The 'global' network of Posts

150. Since our last Report, the FCO has informed us of only one Post closure - that of "a small residual post" in Kingstown, St Vincent & the Grenadines in March 2007.[246] In February 2007 it wrote to us about the relocation of regional Embassy offices in Iraq.[247] We have also been informed about the FCO's decision to give Heads of Mission across its network more flexibility to decide to appoint local staff instead of UK-based staff. Posts will then be able to keep back some of the savings to appoint further local staff or for other uses.[248]

151. The largest change in its network of Posts which the FCO wrote to us about was the decision to reinforce its efforts in Afghanistan. The FCO has created 17 new positions in Kabul, five in Lashkar Garh, and two in Islamabad. It told us that just over half of the paybill cost would be met through "existing plans to draw down staff levels in Iraq" and the remainder from "reassignment of staff working in lower priority areas in London and overseas". The FCO told us that it did not expect to have to close any Posts as a consequence, although it warned "our ability to sustain this increased level of activity on Afghanistan in the long term without considering future post closures will depend on the terms of our eventual CSR settlement.[249]

152. In oral evidence Sir Peter Ricketts told us about further changes the FCO had made in its network:

They have not involved post closures so much as movement of staff away from the classic west European embassies and towards places such as India and China. From memory, we have moved about 25% of staff out of posts in Europe, or working on Europe in the FCO, towards places such as China, which has seen a 10% increase in staff, and India, which has also seen a 10% rise. […] We have increased the size of embassies in countries such as Brazil, which are involved in global issues. […]

The PUS added that this trend of moving staff out of Posts in western Europe would continue, as other Departments were now able to look after their own interests there. Moreover, he believed the trend would "accelerate under the pressure of tight resources and a growing demand for the FCO to engage in a whole range of global issues, such as climate, energy and migration.[250]

153. However, as last year, the FCO's Annual Report once again does not discuss its network of posts at all. The FCO's response to our last Report stated that it did not plan to undertake a zero-based review (ZBR) of its entire global network.[251] It has continued to undertake its ZBR of the Europe network, defined as looking "from first principles at the allocation of resources to the European network".[252] Board minutes from January 2007 and May 2007 show support for implementation of the ZBR programme and encouragement for it to be shared through the Change Committee and through other Directorates as an example of best practice.[253] We asked Sir Peter Ricketts about the failure to discuss the FCO's network of representation. He undertook to include it in next year's Report.[254]

154. We welcome the increases in FCO staff in high priority places, such as Afghanistan, India and China. However, we do not think such redeployments should be decided without consideration of the impact on the FCO's network as a whole. We note the apparent success of the Zero Based Review of the FCO's European network and repeat the recommendation in our previous Report that the FCO should carry out a Zero Based Review of its entire network. We also recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO set out whether the CSR settlement will enable it to sustain higher level activity in Afghanistan in the longer term.

155. Our last Report also recommended that the FCO review its policy towards one-person UK-based diplomatic representation at Posts.[255] In April 2007, the FCO Board considered a paper on Small Posts and the Board agreed that the definition of a Small Post would be reviewed.[256] We asked the FCO about this in correspondence. It told us that the Board had had:

[…] concerns that the then current definition failed to recognise adequately the characteristics of a Small Post and, as a consequence, the current grouping of the really small Posts, and the problems that arise for them. [257]

The Board had also considered whether Consulates General should be included in the definition of Small Posts. The FCO explained:

[…] these Posts tend to have a limited range of tasks (e.g. they generally specialise in consular, entry clearance or commercial work). Thus they do not face the tensions arising from prioritising sometimes competing demands for work on Strategic Priorities, an issue that may affect sovereign Small Posts or those in Overseas Territories. Moreover, subordinate Posts can look to their superintending sovereign Post to handle tasks falling outside their specialist remit, a flexibility not available to sovereign or Overseas Territories Small Posts.[258]

156. We are pleased that the FCO is now reviewing the issues affecting Small Posts and consider that the attention being paid to appropriately defining the characteristics of such a Post should be helpful in reviewing the issues that they face. We will consider some of these issues further in our inquiry into the UK's Overseas Territories.

FCO estate

157. The FCO sends us a quarterly report on assets sold and purchased. Between July and September 2006, the FCO sold four residences in Tel Aviv, Kingstown, Bordeaux and Nassau, with sales proceeds of £1,590,000. In the same period it purchased one office in Palma at a cost of £517,000.[259] In November 2006, the FCO informed us that it had decided to sell the Ambassador's former residence in Lisbon since the cost of its refurbishment would be greater than its market value and because the residence did not meet security requirements.[260] In the last quarter of the financial year 06-07 the FCO sold properties in Vienna and Mbabane, with gross sale proceeds of £1,567,000 and purchased property in Nairobi and Warsaw, to the value of £4,376,000. [261] The FCO has also written to us about the accelerated depreciation of its Basra Office's asset value due to the withdrawal from Basra Palace to Basra Air Station.[262] In April, following our letter to the Foreign Secretary urging a quick resolution to the future of the FCO's accommodation in Mumbai, the FCO decided to purchase office accommodation in a building under construction in the Bandra Kurla area of the city at a cost of £30 million.[263]

158. The FCO Board minutes for May 2007 stated that there were "major (and urgent) requirements in Baghdad, Mumbai and further work in Kabul all driven by security" which meant that there was insufficient capital to fund fully the Estates Programme for 2007/08. As a result, the Board had taken the decision to continue with estates projects to which it was already contractually committed or mid-project, but to put other projects on hold while there was an urgent review of asset sales to provide more capital for the next two financial years.[264] We asked the FCO about the extent of projects it had put on hold for this reason and the expected cost of this delay. It told us that it had had to postpone a new Consulate-General compound in Jeddah, the replacement of an office in Georgetown, the refurbishment of the High Commission in Bridgetown, new offices in Erbil and the refurbishment of buildings at Hanslope Park. The FCO had also decided to look at a sale/leaseback approach in Ottawa, where it had initially planned a traditional office refurbishment. It commented:

Our present estate situation at these locations is manageable, but far from ideal. […] In most cases, the most significant cost of the delay comes in the form of carrying additional risks for an extended period until the new facilities have been completed.[265]

159. We also asked the FCO what the target for capital was in the urgent review of asset sales described in its May Board minutes. It told us that its "first concern" was to meet the agreed Treasury target of £140 million in asset sale receipts between 2004-05 and 2010-2011.[266] The FCO still has £54.4m to be realised in further sales between 1 April 2007 and 31 March 2011 in order to reach this target.[267] It added that it might have to sell some assets if the CSR settlement failed to meet an investment programme of £70-80 million.[268] As we explained in Chapter 2, we are unclear exactly how the capital additions in the CSR settlement will be allocated. The FCO's total estate was valued at £1.2 billion as at 31 March.[269]

160. We asked Sir Peter Ricketts whether there was a danger that the FCO would be forced to make inappropriate asset sales. He replied:

I am very conscious of that risk. I do not want to go there, if it can be avoided. The answer is that we are not looking at sales in desperate urgency, but we have to look at opportunities to sell parts of the estate in order to help provide the money for the higher priorities. We are bidding vigorously to the Treasury for more money next year. It is our programme, and the Treasury is bound to look to us to do some of it by realising some of the capital that we have locked up in estates around the world. We have learned lessons from the past and will aim to do that sensibly in order to ensure that we get proper value. If that takes a bit more time, it will have to take a bit more time.[270]

The action points from the FCO's Board minutes for July 2007 showed that the Security and Estates Directorate was going to work up three or four options for the sale of high value properties.[271]

161. We welcome the FCO's decision to invest in premises in Mumbai. However, we are concerned by the decision to put building projects on hold while there is a major review of asset sales. We reiterate our recommendation in last year's Report that the FCO should base sales solely on the merits of each case rather than on a revenue raising target.

162. In its Report on the FCO's 2003-04 Annual Report, our predecessor Committee concluded that "serious mistakes" had been made in the FCO's handling of the sale of Glencairn, the Ambassador's residence in Dublin, and the purchase of a new residence - Marlay Grange.[272] Glencairn House and estate had comprised 14.2 hectares and was sold for Irish Punt 27 million (£24 million) in 1999.[273] Marlay Grange was purchased for Irish Punt 8 million in 2000 (£6.258 million).[274] An invasive survey was not carried out until after the property was purchased, when the extent of asbestos was revealed. The FCO had ended up deciding to repurchase Glencairn.

163. The National Audit Office also reported its conclusions on this episode and found that the FCO had embarked on the sale of Glencairn "without real knowledge of the likelihood of being able to find the kind of replacement that it wished to purchase" and that its purchase of Marlay Grange "should not have gone ahead unless the owners had first agreed to a full survey".[275]

164. During our inquiry into the FCO's 2005-06 Annual Report, the FCO told us that it still intended to repurchase Glencairn and that it was not marketing Marlay Grange pending completion of the reacquisition of Glencairn.[276] On 23 October 2007, in written answers to parliamentary questions, the FCO confirmed that the Ambassador remained in occupation of Glencairn House "and its immediate curtilage", without paying rent, and that:

[U]nder terms agreed with the purchaser, the agreed portion of the sale price relating to Glencairn House and its immediate grounds of 2.87 hectares (Irish Punt 4 million, £3.5million approximately at today's rate of exchange) will only be payable when the Foreign and Commonwealth Office gives vacant possession. Total fees (legal and agents) relating to the sale amounted to about £170,000.[277]

165. In the written answers the FCO also confirmed that it had incurred the following non -purchase costs related to Marlay Grange:

Up until mid-2004, we had spent £700,000 on works to Marlay Grange, which included asbestos removal, fees and security works. No refurbishment works have been carried out. Since mid-2004 we have incurred security and minor maintenance costs of £507,000.[278]

166. On 30 October 2007, the FCO wrote to us in confidence updating us on its plans for the two residences. We believe this information should be in the public domain. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO give a public update on its latest plans for the Ambassador's residences in Dublin. We also recommend that it explain who was responsible for the failure to carry out an invasive survey of Marlay Grange prior to acquisition.

Defence Attachés

167. The FCO used to contribute about 30% or approximately £10 million a year to the cost of maintaining Defence Attachés/Advisers at Posts.[279] Last year, it decided to withdraw this contribution. The MoD therefore undertook a review of its defence diplomacy network, with the aim of deciding whether to reduce the total number of Attachés or to increase funding to keep their numbers the same.[280] On 17 September 2007, the Ministry of Defence announced that it would be creating a Defence Attaché post in Afghanistan and allocating an additional Attaché to Pakistan. However, Defence Sections would be closing in Albania, Croatia, Guatemala, Ireland, Macedonia, Slovakia and Thailand. In most of these countries Attaché cover would now be provided "from nearby states". Defence Sections in Argentina, Egypt, France, Greece, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Poland, the Russian Federation, Spain and Ukraine would retain cover but be reduced by one.[281]

168. During our evidence session, we asked Sir Peter Ricketts whether the FCO had had any discussions with the MoD about the implications of terminating the funding. He told us that he had talked to his counterpart in the MoD about the decision, but emphasised that the decision was taken by the FCO alone.[282] He justified it as follows:

[…] like all Departments, we are under real pressure from the Treasury to show efficiency savings. We therefore had to look at the totality of our expenditure and make some prioritisation choices. […] We took the view that it was entirely right that the MOD should fund the defence attaché network for defence purposes […][283]

We challenged Sir Peter to tell us whether he believed the Defence Attaché network did not contribute to FCO objectives. He replied:

I believe it serves primary defence objectives, and it is therefore right it should be funded by the MOD. Defence attachés continue to work in close co-operation with FCO-funded parts of our missions abroad, but […] the funds that we had been providing, frankly, were not delivering high-priority outcomes for the FCO.[284]

169. Following our evidence session with him, Sir Peter Ricketts wrote to us, saying that the FCO was still "keen to provide a platform for the Attaché network" through its posts. He explained that the MoD and FCO were cooperating on a new Service Level Agreement between the two Departments that would "ensure that the Attaché network is supported in the same way and on the same financial basis as are staff from other Government Departments located in our overseas posts." Interim arrangements had been agreed for 2008-09, with full charging starting from April 2009. He stressed, "[O]ur aim throughout is to maintain the effectiveness of close FCO/MOD collaboration in the UK and overseas in delivery of the Government's defence and international security policy." [285]

170. Sir Ivor Roberts regretted the FCO's decision. He told us that Defence Attachés had been "invaluable" to him when he was an Ambassador, explaining:

They could pick up intelligence information in areas where I, as a layman in military terms, would never have been able to, and they could go into areas where I, as an identified ambassador, could not go. They could dress down, disappear into the night and pick up information that it was not possible for me to pick up, so I found their role very important in several posts where I went.

He further commented:

Again, it seems a pity that all this happens in the context of one Department trying to save money, as opposed to a holistic approach, asking, "Do we need military intelligence from our attachés?"[286]

171. In its recent Report, Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review, the Quadripartite Committee recommended that the Government should not:

cut defence attaché posts in countries where the export of goods and technology from the UK requires careful consideration to ensure that they meet the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and the National Export Licensing Criteria, and in countries where the UK and other members of the international community are assisting in the destruction of surplus conventional weapons and WMD materials, or where there are concerns about the exporting of such surplus weapons and materials.[287]

172. We are disappointed that there does not appear to have been a joined-up approach to the future of the Defence Attaché network, with the FCO simply taking a unilateral decision to withdraw its contribution to funding in order to reduce demands on its budget. We recommend that the Government reconsider the decision to make cuts to the Defence Attaché network, which is critically important to several Government departments and agencies, in order to ensure that the network has the necessary funding to perform all its roles effectively and efficiently.

Consular services

173. The NAO published a major review of the FCO's consular services in November 2005. The FCO sent the Committee a final update on progress in implementing the NAO's recommendations in March 2007.[288] Initiatives the FCO has introduced in its consular services since the NAO's review include:

- publishing a guide explaining the services that the FCO is and are is not able to provide to British people abroad, Support for British Nationals Abroad: A Guide, which we welcomed in our last Report;[289]

- increasing the number of regional training courses for locally engaged staff from six to eight and introducing obligatory pass/fail pre-posting for all consular officers;[290]

- creating an "Internal Communications Officer" within the Consular Directorate;[291]

- running a programme of regional consular strategy conferences;[292]

- running an award-winning "Know Before You Go" campaign;

- expanding the Consular Review team to include four full-time reviewers and two ad-hoc reviewers and requiring posts to produce implementation plans following a review;[293]

- rolling out updated computer software, Compass (referred to in Chapter 3), to record consular cases;[294]

- creating regional Rapid Deployment Teams in Hong Kong and the US to allow it to respond more quickly to emerging crises in distant locations; [295]

- appointing additional Honorary Consuls (26 in 2006) to provide consular assistance to British nationals in areas where the FCO lacks official representation;[296]

- established a new 24/7 Consular Crisis Centre able to respond to emerging crises;

- establishing a framework document with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, who have responsibility for the aftercare of victims of major incidents, on providing support to British victims of major overseas emergencies.[297]

174. In April 2007 the FCO published a three year strategy setting out its approach to raising the quality, consistency, professionalism and efficiency of consular services.[298] In order to implement this strategy, the FCO is establishing two major change programmes, which will "drive improvements across the consular network and ensure our overseas passport operation meets international requirements for second generation biometrics."[299] We discuss changes to the overseas passport operation in the next section of this Chapter.

175. The Committee visited the FCO's new Consular Crisis Centre on Tuesday 8 May. We were impressed by this new facility. Equipped with 67 workstations, including Firecrest and broadband networks, video and telephone conferencing facilities, television screens and access to key press agency feeds, it has the capacity to respond to two crises at a time.

176. According to the UK's obligations under Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,[300] the FCO's consular staff overseas offer assistance to EU citizens whose own country is not represented. This assistance is offered on a reciprocal basis, with local agreements for which EU mission will help which unrepresented countries' nationals.[301] The European Commission has produced a Green Paper on Diplomatic and Consular Protection of Union Citizens in Third Countries,[302] which was deposited in Parliament on 25 January 2007. The Paper put forward a number of proposals, including improving the information available to EU citizens on consular matters, broadening the entitlement of consular assistance to include non-EU family members of EU citizens, and establishing common consular offices to provide assistance to all EU citizens in third countries. At the meeting of the European Scrutiny Committee on this proposal, the then Minister for Europe described the proposals as "problematic" including because the Government provided consular assistance as a matter of policy rather than an obligation.[303]

177. We asked the FCO what assessment it had made of the impact of providing support to other EU Member States' nationals on the FCO's consular network. It replied:

During 2005-2006, we recorded 120 serious cases in which we provided consular assistance to unrepresented EU citizens. To put this figure in context, the number of serious cases involving British nationals during the same period was over 26,000. Provision of help to EU citizens does not, therefore, currently represent a significant drain on our consular resources. We remain, however, alert to the risk that demand for our services may rise, particularly if the number of EU citizens travelling beyond the EU climbs. We will continue to work with the Council Secretariat, the Commission and EU Partners to monitor the situation, and to find new ways to co-ordinate our consular networks to ensure a fair, effective and efficient means of providing consular assistance in third countries to all EU citizens.[304]

178. We welcome the publication of the consular strategy and the many new initiatives that have been established in consular services since the NAO's review. In particular we were impressed by the new Consular Crisis Centre. However, the FCO must ensure that its planning includes the risk of an increase in demand for support from other EU Member States' nationals. We recommend that in its response to this Report the FCO inform us how it is managing this risk.

OVERSEAS PASSPORT OPERATIONS

179. The FCO's business change programme for passports aims to align passport procedure overseas with that of the Identity and Passport Service (IPS).[305] This will involve British nationals providing finger scans when applying for a passport from 2010 onwards and, for certain first time applicants, authenticating their identity by interview.[306] It will also involve centralised passport printing in the UK.[307] British nationals are now able to apply for a replacement passport through the IPS when visiting the UK.[308]

180. We asked the FCO how far British nationals overseas would have to travel under the new system. In response the FCO said that it would "not be able to match" IPS' UK target of providing offices within 60 minutes of where applicants live "in all places". However, it planned to offer facilities to apply for a passport and give biometrics at all Embassies and Consulates and was also "looking at" alternative methods of collecting biometrics, such as through commercial partners, and introducing remote alternative, such as webcams, for interviews.[309]

181. We also asked how long applicants would have to wait for their new passport to be sent to them. The FCO told us that the arrangements were "still being designed and tested" and that a global target time had yet to be agreed. However, it expected overseas clients to receive a similar service to that being provided by IPS to customers in the UK.[310] Dickie Stagg told us:

For most applicants, it will be a matter of two or three days for them to get a passport back. Of course, it depends hugely on where they are and how close they are to one of our consulates. [311]

182. The FCO Board minutes for June 2007 show that the Board was considering a proposal by Consulate Directorate to merge the passport processing operation with IPS by 2011. The Board endorsed this "direction of travel" but also examined risks, such as the impact on the network, the cost of the transfer and the reputational risk to the FCO. A full business case will be brought to the Board in November 2007.[312]

183. We are concerned that the FCO's change programme for passports may mean British passport applicants overseas have to travel long distances to give biometric data and for interviews. We welcome the consideration the FCO is giving to using commercial partners to collect biometrics and to remote alternatives to interviews. However, we believe the FCO should also have a target for the maximum distance applicants will have to travel and we recommend that it develops such a target. We also recommend that the FCO share with us the business case for merging the overseas passport operation with the Identity and Passport Service, when it is brought to the FCO Board in November 2007.

UKvisas

184. UKvisas has a contract with the Visa Facilitation Service (VFS) to provide a visa application service in India, Nigeria and Russia. On 16 May 2007, the FCO closed VFS's online service worldwide and confirmed that there had been a security breach of the personal details of visa applicants in India.[313]

185. VFS and UKvisas had first been informed of the security problem in India in December 2005 and applicants in Nigeria had reported a similar problem in April 2006. On both occasions, VFS had taken some remedial action.[314] The FCO told us that the view of its legal advisers was that liability for any compensation rested with VFS, not UKvisas.[315]

186. Following the security breach, the then FCO minister, Lord Triesman, announced an independent investigation by Mrs Costelloe Baker, Independent Monitor, UKvisas, into the security breach. Costelloe Baker's report was laid before Parliament on 26 July. It found that "no third party penetration tests were carried out in the development phase of the online system or after it was launched", a failing which it described as "serious and very basic".[316] The report also highlighted other basic security failings within VFS[317] and recommended that the online facility should not be reopened.[318] On UKvisas' responsibility, the report found that UKvisas did not follow best procurement practices in acquiring some of the visa support services,[319] nor react adequately to notifications of the weakness.[320] The report recommend that UKvisas' Board should include a member with responsibility for governance of information assurance.[321]

187. The FCO's response to the report agreed that VFS' online facility should not be reopened. Instead it will be replaced by visa4uk, UKvisas' online application service. The FCO's response also stated that the UKvisas Corporate Services Director would take on the role of Chief Information Officer and that a Technical Design Authority would be established to "ensure the overall coherence and integrity of UKvisas' business processes". UKvisas would also be revising its complaints procedures. It was already undertaking a strategic review of data processing (including by Commercial Partners), in order to strengthen Data Protection Act risk management processes, and would carry out a detailed audit of Commercial Partners' data security procedures and practice in light of the Report.[322]

188. In our South Asia Report we concluded that the outsourcing of visa applications handling had greatly improved the process for visa applicants.[323] We are therefore very concerned to hear that VFS' online facility was not secure. Given the basic weaknesses in VFS' online facility, we agree that it should not be reopened. We are particularly concerned that, according to the findings of Costelloe Baker's independent investigation, UKvisas did not follow best procurement practices nor adequately respond to prior warnings of the security weakness. We welcome the action set out in the FCO's response to the investigation. In particular we conclude that it is vital that UKvisas carry out an audit of all its commercial partners' data security procedures. We recommend that UKvisas share the results of this audit with us.

189. In September 2007, the FCO informed us that "detailed discussions" were now underway on the integration of UKvisas with the Home Office's Border and Immigration Agency.[324] We learnt more about this merger when we visited UKvisas in October 2007. We urge the FCO to keep us informed of UKvisas' progress in making this transition.

Telephone services

190. During the course of our inquiry, we received a memorandum from a British national working in the US complaining about the cost of calling the British Embassy in Washington. The memorandum drew attention to the fact that the calls were handled by an external company, Abtran Ltd.[325]

191. We asked the FCO about the extent of outsourcing of its lines across its network and the average cost of calls to such lines.[326] It told us that most calls at FCO posts were handled by FCO staff at "normal" rates. However, UK visas had signed contracts with CSC Computer Sciences Corporation and VFS Global Ltd for visa applicant lines, with an average cost per call across all countries where the service was already in place of US$6. A "number of posts" had also outsourced phone handling in order "to deal with the large volume passport enquiries". Some of these were local contracts, but the FCO also had one central framework contract for seven posts in Europe and North America with Abtran. The FCO told us the call charges for these calls varied by country, but that "a call made from Spain would cost an average of £3.00, from Germany £3.32, from the US, £5.00, and Canada £8.00".[327]It added that the FCO received no income from the telephone inquiry lines handled by Abtran Ltd in the last 12 months and that the surplus the company made allowed it to run lines at no cost to the FCO.[328]

192. We are concerned by the cost of calls to Posts on outsourced lines managed by Abtran Ltd. While we understand why Posts with high levels of inquiries might wish to outsource phone-handling, we find it unacceptable that British nationals are having to pay as much as an average of £8.00 to call the British Embassy in Canada. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO share with us the process of procurement leading up to the central framework contract with Abtran. In particular we would like to know whether it considered the likely average call charges and whether these charges are limited in the contract.

247   Ev 53 and 63 Back

248   Ev 114 Back

249   Ev 49 Back

250   Ev 103 Back

251   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Eight Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 2005-06: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6791, January 2007, response to recommendation 16 Back

252   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Eight Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 2005-06: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 6791, January 2007, response to recommendation 16 Back

253   Unclassified minutes of FCO Board, 31 January 2007 and 22 May 2007 Back

254   Ev 104 Back

255   Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2005-06, HC 1371, para 90 Back

256   Unclassified minutes of FCO Board, 3 April 2007 Back

257   Ev 114 Back

258   Ev 114 Back

259   Ev 14 Back

260   Ev 5 Back

261   Ev 111 Back

262   Ev 63 Back

263   Ev 54 Back

264   Unclassified minutes of FCO Board, 22 May 2007 Back

265   Ev 114 Back

266   Ev 114 Back

267   Ev 114 Back

268   Ev 114 Back

269   HC Deb, 5 June 2007, col 453W Back

270   Ev 105 Back

271   Unclassified minutes of the FCO Board, 23 July 2007 Back

272   Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2003-04, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2003-04, HC 745, para 92 Back

273   HC Deb, 23 October 2007, col 192W Back

274   HC Deb, 23 October 2007, col 193W Back

275   National Audit Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Resource Accounts 2003-04: Rationalisation of the Glencairn Estate in Dublin, HC ("003-04) 1088 Back

276   Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2004-05, HC 522, Ev 10 Back

277   HC Deb, 23 October 2007, col 192W Back

278   HC Deb, 23 October 2007, col 193W Back

279   Ev 91 [Sir Peter Ricketts] Back

280   Ev 92 [Sir Peter Ricketts] Back

281   HC Deb, 17 September 2007, col 125 WS Back

282   Ev 91-92 Back

283   Ev 91-92 Back

284   Ev 91 Back

285   Ev 109 Back

286   Ev 177 Back

287   Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and Industry Committee, First Joint Report of Session 2006-07, Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review, HC 117, para 312 Back

288   Ev 29 Back

289   Foreign Affairs Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2005-06, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2005-06, HC 1371, para 77 Back

290   Ev 14 Back

291   Ev 14 Back

292   Ev 14 Back

293   Ev 14 Back

294   Ev 14 Back

295   Ev 14 Back

296   Ev 14 Back

297   Ev 6 Back

298   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Delivering Change Together: The Consular Strategy 2007-2010 Back

299   Ev 29 Back

300   This article sets out an obligation of non-discrimination, i.e. it requires EU Member States to treat requests for consular assistance from unrepresented nationals of Member States on the same basis as requests by their own nationals. Back

301   Ev 114 Back

302   European Union Document No. 6192/07 Back

303   European Scrutiny Committee, Sixteenth Report of Session 2006-07, Documents considered by the Committee on 28 March 2007, including: Conservation of the European Eel; Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, HC 41-xvi, para 2.6 Back

304   Ev 114 Back

305   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Departmental Report 2006-07, Cm 7099, May 2007, p 100 Back

306   Ev 109 Back

307   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Delivering Change Together: The Consular Strategy 2007-2010, p 14 Back

308   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Delivering Change Together: The Consular Strategy 2007-2010, p 14 Back

309   Ev 109 Back

310   Ev 109 Back

311   Ev 106 Back

312   Unclassified minutes of the FCO Board, 29 June 2007 Back

313   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation: breach of data security in the VFS online UK visa application facility, operated through VFS websites in India, Nigeria and Russia, 16 July 2007, paras 2- 3 Back

314   Report of The Independent Investigation, paras 4-5 Back

315   Ev 69 Back

316   Report of The Independent Investigation, para 104 Back

317   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation, paras 108 and 114  Back

318   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation, para 158 Back

319   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation, para 116 Back

320   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation, para 179 Back

321   L M Costelloe Baker, Report of The Independent Investigation, para 172 Back

322   Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Foreign & Commonwealth Office response to recommendations contained in the Report of the Independent Investigation: breach of data security in the VFS online UKvisas application facility, operated through VFS websites in India, Nigeria and Russia Back

323   Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2006-07, South Asia, HC 55 Back

324   Ev 118 Back

325   Ev 180 Back

326   Ev 111 Back

327   Ev 114 Back

328   HC Deb, 24 May 2007, col 1476W Back