DR. JAVIER SOLANA

8 JANUARY 2008

  Q616  Chairman: Dr. Solana, we greatly appreciate your help here today. You will know that later this month the British Parliament will consider the terms of the treaty in some detail. Our duty as the Foreign Affairs Committee is to produce a coherent report, with as much detail as possible, to inform our colleagues in Parliament. We understand that there may be certain things that you would prefer not to appear in our report. Your staff can clarify with mine what you are happy with and make any changes that you feel are necessary to protect the process. Can you give us a short commentary on the major points in the treaty that we should be considering? As you know, it has caused considerable debate already in the UK, and it would be most helpful if you could highlight the points that you feel are positive in terms of how we could improve operations—historic compromises usually involve some negativity. We are anxious to report to our Parliament as fully and openly as possible.

  Dr. Solana: Thank you. I shall try my best to be helpful.

    Let me say at the outset that I will make my comments through the prism of my personal experience, so I may not be entirely objective, because one has one's own biography, but I will try to be as frank as I can. I have often worked with you without any problem, and my relations with your Committee have been frank and constructive. That is what I did when I was with NATO, and I hope to repeat it here.

    To cut a long story short, what happened with the Lisbon agreement and the revised treaty will help the European Union and therefore its member states, and I think it will help your country in the right direction. In today's globalised world, in which it is very difficult for one single country to have the weight and influence that were possible in the past, what we have done in the period running up to Lisbon is beneficial. I say this having lived through the period after Amsterdam, leading to Nice, and the period after Nice.

    What are the most important things? The European Union now has a single market, moving in many directions, but it would be interesting to have more transparency and coherence in what we can call an enlarged foreign and security policy. That will be done—that is my feeling and the way in which I have been working, under the principle that all these policies will continue to be intergovernmental: decisions will be taken by consensus, by unanimity, in both foreign policy and security policy. I have no doubt about that, and that is the understanding on which I shall work until the end of my mandate.

    The steps that have been taken will be constructive, positive and beneficial: that is my honest thinking, following a period in which some ideas, suggestions and decisions have been taken and will be implemented, if ratified, after Lisbon. They will make life easier, more efficient, more coherent and more transparent for the EU member states in this field.

    Two or three things have to be underlined. First, we are embarking on a period when the rotation of faces and personalities in the European Union vis-a"-vis third countries, foreign policy and so on will be done in a much more effective, coherent and transparent manner. ***

    Secondly, there is the beginning of the creation of what we may call an external service. I want to emphasise that that will not mean more bureaucracy—we will build on what exists already in the Commission—and that following the treaty the High Representative will be the same name with a different function. The ideas behind that are more coherence and, in particular, more efficiency. That can also be applied to the embryo European foreign service, which will have functions that are now with the Council and will have a component that comes from the member states.

    In the field of security there is, first, the enhanced co-operation that is valid throughout the European Union—that is nothing new—and secondly, the structured co-operation. Those who wish can participate in the enhanced co-operation; on the structured co-operation, it is not enough to wish—it is necessary to have a commitment to go beyond. I emphasise from the outset that this structured co-operation will be taken by unanimity by the members that want to go there, and it would be inconceivable without the United Kingdom, which is at the core of our security and defence capabilities. Structured co-operation will increase the defence capabilities and efficiency of the European Union, so your presence or absence will be a yes or no—it will not happen without you, ***. That is very clear to me.

    For your country, defence has been one of your basic red lines, and I think you have achieved that. In fact, probably the most important thing, aside from the declarations, is the origin of the change. What we had before came through the convention process, but now there are two treaties that have been amended and modified. That is important conceptually for you. The distribution of pillars—in particular the second pillar and the autonomy within that—is maintained, so foreign policy and the security parts will remain under the control of the Council, and all the decisions will be taken by unanimity. Nothing will change in that.

    My experience has been evolving from the moment of my arrival until today, and I can see changes, but really not so much fundamental change. The changes will not be in the field of legitimacy but in that of efficiency—delivery. Throughout this period I have been frustrated by the difficulty in delivering and the rhythm with which the European Union delivers. Whatever we can do to make delivery quicker and more efficient in foreign policy—with human development, help in crisis management and all that—will be very welcome and very good for us all collectively and individually as member states.

    ***

    What has been agreed in Lisbon, and what I hope will be ratified, will be much more in that direction: more efficiency and more coherence. In today's world there are issues that we cannot tackle efficiently, with sufficient weight and influence, on an individual basis, while collectively we can really make the difference sometimes. Coherence, efficiency and good use of money are what we all want at the end of the day, because we have to serve our citizens.

    That is my initial statement, and I will be happy to answer any questions that you want to put to me.

  Q617  Chairman: Thank you for that. You have neatly illustrated that the current division between the community and the foreign and security policies is problematic in certain circumstances. Do you think that institutional change will be the most effective way of overcoming those difficulties and enhancing the EU's performance as an international actor? Within that scenario, how would you describe the interests of member states?

  Dr. Solana: I have no doubt that the institutional changes are in the right direction for the objective that you have underlined: to be more efficient, reasonable and rational in the use of our resources—and we do have resources collectively and institutionally, which have to be used in a more co-ordinated way and, which is my obsession, in a way that is more results-oriented. Obviously, nothing is a hundred per cent., but the decisions go a significant distance in the right direction. We will have to see how they are implemented, but I do not foresee the need for any further changes any time soon: these will be sufficient not only for my lifetime but beyond it. It will have to be done properly and in a reasonable way: I do not believe in big bangs but in evolution. We will have to see how everything evolves and steer things in the right direction as they move along.

    From my point of view, all the changes that have taken place are moving in the right direction and are accommodating the way in which the world is changing, ***.

  Q618  Chairman: That is extremely helpful. In the context of these proposed institutional changes, we have the semi-circus term, "double-hatting"—we hope that it will not prove as comical as its name. We wonder about the effectiveness of this double-hatting or multiple role. How do you expect the new High Representative to balance his Commission and his common foreign and security policy responsibilities?

  Dr. Solana: Let us look at what we have today and what we will have tomorrow. Today we have a High Representative who helps to define, implement and explain foreign policy, but then there is a component—the Commission—with some important resources, and the two are linked in a very loose way. In the future, the High Representative will be responsible to the Council, but the policies defined in that way will also be used to define the manner in which the resources are used. If that is done properly—and there is no reason why it should not be—we will have taken an important step in the right direction to define both the political interests and the resources, in the areas of trade, humanitarian aid and so on.

    In theory, that is the case today, but in practice it may not be so natural. Tomorrow, as I see it, if people are reasonable and intelligent, as I am sure they will be, that will be done in a much more coherent fashion, less bureaucratically and more efficiently. That is not a dream—it is possible to do it, and I think it will be done.

  Q619  Mr. Horam: May I follow up the point about double-hatting—the rather curious title that we have for the role of the new High Representative? Do you believe that one human being can cope with all this? Is it really doable, or will there be a problem of overload? You know from your personal experience over the past five years how difficult the job is with one hat; surely it would be even more difficult with two. If there is a problem of overload, how do you deal with it?

  Dr. Solana: It is true that the job is not easy today, but one of the reasons for that is the internal organisation and the division of hats. Simplifying political decision making and putting all the resources into the objective that has been defined politically will make it easier. Today it is a little more difficult, because the autonomy of the two decisions, if I can call it that, sometimes creates problems and even contradictions. With the new treaty, the relationship will be simpler. The Council will take a decision and somebody will be there to apply it, and it will be easier to use the resources properly.

    The structures will also have to be changed, but that is a question not of the treaty but of administration. Obviously, one person cannot travel to everywhere at the same time, but you will know that very well from your own administrative structure in your Foreign Office, where you have two or three deputies, or whatever. That structure exists already, and it is a question of putting the people in the right place. We have those figures in the institution, and if they are put together, it will be much easier to distribute the load of political travelling, visiting, handling resources and so on. This is not an impossible job if you organise it properly. If it is done properly—I repeat that there is no reason why it should not be—there is an effective link between politically defined priorities and the use of the resources.

    At present, the priorities in the use of resources are sometimes so fixed that when a crisis comes it is very difficult to adapt the structure and deploy them rapidly. We will have much greater fluidity under the new arrangements. A tremendous amount of time is spent solving these internal problems. ***