WEDNESDAY 28 NOVEMBER 2007

DR KIM HOWELLS MP, ANTONY PHILLIPSON AND PAUL ARKWRIGHT

  Q260  Mr. Pope: Israel probably has a nuclear weapon—the Israeli Prime Minister admitted as much about a year ago in an interview, and most observers believe that Israel is in possession of nuclear weapons. In the search for a diplomatic solution to Iran's nuclear ambitions, is it possible that the Israeli weapon could be part of the bargaining process? Could there could be a trade-off if, for example, Israel signed up to the NPT and became much more open and transparent about its own programme?

  Dr. Howells: We have tried on every occasion to get Israel to sign up to the NPT and to do so as a non-nuclear state. We would like Israel to do that. We believe that the whole of that area should be free of weapons of mass destruction. I cannot see the Israelis doing it in the near future, but they must recognise that they have a responsibility too, as part of this great international bargain, to say, "Okay, if we can get some guarantees from countries like Iran, then we are prepared to throw this on to the negotiating table."

  Whenever I have spoken to Israelis they use the threat of an Iranian bomb as a very good reason for not giving up their bomb, and when one talks to Iranians they say exactly the same thing: "Well, why shouldn't we have a bomb? Israel has got a bomb." We press them whenever we can; it is an important issue. Israel should be part of the NPT.

  We have difficulties enough with Pakistan and India and their nuclear weapons in terms of the international treaties. We are not getting very far persuading those two that they should take a more responsible position. The Americans have tried very hard recently with India and we are glad that some progress has been made, but we have a long way to go with both countries.

  Q261  Chairman: What would be the implications of Arab countries in the region getting nuclear weapons if Iran got nuclear weapons?

  Dr. Howells: I will ask Paul to say something about that because this is the world that he inhabits. It is clear to me from discussions that I have had with Ministers and observers from the Gulf region, most of which have been off the record, that there are at least a handful of countries there that are watching Iranian developments very carefully. They feel that if Iran is a year, two or three years away from developing a nuclear bomb, they will look at acquiring similar technology themselves. That is the most worrying thing of all; the issue is not just about an Iranian bomb but about three or four other countries in the area that could easily develop a bomb—well, perhaps not easily develop, but they could either buy one or the technology to develop one. They are not short of saying that; there are some countries there with some very bright people, including nuclear physicists.

  Paul Arkwright: I would just add that one of our prime motivations in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability is the proliferation risk in the region. It is fair to say that it is no coincidence that a number of countries in the region are now expressing an interest in civil nuclear energy if they look at what is happening in Iran. Of course, provided that they abide by their obligations under the NPT, they are fully entitled to civil nuclear energy. That said, there is a clear proliferation risk if a country such as Iran develops the enrichment and reprocessing technology to enable it to reach a nuclear capability. The impact on the region does, therefore, concern us for proliferation reasons.

  Q262  Sandra Osborne: Minister, may I ask you a question on human rights in Iran? The nuclear issue is obviously high on the agenda, as it was when the Committee visited Iran, but meanwhile the human rights situation is abysmal and deteriorating.  Because we were able to go to Iran, we had the opportunity almost at first hand to hear of current human rights abuses. We also had the opportunity to ask questions at a very high level on issues such as women's rights, homosexual rights, capital punishment, corporal punishment and the oppression of religious minorities. We had some very robust discussion about those issues. However, what is your view of the idea that because the nuclear issue is so high on the agenda, we have less ability to positively influence the abuse of human rights in Iran?

  Dr. Howells: I certainly think that we try as hard as we have ever tried to get our views on human rights in Iran across. I recently démarched the Iranian ambassador, for example, over the reports that a man had been stoned to death for adultery in Iran. We did that partly to try to protect the poor woman who was allegedly the other party in this relationship, who had already been in jail for 11 years. They were going to stone her to death as well, and I think that the international community must maintain incredible vigilance. Their treatment of the Baha'is, for example, has been absolutely dreadful, and other religious minorities too. One wonders what national consciousness assumes that the world is not watching what is going on there. It is very disturbing, and we know that the number of people executed, many of then publicly, and many of them very young—18 or 19-year-olds—is increasing this year. More people have been executed this year than last year, and more people ware executed last year than in 2005. I think your description of it is quite right: it is a deteriorating situation, but we must keep plugging away at it and use every opportunity to raise these issues.

  Q263  Sandra Osborne: But has the nuclear issue made it more difficult to do that, do you think that?

  Dr. Howells: No, I have not found that it makes it more difficult. You have met very brave people who stand up for civil liberties and human rights and so on, and there are elements within the Iranian Administration that describe people who make a hue and cry about human rights internally as traitors and spies, and people who seek to undermine Iran's international standing in other ways. That is very regrettable.

  Q264  Chairman: Can I ask you about the domestic situation in Iran? We were told that on the Queen's birthday a few months ago, a mob outside our embassy lobbed rocks over the wall, and there is a level of hostility to the UK that sometimes comes up the agenda. At the same time, our ambassador, Geoffrey Adams, and his colleagues are doing an excellent job, in my opinion, and are certainly trying to get contact with a wide diversity of Iranian society. Given what you have said about the remarks about traitors and the rest of it, how can we best help those modernisers, reformists, and people who are open to the world? Is there not a danger that by being associated with us, we might make their position more difficult, given that context?

  Dr. Howells: The Queen's birthday event in Tehran is a very good example of that. I have heard stories that a lorry suddenly appeared on the scene with lots of rocks in the back, and that people were encouraged, after rent-a-mob arrived, to abuse the guests. Those people had been properly invited. There was no secrecy about it, so yes, I think that your point is a good one. It is a real indictment of a society that allows that to happen—a society that not just frowns on people talking to foreigners but actually punishes them for doing so. Was it Mr. Younger-Ross who said that it reminded of him of stories of the cold war—of countries in the Warsaw bloc that behaved in the same way? I do not think they ever stoned guests going into the Queen's party celebrations. They might have spied on them, but they never stoned them.

  Q265  Chairman: I am conscious of time. We think there will be a vote in five minutes. If there is, will you be able to come back afterwards for a short period, as we will not get through all of our questions otherwise? Hopefully, there will only be one vote.

  Dr. Howells: Yes.

  Q266  Richard Younger-Ross: Just briefly, we were told that ladies turned up with stones in their handbags to throw over the wall at them.

  Dr. Howells: To throw them back at the mob.

  Q267  Richard Younger-Ross: We were also told—perhaps this has something to do with our diplomacy—that those stonings occurred at the British embassy. They do not currently occur at the French embassy, although that might change.

  Dr. Howells: I cannot help you, but Mr. Phillipson might.

  Antony Phillipson: The point that I will make refers back to Mr. Hamilton's earlier question and to Mr. Younger Ross's comment that I might have left an impression that it was an open society. I think I said "relatively open". I was clear that there was an extensive clampdown on political and social freedoms. The bottom line for us is that the Iranian regime—I shall distinguish between the Iranian regime and Iranian society on this point—continues to tell us that it wants an open and frank relationship based on mutual respect. We continue to point out that this is a case where their actions defy their words.

  The Iranian embassy in the UK operates reasonably freely and their ambassador can call on the Minster, not only to demarche, but also to talk about other things. He can meet Cabinet Ministers and move around town freely. Our diplomats cannot do so. Their access is heavily restricted and mobs sit outside our embassy, which is not a coincidence. They do not do so simply because they choose to demonstrate against us. That is carefully controlled and calibrated and meant to send a message to us. The point that we have to keep making to them is that, if that is the message they want to send us, we will draw our own conclusions.

  Q268  Mr. Keetch: This follows on from my earlier question, so as to get a grip on this. You are going to write to us about the Austrian deal. It would also be useful to have a note on suggestions in America that US troops have definitely been killed with Iranian weapons. The Committee would be very interested to know if that is the case with British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. There was also a suggestion in September that we were moving troops up to the Iranian border to try to block the trafficking of weapons. Can you tell us about that operation? Is it still going on and has it been successful? As Ms Stuart said, we have heard some suggestion that the flow of weapons in recent months has declined.

    Dr. Howells: I cannot help you about the movement of troops, because I do not know about that. On my last visit to Helmand I heard it described that we do not really know what is going on in Nimruz province, which is a vast province in the extreme south-west of Afghanistan, simply because we have no one there. It is a wild and woolly place. When I went to Pakistan, I went to Quetta and managed to get as far as the southern Afghan border—the border with Kandahar province. That has got to be one of the most porous borders in the world and is very difficult to police. By the way, I thought the Pakistanis were trying very hard to police it and were pretty well equipped. The great problem was that there were no equipped border guards or police on the Afghan side of the border. It has a very poorly equipped force.

  Therefore, there is no question that weapons can move easily around that area, and there is no shortage of them. The surprise for me is that the Iranian authorities would do deals with the Taliban. I am sure there is an element of believing that my enemy's enemy is my friend. However, one group are extreme Sunnis and the other are pretty fundamental Shi'as, and they see the military threat in Afghanistan as a threat to them, and so are prepared to sup with the devil in that instance.

  Q269  Mr. Keetch: But what about the modern technology and enhanced projectiles? It is not just the Kalashnikovs that we all know are everywhere, but the more modern, armour-piercing technology that has been seen recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The suggestion is that that is coming from Iran. It has certainly been suggested in the US that that is the case and they believe it has been directly involved in the killing of US troops. If that is directly involved in the killing of British troops, that is something that the whole country would be very keen to know about.

  Dr. Howells: We will certainly send you what material we have got on that. As Antony has reminded me, we have occasionally raised that with Iran. We have handed over photographs of convoys that we intercepted coming across the border, and we can certainly send those photographs to the Committee.

  Chairman: Can we move onto some questions about Afghanistan and drugs?

  Q270  Mr. Illsley: President Karzai has said that the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan has never been as friendly as it is today. Do you agree with that?

  Dr. Howells: Well, yes—

  Mr. Illsley: It says here.

  Dr. Howells: It says here.

  The Iranians are a real enigma, in many ways. I went to a conference in Kabul. It was the regional economic co-operation conference, the first major international conference that the Afghans ever organised. The Iranians were among the sharpest contributors to that conference and had the best ideas. They have a real feel for Afghanistan, especially for the western provinces such as Herat. They know the area and are well aware of the great deficiencies in the Afghan infrastructure. They had good ideas about how they could contribute, along with the rest of the international community, to the reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan. Therefore, I can see why President Karzai would say that.

  The best way to characterise Iranian foreign policy is to say that they are playing all ends against the middle, because we know that they are funding the Northern Alliance, which has been reborn as the National Front. They also have links to the Taliban, so it is difficult to see how it is a simple relationship. It is anything but simple.

  Chairman: Can I stop you there? We will adjourn, hopefully for only 15 minutes. If there are two Divisions, it will be 30 minutes. However, we shall come back and conclude our session.

  Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.

  On resuming—

    Chairman: Minister, I thank you and your colleagues for coming back. Mr. Illsley was in the process of getting an answer to a question. Do you wish to add anything?

  Q271  Mr. Illsley: Yes please.

  Minister, you have used quite complimentary terms about Iran's knowledge of Afghanistan. Last year you said that Iran was very actively involved in the fight against drug trafficking. There are huge problems—I think that you said that 60% of the heroin that affects our country comes through Iran. How difficult is it to think about closer relationships with Iran in terms of drug trafficking under the shadow of the nuclear issue and, to some extent, the human rights issues? How difficult is it to get a closer relationship with Iran on those issues, and do we indeed want one, given the problems with Iran's human rights record about which we are lobbied daily?

  Dr. Howells: Yes, I think that that relationship has become more difficult because of the generally frostier relationship on a more formal political level. We are still working with the Iranians on Afghanistan's western border, which is their eastern border. It is still one of the most dangerous places on the face of the earth. We know that Iran has lost a lot of frontier personnel there. As I tried to describe to the Committee, these are well-armed drugs convoys. They are clever at what they do, completely ruthless, and a key part of the route across western Europe.

  There is another element to this in that they also have a big drug problem of their own. It depends on whose figures you look at, but certainly the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention thinks that there are about 3 million people there who are either addicted to, or regular users of, opiates, opium-based substances and heroin. That is a very serious problem, and we would like to work more closely with them on that. However, that is becoming more difficult, and in a way it becomes doubly difficult, because one understands how useful technology such as night-vision glasses would be to them. We could not possibly supply them with such things, given that they are dual-use materials that could be used for military purposes. It is a shame because that lower level of activity hurts their people and others.

  Q272  Mr. Illsley: Just one final question. The last time I asked you this about 18 months ago, you would not justify it with a response, but there has been a press article in the last couple of months suggesting, yet again, that we ought to buy the crop in Afghanistan. Are the Government taking that any more seriously? Is there anything behind that story?

  Dr. Howells: No. I have not detected anything to change our minds on that. The main proponent of that argument, the Senlis Council, has concentrated much more—wisely, I think—on the general problem of corruption in Afghanistan. Drugs are only part of the reason why there is huge corruption. Institutionalised corruption is more corrosive than people realise and it is probably—certainly in some instances—the reason why ordinary people have no faith in some of their provincial governors. They recognise that these are corrupt individuals who are, ostensibly at least, part of the remit of the Kabul Government, and yet those people appear to be taking advantage of their position simply for their own ends. I welcome the new emphasis that the Senlis Council has taken on the matter. It is a wise move.

  Q273  Sir John Stanley: When we were in Tehran we came in for some mild stick at three separate meetings about the failure of British counter-narcotics policy in Afghanistan, coupled with the sad, explosive increase in the poppy crop since our invasion—it may not have been entirely coincidental that that happened on three separate occasions.

  When we came to the meeting with the gentleman who was described as the "acting head of drugs HQ"—Dr. Jahani—he made what appeared to be a constructive proposal that this was an area in which there could be sensible bilateral co-operation between Britain and Iran. In particular it was about us helping them with the requisite equipment which they need to try to interdict heroin coming through their country which, as you rightly pointed out, is the main transit route into Europe and the UK. They referred to radar and scanning equipment. I entirely take your point about the problems of dual-use equipment, but is this an area in which you think that, within the existing sanctions regime, it is possible to establish a genuine, bilateral, constructive and productive co-operation between Britain and Iran to try to do some serious interdiction of the heroin that goes through Iran, and probably ends up in our own country?

  Dr. Howells: Yes, I do. I think that it is somewhere where we can work very closely together, and I hope that we will. Since 2004, we have provided £1 million in assistance to help Iran to build its counter-narcotics capacity and we have played a pretty active role in co-ordinating regional co-operation, because it is not just us, of course—other countries in that area have also been very concerned about it. The vast majority of the funding has been channelled through the UN ODCCP and it has been used mainly to fund border control projects and to increase investigative capacity, but you are quite right that we now have a lot of experience in interdiction and we have been quite successful in some of our border control projects, where we have managed to arrest people. The great problem is, what happens to those people who have been arrested? If the judicial system is not up to it in a particular country, or if there is corruption—there is certainly a lot of corruption in Iran, especially on the wild eastern borders—very often people's freedom is bought and they are released from prison and so on, and they just go back on to the drugs trail.

  There is a huge amount that we could be doing with the Iranians, and we want to work with them on this. Dr. Jahani might have spoken about some of the X-ray machines, for example those that can look at containers in the backs of lorries and give at least some idea about what is in there. I am sure that we would really like to share that technology with everyone to help them, because in the end it is helping ourselves. This stuff is coming on to the streets of Britain and the rest of Europe in the same way as it is getting on to the streets in Tehran. It is one of those times when we think that it is worth really working at this bilateral relationship that we have got with the Iranians. We think that between us we could be doing very valuable work, so I am glad to hear that Dr. Jahani has said that to you because it gives us a bit of hope that it could be one of those avenues that we could open up as a confidence-building measure between our two countries.

  Q274  Sir John Stanley: Could you possibly follow that up with a note to the Committee on the specific items of equipment that they are seeking from us, and whether any or all of those items of equipment can be supplied by us within the existing sanctions regime?

  Dr. Howells: I will certainly try to find out for you. The other big question is cost, of course. We work with some countries who pay for this stuff as well; we have got expertise and we are good manufacturers of that equipment. I do not know what the costs of such a project would be, let us say at the main crossing points between Afghanistan and Iran, and, by the way, between Iran and countries to its north-west.

  The other thing to say is that I am not sure that anyone knows what the drugs situation was like in Afghanistan before our soldiers got down there. When I went to Lashkar Gar, which is now a huge military base but was then a little sort of Beau Geste fort down in Helmand province, and I spoke to Colonel Hogberg, who commanded 100 marines who were holding that fort, it was quite obvious to me within five minutes that that was what they were doing—they were holding the fort. I do not think that they knew what was going on in Helmand province and I do not think that anybody else knew. I doubt whether anybody knew about the drug production down there either. So I simply do not believe these stories that somehow it is vastly different now from how it was in the past. Probably the difference is that there is a lot of income down there for the narco-traffickers, and that they know that the security situation is so bad that they are prepared to take advantage of that and plant very large fields full of opium poppy. I have seen them myself and flown over them in helicopters. There are no houses anywhere near them, and land that is actually owned by the Government is being exploited by these big shots in Helmand province. If there is a difference in the situation, that is what the difference is. I think that they are very clever people, and if they know that there is better governance in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, they will move their production somewhere else. I have no doubt that if we draw them out of Helmand, they would move it into Uzbekistan or into Pakistan again. These are absolutely ruthless and very clever businessmen.

  Q275  Chairman: We have one more area that we would like to touch on before we finish.

  When we went to Iran, we were struck by the number of times that the Iranians raised the issue of what they called the MKO terrorist organisation to an extent level that almost became an obsession. It was on their programme, they wanted us to talk about it and they raised it in lots of contexts. I would be interested to hear your assessment of that. Why is it so important to the Iranians? The MKO is on our Government's list of proscribed terrorist organisations, as well as those of some others. Are there any circumstances or conditions under which it could be removed from that list?

  Dr. Howells: I must be very careful in what I say.

  Q276  Chairman: We have taken legal advice, which is why I can ask the question.

  Dr. Howells: Let me be very careful. The judgment in the appeal by supporters of the MEK against the decision not to de-proscribe the MEK will be handed down on 30 November. It would be a contempt of court to comment on the judgment before it is public. However, we will study it closely and consider the implications for the MEK's proscription and EU listing. As proscription or de-proscription will depend upon that judgment, we will be able to take a view when that has been published on 30 November. I cannot say anything beyond that I am afraid.

  Q277  Chairman: The sub judice rule does not apply to proceedings on this matter in the House. We have taken advice on that. Reference to the issues or the case may be made by us, which is why we are asking questions about it. Is there anything that you would like to say on the wider issue, if not specifically on the judgment?

  Dr. Howells: No. I cannot say that I have ever spoken to the Iranians about the MEK—alias PMOI, or any other name. It is an organisation that I know very little about, except when my friend Mr. Mackinlay informed me many years ago that it was holed up in a place called Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

  Q278  Chairman: We met a number of individuals who claimed to have been in Camp Ashraf before returning to Iran, so we heard one side of that issue. Clearly there is another side of it that other people, including some who have sent us written memorandums, will give us information on for our inquiry.

  Dr. Howells: The decision is going to be made public very soon—Friday, I think.

  Q279  Chairman: After the decision, if you could send us some further considered response in writing, that would be helpful.

  Dr. Howells: I think that you need to speak to the Home Secretary. I think it will be her baby then.

  Chairman: Perhaps you can draw it to her attention.

  Thank you Dr. Howells, Mr. Phillipson and Mr. Arkwright. That concludes our sitting.