; however, the UK's reluctance to do so, probable rightly, anticipates myriad difficulties, including the opportunity for certain elements some to make political capital. (As this commentary was being written, Lugovoi is reported as saying that he will run for the Liberal Democratic Party of the Russian nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in December's parliamentary elections; if elected he may, sources speculate, receive immunity from prosecution in Russian courts.) It may be that the evidence in neither the Litvinenko nor the Berezovsky case—both extremely serious—will ever come to light. The British government thus faces the challenge over the coming period of maintaining pressure on Moscow to cooperate over Litvinenko while isolating the case from and resuming exchanges on other issues of long-term common interest, both bilaterally and in the context of the EU-Russia dialogue.

Dr Derek Averre

16 September 2007