Energy security
18. We
conclude that Russia is dependent on EU energy markets for a considerable
part of its revenue. We further conclude that the diversion of
Russian energy supplies away from EU markets eastwards, including
to China, is not a realistic prospect in the short or medium term.
We recommend that the Government draw on these conclusions to
continue to encourage its EU partners to take a robust and united
approach to dealing with Moscow, in the energy field and beyond.
(Paragraph 162)
19. We conclude that
the prospective shortfall in Russian gas production represents
an urgent energy security concern for the EU, and a greater one
than the risk of Russia disrupting supplies for political reasons.
The intensified competition for Russian gas which appears to be
in prospect between Russian domestic consumers, Russian CIS customers,
and the EU, has the potential to aggravate a number of political
relationships. We welcome the Minister for Europe's apparent awareness
of the urgency of the problem. We recommend that the Government
work to achieve a common understanding of the likely Russian gas
shortfall with both EU partners and Moscow, and that it inform
us in its response to this Report of the steps being taken in
this regard. (Paragraph 170)
20. Given the apparent
detrimental impact of Russian state control on efficiency and
output in the Russian energy sector, we conclude that EU consumers
have a direct interest in liberalisation in the sector and in
Russia remaining open to meaningful foreign participation in the
development of its energy resources. Although large global energy
companies are likely to remain interested in the Russian sector
under almost any conditions, we recommend that the Government
continue to impress on Moscow the mutual benefits that can come
from the existence of transparent and stable conditions for foreign
investment in the Russian energy sector. (Paragraph 176)
21. We welcome signs
on the part of the EU and its Member States of increasing commitment
to energy supply diversification schemes. However, we conclude
that Russia and the EU could come to be direct competitors for
Central Asian energy resources. Under current circumstances, the
EU's aims of achieving supply diversification through independent
access to non-Russian Caspian energy resources may also aggravate
Russia. We recommend that in continuing to pursue supply diversification,
including at the EU level, the Government take full account of
the geopolitical sensitivities involved and seek greater integration
of sectoral and foreign policy considerations. (Paragraph
184)
22. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government inform us of its
initial response to the European Commission's latest proposals
for the energy sector, its assessment of the likelihood of their
acceptance by other EU actors, and its assessment of their likely
impact on EU efforts to win greater Russian compliance with international
regimes governing the energy sector according to liberal and transparent
principles. We further recommend that the Government continue
to impress on its EU partners the way in which bilateral dealings
with Russia in the energy sector can undermine the EU's declared
common interest in encouraging Russian compliance with shared
international energy regimes. We recommend that the Government
therefore continue to encourage its EU partners to act in accordance
with a credible common EU energy policy towards Russia. (Paragraph
196)
23. We conclude that
the FCO is correct to have identified the potential for significant
improvement in energy efficiency in Russia. We support the FCO's
project work in this area, and a strategy of using Russia's interest
in enhancing the efficiency of its energy sector as a means of
further engaging Russia in the wider climate security agenda.
We recommend that the FCO seek opportunities to expand work with
Russia in the energy efficiency field, through both bilateral
and multilateral mechanisms. (Paragraph 201)
24. We commend the
cross-departmental cooperation which is taking place on energy
security matters. We recommend that the Government continue to
foster a cross-departmental approach to energy security and that
it advocate the benefits of this approach to its EU partners and
the EU institutions. (Paragraph 203)
EU-Russia relations
25. We
conclude that the UK is correct to pursue its relations with Russia
both bilaterally and through the EU. Where the EU pursues policies
towards Russia which are in line with UK goals, the UK position
is strengthened. In this context, we commend the Government for
having secured EU Presidency statements in support of the UK position
on the Litvinenko case. However, the EU is too often divided with
respect to Russia, weakening its capacity to engage effectively.
We conclude that there are fundamental difficulties in the EU-Russia
relationship and we are not confident that these can be addressed
effectively until the EU has a common stance towards Russia. We
therefore recommend that the Government make the development of
a united and coherent EU Russia policy an explicit goal of its
work in the EU in 2008. We further recommend that, in its response
to this Report, the Government outline the steps it proposes to
take towards this goal. (Paragraph 223)
26. The imposition
for over a year of trade blockages on two EU Member States by
a third country is unacceptable. We recommend that the Government
impress on the European Commission and Moscow the urgency of resolving
Russia's trade disputes with Poland and Lithuania. Even if Poland
were to lift its veto on negotiations with Russia on a new EU-Russia
agreement, however, we conclude that the launch of such negotiations
in the near future would be probably fruitless and possibly unhelpful.
We recommend that the Government revisit the question of the advisability
of a new EU-Russia agreement as part of its discussions with EU
partners on EU Russia policy, and that it report on initial discussions
in its response to this Report. (Paragraph 236)
27. We conclude that
the Government is correct to support the EU's European Neighbourhood
Policy. We also strongly endorse the FCO's identification of a
need to develop a shared understanding with Russia of the future
of the common neighbourhood, involving the countries concerned
and on the basis of their sovereign choices. However, the evidence
is that this goal remains distant. We recommend that the Government
seek to inject greater strategic awareness into the EU's policies
for the former Soviet space and encourage greater coordination
between the EU's policies for Russia and for other former Soviet
states. (Paragraph 242)
European security issues
28. We
conclude that, whilst in principle we support the concept of "supervised
independence" for Kosovo, we are concerned that the Government
may have underestimated the damage to the authority of the Security
Council, to bilateral relations with Russia, and to the very fragile
democracy in Serbia. (Paragraph 263)
29. We regret that,
eight years after the Kosovo conflict, disagreement over the province
may once again cause the UN to be sidelined. We conclude that
Russia may be adopting an intransigent position now on the Ahtisaari
plan for Kosovo in order to demonstrate its strength. It may also
be using the issue as a way to encourage divisions within the
European Union. However, Moscow would find it much harder to do
so had the plan been accepted by Serbia. We conclude that the
Government underestimated Russia's likely opposition to the Ahtisaari
plan. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
inform us of the steps it is taking to try to win Kosovar Albanian
and Serbian acceptance of a modified version of the Ahtisaari
plan and to prevent a further outbreak of violence taking place.
(Paragraph 264)
30. We conclude that
Russian opposition to US ballistic missile defence (BMD) plans
in Central Europe largely reflects Moscow's sensitivity about
the presence of NATO infrastructure in its former satellite states.
As such, Russian opposition will be hard to overcome. We welcome
signs that the US, Russia and the NATO allies may be engaging
in a more substantive dialogue and search for cooperation on BMD.
As long as it remains committed to the US BMD plans, we recommend
that the Government seek ways to build cooperation around them,
both within NATO and with Russia, so that they do not become a
source of further divisions in Europe. (Paragraph 273)
31. We regret the
manner and timing of the Government's announcement that RAF Menwith
Hill is to participate in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD)
system, and the resulting lack of Parliamentary debate on the
issue. In its response to this Report, we recommend that the Government
inform us of the date on which it received the formal proposal
from the US to include Menwith Hill in the BMD system. We recommend
that there should be a full Parliamentary debate on these proposals.
(Paragraph 275)
32. We are concerned
by Russia's decision to suspend its participation in the Conventional
Forces in Europe Treaty with effect from mid-December 2007. We
recommend that in its response to this Report, the Government
provide us with its assessment of the practical and political
impact of Russia's step. We further recommend that the Government
update us on the steps it is taking to encourage Russia to fulfil
its Istanbul commitments. (Paragraph 285)
33. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government provide us with
its assessment of the likelihood and possible implications of
a renunciation by Russia of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty. (Paragraph 290)
34. We recommend that
in its response to this Report, the Government share with us its
assessment of the likelihood of Moscow retargeting its strategic
missile forces if the US ballistic missile defence deployment
in Europe goes ahead. (Paragraph 295)
35. We welcome the
Government's appreciation of the importance of the NATO-Russia
Council. We conclude that the body has the potential to become
a much more effective forum for ongoing security consultations
between Russia and the West, and we recommend that the Government
work with its partners to exploit its full potential. (Paragraph
298)
36. In the perspective
of the country's NATO membership aspirations, we recommend that
the Government continue to encourage Georgia to resolve its internal
conflicts and to develop more stable relations with Russia. (Paragraph
301)
International security issues
37. We
regard Russia's willingness to export arms to destinations where
they are likely to exacerbate conflict and human rights violations
as unhelpful to international security. We are concerned about
the profound lack of transparency which surrounds Russian arms
sales and which heightens international suspicions of Russia's
behaviour in this field. Given the scale of Russian production
and export, we are of the view that conventional arms control
initiatives supported by the UK cannot be fully effective without
Russian participation. We recommend that the FCO consider ways
in which it could include activities on arms trade transparency
in its programme work in Russia. We further recommend that the
FCO continue to seek to win Russian support for the Arms Trade
Treaty, as a potentially important expression of Russia's desired
status as a respected and responsible international power. We
also recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
update us on progress regarding Russian support for the Arms Trade
Treaty following the 2007 UN General Assembly session. (Paragraph
314)
38. We welcome Russia's
participation so far in international anti-proliferation efforts
regarding North Korea and Iran, and Russia's willingness to be
represented by the EU High Representative in international efforts
to encourage Tehran to abandon uranium enrichment. To maximise
prospects of winning Russian support for the strengthened sanctions
against Iran which it seeks, we recommend that the Government
work to bring closer together the Western and Russian assessments
of the Iranian nuclear threat. We further recommend that the Government
do all it can to encourage Russia to use its leverage over Iran
in the interests of the latter's compliance with its nuclear obligations.
(Paragraph 328)
39. We conclude that
the UK's Global Partnership programme is making a significant
contribution to reducing security risks from WMD materials in
Russia. We welcome Russia's growing financial contribution to
the programme. We recommend that the Government continue to work,
with due regard to legitimate Russian sensitivities, to overcome
the lack of transparency that is impeding further progress in
some areas. We recommend that the Government explore ways of further
enhancing re-employment prospects for Russian nuclear scientists.
We further recommend that, in common with its G8 partners, including
Russia, the Government start to consider options for the post-2012
period that will allow any remaining Global Partnership work in
Russia to continue. (Paragraph 336)
40. Given our position,
stated in our recent Report on the Middle East, that the Government
should consider ways of engaging with moderate elements in Hamas,
we recommend that the Government explore whether Russia's contacts
with Hamas could be a useful channel to pursue. (Paragraph 342)
