Written evidence submitted by the signatories
of "Time to Talk: The Case for Diplomatic Solutions on Iran"
SUMMARY
1. The prospect of a nuclear Iran causes
acute concern not only in the United States and Israel, but also
in Europe and most of the rest of the world. Diplomacy must continue
to be pursued resolutely in order to find a far-sighted and durable
solution. The consequences of any possible future military action
could be wholly counterproductive as well as highly dangerous.
2. The ramifications of military action
are grounds for deep anxiety. The consequences could be devastating
not only for millions of Iranians, many of whom do not share the
hard-line views of their current government, but also for the
prospects of peace in the Middle East; for hopes of stability
finally taking root in Iraq; for people living in developing country
economies, who could be disproportionately affected by the likely
increase in oil prices; for the already strained ecosystem in
the Persian Gulf; and for the UK, US and European economies.
3. Diplomatic options have not been exhausted;
several important obstacles to an agreement remain in place. The
time available should be used to explore these options, methodically
and meticulously.
What form would any possible military action take?
4. The principal aim of military action
against Iran would be to destroy or, at a minimum, substantially
set back its alleged nuclear weapons programme. It is likely that
this would be attempted through air strikes; US commitments in
Iraq and Afghanistan, together with Israel's experience in southern
Lebanon, mean that there is no serious public consideration of
a ground offensive. Potential targets for US or Israeli air strikes
include not only Iranian nuclear facilities and missile delivery
systems but also more general defence infrastructure, especially
air defence systems, in order to paralyse Iran's capacity to defend
against attack and to mount counterattacks. Some have also suggested
that the US military would deliberately target scientific and
technical personnel, who may take longer to "replace"
than physical infrastructure.
5. It is more likely that initial strikes
would concentrate on actual and suspected nuclear facilities involved
in uranium production and enrichment and plutonium separation
research. However, due to the amorphous nature of Iranian nuclear
facilities, their dispersal across the country and their subterranean
design, it is unlikely that the US could achieve its aim of significantly
setting back Iran's nuclear programme through one targeted strike.
6. Some US generals have also warned that
Iranian retaliation to a single air strike could draw the US into
a longer conflict.1 For example, Iran could send Revolutionary
Guards into Iraq to attack coalition forces. The notion of a limited
and quick engagement with Iran is likely to prove as illusory
there as it has in Afghanistan and Iraq.2
Negative consequences of military action
7. A US- or Israeli-led attack on Iran would
likely unleash a series of negative consequences. These might
include:
a. Strengthened Iranian nuclear ambitions;
b. Even greater instability in the Middle
East and broader region, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan;
c. Inflammation of the "war on terror";
d. Exacerbated energy insecurity and global
economic hardship;
e. Damage to developed and developing economies;
f. Environmental degradation; and
Impact on Iran's nuclear programme
8. Iranian planners have studied Israel's
attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and have dispersed nuclear
sites around the country3 and sited many in or near densely populated
cities. Many sites are well hidden, some buried deep underground;
it is believed that the Natanz plant has over 18 meters of concrete
and soil above its roof.4
9. Senior military figures at the Pentagon
are reported to oppose military action at this time and to have
warned that a bombing campaign against Iran would not be successful
in destroying Iran's nuclear programme.5 It is widely agreed that
covert facilities and key personnel could survive air strikes.6
10. A military strike against Iran would
probably engender a new determination within Iran to develop a
nuclear "deterrent", thereby undermining its intended
purpose. In Tehran, a diversity of views concerning an Iranian
nuclear weapon exists at present. A nationalistic and defensive
response to military strikes could silence opposition to nuclear
weapons7 and shore up support for the regime.
11. If Iran did choose (following air strikes)
to pursue a nuclear weapon capability, it is expected that this
renewed effort would be concealed from the international community
and IAEA inspectors. In late April 2006, Iran warned that it would
stop cooperation with the UN and hide its nuclear programme in
the event of a US attack.8 In September 2006, the Iranian Parliament's
Foreign Policy and National Security Committee put forward a bill
to block access to IAEA inspectors if sanctions were imposed.9
Most analysts believe that Iran is genuine in its threat to withdraw
from the NPT in the event of an attack.10 This would remove the
international community's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear programme,
and the knock-on effects could be considerable: the treaty would
be further weakened, potentially leading to increased nuclear
proliferation in the region.
Effects on Middle East stability
12. Beyond the probable impact on Iran's
nuclear programme, grave repercussions may be expected for the
Middle East in the event of military action in Iran. Over the
past five years, Iran's status as a regional power has increased.11
Long-standing Iranian links to Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia groups in Iraq, along with the presence
of significant minority Shia populations in Saudi Arabia and other
countries, could lead to severe destabilisation throughout the
Middle East. From an economic perspective, Iran is a lynchpin
for global energy security. An attack on Iran, a primary producer
of oil with influence over the Straits of Hormuz, could lead to
a further global increase in oil prices.
Impact on Iraq
13. A military attack on Iran by the US
or Israel is likely to provoke a strong Iranian response in Iraq,
threatening US, UK and other coalition forces and further jeopardising
hopes of stability. Iran has a keen interest in the outcome of
the Iraq conflict, due to both its own history of war with its
neighbour during the 1980s and its cultural links and sympathies
with the majority Shia living there. Many Iraqis and Americans
believe Iran's links to Iraqi Shia pose a grave threat to stability
in Iraq. Iran is already thought to have several thousand intelligence
agents operating in the Shia region of Iraq, and despite initially
refraining from overtly manipulating the Iraqi Shia, Iran has
widely and increasingly been accused of arming and inciting Shia
insurgents.12 A decision to activate insurgent units could lead
to an escalation in ethnic violence and push Iraq further down
the road to bloody civil war.13
14. In mid-April 2006, Iranian Revolutionary
Guard General Yahyah Rahim Safavi warned of attacks against US
troops in Iraq in the event of conflict with the US,14 and analysts
have warned that Iranian Revolutionary Guards could move across
the border to launch direct attacks on coalition forces.15 Anticipation
of such a move could motivate US bombing raids on Revolutionary
Guard facilities close to the Iran/Iraq border, extending the
sphere of military action. In the words of one Pentagon advisor,
"If [the US attacks Iran], the southern half of Iraq will
light up like a candle."16
15. The majority of Britain's troops are
stationed in this southern region of Iraq.17 One senior US military
official has warned that British troops, especially those stationed
in Basra, could come under overwhelming attack in the event of
a US/Iranian conflict.18 The UK could then be drawn into a land-based
confrontation with Iran that could result in major losses.
Further potential responses
16. As well as fuelling insurgency activity
in Iraq, Iran could threaten to use its influence in other areas
of the wider Middle East, including key sites for oil production
and transportation.
17. Israel/Palestine: Iran has threatened
direct attacks on Israel in the event of a military attack on
Iranian territory,19 which it could effect using ballistic missiles,
conventional weapons and asymmetric capabilities.20 It is possible
that Iran could exert influence over Hamas to catalyse conflict
in the West Bank and Gaza, undermining attempts, for example by
the UK government, to reinvigorate the Middle East peace process.
18. Afghanistan: Iran has links with the
Northern Alliance and Shia groups in Afghanistan, and Iranian
officials have threatened retaliation against US forces in Afghanistan
should the US attack Iran.21 Not only could NATO forces (including
British troops) become targets, but NATO's overall mission in
Afghanistan could lose important allies and become bogged down
by increased resistance.
19. Lebanon: In the event of a military
attack on Iran, it is expected that Hezbollah could open a second
front, mounting sustained attacks on Israel. Though the recent
war in Lebanon may have temporarily weakened Hezbollah's offensive
capacity, Hezbollah's stature and confidence appear to have increased
dramatically.
20. With the potential for the eruption
or escalation of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Israel
and the West Bank and Gaza, the threat US or Israeli military
attacks on Iran pose to broader Middle East stability cannot be
overemphasised. From the perspective of the UK government, could
cripple attempts to find a solution to conflict in the Middle
East and undermine EU efforts to become a broker for stability
in the region.
Military action may lead to more terror attacks
in the West
21. The West often accuses Iran of being
a state sponsor of terrorism. Prominent figures such as former
US Defense Secretary William Perry have warned that military action
in Iran could lead to a backlash of "Tehran-sponsored terror
attacks."22 In June 2006, UK intelligence agencies also warned
that Iran could launch attacks on British targets if there was
an escalation of tensions between the two countries.23
22. Although Iran has an uneasy relationship
with the al-Qaida movement, there is no doubt that another Western
attack on an Islamic nation would intensify anti-Western and anti-American
feeling, and groups like al-Qaida could capitalise on this sentiment.24
The 2006 conflict in Lebanon generated support for Hezbollah from
both Shia and Sunni communities. Similarly, some might perceive
any military attack against Iran as an attack on the Islamic world.
Though it is impossible to predict where terrorist attacks may
occur, involvement in—or support for—military action
against Iran might push a country higher up the list of potential
targets. It could certainly have a huge impact on inter-community
relations throughout the West.
Economic impacts of military action
23. Perhaps one of the least discussed consequences
of a US/Iranian conflict is the potential economic impact, particularly
on developing countries.
24. Iran is the world's fourth largest oil
exporter and holds 10% of the world's proven oil reserves.25 Whilst
it is unlikely that Iran would completely close exports of oil,
since 80-90% of its export earnings come from oil,26 threats to
production could have a dramatic impact on the sensitive oil market.27
25. Over the summer months of 2006 the price
of oil rose to an unprecedented $77 a barrel, largely as a result
of tensions caused by the Iranian diplomatic crisis.28 In the
event of a military attack on Iran, tensions could spill into
the oil market, and some analysts predict a steep rise in the
price of oil.29 The government of Saudi Arabia has warned that
the price of oil could triple.30
26. Gulf States: Analysts agree that Iran
could incite paramilitaries in Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to sabotage oil export facilities,
creating instability and impacting oil prices.31
27. The Straits of Hormuz: Forty percent
of the world's shipments of oil—over 21 million barrels
a day—pass through this 30-mile-wide strait.32 If the Iranians
could threaten shipping passing through the straits, through effective
mining operations or the use of missiles and torpedoes, this could
impact drastically on the world economy. The US Navy has pledged
to keep the straits open in any scenario,33 but this might be
more complicated than defending against conventional naval attacks,
as was seen in 1988 during the Iran/Iraq war when many Western
navies were involved in its defence. The US administration believes
that Iran has over 700 small landing sites along its Persian Gulf
coastline from which it could apparently launch waves of attacks
on oil shipments and US naval ships.34 There is also a possible
threat of short-range missiles being launched from Iranian islands
in the Persian Gulf (Abu Musa, the two Tunbs or Larak). Even if
the US could ensure continuous transportation of oil through the
straits, the threat of attack could have a significant impact
on oil prices.35
Impact on developing countries' GDPs
28. The impact of this rise in oil price
could be felt most by developing countries, especially those in
sub-Saharan Africa. Increases in the price of oil cause increases
in interest rates, thus globally increasing debt repayments, which
is particularly problematic for heavily indebted countries. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) has shown that non-oil-producing
developing countries are particularly hard hit by high oil prices
because they are more reliant on imported oil and use oil less
efficiently.36 According to the IEA, non-oil-producing developing
countries use twice as much oil per unit of economic output as
do Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
member countries.37
29. The IEA has calculated the direct impact
of a $10 oil price increase on developing nations' GDPs. It has
shown that in the year following a $10 oil price hike, the GDPs
of:
— Asian countries drop on average by
0.8%.
— Highly indebted countries drop on
average by 1.6%.
— Sub-Saharan states drop on average
by 3%.
30. As a general rule, countries with the
lowest GDPs spend the lowest proportion of their spending on health.
So there would be a risk that a 3% fall in GDP might even result
in deeper cuts in health spending at a time when globally 1,400
mothers die every day in childbirth.
Increased oil prices could also affect Europe
31. EU economies would undoubtedly also
suffer from increased oil prices and might even be pushed into
economic recession, as happened in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
The inflationary effect of a rise in oil prices could precipitate
a rise in interest rates, denting consumer confidence and reducing
consumption and, therefore, GDPs.
32. Iran also holds the world's second largest
reserves of natural gas. A rise in gas prices could compound the
threat of recession in Europe.
Impact on the environment
33. The environmental consequences of war
are often ignored. Warfare affects many aspects of the environment,
most importantly land use, water supply, air quality and the balance
of ecosystems, with knock-on effects for human populations. Ordinarily,
environmental damage is caused by bombardments, waste from toxic
munitions and inappropriate land use. Three main environmental
risks can be identified with regard to military action in Iran:
— Radioactive contamination.
— Contamination from oil slicks.
34. A US or Israeli attack on Iran could
lead to severe radioactive contamination caused by the bombing
of nuclear establishments. A military strike against the nuclear
reactor at Bushehr once it is operational would have such severe
consequences for the whole Persian Gulf that they are hard to
contemplate.
35. Iran suffered significant environmental
damage during the Iran/Iraq war, which exacerbated the already
stressed ecosystem in the Persian Gulf. During the Iran/Iraq war,
one oil spill at Nowruz created an oil slick 1,000 kilometres
(over 600 miles) long, extending the entire length of the Gulf.
That one spill released three times the amount of oil as the Exxon
Valdez accident.38 In August 2006, the Israeli bombing of the
Jiyyeh power station in Lebanon, south of Beirut, caused an estimated
10,000-15,000 tonnes of fuel oil to pour into the Mediterranean
Sea.39 It is possible that attacks on Iranian oil facilities or
on vessels passing through the Straits of Hormuz could cause similar
spillages.
36. Oil well fires started by aerial bombardments
or sabotage could also have serious long-term consequences for
the region. In 1991, during the first Gulf War, retreating Iraqi
forces set fire to 736 Kuwaiti oil wells.40 The oil wells burned
for over nine months and the resulting smoke blocked out much
of the light of the sun, causing the average air temperature in
the region to fall by 10°C.41 Oil, soot, sulphur and acid
rain descended as far as 1,900 kilometres (1,200 miles) away,
vegetation and animals were poisoned, water was contaminated and
affected populations suffered respiratory problems.42 The burning
oil fields released almost half a billion tons of carbon dioxide,
the principal greenhouse gas.43
37. Though it is impossible to draw a direct
analogy between the 1991 Gulf War and an attack on Iran, those
experiences do illustrate the potential extent of environmental
damage should oil spills occur. During the Gulf War, oil spills
resulted in the contamination of over 10 million cubic metres
of soil. A major groundwater aquifer and two-fifths of Kuwait's
entire freshwater reserve are still polluted today.44 The World
Resources Institute reported that over four million barrels of
crude oil were poured into the Persian Gulf, turning beaches black,
wiping out more than 25,000 birds and driving millions more away.45
Over 1,500 kilometres (930 miles) of coastline were affected.46
38. With agriculture supplying nearly one-fifth
of Iran's GDP and employing nearly a quarter of the population,47
damage to crops and land could be devastating. The poisoning of
water supplies could also have a significant impact on a country
that already suffers major water shortages.
Impact on civilians
39. Discussions regarding the humanitarian
consequences of military action often concentrate on the immediate
casualties that occur during an attack. Collateral Damage Estimation
(CDE) is now an integral part of military planning. Terms such
as "surgical strike" and "precision-guided munitions"
give the impression that a highly targeted campaign can hit specific
targets and spare the local population. However, over 7,000 civilians
died in the 2003 "Shock and Awe" air campaign against
Iraq, despite the use of precision-guided bombs in nearly two-thirds
of strikes.48
40. Given the proximity of Iran's nuclear
facilities to populated areas, it is unlikely that collateral
damage would be limited to staff and visitors at the facilities.
And if, as anticipated, military support facilities are targeted
to minimise the prospects of Iranian retaliation, the number of
civilian deaths is likely to increase, as many factories and munitions
storage sites are located in urban environments.
41. As discussed previously, a military
strike against the nuclear reactor at Bushehr once it is operational
could have drastic acute and long-term health impacts. While the
range and severity would depend on the containment structure of
the reactor, the method of attack and how long the reactor had
been active, any radiation leak would have a chronic and debilitating
impact on the health of civilians. If, as is more probable, a
strike occurred before the reactor was completed, Russian engineers
and technicians could be at risk, with obvious diplomatic implications.
Alternative Solutions
42. The route to a solution starts with
identifying what each party ultimately hopes to achieve. Despite
the US administration's rejection of the term, a resolution to
the current standoff could well take the form of a "Grand
Bargain," with elements of the June package further developed
through unconditional talks. This would involve addressing a range
of security, economic and energy-related questions, as part of
a process of normalisation in US-Iranian relations. Given the
clear indication that military strikes would be counterproductive
and highly damaging to US interests, the US may conclude that
its objective of regime reform in Iran could be better achieved
by puncturing Ahmadinejad's demonisation of the US through engagement.
43. The UK should operate on two tracks:
supporting EU initiatives and working with the US administration,
advocating relinquishing preconditions and entering into direct
negotiations with Iran. Flexibility, aimed at closing off the
easier routes to developing nuclear weapons while ensuring remaining
sensitive activities (such as limited enrichment) are closely
scrutinized through rigorous inspections, could open up more palatable
options for engagement in the future. Efforts to achieve these
goals could be assisted by the explicit identification of those
technologies that present the greatest threats of proliferation
and an agreement on this analysis.
44. Iran's negotiators will most likely
seek more detailed and specific security guarantees. Engaging
with Iran on broader regional security issues could potentially
be favourable. More than economic incentives, security cooperation
has the potential not only to undermine Iranian ambitions for
a nuclear weapon programme, but also to provide an opportunity
to discuss Iranian support for radical groups in Iraq, Lebanon
and Palestine and perhaps to achieve concessions there as well.
Recent events in Lebanon and its growing influence in Iraq and
Afghanistan have raised Iran's status, and the Iranian leadership
is looking for some acknowledgement of this.
45. The diplomatic track is clearly fraught
with difficulties. But as long as fundamental obstacles remain
in place—such as preconditions concerning the suspension
of Iran's enrichment activities—the potential of diplomacy
cannot fully be tapped. Diplomatic strategies are most likely
to progress if the UK government and other key parties agree:
— To either remove preconditions for
negotiations or find a compromise that allows both the US and
Iran to move forward without having to concede on their respective
red lines.
— To seek direct negotiations between
Iran and the US on the nuclear file and related issues.
— To prioritise proposals and demands
by assessing the security risks associated with the different
technologies being developed by Iran (ie enrichment and reprocessing)
and to agree to this assessment within the UN Security Council—Iran's
plans to use reprocessing technology should be addressed promptly.
— To develop the proposals offered
by the P5+1 on 6 June 2006 in return for tighter inspections and
a commitment from Iran to abandon all ambitions towards reprocessing
(as offered by the Iranians in 2005).
— To explicitly address mutual security
guarantees for the US, Israel and Iran.
46. The UK has played an important role
in fostering a climate of pragmatism. It is recommended that the
UK government continue to give full backing to diplomatic discussions
whilst directly addressing the need for full and direct negotiations
between Iran and the US administration on the nuclear file and
related issues. The time available should be used to build confidence
on both sides, and the UK has a crucial role to play in supporting
that process. UK support can hasten the stepping up of robust
negotiations and, in doing so, increase the likelihood that the
US administration will engage directly with Iran, thereby ensuring
delivery of any negotiated agreement and ultimately avoiding the
potentially devastating consequences of military action.
BACKGROUND
47. The signatories of "Time to Talk"
came together in March 2007 to build political support for those
pushing for a diplomatic solution on Iran. Members of the coalition
share concern over the possible consequences of military action.
The coalition includes organisations with expertise on Iran and
the regional context —such as Oxford Research Group, Foreign
Policy Centre, Oxfam and Medact—as well as additional UK
groups who added their support to help build political pressure
in opposition to possible military action.
SIGNATORIES:
Foreign Policy Centre
Medact
Oxfam
Oxford Research Group
Amicus
Amos Trust
British Muslim Forum
Christian Solidarity Worldwide
GMB
IPPNW
Muslim Council of Britain
Ockenden International
Pax Christi
PCS
People & Planet
The Muslim Parliament
Unison
REFERENCES
1. S Hersh (2006b) "Last Stand: The military's
problem with the President's Iran policy," The New Yorker
10 July 2006 www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060710fa_fact
2. M Chossudovsky (2006) "Nuclear War against
Iran," Global Research 3 January 2006
www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=%20CH20060103&articleId=1714
3. S Brom (2005) "Is the Begin Doctrine
Still a Viable Option for Israel?," in Sokolski and Clawson
Eds (2005) p146
4. "Medical Consequences of a Nuclear Attack
on Iran," Physicians for Social Responsibility Factsheet
May 2006
5. Hersh (2006b)
6. Sokolski and Clawson Eds (2005) p2
7. The Stanley Foundation (2005) "Realistic
Solutions for Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis," Policy
Analysis Brief No. 1 1 January 2005 www.stanleyfdn.org/reports/GS105pab.pdf
8. "Iran threatens to end UN contacts,"
BBC News 25 April 2006 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle—east/4941438.stm
9. "Iranian parliamentary committee approves
blocking nuclear inspections if sanctions applied," International
Herald Tribune 5 September 2006
www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/06/africa/ME_GEN_Iran_Nuclear.php
10. eg Sokolski and Clawson Eds (2005) p2 and
Rogers (2006) pp9-10
11. R Lowe and C Spencer Eds (2006) "Iran,
Its Neighbours and the Regional Crises," Chatham House www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/mep/Iran0806.pdf
12. H Mulholland (2006) "Blair accuses Iran
of arming Middle East insurgents," The Guardian 18
July 2006 politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,,1823358,00.html
13. Rogers (2006) p10
14. "Iran issues stark military warning
to United States," AFP, 14 April 2006 www.afp.com/english/news/stories/060414191647.gkbeufd2.html
15. Rogers (2006) p10
16. Hersh (2006a)
17. "Gunmen open fire in Iraq market `rampage,'"
The Guardian 17 July 2006 www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1822387,00.html
and M Townsend and N Temko (2006) "Extra troops head for
volatile region," The Observer 9 July 2006 observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1816335,00.html
18. Hersh (2006a)
19. "Iran's Revolutionary Guards threaten
to attack Israel," Iran Focus 2 May 2006 www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=7020
20. Chossudovsky (2006)
21. Spiegel (2005) "It's Time to Get Serious
with Iran," Spiegel Interview with Iran expert Kenneth Pollack
22 September 2005 service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,376022,00.html
22. "Perry warns against military action
against Iran," IranMania 25 May 2006 www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=43198&NewsKind=Current%20Affairs
23. "Ministers warned of terrorism threat
from Iran," The Guardian 29 June 2006 www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,,1808836,00.html
24. Rogers (2006) p11
25. T Doggett (2006) "US Says World Could
Handle the Loss of Iran Oil," Reuters 23 May 2006 www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1821394&C=america
26. S Ambrogi (2006) "US Navy Pledges To
Safeguard Hormuz Strait," Reuters 3 July 2006 www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1926024&C=navwar
27. Rogers (2006) p10
28. www.oilnergy.com/1obrent.htm
29. "Iran fears could make oil top $100,"
This is Money 31 August 2006 www.thisismoney.co.uk/investing-and-markets/article.html?in_article_id=412243&in_page_id=3
30. "Iran war "could triple oil price,"
BBC News 21 June 2006 news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/5101444.stm
31. Rogers (2006)
32. "Energy independence or emergence of
US oil imperialism?" Aljazeera Magazine 1 June 2006
www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/conspiracy_theory/fullstory.asp?id=317
33. Ambrogi (2006)
34. Hersh (2006b)
35. Rogers (2006) p10
36. "Analysis of the Impact of High Oil
Prices on the Global Economy," International Energy Agency
Economic Analysis Division (2004)
37. Ibid
38. Mendocino Environmental Center (2004) "The
Environmental Consequences of the Gulf War," www.mecgrassroots.org/NEWSL/ISS08/08.03gulf.html
39. B Whitaker (2006) "Reconstruction alone
estimated at $7 billion in Lebanon," The Guardian
16 August 2006 www.guardian.co.uk/syria/story/0,,1851197,00.html
40. Environment Media Services (2002) "Environmental
Impacts of War," 7 October 2002 Error! Hyperlink reference
not valid.know/read.php?itemid=2624
41. D McLaren and I Willmore (2003) "The
environmental damage of war in Iraq," The Observer
19 January 2003 observer.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/1,12239,878001,00.html
42. A Kirby "Gulf environment faces worse
threats," BBC News 14 March 2003 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/2840995.stm
43. E Pianin "Environmental Damages a Concern—Experts
Fear Effects of War on Persian Gulf Region Could Be `Irreversible,'"
The Washington Post 20 March 2003 Error! Hyperlink reference
not valid.www.cpeo.org/lists/military/2003/msg00297.html
44. McLaren and Willmore (2003)
45. Pianin (2003)
46. McLaren and Willmore (2003)
47. www.countriesquest.com/middle_east/iran/economy/agriculture.htm
48. Human Rights Watch (2003) "Off Target:
The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq,"
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203/index.htm
| 
